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SUMMARY OF THE THESIS
The title of this thesis is: The Customary Law of Intestate Succession. The African
customary law relating to intestate succession has always been known to discriminate
against women. The thesis therefore focuses on the customary law of intestate
succession in the countries of South Africa, Ghana and Swaziland and the inroads they
have made in improving the rights of women in this discriminatory field of African
customary law. 
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the topic of the
research. It highlights the organisation of the intended research which comprises: a
statement of the problem, the legal framework, research methodology and a summary
of the chapter. Chapter 2 defines the general terms and concepts used in the
customary law of intestate succession. This facilitates an understanding of the general
principles comprising the body of law known as the customary law of intestate
succession and lays the foundation for the country specific issues that are investigated
in the following chapters. Chapter 3 discusses the recognition, application and
development of the customary law of intestate succession in the country of South
Africa. Chapter 4 considers the rules and laws of the customary law of intestate
succession in the West African country of Ghana. Chapter 5 explains the current rules
and laws of the customary law of intestate succession prevailing in the Kingdom of
Swaziland.
Finally, chapter 6 brings the thesis to a meaningful end, by criticizing the approaches
adopted by the countries of South Africa, Ghana and Swaziland in improving the rights
of women as far as the customary law of intestate succession is concerned. The
chapter also presents various recommendations for improving the rights of women in
this discriminatory field of the law.




ACHPR African Charter on Human and People’s Rights
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women
CDC Constitution Drafting Committee (Swaziland)
Contralesa Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
CRC Constitutional Review Commission (Swaziland)
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
SALRC South African Law Reform Commission
TRC Tinkhundla Review Commission (Swaziland)
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
WLSA Women and the Law Southern Africa
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES AND FRAMEWORK
OF THE STUDY
1.1 Introduction
In all Western systems of law, succession or inheritance (terms which is often used
interchangeably) forms part of private law and is concerned with the principles which
determine the distribution of a deceased’s estate after his or her death.  In customary1
law, however, the terms “succession” and “inheritance” are ascribed distinctive
meanings. The mere division of a deceased’s assets among his or her heirs would be
regarded as inheritance in African customary law.  Inheritance can either take place2
according to the provisions of a will, ie, testate inheritance – or “in accordance with the
rules of the common law where no will exists, ie, intestate inheritance”.  Succession on3
the other hand, is mainly concerned with succeeding to the “status of the deceased”,4
ie, assuming the role of the deceased or taking his position and obtaining authority over
the people and property over which the deceased exercised authority.  The customary5
law of succession therefore outlines the principles to be followed at the death of a
deceased (ie, usually the family head).
1.1.1 Problem statement
Amongst all tribes in Africa, succession to status in African customary law is based on
Rautenbach C, Du Plessis W  and Venter AM “Law of succession and inheritance” in Bekker JC,1
Rautenbach C and Goolam NMI Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa (2006) 93.
Rautenbach C, Mojela K, du Plessis W  and Vorster LP “Law of succession and inheritance” in Bekker2
JC, Labuschange JMT and Vorster LP Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa Part 1 Customary
Law (2002) 109.
Ibid. 3
Maithufi IP “The effect of the 1996 Constitution on the customary law of succession and marriage in4
South Africa: Some observations” (1998) De Jure 288.
Bekker JC Seymour’s customary law in southern Africa (1989) 70.5
1
the principle of primogeniture.  According to that principle, the eldest or oldest son is6
the only person eligible to succeed the deceased.  This means that women and7
younger siblings are excluded from succeeding to important positions of status purely
on the basis of their gender or birth.  This is not the case in Western law, as all persons8
are entitled to inherit the property of a deceased person irrespective of their gender or
birth. The fact that women and younger children are still discriminated against in this
day and age on the basis of an age old customary practice can no longer be tolerated.
This is especially relevant in the context of the fact that it has become a current trend
in most African states to adopt Constitutions which guarantee numerous fundamental
and human rights, including such rights as the rights to culture and equality. 
To this end, this study therefore generally considers the impact of the customary law
of intestate succession on the rights of women in tribal communities in the countries of
South Africa, Ghana and Swaziland. The basic objectives of the study are to: (a)
determine the elements of both the customary and common laws of intestate
succession applicable in each of the countries mentioned above; (b) to determine the
role of the courts and other institutions in resolving disputes related to succession but
more importantly; the ability of courts to initiate change to the existing rules of
customary law affecting intestate succession; (c) an evaluation of the impact of the
provisions of the Constitutions of each of the afore-mentioned countries on the
customary law of intestate succession; and (d) an assessment of whether the laws
currently in place are able to effectively eradicate discrimination in this contentious field
of the law. 
1.1.2 Demarcation of the field of investigation and the reasons
therefore
Succession is a complex field of study and may lend itself to numerous spheres of
Kerr AJ The customary law of immovable property and of succession (1990) 99. See also Sonti v Sonti6
1929 NAC (C&O) 23 at 24.
Olivier NJJ, Bekker JC, Olivier NJJ (jnr) and Olivier W H Indigenous law (1995)148.7
Bekker JC and De Kock PD “Adaptation of the customary law of succession to changing needs” (1992)8
Comparative International Law Journal of South Africa 368-369.
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research. This study is however confined to the customary law of intestate succession
in the countries of South Africa, Ghana and the kingdom of Swaziland. The countries
of South Africa, Ghana and Swaziland were chosen for this study because: 
(a) all three countries were formally under British rule and administration, where the
recognition and application of African customary law was virtually disregarded;
(b) English law had an impact on the legal development of all three countries, albeit
that Roman-Dutch law is the dominant “western” law in Swaziland and South
Africa;
(c) deep legal pluralism prevails in all; i.e. in all three countries, a multiplicity of
legal systems are recognised and observed.9
(d) all three countries have relatively new Constitutions granting a wide variety of
rights and the researcher wanted to investigate the interplay between rights at
customary law (which are traditionally group orientated) and constitutional rights
(which are individualistic by nature); and
(e) South Africa has made numerous changes to its laws relating to intestate
succession, Swaziland is one of the last remaining monarchies in Africa, and
Ghana’s succession laws are so dissimilar to both South Africa and Swaziland
that the researcher regarded it as an interesting comparator. Ghana has also
enacted or drafted in depth legislation pertaining to the customary law of
intestate succession.
South Africa’s population is diverse and consists of a number of tribal groupings
including for example, the Zulus, Xhosa’s, the Ndebele, the Tswana and the Venda.10
Ghana’s population is also heterogeneous and also consists of numerous tribal
communities including the Akan (who comprise most of the population of Ghana), the
Ashantis, Fantis, Gas, Ewes, Ga-Dangmes and Gonjas to name but a few.  However,11
unlike South Africa and Ghana, the kingdom of Swaziland lacks any tribal
For a discussion of deep legal pluralism see Van Niekerk GJ “Legal pluralism” in Bekker JC,9
Rautenbach C and Goolam NMI in Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa (2006) 6.
See generally Van W armelo NJ “The classification of cultural groups” in Hammond-Tooke W D The10
bantu-speaking peoples of southern Africa (1974) 56-84.
Bankas EK “Problems of intestate succession and the conflict of laws in Ghana” (1992) International11
Lawyer 438.
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differentiation. It is important to mention that in the course and scope of this study, the
customary law of intestate succession will be explored in general terms in the countries
under consideration and without any particular reference to any singular tribe or tribes
as that would fall outside the capacity of the study and would be too extensive for the
purposes of this study. 
1.2 The legal framework
This study is conducted from a purely legal perspective. Before embarking on an
investigation into the topic, it would be most valuable to firstly consider the sources of
law in the countries under consideration in this study and secondly to define customary
law and place it in the context of the South African, Ghanaian and Swazi legal systems.
1.2.1 Sources of law
The anthology of legal rules and principles governing the customary law of intestate
succession can be found in the sources of law.  Sources of law refer to where the law12
derives from and where it can be located.  In South Africa, the sources of law13
comprise the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108) of 1996 (which is
the supreme law of the land),  legislation (ie, all laws enacted by an organ of state14
vested with the powers to do so), common law (ie, all law which is not statutory law and
which is not customary law falls into this category), case law (which is derived from the
judgments of courts, as courts are permitted to interpret, apply and hence make law)
and customary law (which will be defined further below).
In Ghana, the sources of law include: the Constitution  (which is also the supreme law15
of the land);  enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established16
by the Constitution (or legislation); any Orders, Rules, Regulations made by any person
Squelch JM Private education in South Africa: The legal status and management of private schools12
(Unpublished LLD thesis Unisa) (1997) 7.
Ibid.13
See section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.14
The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992.15
See article 1(2).16
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or authority under a power conferred by the Constitution (or subsidiary or subordinate
legislation); the existing law or the written and unwritten laws of Ghana that existed
immediately before the coming into force of the 1992 Constitution; and the common law
(or the English common law), English doctrines of equity, and the rules of customary
law (which will be defined further below).17
The law of Swaziland is derived from a number of sources including: the Constitution18
(which is the supreme law of the land);  legislation; common law; judicial precedent (or19
case law); customary law (which will be defined further below); authoritative texts; and
decrees.20
1.2.2 What is customary law?
In South Africa, customary law may be defined as: “the customs and usages
traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which
form part of the culture of those peoples”.  The application of customary law in South21
Africa is sanctioned by section 211(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, (Act 108) of 1996 which provides that: “the courts must apply customary law
when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that
specifically deals with customary law”. Section 211(3) of the Constitution therefore has
the effect of raising customary law to the same status as the common law;  this was22
not the case in the past as customary law was often viewed as inferior to the common
law and was always disregarded or ignored as a source of South African law. 
In Ghana, customary law refers to “the rules of law which by custom are applicable to
particular communities”.  This means that customary law “is now a question of law to23
Article 11 of the Constitution. See also Globalex at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Ghana1 .htm17
2-3 (accessed 10/02/2012).
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act 101 of 2005.18
See section 2(1).19
Globalex at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Swaziland/htm 2 (accessed 09/02/2012).20
Section 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.21
Bennett TW  “The conflict of laws” in Bekker JC, Rautenbach C and Goolam NMI Introduction to legal22
pluralism in South Africa (2006) 17.
Article 11(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992.23
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be determined by the courts”.  According to sections 42 and 43 of the Ghana24
Chieftaincy Act 370 of 1971,  the National House of Chiefs and/or a Regional House25
of Chiefs, are empowered to draft their own pronouncements of customary law for
endorsement and promulgation as possible legislation by the President after
consultation with the Chief Justice.  26
In the kingdom of Swaziland, customary law may be described as: 
… the indigenous system of customary jurisprudence existing amongst the Swazi. It
embraces all customary rules of conduct, whatever their source, which are recognised
at the present time and can be enforced by them.27
The application of customary law in Swaziland finds its approval in section 252(2) of the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland  which provides that: “the principles of Swazi28
law and custom are recognized and adopted and shall be applied and enforced as part
of the law of Swaziland.29
1.2.3 The general characteristics of customary law 
1.2.3.1 The unwritten nature of customary law
 
Originally, customary law was largely unwritten.  Proceedings in the tribal courts (like30
the chiefs and headman’s courts)  were conducted orally and the law was also31
transmitted verbally from one age group to the next.  As a result thereof, the larger32
community possessed a basic knowledge of the law. The unwritten nature of the law
Globalex at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Ghana1.htm 8 (accessed 10/02/2012).24
As amended by the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Decree, 1973 (NCRD 166), the Chieftaincy25
(Amendment) (no 2) Decree, 1973 (NCRD 226), the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Law, 1982 (PNDCL 25)
and the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Law, 1993 (PNDCL 307).
Ibid.26
W omen and Law in Southern Africa Research and Educational Trust Inheritance in Swaziland: Law27
and practice (1994) 21.  
Act 101 of 2005.28
See Globalex at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Swaziland/htm 5 (accessed 09/02/2012). 29
Van Niekerk GJ The interaction of indigenous law and western law in South Africa: A historical and30
comparative perspective (Unpublished LLD thesis Unisa) (1995) 37.
See Bekker (1989) op cit 15-30.31
Id 14-30.32
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also manifested itself in both Ghanaian customary law and Swazi law and custom.  33
1.2.3.2 The customary nature of customary law
Customary law is often based on the customs of indigenous African people. The term
“custom” refers to the traditions, practices, moral or ethical codes and the rules for living
that are adhered to by members of the community.  The customs of an indigenous34
community are well known by every member of the community as they are passed
down from generation to generation by older members of the group; usually the older
men.  The customs of an indigenous community are generally adhered to for fear of35
ancestral punishment  and to maintain social order. Customs commonly transform into36
customary law over time and especially when they are endorsed by the group’s belief
in its “indispensability and desirability”,  and “through recognition of the judicial37
decisions of the authority”.  Therefore, the terms custom and customary law, although38
distinct, are interrelated. 
1.2.3.3 Customary law as an expression of community values
Because the community participates in the process of adjudication, this has resulted in
the law giving expression to the established values or the universal ethical code of
conduct of the community. This means that as the values in the community change over
time, so does the law.  Amongst the Swazi, variances between legal and moral values39
are unknown, and hence the evolutionary nature of Swazi customary law is
demonstrated. This rule seems to be applicable to all tribal communities. The main
focus of customary law is to initiate reconciliation between people and to guarantee the
preservation of group harmony.  African customary law, unlike Western law, is also40
Marwick BA The Swazi (1966) 280.33
See generally Gluckman M Order and rebellion in tribal Africa (1963) 198.34
See Bekker (1989) op cit 11 and Marwick op cit 280.35
Pospisil LJ Anthropology of law: A comparative theory (1971) 169-170.36
Pospisil LJ The ethnology of law (1978) 63-64.37
Pospisil (1971) op cit 345.38
Anspach P The indigenous rights of personality with particular reference to the Swazi in the Kingdom39
of Swaziland (Unpublished LLD thesis Unisa) (2004) 71.
Ibid.40
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group or community orientated in the sense that rights and duties are shared  and are41
not individually based, and land or property is owned communally. 
1.2.3.4 The role of magico-religious conceptions in African
customary law
Many African communities believe in the existence of the supernatural and their outlook
on the subject may differ from tribe to tribe. In this study the researcher will limit her
analysis to a description of only two of the most popular forms of supernatural
phenomena viz the belief in ancestral spirits and sorcery.
1.2.3.4.1 The belief in ancestral spirits 
The observance of South African customary law, Ghanaian customary law and Swazi
law and custom is rooted in the strong belief of ancestral spirits. The Swazis believe
that the ancestors (emadloti) live in the spiritual world and that all living conventions,
and thus also Swazi law and custom originate from and are protected by the ancestral
spirits.  The emadloti are affirmed by each family at every family event viz birth, death,42
illness and the construction of and re-location of homesteads.  43
The ancestral spirits are interested in the welfare and prosperity of the kinship group44
and also ensure that the rules for living and Swazi law and custom are adhered to.  A45
failure to comply with law and custom and the rules for living “may lead to punishment
by the ancestral spirits because such disregard or deviation is regarded as disrespectful
and neglectful of the ancestors”.  In such cases, reconciliation or the appeasement of46
the ancestors is achieved by slaughtering an animal and by partaking in a communal
Van Niekerk (1995) op cit 37.41
W helpton FPvR “Swazi law and custom (emasiko nemi esiswati): Law (lesiko) or custom (umhambo)”42
(2004) Codicillus 30.
Kuper H The Swazi (1952) 43.43
Hammond-Tooke W D The roots of Black South Africa (1993) 153.44
Kuper op cit 42.45
W helpton op cit 30-31.46
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meal.  The belief in ancestral spirits is unique in Africa, in that it promotes mechanisms47
to keep people in line with acceptable standards of conduct, without the need for
regulation by law.  48
1.2.3.4.1 The belief in sorcery
Sorcery may be defined as: “the malicious use of magic to inflict harm upon other
people or their property”.  The sorcerer is usually a person and it is therefore beneficial49
to the community that the sorcerer be identified and banished from the tribal
community. Various techniques such as divination are often employed to identify a
sorcerer.  Despite the influence of Westernisation, the belief in sorcery is still regarded50
as very serious by many tribal communities.51
 
1.2.4 Classification of customary law
In African societies, there is often a dichotomy between the actual practices or rules in
which people engage or follow and the customary law as it is recorded in the law books
of the country. It is therefore quite common practice to make a distinction between
“living” and “official” customary law.  “Living” customary law may be defined as: “the law52
that is actually observed by communities”.  “Official” customary law may be defined as:53
“customary law that is contained in legislation and precedents”.  This important54
distinction should be kept in mind throughout this study. 
Hammond-Tooke W D “W orld view II: A system of action” in Hammond Tooke W D The bantu-speaking47
peoples of Southern Africa (1974) 353.
W helpton op cit 31.48
Schapera I The bantu-speaking tribes of South Africa: An ethnographical survey (1937) 211.49
Gluckman M Politics, law and ritual in tribal society (1965) 218.50
Anspach op cit 74.51
Bennett TW  Customary law in South Africa (2004) 29.52
Lehnert W  “The role of the courts in the conflict between African customary law and human rights”53
(2005) South African Journal on Human Rights 246. See also De Koker JY “African customary family




1.3 Research methodology 
This study has been approached from a purely legal perspective and therefore involves
legal research. In general, research may be defined as: “the systematic investigation
into and study of materials and sources in order to establish facts and reach new
conclusions”.  Legal research may be defined as: “finding all the law relevant to the55
legal question being researched, applying the law to the legal question and reaching an
answer”.  In this study, legal research is embarked on in the field of intestate56
succession in African customary law, with a view to discerning, describing and
interpreting a vast array of legal facts and principles relating to the legal status of
women.  In this section, the researcher will highlight some of the research methods57
used in this study in order to collect the relevant data. 
1.3.1 Literature review
In general, all research begins with a literature review. Comprehensive legal research
requires a methodical inspection of a suitable amount of the substantial legal literature
available.  The purpose of a literature review is to broaden ones understanding of the58
problem at hand and also assists in placing the study in its proper historical context.59
The literature review also: “provides a background for the important variables or
concepts in the study and describes the similarity and difference between your work
and that of other authors and researchers in the field”.  The literature review60
“contributes the first bricks to building a general understanding of the legal system, its
tensions, and also the art and technique of legal research”.  A thorough literature61
review widens the researcher’s knowledge on the subject matter under consideration
and promotes the reception of novel data and information, which is essential for a
The Oxford English Dictionary Online (2012) http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/research?q=55
research.
Bast CM and Hawkins M Foundations of legal research and writing (2006) xxii.56
Squelch op cit 12.57
Id 13.58
Ibid.59
Roberts CM The dissertation journey: A practical and comprehensive guide to planning, writing, and60
defending your dissertation (2010) 25.
Lomio JO and Spang-Hanssen H Legal research methods in the US and Europe (2009) 135.61
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thesis.  When compiling a literature review, numerous sources are usually consulted.62
The following two types of sources were employed in this study.
1.3.1.1 Primary sources
Primary sources may be defined as: “those sources which are direct, authoritative and
not influenced by anybody’s opinion”.  Examples of primary sources of law may include63
case law, statutes, ordinances or regulations.  The primary sources of law consulted64
in this study include: the Constitutions of the various countries under consideration; the
relevant national legislation governing or influencing the customary law of intestate
succession; the various ordinances and regulations regulating intestate succession; and
the relevant case law in each of the areas of investigation. 
It is worth noting at this point, that the researcher found it extremely difficult to find
Swazi case law on the subject matter. This could be due to the fact that matters
pertaining to Swazi law and custom are not heard in the mainstream courts but are
often adjudicated on by Swazi (customary) courts.  The decisions of Swazi courts are
not reported as Swazi law and custom remains largely unwritten and is usually
transferred orally from one generation to the next.  Another problem with Swazi case65
law is that although there is indeed a:
vast body of law on inheritance (or succession) derived from common law through
reported cases, unfortunately, most of the reported cases are from South Africa.  A
quick search for reported cases in Swaziland reveals a dearth of such materials. 
Causes for this could be that most conflicts on inheritance (or succession) are not
brought to the courts either because they are dealt with by rules and procedure under
Swazi law and custom or because all the cases end up resolved in the office of the
Master of the High Court.  It could also be that members of the society are not aware
of the remedies available in court, thus they “sleep” over their rights.66
Squelch op cit 13.62
Chatterjee C Methods of research in law (1997) 23.63
McCormick MA Legal research (1996) 4.64
Globalex (Swaziland) op cit 5.65
Iya PF “The law of inheritance in Swaziland” in W omen and Law in Southern Africa Research Project66
Working Papers on Inheritance law in Southern Africa (1992) 55.
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1.3.1.2 Secondary sources
Secondary sources may be defined as: “works that write about or explain primary
sources”.  Examples of secondary sources may include the opinions of experts, books67
or published articles.  The secondary sources of law consulted in this study include a68
vast array of textbooks, books, periodicals, law reviews, researched articles, newspaper
articles, dissertations and other documents obtained via the internet. A large majority
of the body of secondary sources consulted in this study has been written by the known
subject specialists in the field of African customary law from the different countries
under consideration. 
1.3.2 Field research
Field research is not often undertaken when legal research is conducted; as field
research is often associated with anthropology.  Anthropology is the “comparative69
study of human societies and cultures and their development”.  Anthropologists merely70
define field research as “being away in the field”.  Because of the unwritten nature of71
African customary law and the fact that this study seeks to gauge the “living” or
“unofficial” law of the African people in the areas under investigation, fieldwork was an
indispensable component of this thesis. Although it is quite plausible for the legal
researcher to consider the research methods and techniques of the anthropologist, it
is not appropriate for him or her to adopt those methods and techniques as the
objectives of the two disciplines are dissimilar.  72
For the anthropologist, law is considered as assimilated into a group’s culture and the
aim of their field research is to merely document both the law and associated
McCormick op cit 4.67
Chatterjee op cit 23.68
Coffey A and Atkinson P Making sense of qualitative data (1996) 92.69
The Oxford English Dictionary Online (2012) at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/anthropology70
?q=anthropology
Coffey and Atkinson op cit 93.71
Prinsloo MW  “Principles, methods and techniques” in Van Niekerk GJ and Vorster LP (eds) Field72
research in indigenous law (1991) 4.
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customs.  The purpose of the legal researcher in conducting field research is to73
compile a valuable law reference which may be utilised by the various courts and other
legal entities.  It is however worth noting that a comprehensive study of the legal rules74
and customs of African people can only be done justice by engaging in a contextual
analysis of their socio-economic environment and the beliefs and customary traditions
at work in their respective communities.  In this regard, anthropology may prove to be75
quite useful. It is therefore imperative that those facets of custom, which are needed to
give us a deeper understanding and explanation of the law, should also be documented
simultaneously.  It is for this reason, that although the primary approach of this study76
was from a legal perspective, the researcher also used anthropological field research
techniques and methods to gain insight into the customary law of intestate succession
amongst the Swazi.
1.3.2.1 Areas of field research
South Africa contains a large body of completed research on the customary law
pertaining to the subject of intestate succession. It is for this reason that very little field
research was conducted in South Africa. Informal interviews were however held with
students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and the general public in the province of
KwaZulu-Natal. The participants were more than willing to share their opinions with the
researcher and were not coerced into engaging with the researcher.
Ghana also contains a large body of completed research on the customary law
pertaining to the subject of intestate succession. However, it is not for this sole reason
that research was not conducted in this country. A genuine lack of sufficient funding
prevented the carrying out of the relevant research in Ghana. 
In Swaziland, interviews were held in Mbabane with a an expert and two lay women
perceived to be knowledgeable in the field of intestate succession.
Anspach op cit 33.73
Ibid.74
Ibid.75
Prinsloo op cit 12-13.76
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1.3.2.2 Panel of experts in Swaziland
The interviews with the panel were conducted in Mbabane, the capital city of the
Kingdom of Swaziland. The interviews were organised and facilitated by Mr Richard
Dumisa Dlamini. Mr Dlamini was quite capable of conducting and facilitating the
interviews as he had been employed for many years in the Civil Service of Swaziland
and the Public Broadcaster in the Kingdom. Mr Dlamini served as an interpreter during
the interviews and also provided valuable information and insight into the discussion on
the customary law of intestate succession in Swaziland. 
Two other female experts were also consulted as part of the interviews. Their
contribution remains invaluable as they were able to give the researcher a female
perspective on both the customs and laws pertaining to intestate succession prevalent
in Swaziland. The experts were professional, knowledgeable, and trustworthy and were
willing to share their expertise with the researcher. They were also made aware of the
reasons for the research. 
1.3.2.3 Interviewing process
The researcher employed Prinsloo’s  interviewing procedures and techniques. The77
purpose of the interviews was to gain insight into the research topic from members of the
Swazi people who are well acquainted with Swazi customs and Swazi way of life, and with
the intention of attaining valid and reliable information. Prinsloo’s  control techniques78
were implemented to ensure the correctness of the information gathered. The interviews
were conducted along the following lines: a group of questions were prepared beforehand
and the interviewees were given an opportunity to respond to each of the questions
individually. The information gathered at these interviews was recorded in written notes.
No recording devices were used as it was perceived that this might seriously hamper the
collection of the information needed. The interviews were rather informal and questions
were formulated objectively always bearing in mind the culture of the people concerned.
Prinsloo op cit 18-27.77
Id 28-29.78
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1.3.3 An analysis of international law
South Africa, Ghana and Swaziland have become parties or signatories to many
international instruments. It is therefore significant that this study engages in a brief
analysis of these various international documents and investigates each countries level
of obligation in regard thereto; and their impact on the customary law of intestate
succession. As stated previously, the current customary rules pertaining to intestate
succession are discriminatory and therefore infringe upon various human rights. As a
result thereof, it is imperative that this study consider international law especially as it
affects human rights. 
International law is particularly relevant in South Africa as section 39(1)(b) of the
Constitution bears an injunction that “when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court,
tribunal or forum must consider international law”. In Ghana, section 40(c) of the
Constitution states that: “in its dealings with other nations, the Government shall –
(c) promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of
international disputes by peaceful means;
(d) adhere to the principles enshrined in or as the case may be, the aims and ideals
of S
(i) the Charter of the United Nations;
(ii) the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity;
(iii) the Commonwealth;
(iv) the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States; and 
(v) any other international organisation of which Ghana is a member.
In the Kingdom of Swaziland, mere mention is made in section 238(1) of the provision
for the execution of international agreements by the Government.79
Section 238 provides that:79
(2) An international agreement executed by or under the authority of the Government shall be subject to
ratification and become binding on the Government by S
(a) an Act of Parliament; or
(b) a resolution of at least two-thirds of the members of a joint sitting of the two Chambers of Parliament.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (2) do not apply where the agreement is of a technical, administrative or
executive nature or is an agreement which does not require ratification or accession.
(4) Unless it is self-executing, an international agreement becomes law in Swaziland only when enacted into law
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1.4 Organisation of the thesis
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the topic of the
research. It highlights the organisation of the intended research which comprises: a
statement of the problem, the legal framework, research methodology and a summary
of the chapter.
Chapter 2 defines the general terms and concepts used in the customary law of
intestate succession. This facilitates an understanding of the general principles
comprising the body of law known as the customary law of intestate succession and
lays the foundation for the country specific issues that are investigated in the following
chapters.
Chapter 3 discusses the recognition, application and development of the customary law
of intestate succession in the country of South Africa.
Chapter 4 considers the rules and laws of the customary law of intestate succession in
the West African country of Ghana.
Chapter 5 explains the current rules and laws of the customary law of intestate
succession prevailing in the Kingdom of Swaziland.
Finally, chapter 6 provides a synopsis of the enquiry and the conclusions and concerns
arising from the study.
1.5 Summary of the chapter
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the subject matter of the research topic and sets out
a statement of the problem under investigation. It provides an explanation of the place
by Parliament.
(5) Accession to an international agreement shall be done in the same manner as ratification under sub-section (2).
(6) For the purposes of this section, “international agreement” includes a treaty, convention, protocol,
international agreement or arrangement.
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of customary law in the legal systems of the various countries under consideration and
also presents the reader with various definitions for customary law in the various legal
jurisprudences. Attention is then given to a brief exposition on the general
characteristics and classification of customary law. The methods of research employed
in this study are then discussed at length and finally a brief overview is given of the
basic framework of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2
INTESTATE SUCCESSION: GENERAL RULES, TERMS
AND CONCEPTS
2.1 Introduction
“African customary law is a community-based system of law”.  The family is therefore1
the most important social construct in African society. In western societies, the most
common family form is the nuclear family i.e. a family consisting of a single husband,
wife and their children. However, the traditional African family may consist of more than
one nuclear family due to the polygynous  nature of African customary marriages. This2
means that a traditional African family would usually comprise a husband, and his wife
or wives and their children. Each customary marriage creates a separate household
and several households together produce a family group, which is controlled by a family
head (the common husband). The family is also the most important institution in matters
of intestate succession, as it is they who are responsible for the appointment and
sometimes even the choosing of the intestate successor. 
In this chapter, the researcher defines some of the key terms and concepts relevant to
the customary law of intestate succession, particularly pertaining to South Africa. Some
of the terms and concepts described in this chapter also apply to the customary law of
intestate succession in Ghana and Swaziland; however the general rules and concepts
governing intestate succession in those countries will be discussed in chapters 4 and
5 of this thesis respectively.
Wicomb W and Smith H “Customary communities as ‘peoples’ and their customary tenure as ‘culture’: What we1
can do with the Endorois decision” (2011) African Human Rights Law Journal 427. 
Polygyny refers to the situation whereby a man can be married to more than one woman at the same time.2
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2.2 The principle of male primogeniture
Amongst most tribes in Africa, succession to status in African customary law is based
on the principle of male primogeniture.  This principle may be expressed as follows:3
On the death of a Native his estate devolves on his eldest son or his eldest son’s
eldest male descendant.  If the eldest son has died leaving no male issue, the next4
son, or his eldest male descendent inherits, and so on through the sons respectively.5
The effect of the rule of primogeniture means that African customary law does not
permit women or females to inherit property or to succeed to positions of authority. This
generic definition of male primogeniture is applicable to all of the countries under
discussion in this thesis.
2.3 Polygamy
It is well known that African people practice polygamy. Polygamy is a collective term
used to describe the phenomenon of entering into a marriage with more than one
spouse simultaneously. Anthropologists distinguish between two forms of polygamy viz
polygyny and polyandry.  Polygyny refers to the form of marriage in which a man is6
married to more than one woman at the same time.  Although polygynous marriages7
are no longer common, it must be noted that the African customary marriage is still a
potentially polygynous one. Polyandry refers to a form of marriage in which a women
is married to more than one man at the same time.  Polyandry is uncommon amongst8
the indigenous African peoples.
Kerr AJ The customary law of immovable property and of succession (1990) 99.  See Nzimande v Nzimande and3
Another [2005] 1 All SA 608 (W) at 631 E-F.
See Mgoza and Another v Mgoza 1967 (2) SA 436 (A) at 440D-E and Matambo v Matambo 1969 (3) SA 717 (A)4
at 719A-B. Omotola JA “Primogeniture and illegitimacy in African customary law: The battle for survival of culture”
(2004-2005) Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 116. [should this be deleted?]
Sonti v Sonti 1929 NAC (C&O) 23 at 24.5




2.4 The family head
The family head was responsible for all members of his family group and he also
controlled its property. The property of the family group comprised of general (family),
house or personal property. General property is: “property which has not been allotted
to any house, or which does not accrue automatically to a house”.  House property may9
be defined as: “… the property which accrues to a specific house, consisting of a wife
and her children, and has to be used for the benefit of that house”.  Personal property10
on the other hand may be described as: “the property belonging to a person who has
acquired it, although it may be under the control of the family head”.  The death of the11
family head therefore had significant consequences for the family group and its
property. Rules and laws of succession were thus contrived in order to alleviate the
burdens associated with death; to maintain the family’s honour and to safeguard the
material interests of the deceased’s descendants. 
Traditionally, the family head held the most power within the family group.  This did not12
mean that he could act capriciously; but was supposed to confer with the other
members of the family group when making important decisions.  He was solely13
responsible for the support and maintenance of the entire family group. He was liable
for their debts, for any fines imposed on them, or damages awarded against them.14
Members of the family group could only take legal action against other people if they
were assisted and represented by the family head; and could also only be sued through
him.  The family head “is entitled to respect and obedience from the other members15
of his group, keeps them in order, and must be consulted by them in all their more
important undertakings”.  16
Maithufi IP “The law of property” in Bekker JC, Labuschange JMT and Vorster LP Introduction to legal pluralism9
in South Africa Part 1 Customary law (2002) 54.
Maithufi op cit 55.10
Id 56.11
Whitfield GMB South African native law (1929) 33.12
See Bekker JC Seymour’s customary law in southern Africa (1989) 70.13




2.5 Factors affecting the order of succession
 2.5.1 Sex or gender
Traditionally, sex played a definitive role in the determination of a person’s status.  Women17
were considered as perpetual minors and either fell under the guardianship of their fathers
(if they were unmarried or single), or husbands (if they were married), or his successor (if
they were widows).  Only male persons were eligible to succeed to positions of status. A18
woman was incapable of succeeding to the position of family head or to general or house
property,  on the sole basis of the fact that she was female. These positions have however19
changed and these changes will be discussed in the following chapters of this thesis.
2.5.2 Rank
Due to the polygynous nature of the customary marriage, African customary law
distinguishes between “family rank” and “house rank”. Each of these categories of rank
will be discussed individually immediately hereunder.
2.5.2.1 Family rank
Family rank refers to the status of family members within the family group.  In20
customary law, males held a higher rank than their female counterparts. A person’s
rank was ultimately determined by the principle of primogeniture. On the basis of that
principle, oldest sons always had a higher rank than younger brothers and all sisters.
That meant that females were always subjected to the authority of males and males
alone were allowed to become family heads.  21
In the extended family group however, the rank of a child was determined by the rank
See generally Schapera I The Tswana (1962) 37-38.17
Olivier NJJ, Olivier NJJ (jnr) and Olivier WH Die privaatreg van die Suid-Afrikaanse bantoetaal-sprekendes18
(1981) 5.
See 2.2 above.19
Sansom B “Traditional rulers and their realms” in Hammond-Tooke WD The bantu-speaking peoples of southern20
Africa (1974) 262.
See Bennett TW Customary law in South Africa (2004) 335.21
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of their father within his family of origin.  So, for example, if the father was the first born22
son in his family group that would mean that his children would hold a higher rank than
any of the other children born of his siblings. This may be illustrated as follows:
                              K                                                 L                                                 M
                 
                  S                    T                            U                   V                            W                   X
Figure 1: Family rank
For purposes of simplicity, only males have been represented in this diagram. K, L and
M are three brothers, whereby K is the oldest and M is the youngest. They are all
married and they each have two sons. The sons of K, namely S and T, will have a
higher rank than the sons of L and M, irrespective of whether they are older or younger
than the sons of L and M. We could go further and say that the sons of L, namely U and
V will then rank higher than the sons of M and so on. 
2.5.2.2 House rank
House rank simply refers to the hierarchy of the various houses that constitute a family
group.  In a polygynous marriage, each marriage creates a separate family or23
household with the husband as the common spouse to all the families.  Each24
household or separate family has a particular rank. The rank of a household is
determined by either of the following factors: (a) when the house came into existence,
ie when the man married the women; or (b) the descent group of the main or great wife.
Each of these factors will now be discussed individually. 
Ibid.22
Whitfield op cit 34.23
Schapera (1970) op cit 15.24
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2.5.5.2.1 When the house came into existence
Amongst the indigenous African peoples, the wife married first is known as the “main
wife” or the “great wife”.  The rank of the children born in a specific household is thus25
solely dependent upon the rank of their mother’s house or house rank. In other words,
the rank of the children born to the main or great wife (irrespective of age) will be higher
than the rank of all the other children born to the ancillary wives. That means that the
house rank of the main or great wife and her children will be higher than that of the
other spouses and their children in the other houses. This may be explained
diagrammatically as follows:
                                             1
                                                                                                2
                                                                                    P
                          1                                       1
                                                                            Q            R
                                                                     2                                 2
                                                                          
Figure 2: House rank
In the diagram above, the family group comprises of three sections, namely P, Q and
R. Each section comprises of two houses (which were created by the marrying of two
wives) in a specific order. The order of rank is indicated as “1” and “2”. This means that
wife “1” in section P will have a higher rank than wife “1” in section Q and hence her
children will also rank higher than the children of wife “1” in section Q. We could go
further and say that wife “1” in section Q will have a higher rank than wife “1” in section
R and hence her children will also rank higher than the children of wife “1” in section R
and so on. 
Bekker (1989) op cit 126.  See also Mahlaba v Mahlaba NO (1924) NPD 372 at 373.25
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2.5.2.2.2 The descent group of the main or great wife
With regards to this factor, the order in which the wives are married is not crucial for the
ranking.  The only requirement here is that the main wife must come from a particular26
descent group, and does not necessarily have to be the wife whom the man marries
first.  This means that the children’s rank within the household will once again be27
determined by their mother’s house rank. This type of ranking is common amongst the
Swazi.  28
2.6 General and special succession
Due to the polygynous nature of customary law, succession in African customary law
may be further subdivided into general succession and special succession. The fact
that African customary law differentiates between general and special succession also
means that it makes provision for specific general successors and house successors. 
General succession may be defined as succession to the entire household and the
property of the general estate. This means that for this type of succession, the general
successor would therefore succeed to all the property belonging to the family group as
a whole, and to the property belonging to the household to which he belongs (here the
distinction between family rank and house rank is particularly relevant). Special
succession may be defined as succession in a specific house and succession to its
house property. This means that for this type of succession, the house successor would
only succeed to the property belonging to the household to which he belongs (here
again, the distinction between family rank and house rank is particularly relevant). This
may be explained diagrammatically as follows: 





                                                                           Family head G
                                 House M                                                                                 House N
                                                                                                           
           Son B                                      Son D                                          Son K                                 Son L
 
Figure 3: General and special succession
For the sake of simplicity, only male persons have been indicated in the above diagram.
Family Head G has two wives which has created two houses, viz House M and House
N. Two sons were born in each of the respective houses. Upon the death of Family
Head G, Son B would succeed to the position of both general successor and house
successor, as he is the first born son of the deceased’s main or great wife. Son K,
however, would only succeed to the position of house successor in House N, as he is
not the oldest son in the wider family group. 
2.7 The powers and duties of the successors
The successor in customary law originally succeeded to both benefits and duties.  In other29
words, “when a family head died his powers and duties passed to the general successor
and to the house successors in more or less direct proportion to the rank of each house”.30
In this regard a house successor’s duties included: (a) caring for and supporting the
members of the house; (b) managing the payment and collection of debts; (c) ensuring the
Mgoza v Mgoza 1967 (2) SA 436 (AD) at 440D-G.29
Rautenbach C, Mojela K, Du Plessis W and Vorster LP “Law of succession and inheritance” in Bekker JC,30
Labuschagne JMT and Vorster LP Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa part 1 Customary law (2002)
113.
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provision of marriage goods for sons and wedding garments for daughters;  (d) maintaining31
and catering for the needs of the widow and her minor children; and the (e) responsibility
for the delicts committed by members of his household.  32
The house successor was entitled to: (a) the earnings of minors and the widow of the
house; (b) the lobolo paid in consideration of a customary marriage for a woman in his
particular house; and the (c) debts owed to the deceased.  A house successor’s duties33
were however constrained somewhat by the fact that he was obliged to consult with the
widow in all matters concerning the administration of the house property. In fact a
widow was empowered to prevent the house successor from squandering the house
assets or impoverishing the house itself.  34
“With regard to the house to which he succeeds, the general successor’s powers and
duties were the same as those of the other house successors”.  The general successor’s35
duties included: (a) assuming the role of the deceased family head albeit limited in
respect of the authority over the various houses; (b) acquiring control over the general
property; (c) responsibility for the general debts of the household; (d) the collection of
outstanding debts; and (e) the performing of family rituals on behalf of family members.  36
The successor succeeded to both the assets and liabilities of the deceased’s estate37
irrespective of whether the liabilities exceeded the assets.  This situation of universal38
succession is however not uniform in the whole of South Africa. For example, in
KwaZulu-Natal, a successor’s liability for the debts of a predecessor is restricted to
debts equivalent to the assets of the estate.  The successor is however fully liable for39
debts arising from marriage contracts, ie, lobolo debts. The successor was also
responsible for the delicts of the deceased. In this regard his delictual responsibility was
however restricted to cases where the action originated prior to the death of the
Ibid.31
Bekker (1989) op cit 297-298.32
Olivier NJJ, Bekker JC, Olivier NJJ (jnr) and Olivier WH Indigenous law (1995) 148.33
Seymour op cit 277.34
Rautenbach (et al) (2002) op cit 113.35
Ibid.36
See Mgoza and Another v Mgoza 1967 (2) SA 436 (A) at 440D, Lloyd v Nkolele (1907) EDC 127 at 130.37
Kerr AJ “Customary law, fundamental rights and the Constitution” (1994) South African Law Journal 128.  See38
also Galeka v Sheriff of Natal (1891) 12 NLR 127 at 128.
Msutu v Bovela (1896) 17 NLR 357 at 358.39
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deceased or where the deceased acknowledged or admitted his responsibility before
his death. Here, the successor’s liability for the delicts of the predecessor is limited to
the affordability of the estate.40
With regard to the successor’s rights and responsibilities to the widow; the widow has
a right to continue living in the family homestead (or kraal of her deceased husband)
and the successor is obliged to assign a place of residence for her.  As long as the41
widow remains in the family homestead of her deceased husband or in the residence
assigned to her by the successor, she and her children are entitled to appropriate
maintenance and the use of the assets of the estate, despite the fact that she has no
right of ownership with regards to that property.  The successor may not arbitrarily42
dispose of or sell house property unless he has first consulted with the widow and the
sale or disposal is essential for the maintenance of the widow and her children.  43
If the successor fails to adequately maintain the widow and her children or if he neglects
them in any way, the widow (with the permission of the chief or the court) may be
allowed to establish her own homestead or kraal and a male may be appointed as
guardian or trustee of her and her children. In cases where the successor is a minor,
then he, his mother and other minor children fall under the guardianship of a senior
male relative of the deceased family head. In these instances, even though the
successor is the owner of the property, the senior male relative controls the family
property and uses it for the benefit of the successor until he reaches majority.  44
2.8 The order of succession 
In order to determine the eligibility of the surviving members of the family group to
succeed to the intestate estate of the deceased, three important factors are taken into
consideration viz “succession on death, primogeniture and succession by males in the
Bekker (1989) op cit 301-302.40
Olivier (et al) (1995) op cit 161.41
Schapera I Married life in an African tribe (1939) 316.42
Olivier (et al) (1995) op cit 161.43
Ibid.44
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male line of descent”.  The researcher also stated above that customary law permits45
the practice of polygyny. It is important to state that not all family heads may choose to
exercise their right to enter into marriages with more than one woman. This means that
African customary law makes provision for families that are monogamous and families
that are polygynous. The order of succession in these afore-mentioned family structures
differs and will be highlighted immediately below.
2.8.1 Succession in monogamous families
The order of succession in a monogamous family is as follows:
• The eldest son, or, if he is deceased, his eldest son.
• If the eldest son died without any male heirs, the second born son or his male heirs
succeed, in order of their birth.
• If the deceased died without leaving behind any male heirs, or if he outlived all his
male heirs, the deceased’s father is the successor.
• If the deceased outlived all his male heirs and his father, he is succeeded by his
eldest brother.
• If the deceased outlived all his male heirs and his father and his eldest brother, he
is succeeded to by his eldest brother’s oldest son i.e. the deceased’s nephew.
• If the deceased’s father or the deceased’s brothers have no male heirs to succeed
him, the deceased is succeeded to by his grandfather or one of the grandfather’s
male heirs according to their rank and status. This rule would also be applicable
should the great-grandfather and his male heirs ever be considered for succession.
• If the list of eligible heirs above is exhausted, meaning that there are no available
male heirs to succeed the deceased, the deceased is succeeded to by the
traditional ruler of his traditional authority. 
• If the deceased’s traditional authority does not have a traditional ruler, the President
of the country succeeds the deceased.  46
2.8.2 Succession in polygynous families
As stated above, in some cases the family head may have entered into more than one
customary marriage. Polygynous succession deals with this scenario. Each polygynous
marriage establishes a separate family or house, with the husband being the common
Rautenbach (et al) (2002) op cit 111.45
Bennett TW A sourcebook of African customary law for southern Africa (1991) 399-401; Rautenbach (2002) (et46
al) op cit 111, Bekker (1989) op cit 274-5 and Olivier (1995) (et al) op cit 148.
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spouse to all the houses or families.  The rank of each wife or the order in which she47
was married plays an important role in polygynous succession. The distinction between
general and house property and between tribal groups who “divide their households into
sections and those who do not”  also plays a decisive role in this type of succession.48 49
Polygynous succession can be classified as either simple or complex.  What follows50
hereafter is an explanation of these two forms of polygynous succession.
2.8.2.1 Simple polygynous succession
Here succession is similar to succession in monogamous families. The eldest son (or
if he is deceased, his eldest son) of the senior wife  succeeds to the status of the51
deceased.  If the eldest son died without any male descendants, the second born son52
(or his male heirs in order of their birth) of the senior wife succeeds.  If the senior53
house failed to produce any sons or other male descendants, the eldest son (and his
descendants) of the wife married second would be the next eligible successor in the
order of succession.  This type of succession is practiced amongst the Tsonga tribes.  54 55
2.8.2.2 Complex polygynous succession
For this type of succession, the rank of each wife or her house and the time at which
she was married is imperative.  The wife married first is known as the main or great56
wife. All wives married after the main or great wife are subordinate to her and to each
other depending upon the time at which they were married. This can be explained
diagrammatically as follows:
Bennett (1991) op cit 401.47
Rautenbach (et al) (1995) op cit 111.48
Olivier (et al) (1995) op cit 149.49
Bennett (1991) op cit 401.50
Ngeqe v Zwelinjani (1897) 18 NLR 135 at 136.51
Kerr AJ The native law of succession in South Africa (1961) 71.52
Id 72.53
Namba v Namba 1956 NAC 35 (S) at 36 where the Court stated that: “as eldest son of the third wife, the qadi54
to the great house, plaintiff is entitled to succeed to the property of the great house in the absence of male issue
in that house”.
Bekker (1989) op cit 275.55
Ibid.56
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                                                                 Family head K
 
                     Wife A                                             Wife B                                             Wife C
Figure 4: Ranking of wives
In the diagram above, Family Head K has three wives, namely A, B and C. Wife A is the
main or great wife because she was married first. Wife B is the second wife and Wife
C is the third wife. Wives B and C are subordinate to Wife A and Wife C is subordinate
to Wife B because she was married last.
Due to the numerous wives and households created by the multiple marriages this type
of succession is rather complicated and takes place as follows. The eldest son of the
main or great wife succeeds to the status of the deceased.  He also succeeds to the57
property of the main (also referred to as great) house and any unallocated general
property.  The eldest sons in each of the remaining houses succeed to the property of58
their respective houses.  This can be explained diagrammatically as follows:59




                                                         Family head K
     
                  W ife A                                           W ife B                                         W ife C
                                      
                                                                        
          Son D              Son E                    Son F              Son G                   Son H              Son I
Figure 5: Complex polygynous succession
In the diagram above, Family Head K has three wives, namely A, B and C. Each
marriage creates a separate house, namely house A, house B and house C and K is
the common spouse in each house. K has two children with A (namely sons D and E),
two children with C (namely sons F and G) and two children with C (namely sons H and
I). If K dies, D will succeed to the status of K and to the property of house A and any
allocated property. Succeeding to the status of K means that D will become the new
family head in the place of K. Son F on the other hand will only succeed to the property
of house B and Son H will only succeed to the property of house C. 
In cases where an inferior house does not have an heir, that particular house is
succeeded to by the great house.  Alternatively, if there is no heir in the great house,60
that house is succeeded to by the “eldest son of the next senior house and so on”.61
Among some tribal groups (like the Cape Nguni and the Xhosa), that practice the
complex system of polygyny, houses are divided into sections. For example, each main
house will have two affiliated (qadi) houses attached to it thus forming a section.  In62
cases where there is no heir in the main house or in an inferior house, the successor
must first be acquired from the houses affiliated to the main house within that section
Bennett (1991) op cit 401.  See also Sonti v Sonti 1929 NAC (C&O) 23 at 24 and Sigcau v Sigcau 1944 AD 6760
at 72.
Bekker (1989) op cit 276.  61
Id 275.62
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before proceeding to the next section for a successor. In other words, if there is no male
within a specific section who can succeed, then only may a successor be obtained from
the section next in rank.  63
 
2.9 The provision of a successor in a house in which
there is no successor
The principal purpose of the customary marriage is the continuation of the family
lineage of the husband through the procreation of descendants. The importance of
descendants is directly linked to the belief in ancestor spirits. The deceased must
procreate offspring to perpetuate his name and to take care of his spirit in the spiritual
realm. We can therefore infer that the procreation of descendants is extremely
important amongst the indigenous African peoples. For succession, the procreation of
descendants is very important as it ensures that the deceased has someone to assume
his position upon death and also to maintain and look after the family and their property.
However, situations may arise where either of the parties to the marriage are unable
(for whatever reason) to have children. In customary law, what happens when such
situations present themselves to the families or parties involved in the marriage
contract? 
All customary marriages require the delivery of lobolo  (emalobolo or bohali in Swazi64
law and custom and tanu in Ghanaian customary law) in African law. The principal
effect of the lobolo contract (the payment of which is a requirement for a valid
marriage)  is to transfer the reproductive capacity of the women from her guardian (her65
father) to her husband.  By virtue of the fact that lobolo has been paid, substitution may66
occur in cases where one of the spouses is unable to produce a successor.67
Rautenbach C, Du Plessis W and Venter AM “Law of succession and inheritance” in Bekker JC, Rautenbach63
C and Goolam NMI Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa (2006) 96.
Lobolo may be defined as: “property in cash or kind which a prospective husband or the head of his family64
undertakes to give to the head of the prospective wife’s family in consideration of a customary marriage” (section
1(iv) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998)”.
See section 3 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.65
Bekker (1989) op cit 150. 66
It is important to note that the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 is silent on the matter of67
substitution.  However, the fact that the death of a spouse is not unequivocally listed as a way of dissolving a
customary marriage, we can presume that the rules of customary law are still applicable here.
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Alternatively, other means such as the institution of a legitimate son in one house as
successor in another house, the institution of an illegitimate son as heir and the
adoption of a successor could also be employed in order to ensure a successor for the
deceased.
Customary law generally identifies three possibilities of substitution namely the ukuvusa
custom, seed-raising (the “sororate” custom) and the ukungena (or levirate) and
ukuzalela customs. Each of these possibilities will now be discussed independently.
2.9.1 Ukuvusa
Ukuvusa is an Nguni word which literally means “to wake” or “to raise”. The ukuvusa
custom is not practiced in Swaziland and Ghana. Generally, the ukuvusa custom is
employed where a man dies (leaving property) before getting married and before
procreating a successor.  His family will then marry a wife in his name in order to68
continue his family lineage. The ukuvusa custom is recognised by the Zulu and is
defined in section 1(1) of the KwaZulu-Natal Codes of Zulu Law  as:69
A form of vicarious union which occurs when the heir at law or other responsible
person uses property belonging to a deceased person or his own property to take a
wife for the purpose of increasing or resuscitating the estate of such deceased person
or to perpetuate his name and provide him with an heir.
The ukuvusa union creates a new house and house estate in the name of the
deceased.  The ukuvusa wife and the children born of the ukuvusa union are regarded70
as the deceased’s. The ukuvusa successor (ie, the male person who marries a wife for
the deceased for the purpose of procreating a successor) has no claim on the
deceased’s estate. The eldest son born of the ukuvusa union is the rightful heir to the
property of the deceased.  The ukuvusa union is regarded as a customary marriage71
and has to be registered. It is also important to note that because the ukuvusa union
is recognised as a customary marriage it must now fulfil all the legal requirements
Kerr (1990) op cit 141. 68
Proclamataion R151 of 1987.69
Olivier (et al) (1981) op cit 536.70
Mönnig HO The Pedi (1967) 206-207.71
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provided for in the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act  in order to be valid.72
According to section 3 of the Act, the legal requirements for a valid customary
marriage  are as follows:73
(1) The prospective spouses:
(i) must both be above the age of 18 years; and
(ii) must both consent to be married to each other under customary law; and 
(2) The marriage must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance
with customary law.
The ukuvusa union cannot satisfy the consensual requirement  for a valid customary74
marriage, since one of the spouses to the marriage is dead and his consent can
obviously not be procured. We can therefore assume that the ukuvusa union is no
longer applicable under current South African law. 
2.9.2 The marrying of seed-raisers (“sororate” custom)
The term “sororate” is derived from the Latin word “soror”, which literally means “sister”.
A seed-raiser is married when a wife is unable to reproduce (for various reasons) a
successor. Her husband will then enter into a marriage with another woman (known as
ihlati in Swazi law and custom) in order to procreate children for himself and on behalf
of his barren wife.  This custom is practiced amongst the Swazi, but under the literature75
consulted, no reference was made to such a custom under Ghanaian customary law.
Some of the general principles of this custom may be summed up as follows:
(a) A man can marry a seed-raiser as a substitute or supporting wife for a wife in
one of his main houses.  A seed-raiser is seldom married as a substitute for an76
affiliated wife.77
(b) Marriage to a seed-raiser may take place where the wife concerned:
– dies without leaving a surviving son (or his descendants);
– is unable to procreate or is barren;
120 of 1998.72
Please note that the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 distinguishes between marriages73
entered into before 15 November 2000 and marriages entered into after 15 November 2000.  Here we are
referring to marriages entered into after 15 November 2000.
Section 3(1)(ii) of Act 120 of 1998.74
Schapera (1970) op cit 155.75
Seymour op cit 258.76
Ibid.  77
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– has already passed the fertility age without leaving a surviving son;
– has her marriage dissolved (through divorce) without the birth of a son that
could be an heir;
– deserted her husband without leaving a son as heir; or
– left young children behind after her death or the dissolution of her
marriage.78
(c) It is uncommon to put a seed-raiser in a house where there is already a son or
where it is still possible for the wife to procreate children.79
(d) The husband is not entitled to alter the status of his wives, and therefore he may
not, put a qadi wife as seed-raiser in the house of a deceased wife.80
(e) It is customary, but not compulsory, that the seed-raiser be chosen from the
family group of the wife concerned.81
(f) The union of the seed-raiser is a normal customary marriage concluded with the
usual ceremonies.  82
(g) A husband should notify his relatives of his intention to marry a seed-raiser, and
at the marriage ceremony he should publicly announce that the wife is married
as seed-raiser in a specific house.83
(h) A seed-raiser has no separate status of her own, and she, with her children, do
not form a separate house.84
(i) The sons of a seed-raiser are regarded as full heirs as if born of the original wife
in that house. 85
(j) If it would happen that children are born of the original wife, then the children of
the seed-raiser are regarded as junior brothers and sisters of those children.86
 
The “sororate” union is regarded as a customary marriage but its effects and
consequences differ significantly from those of a marriage. For example, the seed-raiser
does not create a new house as a legal unit with separate house property.  In fact, she87
is merely “an auxiliary wife of the house into which she has been placed, and all her
children belong to that house as if they were the children of the main wife”.  88
Olivier (et al) (1995) op cit 166.78
Dumalisile v Dumalisile 1948 NAC 7 (S) at 8.79
Ibid.80
Whitfield op cit 34.81
Olivier (et al) (1995) op cit 166.82
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2.9.3    Ukungena (levirate custom) and ukuzalela 
2.9.3.1 Ukungena  (levirate custom)89
The term levirate is derived from the Latin word “levir” which literally means “brother-in-
law”. The indigenous African people refer to the levirate custom by various names for
example, among the Nguni, this custom is generally known as ukungena (which literally
means “to enter”), and amongst the Sotho, it is known as go tsena mo tlung (which
literally means “to enter the house”) or go tsena (which means “to enter”).  Among the90
Swazi and under Ghanaian customary law the custom is simply referred to as the
levirate. The Ghanaians specifically refer to the custom as ahosi dede which literally
means “marriage to a widow”.
The ukungena custom is practiced when a married man dies before he can procreate
a successor with his wife. If his wife is still capable of reproducing, one of his relatives
(the relative here is referred to as an umngeni by the Swazi’s which literally means “one
who enters”) will enter into a relationship with her in order to procreate a successor for
the deceased.  The ukungena custom is defined in section 1(1) of the KwaZulu-Natal91
Codes of Zulu Law  as follows:92
a union with a widow undertaken on behalf of her deceased husband by his full or half
brother or other paternal male relative for the purpose (i) in the event of her having no
male issue by the deceased husband of raising an heir to inherit the property or property
rights attaching to the house of such widow …
From the above we can conclude that in customary law, the death of a male spouse
does not dissolve a marriage. In fact, the contract of marriage continues to exist
between the two family groups concerned.  The so called “widow” is expected to93
remain in the family group of her deceased husband and must avail herself for the
See generally Gobeyana v Maranana (1900) 21 NLR 19 at 19-20, Nkomiyapi v Nontuntu (1896) 17 NLR 238 at89
239 and Upahlana v Ujwaba (1897) 18 NLR 15 at 17.
Schapera (1970) op cit 233.90
Preston-Whyte E “Kinship and marriage” in Hammond-Tooke WD The bantu-speaking peoples of southern Africa91
(1974) 189-190.
Proclamation R151 of 1987.92
Olivier (et al) (1985) op cit 163.93
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procreation of children on his behalf.  The main principles of the ukungena custom may94
be summed up as follows:
(a) The ukungena partner is usually a close relative of the deceased for example
a younger brother.  In fact, amongst the Zulu and Swazi, older brothers are95
precluded from entering into an ngena union with their younger brother’s
widow.  Those tribes only permit a younger brother of the deceased to ngena96
his brother’s widow or widows.  A son may never be the ukungena partner of97
his own mother as that amounts to incest.  98
(b) The widow of the deceased sometimes had a choice as to which relative of her
deceased husband would fulfil the duty of ukungena partner.  However, the99
family council or a particular person could also select the ukungena partner on
the wife’s behalf.  100
(c) The ukungena union must take place with the consent of the widow.  If such101
consent is obtained and she later regrets her decision, she has a right to
terminate the union at any time.  102
(d) The ukungena union must be authorized or sanctioned by the family council of
the deceased. Usually ceremonial acts like the slaughtering of an animal are
performed as evidence that the ukungena union exists.  103
(e) Women who have already passed the age of child-bearing are not expected to
participate in an ukungena union.104
(f) The widow may remain in her own house or kraal (ie, the house of the
deceased) or may choose to reside in the house of the ukungena partner.105
The widow however, is not under the guardianship of the ukungena partner, but
falls under the guardianship of her deceased husband’s successor. The
Seymour op cit 265.94
Kerr (1961) op cit 63.95
Seymour op cit 270.96
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Section 56(1)(b) of the KwaZulu-Natal Codes of Zulu Law.  See also Mhlongo v Sibeko 1937 NAC (T&N) 34 at101
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children born of the ukungena union are regarded as the children of the
deceased with full rights of succession; subject to the rules of primogeniture of
course.  106
(g) The ukungena union does not establish a new marital union; the original marital
union is merely continued. It is therefore logical that no further marriage goods
or lobolo is required for the ukungena union to be valid. 
 2.9.3.2 Ukuzalela 
 
The ukuzalela custom is practiced when a married man dies, leaving male issue.  If107
his wife is still capable of reproducing, one of his relatives will enter into a relationship
with her in order to procreate more children for the deceased.  The ukuzalela custom108
is defined in section 1(1) of the KwaZulu-Natal Codes of Zulu Law  as follows:109
a union with a widow undertaken on behalf of her deceased husband by his full or half
brother or other paternal male relative for the purpose … or (ii) in the event of her
having such male issue of increasing the nominal offspring of the deceased. 
The ukuzalela custom is distinguishable from the ukungena custom with regards to their
individual purpose and this is accentuated by the quotation immediately below: 
Ukungena is normally used to denote an alliance for the express purpose of raising an
heir for a deceased kraal-head who has no sons, while ukuzalela is used to denote an
alliance entered into merely for the purpose of raising further regular children when the
deceased already has a son and heir.110
The ukuzalela custom is not practiced by either the Swazi or Ghanaians. The main
principles of the ukuzalela custom may be summarised as follows: (a) the children born
of a valid ukuzalela union are regarded as the children of the deceased;  (b) the111
ukuzalela union must be authorised or sanctioned by the family council of the
deceased.  As with the ukungena custom, the family council could select the ukuzalela112
Guma v Guma (1919) 4 NAC 220 at 224.106
Kerr (1990) op cit 141.107
Whitfield op cit 184.108
Proclamation R151 of 1987.109




partner on the wife’s behalf;  and (c) amongst the Zulus, the ukungena and ukuzalela113
partners may claim a fee as compensation for their services.  The fee is redeemable114
against the estate of the widow’s house.  115
Most of these supporting marital unions are fast becoming obsolete  and the principles116
of non-discrimination, freedom of marriage guards against women being forced into
such unions against their will.  117
2.10 Other methods used for the provision of a successor
2.10.1 The institution of a legitimate son in one house as
successor in another house
Amongst some indigenous communities it is an accepted customary practice for a son
from one house to be instituted as successor in another house that has no successor.118
In such cases, the instituted son “loses his right of succession to the house or family
from which he was taken”.  If a male child or successor is subsequently born in the119
house having no successor, the instituted son reverts back to his former position.  The120
institution of a legitimate son in one house as successor in another house must be
publicly sanctioned by the family group concerned and notification of the formal
declaration must be sent to the chief of the tribe.  121
2.10.2 The institution of an illegitimate son as successor
Amongst some indigenous communities it is an accepted customary practice for a head
of a house to institute an illegitimate son (by a dikazi  or spinster and not by another122
Ibid.113
Id 272.114
Bennett TW “The equality clause and customary law” (1994) South African Journal on Human Rights 126.115
Bennett TW Human rights and African customary law under the South African Constitution (1999) 128.116
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Seymour op cit 262.118
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man’s wife) as successor in cases where he has no legitimate male children.  Such123
an institution is only valid if the head of the house has paid damages and isondlo  to124
the guardian of the women concerned and that the necessary formalities must have
been complied with or performed.  Logic dictates that if the head of a house125
subsequently marries the woman who is the mother of his illegitimate son or successor,
the son is automatically legitimised and entitled to the usual rights of succession.126
2.10.3 The adoption of a successor
Amongst some indigenous communities it is an accepted customary practice for the
head of a house to adopt a successor in instances where he has no sons at all.  In127
customary law, it is preferable that the head adopt the son of a close relative in his own
family group rather than one having no relationship by blood through the male line.128
The male person who is adopted as successor does not have to be a child, but may be
a young male or a youth.  The adoption of a son for purposes of succession must be129
consented to and must be publicly approved by the family group concerned.  The130
adopted child is for all intents and purposes regarded as a son of the head and is
therefore eligible for both general and special succession.  It is sometimes customary,131
but not compulsory, for the head to compensate the child’s father with cattle for the
adoption.  132
2.11 Disposition of assets by the family head before
death (disposition inter vivos)
Succession in customary law only occurs on the death of the family head. However, “a
family head may during his lifetime dispose of his assets by means of a final disposition
Kerr (1961) op cit 57.123
Generally, isondlo may be defined as: “the bringing up or maintaining of a child” (see Seymour op cit 232.)124
Mkanzela v Rona (1950) 1 NAC (S) 219 at 221.125
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or according to traditional customs”.  Both Swazi (see chapter 5 below) and Ghanaian133
(see chapter 4 below) law allow for a disposition inter vivos and both laws also
accommodate a deathbed disposition (which is specifically known as a samansiw in
Ghanaian law). 
2.11.1 Disposition of assets by means of a final disposition
 
According to Olivier, a family head may on his deathbed or while he is still in good
health make a declaration as to how his assets should be dealt with.  In his final134
disposition, the family head must still comply with the principles of customary law.  For135
example, the family head may not:
• disinherit his sons in favour of daughters;
• disregard the principle of primogeniture;
• exclude an heir from the law of succession unless it is not according to customary
law and procedure; and 
• alter the status of the different houses in order to favour certain descendants.136
The family head must make his disposition known to at least several persons of the wider
family circle (including the family council and the main successor). The deathbed wishes
of the family head are usually respected and honoured. The family head must ensure that
the final disposition of property is done by him and that it is conducted in the presence of
all concerned parties including those who would also probably be disadvantaged as a
result of a disposition.  In cases where an heir is dissatisfied with the disposition, he or137
she must object immediately and may even have recourse to the courts.  138
 
2.11.2 Disposition of assets according to customary law
During his lifetime a family head may employ the following methods to dispose of his
assets according to customary law:
Olivier (et al) (1995) op cit 153.  See also Sotobe v Sikoteni (1896) 17 NLR 247 at 247.133
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• the allocation of property to a particular house or son (such allocation must
comply with all formalities and may take place more than once);  139
• the adoption of a young child (usually the child of a relative) will affect the
normal hierarchy of succession (an adopted child, however, would be excluded
by the birth of a legitimate child – the Zulu and Swazi do not recognise
adoption). The adoption must be consented to by both family groups and the
tribal chief must be advised of the adoption;140
• the transfer of a younger son from one house to another house without a son
(such a son succeeds to the latter house);141
• seed-raising is also a possibility when trying to secure a successor in a house
where there is no male heir;
• the transferral of daughters to sons in a house as a way of securing the
marriage goods of these sons (the marriage goods acquired for a daughter are
then utilised as marriage goods for the wife of one of the sons);142
• ukungena custom (which was discussed above); and 
• disherison (disinheritance) the means of excluding a successor from the
sequence of succession (disherison can only be done if there are special
reasons and certain formalities have been complied with).  143
2.12 Disinheritance
In terms of customary law, a family head may (under certain circumstances and
according to the prescribed formalities) disinherit his son and eliminate him from his
lawful right of succession.144
2.12.1 Reasons for disinheritance
Disinheritance requires sound reasons.  The special reasons for disinheritance include:145
Dingezweni v Ndabambi (1906) 1 NAC 126 at 127.139
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• serious misconduct making him unworthy to succeed his father as family head eg
misconduct of a criminal nature, stealing repeatedly, prodigality or other serious
misconduct;146
• behaviour towards his father that is irreconcilable with being his father’s successor,
eg assaulting his father, chasing his father out of the latter’s kraal, or serious
disobedience;147
• wastefulness or extravagance in respect of the personal property of the family head,
the family estate (i.e. the general property) or house property;
• a persistent refusal to contribute to the maintenance of the family;
• if he is an illegitimate child begotten by an outsider (if an illegitimate child is
repudiated by the family head, he is automatically disinherited);
• being an idiot or insane;148
• amongst the Venda specific circumstances such as an attempt to murder his father
in order to expedite his succession, adultery with the younger wives of his father,
repeated assaults on his father, desertion of his father and repeated acts of
adultery;
• the KwaZulu-Natal Codes  state that a child may be disinherited by his father on149
application to the chief by reason of the fact that he refuses to be controlled by his
father or has by gross misconduct disgraced the family or refuses to make
reasonable contribution towards the maintenance of the family, or for other good
and sufficient cause;
• amongst the South Eastern Nguni (i.e. the Nguni in areas outside the Eastern
Cape), gross misconduct, insanity and any other reasonable cause qualify as
circumstances entitling disinheritance;
• amongst the Nguni in the Eastern Cape gross misconduct incompetence to deal
with the inheritable property, being insane or an idiot qualify as circumstances
entitling disinheritance.  150
2.12.2 The prescribed formalities
As stated previously, a family head may disinherit his son and exclude him from the
right of succession according to certain prescribed formalities. In this regard, the head
of the family may follow any one of two procedures (described hereunder) in order to
exclude an heir from succession: (1) He may convene a meeting of the members of the
family group (including the son to be disinherited) and publicly declare his son
disinherited stating the reasons therefore. The disinherited son will then be afforded the
Whitfield op cit 355.146
Mfenqa v Tshali (1900) 1 NAC 31 at 32.147
Mani v Mani [1996] 3 All SA 47 at 51I.148
See section 81(9)(a)(i) of the KwaZulu Law on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 and the Natal Code of Zulu Law149
Proc R151 of 1987.
Olivier (et al) (1995) op cit 158.  See also Paqa and Mgxunga v Mpantu and Paqa 1942 NAC 94 at 96.150
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opportunity to defend himself. If the family tribunal considers his defence as
unacceptable; the disinheritance will be authorised and a report will be furnished to the
chief to that effect. The report is an essential requirement for the validity of the
disinherison.  (2) He may convene a meeting of the members of the family group151
(excluding the son to be disinherited) and discuss the charges or complaints against his
son. After the completion of the afore-mentioned discussions, a request must be made
to the chief to call upon the son to furnish reasons (to the family tribunal) as to why he
should not be disinherited. If the chief is satisfied with the reasons for the disinheritance
and sanctions it, he may make it known administratively.  152
2.12.3 Appeal and reinstitution or revocation
A disinherited son may not appeal to a court of law in order to have the decision of the
family tribunal reversed or overturned. However, a court will nullify the decision of the
family tribunal to disinherit a son, “where the reasons therefore as required by customary
law are absent or where the customary law procedures have not been followed”.  153
With regard to revocation, the family head is entitled to revoke his position to disinherit
his son at any stage of the process. Such revocation must be express or necessarily
implied.  The revocation will have the effect of reinstating the heir as successor.  154 155
2.12.4 Consequences of disinheritance
One of the main and most obvious consequences of disinheritance is that the
disinherited son is no longer eligible for succession. As a result thereof, he is prohibited
from inheriting the property (ie, general and house property) of the family head and is
also precluded from succeeding as the family head.  The family head’s successor will156
now be the individual (son or male) second in rank to the disinherited heir. The family
Whitfield op cit 354.151
Mnengelwa v Mnengelwa 1942 NAC (C&O) 2 at 5.152
Olivier (et al) (1981) op cit 480.153
Nkosi v Khanyile No and Another 2003 (2) SA 63 (N) at 70A-G.154
Olivier (et al) (1995) op cit 159.155
Kerr (1961) op cit 30. 156
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head is precluded from appointing an heir or successor capriciously.  In other words,157
the rules of succession in customary law must still be applied even in the case of
disinheritance. “A disinherited son is only excluded from his right of succession in
respect of his own father, and it does not affect his qualification to inherit in respect of
another member of his family group”.  Finally, the disinheritance of a successor does158
not have the effect of disqualifying his male descendants.  159
 
2.13 Summary of the chapter
In chapter 2, a few of the terms and concepts relevant for an understanding of the
customary law of intestate succession (particularly in South Africa) are defined and
explained. Amongst the many concepts explained, are included the rule of male
primogeniture, polygamy and the role of the family head. Some of the various principles
or rules affecting succession are also examined in this chapter and they include: the
factors affecting the order of succession (ie, sex or gender and rank (where a further
distinction is made between family rank and house rank)); general and special
succession; the powers and duties of the successor; the order of succession (in
monogamous and polygynous families); the provision of a successor in a house in
which there is no successor (here attention is paid to the substitutionary customs of
ukuvusa, sororate, ukungena and ukuzalela); other methods used for the provision of
a successor (here attention is given to the institution of a legitimate son in one house
as successor in another house, the institution of an illegitimate son as a successor and
the adoption of a successor); the disposition of assets by the family head before death
(disposition inter vivos) and disinheritance. 
Sithole v Sithole 1938 NAC (T&N) 35 at 37.157
Olivier (et al) (1995) op cit 159.158
Ibid.    159
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CHAPTER 3
THE R EC O G N ITIO N , A PPLICA TIO N  A N D
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF
INTESTATE SUCCESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, attention is given to the historical development of the customary law of
intestate succession and the current legislative and constitutional framework put in
place for the recognition and application of the customary law of intestate succession
in South Africa. Reference is also made to the leading cases affecting and altering the
rules of the customary law of intestate succession. This is followed by a brief discussion
of two innovative statutes amending the existing rules of intestate succession and
changing the face of customary law forever.
 
3.2 Historical context
Prior to 1993, customary law enjoyed limited recognition and was never wholly accepted
as an integral part of the South African legal system. In the former Cape colony (which
comprised of Bechuanaland, British Kaffraria, the Transkei and the rest of the colony),
customary law was considered to be uncivilised and was therefore disregarded. Roman-
Dutch Law was proclaimed as the legal system for the Colony because it was perceived
to be a “civilised” system.  Up until 1859, the Colony was administered under martial1
law to avoid the problem of recognition of customary law or native law as it was then
known.  Most of the indigenous groups residing in the colony however, continued to2
Bennett TW  Application of customary law in Southern Africa (1985) 40.1
Kahn E “Recognition of native law and creation of native courts” in Hahlo HR The Union of South2
Africa: The development of its laws and constitution (1960) 319.
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reside according to the tenets of customary law. Finally, in 1864 in British Kaffraria and
the rest of the Colony, the promulgation of the Native Succession Act  gave courts the3
authority to apply customary law in cases involving intestate succession.  In British4
Bechuanaland, native law was recognised. So too was the civil authority of chiefs over
tribal members and the chief’s criminal authority over most crimes except crimes of a
serious nature.  5
In the former Transkei, customary law was recognised through various annexation
Acts.  Magistrates’ courts were vested with powers to apply either colonial law6
generally, but were not precluded from deciding cases between Natives based on
customary law (or native law).  The Supreme Court (as it was then known) as a court7
of first instance, could not exercise the discretionary power afforded to magistrates’
courts with regards to the choice of law, but could when hearing appeals from the
Transkeian Magistrates’ courts determine whether the magistrates’ court had applied
its mind judicially, to a matter involving Natives, and if not, it could itself apply the
correct system of customary law.  “By this means, native systems of private law came8
to be recognised in uncodified form; to be determined as a fact from case to case”.  9
In the former Transvaal customary law was only recognised to the extent that it was not
in conflict with the generally accepted principles of civilisation. As a result thereof,
polygamy and lobolo were not recognised. Legislation regulating marriage was only
applicable to Whites  and only in 1897 was provision made for the solemnisation of10
civil (Christian) marriages between non-Whites.  The State President was appointed11
as paramount chief and assumed all powers and authority vested in a paramount chief
at customary law.  The State President had the authority to appoint native12
commissioners, who could preside over civil matters between Natives (belonging to
18 of 1864.3
Brookes EH History of native policy in South Africa (1924) 87.4
W hitfield GMB South African native law (1929) 5-6.5
Legislation through which these areas were incorporated into the Cape Province. 6
Kahn op cit 320.7
Ibid.8
Ibid.9
See Law 3 of 1871.10
See Law 3 of 1897. 11
Brookes op cit 130.12
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their tribal area of jurisdiction) on the basis of native laws as long as there was no
injustice and the native law was not contrary to the principles of natural justice.  Law13
4 of 1885, created a court system for deciding civil cases between Natives. 
With few changes, the legal system established in 1885, continued until 1927. During
that period however, commissioners and traditional leaders had the authority to apply
customary law alone. If Black persons wanted the common law to be applied to their
case, they had to make an application to a magistrates’ court or the Supreme Court.14
Section 70 of Proclamation 28 of 1902 also gave commissioner’s courts exclusive
jurisdiction to preside over matters pertaining to the distribution of the intestate estates
of Natives who were married according to customary law or who were single.  By virtue15
of the same Ordinance, the intestate estates of Natives married according to civil law
and the offspring of such marriages, had to be distributed according to the law of the
Transvaal Colony.  The former Orange Free State did not develop any policy towards16
the recognition of customary law.  17
In the former province of Natal however, the development of customary law flourished.
The annexation of Natal by Britain in 1843 brought with it the establishment of Roman-
Dutch law as the general or official law of the Colony.  Ordinance 3 of 1849 gave some18
recognition to customary law provided that “it was not repugnant to the general
principles of humanity observed throughout the civilised world”. Additionally, the task
of administering justice according to customary law was assigned to the local tribal
chiefs or traditional leaders and government was still vested with the ultimate power of
amending or abolishing customary law. Law 11 of 1864 (as amended by Law 28 of
1865) created a system which enabled Africans to make an application to the Governor
to be exempt from customary law.  In order to qualify for such an exemption an African19
person had to “state particulars of family, property, local chief and so on, and furnish
Kahn op cit 325.13
Seymour SM Bantu law in South Africa (1970) 5-6.14
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proof of an ability to read and write”.  Law 1 of 1869 codified the customary laws of20
marriage and divorce and in 1891, a code  dealing with issues relating to family law,21
succession, public law and procedure was enacted to guide courts in their adjudication
of matters relating to customary law. Unfortunately, the code proved to be ineffective
as it was a gross misrepresentation of customary law.  22
The Unionisation of South Africa in 1910 brought to the fore that the divergent
approaches to customary law needed to be reconsidered and reformulated. Between
1910 and 1927, numerous pieces of legislation were promulgated (unsuccessfully) to
regulate Africans and African customary law, as apartheid was slowly beginning to
evolve. For example, the Native Land Act 27 of 1913, barred Africans from purchasing
or leasing land outside certain prescribed areas contained in the Schedule of the Act.
In order to protect the interests of white South Africans, the Native Trust and Land Act
18 of 1936, made more land available for the settlement of Africans, but clamped down
on African tenancies on white-owned farms in an attempt to eliminate such practices.
In 1927 however, the Native Administration Act  created a homogeneous approach to23
the recognition of customary law and also made provision for special courts furnished
with the task of resolving disputes between Africans. Section 11 of the afore-mentioned
Act granted national recognition to customary law in the courts of traditional leaders
(chiefs) and commissioners. The courts of traditional leaders were confined to applying
customary or native law alone, whereas the courts of native commissioners could apply
either customary or common law in any cases between Natives involving issues
pertaining to the customs practiced by Natives.  Section 11(1) of the Act gave a24
discretion to the native commissioner’s courts in all proceedings between Natives
involving questions of customs followed by natives to apply the relevant native law
Bennett (1985) op cit 44.20
Law 19 of 1891. See also Bennett TW  and Pillay A “The Natal and KwaZulu codes: The case for21
repeal” (2003) South African Journal on Human Rights 219-220.
W hitfield op cit 8 and Marais JS “The imposition and nature of European control” in Schapera I The22
bantu-speaking tribes of South Africa (1937) 344. 
38 of 1927. This Act was later known as the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927.23
Section 12(1)(a) of the Native Administration Act 38 of 1927 which provided that: “The Minister may24
– authorise any Bantu chief or headman recognized or appointed … to hear and determine civil claims
arising out of Bantu law and custom brought before him by Bantu against Bantu resident within his area
of jurisdiction”.
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thereto, provided that it was not contrary to the principles of public policy or natural
justice.  25
The jurisdiction of courts of traditional leaders and native commissioners was confined
exclusively to blacks as it was presumed that only blacks could submit to customary
law.  The courts could hear any matter pertaining to civil claims. Additionally, the26
defendant had to reside, be engaged in business or employed within the court’s area
of jurisdiction.  In terms of the Native Laws Further Amendment Act 79 of 1957,  the27 28
jurisdiction of the commissioner’s courts was expanded to include criminal matters
involving Africans.  29
Section 12(1) of the Native Administration Act  also made provision for chiefs’ and30
headmen’s courts. According to that section, the Minister could authorise any state-
recognised chief or headman to hear civil claims arising out of customary law. The
courts of chiefs and headmen were restricted from presiding over any matter pertaining
to civil or Christian marriages. Section 10 of the Native Administration Amendment Act
9 of 1929  made provision for special courts to preside over matters pertaining to civil31
or Christian marriages concluded by Africans. 
In the 1980s, and after a realisation that the apartheid system had failed, the regime in
power commissioned an inquiry into the structure and functioning of the courts  (the32
Hoexter Commission). The recommendations of the Commission included:
(a) the abolition of the commissioner’s courts, the Appeal Courts and the Black
Divorce Courts;
(b) the jurisdiction of the commissioner’s courts and the Appeal Courts was resumed
by the magistrate’s courts and the Supreme Court; and the jurisdiction of the
Kahn op cit 328.25
Section 10(1) of the Native Administration Act 38 of 1927 provided that: “The Governor-General may,26
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Divorce Courts was resumed by the proposed family courts; and
(c) the preservation of the courts of chiefs and headmen.33
The apartheid government accepted the Commission’s recommendations and
eliminated the separate court system for blacks by promulgating the Special Courts for
Blacks Abolition Act.  Section 11(1) of the Black Administration Act was repealed and34
was replaced by section 54A(1)  of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944. This35
temporary resolution continued to be in force until 1988, until the Law of Evidence
Amendment Act  was enacted. 36
In the 1980s and 1990s, the law of succession was also amended; for example, the
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 codified the common law of intestate succession
and the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of 1992 amended testate succession
by effecting essential modifications to the Intestate Succession Act and the Wills Act
7 of 1953.  The changes effected to the South African law of succession however,37
“failed to consider the distinction between the common law of succession and the
customary law of succession and inheritance applicable to black South Africans living
predominantly in rural areas”.  38
In 1988, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 (hereafter referred to as the
Law of Evidence Amendment Act) was enacted which gave the courts a discretion to
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(1) Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of indigenous
law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty:
Provided that indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of public
policy and natural justice: Provided further that it shall not be lawful for any court
to declare that the custom of lobola or bogadi or other similar custom is
repugnant to such principles.
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not preclude any party from adducing
evidence of the substance of a legal rule contemplated in that subsection which
is in issue at the proceedings concerned.
(3) In any suit or proceedings between Blacks who do not belong to the same tribe,
the court shall not in the absence of any agreement between them with regard to
the particular system of indigenous law to be applied in such suit or proceedings,
apply any system of indigenous law other than that which is in operation at the
place where the defendant or respondent resides or carries on business or is
employed, or if two or more different systems are in operation at that place (not
being within a tribal area), the court shall not apply any such system unless it is the
law of the tribe (if any) to which the defendant or respondent belongs. 
(4) For purposes of this section “indigenous law” means the law or custom as
applied by the Black tribes in the Republic.
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act omitted any reference to race from the provisions
recognising customary law and extended the application of customary law to all courts
in South Africa.  The promulgation of the Act however, did not improve the status of39
customary law in the country, as customary law continued to remain subordinate to the
common law and Roman-Dutch law. In fact, the promulgation of both the Black
Administration and the Law of Evidence Amendment Acts introduced a system of legal
dualism in South Africa. In the next section; attention is given to legal dualism and its
impact on the customary law of intestate succession. 
 
3.3 Legal dualism
The South African legal system makes provision for two different systems of
succession: the common law (together with the statutes amending it) which is founded
on Roman-Dutch law and various customary laws.  This meant that when presented40
with a case, the courts had to determine (on a case-by-case basis) which of the two
See Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) op cit para 52. 39
South African Law Reform Commission The Harmonisation of Common law and Indigenous Law (Draft40
Issue Paper on Succession) Project 108 Issue Paper 12 (1998).
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legal systems to apply to a given set of facts.  Historically, this also meant that a41
person’s race and more specifically the type of marriage contracted  and the42
patrimonial consequences arising from such marriage determined the applicability of
customary or common law in each and every matter involving a deceased estate.  43
In cases where an African died intestate, the law regulating the devolution of the estate
was governed by choice of law rules.  The choice of law rules governing the intestate44
succession of Black estates were embodied in the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927
(hereafter referred to as the Black Administration Act) and the Regulations45
promulgated there-under. In this regard, section 23 of the Black Administration Act
provided that:
(1) All movable property belonging to a Black and allotted by him or accruing under
Black law or custom to any woman with whom he lived in a customary union, or
to any house, will upon his death devolve and be administered under black law
and custom.
(2) All land in a tribal settlement held in individual tenure upon quitrent conditions by
a black will devolve upon his death upon one male person to be determined in
accordance with tables of succession to be prescribed under section 23(10).
(3) All other property of whatsoever kind belonging to a black may be devised by
will.
(4) …
(5) Any claim or dispute in regard to the administration or distribution of any estate
of a deceased Black shall be decided in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(6) In connection with any such claim or dispute, the heir, or in case of minority his
guardian, according to Black law, if no executor has been appointed by a Master
of the Supreme Court shall be regarded as the executor in the estate s if he had
been duly appointed as such according to the law governing the appointment of
executors.
(7) Letters of administration from the Master of the Supreme Court shall not be
necessary in, nor shall the Master or any executor appointed by the Master have
any powers in connection with, the administration and distribution of –
(a) the estate of any Black who has died leaving no valid will;  
Bennett TW  Human rights and african customary law under the South African Constitution (1999) 51.41
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(b) any portion of the estate of a deceased Black which falls under subsections
(1) or (2).
(8) A Master of the Supreme Court may revoke letters of administration issued by
him in respect of any Black estate.
(9) Whenever a Black has died leaving a valid will which disposes of any portion of
his estate, Black law and custom shall not apply to the administration or
distribution of so much of his estate as does not fall under subsections (1) or (2)
and such administration and distribution shall in all respects be in accordance
with the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66 of 1965).
(10) The Governor-General may make regulations not inconsistent with this Act –
(a) prescribing the manner in which the estates of deceased Blacks shall be
administered and distributed;
(b) defining the rights of widows or surviving partners in regard to the use and
occupation of the quitrent land of deceased Blacks;
(c) dealing with the disherison of Blacks;
(d) …
(e) prescribing tables of succession in regard to Blacks; and
(f) generally for the better carrying out of the provisions of this section.
(11) Any Black estate which has, prior to the commencement of this Act, been
reported to a Master of the Supreme Court shall be administered as if this Act
had not been passed, and the provisions of this Act shall apply in respect of
every Black estate which has not been so reported. 
The first three subsections of section 23 of the Act determined the applicable system
of law, ie, customary law or common law.  Generally, the implication of subsections (1)46
and (2) of the Act was that all other property could be disposed of by means of a will but
that movable house property belonging to the deceased and quitrent land in a tribal
settlement held in individual tenure by a black person had to devolve according to the
customary rules of succession and inheritance.  Estates that were partly or wholly47
bequeathed by a will were to be administered by the Administration of Estates Act 66
of 1965.  Persons excluded from the application of customary law, included persons48
who had concluded a civil marriage and single men and women (who had never been
married) who held rights to property individually; such persons could dispose of their
estates by means of a will.  Section 23 of the Black Administration Act obviously49
Kerr AJ The customary law of immovable property and of succession (1990) 157.46
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amounted to racial discrimination,  as no such provision was included in any of the50
legislation regulating the intestate inheritance of Whites, Coloureds and Indians. 
The applicability of the common or customary law to other divisions of property was
made provision for in the additional choice of law rules found in the Regulations for the
Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks (GN R200 of 1987)51
(hereafter referred to as “the regulations”). The regulation was issued in terms of
section 23(10)  of the Black Administration Act and gave legal credence to the52
customary law rule of male primogeniture.  It also provided for rules for the devolution53
of a deceased black estate in instances where section 23 of the Black Administration
Act did not apply, and in cases where the deceased failed to dispose of his estate by
means of a valid will.  In such cases, the property of the deceased had to be54
distributed according to the rules laid down in regulation 2 which provided that:
If a Black dies leaving no valid will, so much of his property, including immovable property, as
does not fall within the purview of subsection (1) or subsection (2) of section 23 of the Act shall
be distributed in the manner following:
(a) …
(b) If the deceased was at the time of his death the holder of a letter of exemption issued
under the provisions of section 31 of the Act, exempting him from the operation of the
Code of Zulu law, the property shall devolve as if he had been a European.
(c) If the deceased, at the time of his death was –
(i) a partner in a marriage in community of property or under antenuptial contract; or
(ii) a widower, widow or divorcee, as the case may be, of a marriage in community of
property or under antenuptial contract and was not survived by a partner to a
customary union entered into subsequent to the dissolution of such marriage, the
property shall devolve as if the deceased had been a European.
(d) When any deceased Black is survived by any partner –
(i) with whom he had contracted a marriage which, in terms of subsection (6)
of section 22 of the Act, had not produced the legal consequences of a
marriage in community of property; or
(ii) with whom he had entered into a customary union;
(ii) who was at the time of his death living with him as his putative spouse;
(iv) or by any issue of himself and any such partner, and the circumstances
are such as in the opinion of the Minister to render the application of Black
Knoetze (2005) op cit 138.50
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law and custom to the devolution of the whole, or some part, of his
property inequitable or inappropriate, the Minister may direct that the said
property or the said part thereof, as the case may be, shall devolve as if
the said Black and the said partner had been lawfully married out of
community of property, whether or not such was in fact the case, and as
if the said Black had been a European.
(e) If the deceased does not fall into any of the classes described in paragraphs (b),
(c) and (d), the property shall be distributed according to Black law and custom. 
The property of persons excluded from the application of customary law in terms of
section 31  of the Black Administration Act, had to be disposed of according to the55
common law of succession as regulated by the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 198756
(hereafter referred to as the Intestate Succession Act). According to this regulation, the
type of marriage contracted by the deceased was also important in determining which
legal system would be applicable to the estate of the deceased. In cases where the
deceased had only concluded a civil marriage and the matrimonial property system
governing the marriage was in community of property; the deceased’s estate had to
devolve according to the rules of the common law of succession. If the Minister was of
the opinion that “the partial or whole application of customary law to the devolution of
the estate would result in inequitable or inappropriate circumstances, he was entitled
to make an equitable distribution”.  57
In KwaZulu-Natal, the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 did not adhere
to the choice of law rules. The relevant sections of the Code actually provide that in
cases where the deceased contracted a civil or Christian marriage or had no male heir,
the estate devolves according to common law, irrespective of the matrimonial property
system applicable to the marriage. 
In addition to the problems outlined above, the choice of law rules presented more
problems with the advent of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108)
of 1996 as they clearly violated the right to equal treatment  and freedom from racial58
Section 31 gave the president the power to exempt any black from the operation of customary law55
under any conditions as he may see fit. 
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discrimination.  The rules of intestate succession were therefore outdated and no59
longer justifiable and were in dire need of amendment in order to bring it into line with
the Constitution, current social practices and human rights. The impact of the
Constitution on the customary law of intestate succession is the focus of the following
section in this chapter. 
3.4 Constitutional recognition of customary law
3.4.1 The Interim Constitution60
Prior to 1994, customary law enjoyed limited recognition as a legal system. It was a
system regarded as “inferior to the existing body of South African law and its
recognition, application and development was largely subject to the whim of the courts
who were not always comfortable with or well versed in customary law, and who were
often-prejudiced”.  In 1994, South Africa emerged as a democracy from a history61
characterised by racial oppression and discrimination. An interim and supreme62
Constitution was adopted with a justiciable Bill of Rights  and for the first time, all South63
Africans were vested with rights to dignity,  equality,  freedom and security of the64 65
person,  including freedom of religion,  freedom from racial discrimination,  etc. The66 67 68
Interim Constitution also made specific provision for a right to culture.  Section 3169
provided that:
Every person shall have the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural
life of his or her choice.
Section 9(3), (4) and (5).59
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In addition to section 31, the Interim Constitution also outlined and established the
powers of traditional authorities  (albeit subject to the fundamental rights) and gave70
them a mandate to form both provincial and national Houses of Traditional Leaders.  71
Section 181(1) made provision for the recognition of a “traditional authority which observes a system of70
indigenous law” and section 181(2) provided that “indigenous law shall be subject to regulation by law”.
In this regard section 183 provided that:71
(1) (a) The legislature of each province in which there are traditional authorities and their communities, shall
establish a House of Traditional Leaders consisting of representatives elected or nominated by such
authorities in the province. 
(b) Draft legislation providing, subject to this Chapter, for the establishment, the composition, the
election or nomination of representatives, and the powers and functions of a House contemplated
in paragraph (a), and for procedures applicable to the exercise and performance of such powers and
functions, and for any other matters incidental to the establishment and functioning of such a House,
shall be introduced in a provincial legislature not later than six months after the election of the first
Premier of such province in terms of this Constitution. 
(c) The traditional authorities resident in a province shall before the introduction of draft legislation
referred to in paragraph (b), be consulted, in a manner determined by resolution of the provincial
legislature, to establish their views on the content of such legislation. 
(2) (a) A House referred to in subsection (1) (a), shall be entitled to advise and make proposals to the
provincial legislature or government in respect of matters relating to traditional authorities,
indigenous law or the traditions and customs of traditional communities within the province. 
(b) Any provincial Bill pertaining to traditional authorities, indigenous law or such traditions and customs,
or any other matters having a bearing thereon, shall be referred by the Speaker of the provincial
legislature to the House for its comments before the Bill is passed by such legislature. 
(c) The House shall, within 30 days as from the date of such referral, indicate by written notification to
the provincial legislature its support for or opposition to the Bill, together with any comments it wishes
to make. 
(d) If the House indicates in terms of paragraph (c) that it is opposed to the Bill, the provincial legislature
shall not pass the Bill before a period of 30 days as from the date of receipt by the Speaker of such
written notification has lapsed. 
(e) If the House fails to indicate within the period prescribed by paragraph (c) whether it supports or
opposes the Bill, the provincial legislature may proceed with the Bill. 
Section 184 provided that: 
(1) There is hereby established a Council of Traditional Leaders consisting of a chairperson and 19
representatives elected by traditional authorities in the Republic. 
(2) The Chairperson and members of the Council shall be elected by an electoral college constituted by the
members of the Houses of Traditional Leaders referred to in section 183. 
(3) (a) Draft legislation providing, subject to this Chapter, for the composition, the election of representatives
and the powers and functions of the Council established by subsection (1), and for procedures
applicable to the exercise and performance of such powers and functions, and for any other matters
incidental to the establishment and functioning of the Council, shall be introduced in Parliament not
later than six months as from the commencement of this Constitution. 
(b) Section 183(1)(c) shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of draft legislation referred to in paragraph
(a) of this subsection, and in such application a reference therein to a provincial legislature shall be
construed as a reference to Parliament. 
(4) The Council shall, in addition to any other powers and functions assigned to it by any other law, be
competent – 
(a) to advise and make recommendations to the national government with regard to any matter
pertaining to traditional authorities, indigenous law or the traditions and customs of traditional
communities anywhere in the Republic, or any other matters having a bearing thereon; and 
(b) at the request of the President, to advise him or her on any matter of national interest. 
(5) (a) Any parliamentary Bill pertaining to traditional authorities, indigenous law or the traditions and
customs of traditional communities or any other matters having a bearing thereon, shall, after having
been passed by the House in which it was introduced but before it is passed by the other House, be
referred by the Secretary to Parliament to the Council for its comments. 
(b) The Council shall, within 30 days as from the date of such referral, indicate by written notification to
the Secretary to Parliament its support for or opposition to the Bill, together with any comments it
wishes to make. 
(c) If the Council indicates in terms of paragraph (b) its opposition to the Bill, the other House shall not
pass the Bill before a period of 30 days as from the date of receipt by the said Secretary of such
written notification has lapsed. 
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In addition to the afore-mentioned provisions, the term “customary law” was specifically
mentioned in the following sections namely, sections 33(2),  33(3)  and 35(3).  The72 73 74
inclusion of so many express references to customary law in the Interim Constitution
made it abundantly clear that “customary law was now being treated as a foundation
of the South African legal system on the same terms as Roman-Dutch law”.75
Furthermore, the Interim Constitution, “thus guaranteed people the freedom to live
according to the legal system applicable to their particular cultural group” and placed
an accompanying obligation on the State to ensure that this was possible in the case
of customary law as well.  The Bill of Rights also enhanced the status of African76
customary law (albeit indirectly) by altering the way in which courts would determine
“public policy”. Prior to the enactment of the Interim Constitution, courts only considered
the views of a small group of the population of South Africa, when determining what
was consistent with, or opposed to, public policy. The fact that the Interim Constitution
promotes equality between the people of South Africa and its explicit provision for the
protection and promotion of the heterogeneous cultures in South Africa, seems to
suggest that courts have no option but to consider the views of the wider South African
population when determining the content of public policy.  However, the birth of a77
customary law jurisprudence was not without problems since the: 
application of customary law was still subject to the repugnancy clause 8, and large78
sections of it were threatened with constitutional review on the ground that they
contravened various provisions in the Bill of Rights.  79
To compound this problem, the version of customary law that was about to come
(d) If the Council fails to indicate within the period prescribed by paragraph (b) whether it supports or
opposes the Bill, Parliament may proceed with the Bill.
Section 33(2) provided that: “Save as provided for in subsection (1) or any other provision of this72
Constitution, no law, whether a rule of the common law, customary law or legislation, shall limit any
right entrenched in this Chapter”.
Section 33(3) provided that: “The entrenchment of the rights in terms of this Chapter shall not be73
construed as denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms recognized or conferred by
common law, customary law or legislation to the extent that they are not inconsistent with this Chapter”.
Section 35(3) provided that: “In the interpretation of any law and the application and development of74
the common law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects
of this Chapter”.
Olivier NJJ, Bennett TW , Church J, Mqeke RB, Rautenbach C, Du Plessis W , Olivier W H and Rugege75
S “Indigenous law” in Joubert W A and Faris JA (eds) The law of South Africa (LAWSA) (2004) 29.
Himonga and Bosch op cit 310.76
Ibid.77
Section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988.78
Olivier (et al) (2004) op cit 29. 79
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under scrutiny had recently been discredited for its association with apartheid and for
being an invented tradition i.e. lacking genuine roots in African history.80
Despite these overwhelming challenges, the Constitutional Principles attached to the
Constitution lobbied for the retention of the recognition of customary law in the Final
Constitution. In this regard, like the other Constitutional Principles, Constitutional
Principles XI  and XIII  could not be amended or repealed by the Constitutional81 82
Assembly (ie, the body responsible for drafting the final Constitution)  and the83
Constitutional Assembly was obliged to abide by the Constitutional Principles when
drafting the Final Constitution.84
 
3.4.2 The final Constitution
3.4.2.1 General
On 4 February 1997 (and in accordance with the Constitutional Principles discussed
above), South Africa adopted a Final Constitution  (hereafter referred to as the85
Constitution) guaranteeing a number of human rights and also guaranteeing the
protection and application of customary law, which was once again dependant on a
right to culture. In this regard, sections 30 and 31 provide that:
Bennett (2004) op cit 78.80
W hich provides that: the diversity of language and culture shall be encouraged.81
W hich provides that: the institution, status and role of traditional leadership , according to indigenous82
law shall be recognised and protected in the Constitution and indigenous law like the common law shall
be recognised and applied by the courts, subject to the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution
and to legislation dealing specifically therewith.
In this regard section 74(1) provided that: 83
No amendment or repeal of – 
(a) this section or the Constitutional Principles set out in Schedule 4; or 
(b) any other provision of this Chapter in so far as it relates to – 
(i) the Constitutional Principles; or 
(ii) the requirement that the new constitutional text shall comply with the Constitutional Principles, or that
such text shall be certified by the Constitutional Court as being in compliance therewith, shall be
permissible. 
In this regard section 71(1) provided that84
(1) A new constitutional text shall – 
(a) comply with the Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 4; and 
(b) be passed by the Constitutional Assembly in accordance with this Chapter. 
See also Kerr AJ “Customary law, fundamental rights and the Constitution” (1994) South African Law
Journal 722-723.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108) of 1996.85
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30 Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life
of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
31 (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not
be denied the right, with other members of that community –
(a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language; and
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations
and other organs of civil society. 
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent
with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
In addition to sections 30 and 31, section 211 provides that:
(1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary
law, are recognized, subject to the Constitution.
(2) A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may function
subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which includes amendments
to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs,
(3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the
Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.
According to section 211(3), courts no longer have a choice in applying customary law to
a particular case; they are now compelled to apply customary law, although constantly
subject to the Constitution and any applicable legislation.  Furthermore, customary law86
may be sub-divided into “official” and “living” customary law. This distinction was
highlighted in chapter 1 of this thesis and will not be elaborated on any further here.
However, what needs to be said is that South African courts are also acquainted with this
distinction and should not only consider “official” customary law when making judicial
pronouncements, but should also consider “living” customary law.87
 African customary law seems to enjoy the same status as the common law in sections
39(2) and (3) of the Constitution which provides that: 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law, or
Bennett TW  “Re-introducing African customary law to the South African legal system” (2009) American86
Journal of Comparative Law 7-8.
Maithufi IP “The Constitution and the application of customary family law in South Africa” (2002) De87
Jure 213. See also Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 (4) SA 771 (T) at 774B-F.
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customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights. 
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms
that are recognized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation,
to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill. 
Section 181(1)(c) of the Constitution also makes provision for the formation of a
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural and Linguistic
Communities. Section 235 of the Constitution also makes provision for a right to self-
determination for cultural and linguistic communities.  With the introduction of the88
Constitution and the provisions making reference to customary law it seems that the
status of customary law has improved considerably, in comparison to the status
customary law endured under colonialism and apartheid. 
However, although the Constitution guarantees numerous rights, including a right to
culture, it must be noted that the rights in the Bill of Rights are not absolute. They may
be restricted by the rights of others and by pressing national concerns like public order,
safety, health and democratic values”.  Section 36 of South Africa’s Constitution89
prescribes a formula for the justification of limitations of the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,
taking into account all relevant factors, including-
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided for in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.”
In addition to the set of criteria listed in section 36, any limitations analysis requires a
Section 235 provides that: “The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as88
manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the
notion of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language
heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national
legislation”. 
Currie I and de W aal J The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) 163.89
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balancing of interests.  This means that when one has to confirm a legitimate violation90
of any single right, the specific right (eg, the right to equal treatment) must be balanced
against another right (eg, the right to culture) and the restricting law (eg, the customary
law of intestate succession) in order to determine whether the offending law would be
permissible in an open and democratic society.  The case of Christian Education SA91
v Minister of Education  is a good example here. In that case, the rights to freedom of92
religion and culture were at variance with the law banning corporal punishment in
educational academies. After weighing up the rights against the limiting law; and after
careful consideration of the general limitations provision, the court found that the law
banning corporal punishment was reasonable and justifiable under section 36,93
because the rights of children to dignity and freedom and security of the person were
by far more deserving of protection than their parents’ rights to culture and religion.94
The case of Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope and
Others  is also a good example here. In that case the court had to determine whether95
the failure to make provision for an exemption for the religious consumption of illegal
narcotics constituted a justifiable limitation of the appellant’s constitutional rights to
freedom of religion and culture.  The court found that although the embargo on the96
consumption and possession of prohibited drugs constituted an obvious violation of the
appellant’s right to smoke cannabis as part of his religion and culture; the violation was
reasonable and justifiable because there were no other means available to limit and
deter the harmful use of illegal drugs.  97
3.4.2.2 The right to culture as encapsulated in sections 30 and 31
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
Section 30 provides for an individual right to participate in the culture of one’s choice,
whilst section 31 provides for a group right to participate in cultural activities. It is
SALRC (1998) op cit 10.90
S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 104.91
2000 (4) SA 757 (CC).92
Christian Education (2000) op cit para 52.93
Christian Education (2000) op cit paras 41, 43 and 47.94
2002 (2) SA 794 (CC). 95
The appellant in the case claimed that he smoked cannabis as part of his religion and culture.96
Prince op cit paras 133-134 and 138.97
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important to note that neither of these sections makes any mention of customary law
per se, however, customary law is assumed to be an important component of African
cultural tradition.  “Culture” may be defined as:98
A people’s entire store of knowledge and artefacts, especially the languages, systems
of beliefs, and laws, that give social groups their unique character.  99
For anthropologists, “culture” refers to:
the total way of life of a society. Such a way of life comprises a system of thought,
values, norms and material creations of a society which have come into being through
interaction with the environment.  100
From the above definitions, we can conclude that, although “culture” and customary law
are distinct, they are nevertheless inextricably linked. Therefore, when lawyers attest
to a right to culture, under constitutional and international law, they commonly mean a
solid rule or practice that is idiosyncratic to the traditions of a specific community.101
 
Because international law is considered as part of the South African legal system  and102
because the Constitution places a duty on courts to consider international law when
interpreting the Bill of Rights,  the right to culture must be analysed against public103
international law.  The right to culture in international law is based on article 27 of the104
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the right to self-determination
Bennett (2004) op cit 78.98
Bennett (1999) op cit 23-24.99
Church J “The constitutional right to culture and the judicial development of indigenous law: A100
comparative analysis of cases” (2007) Anthropology Southern Africa 57.
Olivier (et al) (2004) op cit 30.101
In this regard section 231(4) provides that: “Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic102
when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that
has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution
or an Act of Parliament”.
Section 232 also provides that: “Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament”.
In this regard section 39(1) provides that: “W hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or103
forum –
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
Bennett (2004) op cit 84.104
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and the doctrine of aboriginal rights.  Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil105
and Political Rights (1966) provides that:
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language. 
Article 27 may only be claimed by minority groups and may therefore not be relevant
to African indigenous communities in South Africa as they are not in the minority but in
the majority. However, the right in article 27 is augmented by a general right to self-
determination which may be claimed by “all peoples” and not just minorities. In
international law, the right to self-determination is usually limited to situations where
people are professing political independence however, it is a wide enough right that
may also include a right to cultural development.  Aboriginal rights may be claimed by106
cultural communities who have been historically disadvantaged or dispossessed of land
or natural resources by colonial entities.  African indigenous people definitely fall into107
this category and therefore, a claim to the acknowledgement of an African cultural
traditional would fit nicely into this doctrine.  108
The similarities of sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution and article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) are obvious. The rights
protected under section 30 of the Constitution and article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are individual rights, but they are dependant on
the group’s capacity to preserve its culture, language or religion. The state must not
interfere with the rights of the individual and must allow the existence of institutions that
would be necessary to maintain the culture concerned.  The rights contained in both109
pieces of legislation are therefore formulated as “both an individual and a group
entitlement”.  Group and individual rights are thus symbiotic in nature: as culture isn’t110
Olivier (et al) (2004) op cit 31.105
Bennett (2004) op cit 84.106
Bennett (1999) op cit 14.107
Olivier (et al) (2004) op cit 31.108
Id 33.109
Bennett (1999) op cit 24.110
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experienced in isolation, but in relation to others as well.  The individual right to111
adhere to a culture of choice assumes the existence of a cultural group or community,
and this community must first exist before the individual may have any rights in it.  We112
can therefore conclude that a person’s entitlement to have customary law applied in a
judicial challenge, is dependant upon his or her membership of a group or community
and the group must be recognised by the state before the individual may enforce his
or her right.  113
The right of a person to participate in a culture of choice is not without restriction.  In114
addition to the general limitations clause found in section 36 of the Constitution,
sections 30 and 31 contain an “internal limitation clause”  or is qualified by stating that115
the right to culture may not be “exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision
in the Bill of Rights”. Here, the case of Christian Education SA v Minister of Education116
might be an apt illustration of how the “internal qualifier” (ie, section 31(2)) functions.
The applicant in the case contested the constitutionality of section 10 of the South
African Schools Act 84 of 1996, which outlawed the practice of corporal punishment in
schools. The applicant contended that the outlawing of corporal punishment breached
their rights to religious and cultural freedom, since the chastisement of children was a
crucial feature of Christianity. The court a quo  held that because corporal punishment117
violated numerous other rights in the Bill of Rights,
to allow corporal punishment to be administered at Applicant’s schools, even if it is
done in the exercise of the religious beliefs or culture of those involved, would be to
allow the applicant’s members to practice their religion or culture in a manner
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights in contravention of section 31(2) of the
Constitution.  118
The applicant then appealed to the Constitutional Court. At the outset, the Court noted
Robinson K “The minority and subordinate status of African women under customary law” (1995) South111
African Journal on Human Rights 469.
Bennett (1999) op cit 25. 112
Ibid.113
Beukes M “Culture and cultural rights” in Joubert W A and Faris JA (eds) The law of South Africa114
(2004) 423-424.
Bennett (2004) op cit 89.115
2000 (4) SA 757 (CC).116
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 1999 (4) SA 1092 (SE).117
Id at 1108B/C-C/D.118
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that the case involved a plurality of converging constitutional values and interests, some
overlapping and some conflicting with one another.  The Court held that the: 119
interest protected by section 31 is not a statistical one-dependent on a counter-
balancing of numbers, but a qualitative one based on respect for diversity. Section
31(2) ensures that the concept of rights of members of communities that associate on
the basis of language, culture and religion, cannot be used to shield practices which
offend the Bill of Rights.  120
The Court presumed (without deciding) that the appellant’s religious rights under
section 15 and 31(1) were both in contention. The Court also assumed that corporal
punishment, as it was practiced by the appellant’s members was not inconsistent with
any provision of the Bill of Rights as provided for in section 31(2). On the basis of these
two assumptions, the Court concluded that section 10 of the South African Schools Act
84 of 1996 (that prohibited corporal punishment in all schools in South Africa), limited
the rights of parents under sections 15 and 31.  The Court argued that the limitation121
on the rights of the appellants could only be justified if they passed the constitutionality
tests set out in section 36 of the Constitution.  122
The South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 prevented corporal punishment in schools
and did not prevent parents from raising their children according to the tenets of
Christianity.  The prohibition of corporal punishment was not only aimed at dealing123
with disciplinary problems but was also designed to promote respect for the dignity and
physical and emotional integrity of all children.  The parents (ie, the appellants124
members) in the case were not precluded from practicing their Christian beliefs, they
were merely prevented from giving educators the power, “acting in their name and on
school premises, to fulfill what they regarded as their conscientious and biblically
ordained responsibilities for the guidance of their children”.  Considering all the issues125
and in light of the factors enumerated in section 36(1) – and “weighing those








considerations cumulatively – the Court could not but find that the generality of the law
in question had to be upheld over the appellant’s claim for a constitutionally compelled
exemption from the prohibition against the use of corporal punishment in schools”.  126
Although the inclusion of a specific right to culture in the Constitution is a step forward
for our democracy, it nevertheless creates numerous other problems for the existing
body of customary law, since customary law must now be interpreted  and evaluated127
in the light of the fundamental rights embodied in the Bill of Rights, and particularly in
the light of the equality clause articulated in section 9  of the Constitution. In addition128
to section 9 of the Constitution, the UN Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) calls on all States to “take all appropriate
measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices which constitute discrimination against women”.  African customary law129
and human rights are intrinsically incompatible because:
Human rights emphasise the individual while customary law emphasises the group or
community; customary law stresses duties, human rights regimes normally stresses
rights; and customary law is imbued with the principle of patriarchy which means that
any freedoms of thought, speech, movement or association are qualified by the
respect due to all senior men.130
It is often assumed that because sections 211(3), 30 and 31 of the Constitution makes the
application of customary law subject to the Bill of Rights, and because of the patriarchal
Id para 52.126
Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides:127
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court,
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
Section 9 provides that:128
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms
of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the
discrimination is fair. 
Article 2(f).129
Bennett TW  “The compatibility of African customary law and human rights” (1991) Acta Juridica 23.130
See also Bekker JC “How compatible is African customary law with human rights? Some preliminary
observations” (1994) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 441.
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nature of African communities, a vast majority of the customary law will be found to be
unconstitutional especially when considering the horizontal application of the Bill of
Rights.  One of the most crucial questions asked during the drafting process of the interim131
Constitution was whether the Bill of Rights would apply “vertically” (ie, regulating
relationships between the citizen and state) or “horizontally” (ie, regulating relationships
between private individuals). At that point in time it was generally accepted that
fundamental rights only applied vertically and that relationships between private individuals
would continue to be governed by private law.  The final Constitution resolved this issue132
and coherently affirmed that fundamental rights would also be horizontally applicable. 
The fact that the Bill of Rights also applies horizontally does not mean that citizens can
enforce all the rights mentioned in the Constitution. For example, the rights to a fair
trial  and citizenship  are only enforceable against the state. Section 9 however, also133 134
applies horizontally, since section 9(4) specifically states that: “No person may unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of
subsection (3)”. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination
Act  also endorses the horizontal applicability of the Bill of Rights by proclaiming that135
neither the state nor any person may unfairly discriminate against any other person.  136
Furthermore, section 8 of the Constitution provides that:
(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary, and all organs of state.
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the
nature of any duty imposed by the right.
(3) In applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights to natural and juristic persons in
terms of subsection (2), a court –
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or where necessary,
develop, the common to the extent that legislation does not give effect to
that right; and
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the
limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).
Pieterse M “Killing it softly: Customary law in the new constitutional order” (2000) De Jure 39. 131
Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at 695E.132
Section 35(3).133
Section 20.134
4 of 2000. Some of the provisions of this Act are discussed in detail at 3.7.1 below.135
Section 6.136
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(4) Juristic persons are entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent
required by the nature of the right and of the juristic person.
With regards to African customary law, however, whether the Bill of Rights applies both
directly vertically and horizontally is not clear. Section 8(1) implies horizontality by
stating that the Bill of Rights applies to “all law”; that includes customary law. Section
8(2) unequivocally allows for the horizontal application of a right as it states that the Bill
of Rights “binds natural persons …”.  However, section 8(3) creates a problem in that137
it limits the application of the Bill of Rights and the developmental task of the courts to
the common law alone.  Furthermore, section 173  of the Constitution also makes138 139
exclusive reference to the courts power to develop the common law. None of these
sections make mention of the development of customary law. On the other hand,
sections 39(2) and (3) makes reference to the development of both the common law
and customary law.  The fact that section 8(3) omits a reference to customary law has140
the effect that “the Bill of Rights will only be applied to the customary law in a direct
horizontal manner in terms of sections 8(1), 39(2) and 211 of the Constitution”.  141
Some have also assumed that where the right to culture conflicts with the right to
equality, the right to equality will always prevail.  This argument is too simplistic and142
fails to consider that “culture” and “customary law” are distinguishable and that the right
protected in the Constitution is a right to culture, and not a right to abide by customary
law. That being said however, the connection between culture and customary law is
undeniable.  One cannot assume that socio-cultural attitudes and daily traditions will143
be discontinued when a feature or rule of customary law is declared unconstitutional by
a court of law.  Culture is dynamic and is capable of accommodating social change.144 145
If customary law is evaluated and interpreted in its proper context, one may conclude
Olivier (et al) (2004) op cit 36.137
Rautenbach C “A commentary on the application of the Bill of Rights to customary law” (1999) Obiter 120.138
Section 173 of the Constitution provides that: “The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and139
High Courts have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the
common law, taking into account the interests of justice”.
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that it does not conflict with human rights perpetually but rather aims for the same result
(the achievement of human dignity) through varying means.  The simple eradication146
of the rules, traditions and customs of African customary law, in the name of the
Constitution, without considering its proper context and significance is disdainful.147
Culture should be afforded the opportunity, “to the extent possible and tolerable in the
constitutional dispensation, to change from within”.  If women are given the requisite148
authority and motivation to question various aspects of their culture, they can promote
change without abolishing their culture and submitting to Western ideals and norms.
The courts and the legislature must always contemplate this when deliberating on the
implications of the Bill of Rights on customary law.  149
3.4.2.3 Interpretation of fundamental rights 
The fundamental rights mentioned in the Constitution are not arranged in a hierarchical
order; that is from more important to less important. As a result thereof, the Constitution
may not be interpreted in such a way that customary law is preferred at the expense of
other fundamental rights.  Rather the principle here should be that “fundamental rights150
must determine the content of customary law”.  The provisions of the Constitution’s151
interpretations clause  confirms this rule. Section 39(2) is particularly important for152
customary law, because courts are now compelled to interpret customary law so as to
“promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. This rule “amounts to
‘indirect application’  of the Bill of Rights to family relationships”.  The principle of153 154
“indirect application” is quite valuable for customary law since it provides the court with
Bennett TW  “The equality clause and customary law” (1994) South African Journal on Human Rights146
122, 130.
Pieterse (2000) op cit 40.147
Ibid.148
Ibid.149
SALRC (1998) op cit 10.150
Ibid.151
Section 39.152
“Direct application implies that a right can be used as a ground for striking down a rule of common or153
customary law. By contrast, indirect application assumes that the offending rule should be allowed to
stand but that it be modified so as to reflect the spirit and objects of the fundamental rights.” (Bennett
TW  “The conflict of laws” in Bekker JC, Labuschagne JMT and Vorster LP Introduction to legal
pluralism in South Africa Part 1 Customary law (2002) 23 footnote 18).
SALRC (1998) op cit 10.154
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a mechanism for favouring “living customary law” to “official customary law”.  This was155
illustrated in the case of Mabena v Letsoalo.  The case dealt with the age old practice156
of lobolo. According to official customary law, the consent of the bride’s and groom’s
guardians was essential for the concluding of a lobolo agreement. The court
nevertheless endorsed a contemporary social practice  which allowed the groom to157
negotiate lobolo with the bride’s mother. This innovative gender-neutral custom was
found to be in harmony with the “spirit, purport and objects” of the Bill of Rights.  158
The Constitution establishes and clarifies particular rules. Firstly, the right to culture is
subordinate to the right to equal treatment, irrespective of the fact that the law is obliged
to respect African culture and tradition. Secondly, discrimination based on any of the
grounds listed in section 9(3) is strictly prohibited, irrespective of whether the
discrimination takes place within the family and is permissible under private law. Thus
rules of customary law can be upheld when they are in accordance with the equal
treatment rule, however, when customary law offends the principle of equal treatment,
it must be adapted.  159
The tension between these competing principles namely, the right of the individual to
equal treatment and the right of the group to adhere to the culture of its choice, initiated
an investigation into the customary law of succession; a branch of customary law which
aptly reflects the problems associated with the constitutional recognition of customary
law. The investigation was spearheaded by the South African Law Reform Commission
(SALRC) and it is their report or findings which forms the basis of the next section in this
chapter.
 
The distinction between “official customary law” and “living customary law” is fully explored in chapter155
1 of this thesis.
1998 (2) SA 1068 (T).156
See the findings of Prinsloo MW , Van Niekerk GJ and Vorster LP “Perceptions of the law regarding,157
and attitudes towards, lobolo in Mamelodi and Atteridgeville” (1998) 31 De Jure 75-76.
Mabena op cit 1074-1075.158
SALRC (1998) op cit 11.159
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3.5 The role of the South African Law Reform
Commission (SALRC) in the development of the
customary law of intestate succession
3.5.1 Introduction
On 28 April 1998, the South African Law Reform Commission  (hereafter the SALRC)160
released an Issue Paper  challenging the existing customary law rules of succession.161
The topics discussed in the paper included things like succession to the head of a family;
variations in the order of succession (including disinheritance and distributions of property
inter vivos; underage heirs; widows; succession to women; wills; burial and funeral
ceremonies and administration of estates.  The releasing of an Issue Paper on the162
customary law of intestate succession was prompted by South Africa’s commitment to the
promotion of formal  and substantive equality.  The country’s dedication to the163 164
advancement of equality is accentuated by numerous other sections  of the Constitution165
and various conventions under international law.  Although succession to the status and166
property of a deceased person, as a branch of private law, can exist in harmony with the
Constitution, it is important to note that the customary law rules regulating succession are
discernibly at variance with section 9 of the Bill of Rights. 
The South African Law Reform Commission is a body tasked with the responsibility of conducting160
research with respect to all branches of the law for the sole purpose of making recommendations to
Government for the development, improvement, modernisation or reform of the law
(http://www.justice.gov.za.salrc/ accessed 14/12/2011).
South African Law Commission Harmonisation of the common law and the indigenous law: Draft Issue161
Paper on Succession Issue Paper 12. Project 108 (1998).
SALRC (1998) op cit ix.162
Formal equality means “sameness of treatment: the law must treat individuals in like circumstances163
alike” (Currie and de W aal op cit 232).
Substantive equality “requires the law to ensure equality of outcome and is prepared to tolerate164
disparity of treatment to achieve this goal” (Currie and de W aal op cit 233).
For example, one of the founding values listed in section 1 is “the achievement of equality and the165
advancement of human rights and freedoms”. Section 7(1) also makes mention of the fact that “the
Bill of Rights enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of
human dignity, equality and freedom”. Section 39(1) says that “when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a
court, tribunal or forum- must promote the values that underlie and open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom”. Also see section 36 discussed above.
For example, the sole objective of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination166
against W omen (CEDAW ), 1979 (which was signed by South Africa on 29 January 1993) is to
“eliminate discriminatory behaviour which is adverse to women” (article 1). The Convention places an
obligation on States Parties to change and abolish all laws violating the principle of gender equality.
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Prior to the changes prescribed by the SALRC, all statutory attempts to develop this
subdivision of customary law were restricted to Roman-Dutch Law.  The government167
of the day failed to keep customary law in line with changing social needs. As a result
thereof, the plight of widows and dependant children was in serious and desperate
need of reform.  The enactment of the final Constitution with an entrenched right to168
equality provided the perfect opportunity for improving the rights of these disadvantaged
groups of society.  The SALRC was seen as the entity best suited to conduct an169
investigation into this aspect of customary law. 
3.5.2 The Customary Law of Succession Amendment Bill, 1998
The issues raised in the paper sparked considerable public interest and debate. From
the vast number of comments received, it was evident that the customary law of
succession was in need of reformulation. Succumbing to extensive pressure from
various sources, the Department of Justice developed a Draft Bill  (amending the170
customary law of succession) in a vain attempt to bring the customary law of
succession into line with the South African Constitution, the common law, the Wills
Act  and the Intestate Succession Act . 171 172
The Bill proposed the following changes to the existing body of customary law: The
common law of succession must be made applicable to all individuals.  This meant173
that a Black person must be free to dispose of any of his or her property by executing
a will. The restriction imposed in terms of section 23(1) of the Black Administration Act
38 of 1927 must therefore be removed. In cases where a Black person died intestate,
his or her estate must be administered in terms of the rules of the common law of
SALRC (1998) op cit para 1.1.167
Please note that section 79(3) of the KwaZulu and Natal Codes altered customary law by providing that:168
if a deceased leaves no male heir, his estate devolves according to the rules of intestate succession
applicable to a civil marriage. 
Under this section, a widow and even daughters would be eligible to inherit from the estate. Secondly,
provided that the deceased is married by civil rites, his or her estate will be distributed according to the
1934 Succession Act (Bennett (2004) op cit 358).
Maithufi IP “Indigenous law: Constitutionality of regulations for the administration and distribution of169
estates of deceased Blacks” (2000) De Jure 156.





intestate succession.  In other words, the intestate estates of all persons in South174
Africa, irrespective of their race, must be administered in terms of the Administration of
Estates Act.  It substantially altered section 1 of the Intestate Succession Act, by175
extending the definition of “spouse” to include a spouse with whom the deceased had
concluded a customary marriage.  In fact, clause 4 made specific provision for various176
anomalies arising from the death of the deceased namely: in cases where the
deceased had one wife or many wives or had children or didn’t have children.
The Bill was submitted to Cabinet in June 1998 and then presented to Parliament, shortly
thereafter. It immediately evoked strong criticism from traditional leaders who were
dissatisfied with the terms of the Bill and the Department’s failure to consult with the
relevant role players and stakeholders. They were offended by the adoption of Eurocentric
and Roman-Dutch law principles to African customary law. The various stakeholders held
numerous meetings in an effort to resolve the dispute brought to the fore by the traditional
leaders. All the parties finally agreed not to proceed with the Bill, and the matter was
referred back to the Law Reform Commission for further comment and consideration. 
3.5.3 The Discussion Paper on Succession 1999
In 1999, the SALRC resumed its probe into the customary law of succession which
culminated in the publication of Discussion Paper 93.  The Commission asserted that177
Clause 2(2).174
66 of 1965.175
Clause 4. In fact sections 2(1) and 2(2) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998176
specifically recognises the validity of all customary marriages. For further information on customary
marriages in general see Bekker JC “Requirements for validity of customary marriages” (2001) South
African Journal of Ethnology 41-47; Bonthuys E “Still unclear: The validity of certain customary marriages
in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act” (2000) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 616-625; Dlamini CRM “The ultimate recognition of the customary marriage in South
Africa” (1999) Obiter 14-40; Jansen RM “Family law” in Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa
(2006) 29-52; Maithufi IP “The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998: A commentary” (2000)
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 509-516; Mqeke RB “The ‘rainbow jurisprudence’ and
the institution of marriage with emphasis on the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998”
(1999) Obiter 52-68; Oomen B “Traditional woman-to-woman marriages, and the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act” (2000) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 274-282; Vorster
LP, Dlamini-Ndwandwe N and Molapo MJ “Consequnces of the dissolution of customary marriages”
(2001) South African Journal of Ethnology 62-66 and W helpton FPvR and Vorster LP “Dissolution of
customary marriages” (2001) South African Journal of Ethnology 56-61. 
South African Law Reform Commission Customary Law of Succession Discussion Paper  93: Project177
90 (1999).
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it was impossible for them to reform the whole of the customary law of succession and
for purposes of expediency, decided to limit their investigation to those sections of the
customary law of succession which violated or potentially violated the Constitution. It
was their task to determine whether issues could be reformed by amending legislation
already in existence. The Commission observed that the customary law rules of
succession were outdated and failed to adequately cater for the needs of modern
society. They also noted that customary laws that violated the democratic principle of
equality could not be allowed to persist in our current constitutional dispensation. The
Discussion Paper made numerous proposals which may be summarised as follows.
(a) The order of succession had to be developed to provide a material basis of
support for surviving spouses and immediate descendants of the deceased. 
(b) The Intestate Succession Act had to be amended to be applicable to the estates
of deceased Africans in order to ensure inheritance of surviving spouses,
children and parents of the deceased.
(c) The right of a surviving spouse to the matrimonial home and its contents had to
be secured.
(d) The changed role of the customary heir had to be recognised by removing his
liability to pay for the debts of the deceased.
(e) The rules regarding succession to the traditional office had to be removed from
the ambit of the proposed Act.178
The recommendations of the Commission were consolidated in the Draft Bill for the
Amendment of the Customary Law of Succession, whose provisions resembled (rather
surprisingly) the Customary Law of Succession Amendment Bill B109 of 1998 and
which will be discussed immediately below.
3.5.4 The Draft Bill for the Amendment of the Customary Law of
Succession
Clause 1 of the Bill defined the concepts of customary law,  Minister,  personal179 180
Rautenbach C and du Plessis W  “South African Law Commission’s proposals for customary law of178
succession: Retrogression or progression” (2003) De Jure 27. 
“Customary law” means the laws and customs traditionally observed by the indigenous African peoples179
of South Africa which form part of the culture of those peoples, whether or not such laws and customs
are codified.
“Minister” means the Minister of Justice.180
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belongings  and traditional leader.  Clause 2(1) provided that testate estates181 182
devolved in terms of a person’s will and intestate estates devolved according to the
Intestate Succession Act. Clause 2(2) extended the application of the amended
Intestate Succession Act to cover the intestate estate of a person who contracted a
valid customary marriage before the Draft Bill came into force. Clause 2(3) guaranteed
the inheritance of the deceased’s house and personal belongings to the surviving
spouse  and provided that the surviving spouse could choose the house she wanted183
to inherit, in cases where the deceased owned more than one home.  Clause 2(4)184
excluded the application of succession to the office of a traditional leader from the
provisions of the Bill. 
Clause 4 dealt exclusively with the amendment of section 1 of the Intestate Succession,
thereby extending the scope of the Act to include spouses of monogamous and
polygamous customary marriages. Clause 4 also amended section 1 of the
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 by broadening the definition of
“survivor” to include “any child or other person related to the deceased who was in fact
dependant upon the deceased for support prior to the deceased’s death”. Clauses 5(a)
and (b) repealed certain sections of the KwaZulu Act on the Codes of Zulu Law,  the185
Natal Code of Zulu Law  and the whole of section 23 of the Black Administration Act.186
Clause 5(c) repealed the customary law duty of the heir to maintain the dependants of
the deceased and also repealed the heir’s universal succession obligations to settle the
debts owed by the deceased.
Although the provisions of the Bill were commendable, they nevertheless presented
many additional problems for customary law. Although securing equal treatment for all
women, it abrogated the whole of the customary law of intestate succession and opted
“Personal belongings” means a deceased person’s articles of clothing, personal use or adornment,181
furnishings and other items of household equipment, simple agricultural and hunting equipment, books,
motor vehicles or means of transportation ; the term does not include money or security for money or
articles used by the deceased for business purposes.
“Traditional leader” means any person who in terms of customary law or any other law holds a position182
in a traditional ruling hierarchy.
Clause 2(3)(a).183
Clause 2(3)(b).184
Act 16 of 1985.185
Proc R151 GG 10966 of 1987.186
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for a moderately transformed portrayal of the common law.  The Bill also distorts the187
customary law concepts of property, as it fails to consider that most property in
customary law is communally owned.  As a result thereof, in cases where house or188
family property is bequeathed to a non-family member in terms of a will, the family
members of the deceased would lose all their rights in the said property, because of the
provisions of the proposed Bill.189
Secondly, the position of house property was unclear in the Bill. Clarity needed to be
obtained on whether house property would constitute part of the deceased’s estate or
whether it would be distributed to the house in terms of customary law.  The Bill failed190
to make provision for a clause dealing specifically with the rights and duties of the
heir.  Thirdly, the clause relating to the selection of a house was defunct or191
insufficient. It failed to account for circumstances in which there are insufficient houses
to distribute amongst the various wives, and does not consider the fate of the occupants
of the house the wife chooses, as a real possibility exists that she may not choose the
house that she and her family currently inhabit.  Fourthly, the Bill omitted any192
discussion on the important question of retrospectivity.  And finally, and in my opinion193
most importantly, the drafters of the Bill failed to consider the impact of the proposed
legislation (once enacted) on communities practicing and adhering to the rules of the
customary law of intestate succession. Would they unquestioningly accept the
elimination of the rule of primogeniture or would they merely continue to live their lives
as they always have, strictly adhering to the age old traditions of intestate
succession?194
In this regard, Rautenbach and du Plessis are of the opinion that “the enforcement of
new succession rules might have the repercussion of their becoming mere paper law
Pieterse (2000) op cit 49.187
Pieterse M “The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 : Final188
nail in the customary law coffin” (1999) South African Law Journal 632. See also van Niekerk GJ
“Indigenous law and narrative: rethinking methodology” (1999) Comparative International Law Journal
of South Africa 227.
Pieterse (2000) op cit 49.189
Rautenbach and du Plessis (2003) op cit 30.190
Pieterse (2000) op cit 49.191




if the social issues encompassing the customary law of succession are not addressed.
However, on the other hand, the legislature is obliged to promote social change by
enacting legislation. The question that remains is however, whether such legislation will
be effective and enforceable”.195
The Draft Bill was never promulgated or even submitted to Parliament. This was due
to the significant judicial and legislative developments that ensued during the course of
and after the drafting of the Bill. Numerous individuals dissatisfied with the effects of the
choice of law rules challenged the constitutionality of the rules regulating the customary
law of succession in various divisions of the courts. Their attempts to change the status
quo altered the face of the African customary law of intestate succession forever. It is
these important judicial and legislative developments that the researcher will now
consider.
3.6 The role of the judiciary in the development of the
customary law of succession
The “official” and “living” customary laws of intestate succession have for years been
premised on superfluous notions such as choice of law rules, male primogeniture and
inequality. Since the inception of the new constitutional democracy and the recognition
of customary law as an indispensable source of South African law, the courts have
been one of the major driving forces in reforming both official and living customary
law.  In this section, we examine the way in which the courts have reformed the196
existing customary laws of intestate succession in order to bring it into line with the
Constitution and international law. For purposes of convenience, the researcher has
divided this section into two distinct parts. In the first part (3.6.1), the researcher will be
discussing all cases abolishing (or seeking to abolish) the rule of male primogeniture
and thereby promoting equality; and in the second part (3.6.2), a discussion of the
cases relating to the choice of law rules governing the customary law of intestate
succession will be considered. 
Rautenbach and du Plessis (2003) op cit 31.195
Bekker JC and van Niekerk G “Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa: Harmonization,196
or the creation of new marriage laws in South Africa?” (2009) SA Publiekreg/Public Law 207.
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3.6.1 The rule of male primogeniture and the promotion of
equality
3.6.1.1 Mthembu v Letsela  197
Briefly, the facts of Mthembu are as follows: Tebalo Watson Letsela (the deceased) was
killed by unidentified assailants on 13 August 1993. The deceased (who died intestate)
possessed a 99-year leasehold title which gave him the full right, title and interest in a
house located in Vosloorus, Boksburg. The applicant (Mildred Mthembu) and her two
minor daughters lived on the property with the deceased. One of these minor children
namely Thembi, was in fact the daughter of the deceased and Mildred Mthembu and
she was born on 7 April 1988. The deceased had no other offspring besides the
daughter, but had three sisters and a father (the first respondent). The applicant
contended that she had been married to the deceased by customary tradition and a
customary union was entered into on 14 June 1992. An amount of R2 000 was agreed
upon as lobola but only an initial instalment of R900 was paid. The balance of the lobola
was to be paid in October 1993, however the deceased died on 13 August 1993, and
thus the balance was never paid. 
The respondent disputed the authenticity of the applicant’s contention and denied the
existence of a customary marriage between the deceased and the applicant.
Furthermore, he insisted that she and her daughters abandon the property and
relinquish the deceased’s movable assets. The respondent denied that he was under
any obligation to maintain the applicant and her daughter. In fact, he averred that the
relevant property had to devolve upon him as this was in accordance with the
customary law rule of male primogeniture as envisaged in section 23 of the Black
Administration Act, read with regulation 2 of Government Notice R200 of 1987. 
In the court of first instance,  the applicant sought an order confirming:198
1997 (2) SA 936 (T); 1998 (2) SA 675 (T) and 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA).197
Mthembu v Letsela 1997 (2) SA 936 (T).198
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1.1 that the rule of African customary law which generally excludes African women
from intestate succession is inconsistent with the Constitution and consequently
invalid;
1.2 that section 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 and section 2 of the
Regulations for the Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased
Blacks made under section 23(10) of the Act by Government Notice R200 of 6
February 1987 are invalid insofar as they demand the application of the
customary law rule; 
1.3 that the administration and distribution of the estate of the late Tebalo Watson
Letsela is governed by the common law of intestate succession; and
1.4 that Tembi Mthembu is the deceased’s only intestate heir.  199
Alternatively, the applicant sought an order declaring:
2.1 that the customary law rule offends against public policy and natural justice and
is consequently unenforceable;
2.2 that upon a proper interpretation of section 23 of the Act and section 2 of the
regulations (particularly in the light of section 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment
Act  and sections 35(3) and 232(3) of the Constitution), they do not demand the200
application of the customary law rule;
2.3 that the administration and distribution of the estate of the deceased is not
governed by the customary law rule; and
2.4 that Tembi Mthembu is the deceased’s only intestate heir.201
Counsel for the applicant argued that the rule of primogeniture and regulation 2(e) of
the regulations was grossly discriminatory against African women and children, who are
not the eldest child. He claimed that this situation was inherently unconstitutional and
violated sections 8(1) , 8(2),  8(4)  and section 14  of the Interim Constitution as202 203 204 205
Mthembu (1997) op cit 939.199
45 of 1988.200
Mthembu (1997) op cit 939-940.201
Section 8(1) provided that: “(1) Every person shall have the right to equality before the law and to equal202
protection of the law”. 
This section provided that:203
No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without derogating from the
generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: race, gender, sex, ethnic
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language.
This section provided that:204
Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) shall be presumed to
be sufficient proof of unfair discrimination as contemplated in that subsection, until the contrary is established.
Section 14 provided that:205
(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, which
shall include academic freedom in institutions of higher learning. 
(2) Without derogating from the generality of subsection (1), religious observances may be conducted at state
or state-aided institutions under rules established by an appropriate authority for that purpose, provided
that such religious observances are conducted on an equitable basis and attendance at them is free and
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it amounted to unfair discrimination on the established grounds of sex or gender.  He206
further contended that the regulations enacted under GN R200 of 1987, were ultra vires
and had actually been expunged by the decreeing of the Intestate Succession Act,
which provided for the intestate inheritance of any surviving descendant in cases where
the deceased was not survived by a spouse, and which also made provision for
illegitimate children to inherit the intestate estates of their parents. 
Counsel for the respondent argued that a decision as to whether a customary marriage
existed between Mildred Mthembu and Tebalo Watson Letsela was crucial for
determining the manner in which the estate was to be distributed and was also pertinent
to settling the dispute regarding the legal guardianship pf Tembi.  Counsel requested207
that the matter be referred for the hearing of oral evidence on the following issues:
(1) whether or not a customary union existed;
(2) whether the applicant has locus standi in the application;
(3) whether the applicant is the legal guardian of the minor child Tembi; and
(4) whether the applicant was obliged to exhaust her remedies under regulation
2(d).  208
In the court of first instance, it was decided that the rule of male primogeniture had to
be balanced against the provisions of section 31  of the Interim Constitution. The court209
was also mindful of the fact that it had to consider the provisions of the limitations
clause as well.  After balancing the rule of primogeniture against the provisions of210
section 31 of the Interim Constitution and after careful consideration of the limitations
voluntary. 
(3) Nothing in this Chapter shall preclude legislation recognising – 
(a) a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular religion; and 
(b) the validity of marriages concluded under a system of religious law subject to specified procedures.
Mthembu (1997) op cit 941.206
Id 942.207
Ibid.208
This section made provision for the right of every person to use the language and participate in the209
cultural life of their choice.
In this regard section 33 provided that:210
(1) The rights entrenched in this chapter may be limited by law of general application, provided that such
limitation –
(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is –
(i) reasonable; and 
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and
(b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in question.
(2) Save as provided for in ss(1) or any other provision of this Constitution, no law, whether a rule of the
common law, customary law or legislation, shall limit any right entrenched in this chapter.
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clause, the court found that the customary law rule of male primogeniture was not in
conflict with sections 8 and 14 of the Constitution; nor was it in the court’s opinion
contrary to public policy or natural justice.  211
According to the court, the rule of male primogeniture is primarily applied in rural areas and
upon distribution of the deceased’s estate onto the male successor, the male successor
has an inherent duty to support and protect the customary spouse or spouses and the
children born of the customary marriage/s and affiliated to a specific house of the
deceased. In addition to support and protection, the customary spouse may continue to
reside at the deceased’s home and may continue to utilise the property of the estate
without being evicted by the successor.  In the court’s assessment of the customs and212
practices associated with the rule of male primogeniture (as mentioned immediately
above), it concluded that if one accepts the successor’s duty to provide support,
maintenance and sanctuary as an essential corollary of the practice of primogeniture, it was
challenging to parallel this form of differentiation between men and women with the idea
of “unfair discrimination” as used in section 8 of the Constitution.  In the court’s opinion,213
“even if the rule of male primogeniture was prima facie discriminatory on the grounds of sex
or gender and the presumption contained in section 8(4) came into operation”, the
presumption would be rebutted by the inherent duty of support.  However, the court noted214
that if the right to support fell away, the whole matter would be different. 
In terms of African customary law, an illegitimate child belongs to the maternal family
and has no claim on the estate of the biological father. It is for this reason that the court
concluded that it was important to first confirm what the marital state was between the
applicant and the deceased, inter alia by reason of the provision found in regulation
2(d)(iii)  of the regulations framed under the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927.215 216
The application was then postponed and the matter was referred for the hearing of oral
evidence on the following issues: 




Regulation 2(d)makes provision for surviving partners of a deceased Black who had contracted a215
marriage out of community of property, or who had entered into a customary union, or who was at the
time of his death living with him as his putative spouse, to be considered as being lawfully married out
of community of property for purposes of the devolution of the estate.
Mthembu (1997) op cit 946.216
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(a) whether the applicant had entered into a valid customary union with the
deceased during the latter’s lifetime; or
(b) whether a putative marriage under customary law existed between the applicant
and the deceased.217
At the second hearing,  the applicant relied on four distinct grounds for her claim that218
the rule of male primogeniture be held to be invalid and that Tembi be declared the
deceased’s sole heir. Those grounds are as follows:
(1) The regulation in terms of which the deceased’s estate is to be administered
according to African law and custom, is ultra vires at common law.
(2) The aforesaid regulation has been impliedly repealed by section 1(1) read with
section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act, Act 81 of 1987.
(3) The customary law rule of succession which excludes women ought to be
developed in terms of section 35(3) of the Interim Constitution with due regard to the
fundamental value of equality, to avoid discrimination between men and women. 
(4) If the customary law rule is not so developed, then it would be repugnant to the
“principles of public policy or natural justice” within the meaning of section 1 of
the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988.219
With regards to the matters referred for the hearing of oral evidence, at the first hearing,
Mynhardt J concluded that neither the applicant (Mildred Mthembu) nor the first
respondent (the deceased’s father) had produced any evidence either proving or
disproving the issues, and therefore, the application in the court had to proceed and be
adjudicated on the basis that the applicant and the deceased were not married to each
other and that Tembi was illegitimate.  220
After a brief explanation of the rule of male primogeniture and the concomitant duty of
support of the successor to the wives and children of the deceased,  the court found221
that because the applicant and the deceased were not married to each other according
to African customary law, the applicant and Tembi were not entitled to continue residing
at the deceased’s home and they also did not have a right to use the deceased’s
movable property.  222
Mthembu (1997) op cit 947.217






The court came to the conclusion that the regulations in terms of which the deceased’s
estate was to be administered according to African law and custom, were not ultra vires,
since sections 23(1) and (2) of the Black Administration Act acknowledged the rule of
male primogeniture. As a result thereof, the fact that the State President was entitled
to enact regulations in terms of section 23(10)(a) of the Black Administration Act,
inevitably gave him a mandate to implement and observe the rules of male
primogeniture “when prescribing the manner in which the estates of deceased Blacks
are administered and distributed”.  223
Secondly, the court found (contrary to the applicant’s contention) that regulation 2(e)224
had not been impliedly repealed by the Intestate Succession Act. In this regard, the
court argued that the fact that section 23 of the Black Administration Act was
specifically mentioned in section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act, meant that it
obviously incorporated a reference to subsection (10) of section 23 of the Black
Administration Act.  With regards to the applicant’s third ground of contention and225
after engaging in a lengthy discussion of the place of the rule of male primogeniture in
customary family law,  the court concluded that because the applicant was not married226
to the deceased, Tembi was therefore an illegitimate child. She therefore had no claim
to inherit intestate from the deceased, and that was based purely on her illegitimate
status. It did not matter that Tembi was female because even an illegitimate son would
not be entitled to inherit intestate from the deceased. Therefore, Tembi was ineligible
to succeed because she was an illegitimate child and not because she was female and
that the system of primogeniture is applied in African customary law.  In the present227
case there was therefore no unfair discrimination on the grounds of sex or gender, and
neither was the value of equality infringed,  because Tembi was still entitled to be228
maintained and supported by her guardian.  The court further felt that it was not the229
correct forum to develop the customary law of intestate succession. In it’s opinion, that
particular task was assigned to and had to be performed by the legislature. 
Id 682.223
Enacted under GN R200 of 1987.224






Finally, the court argued that the customary law rule of intestate succession was valid
and not contrary to the principles of public policy or natural justice. The learned judge
asserted that if he found the succession rule to be offensive to public policy, he would
be guilty of “applying western norms to a rule of customary law which is still adhered to
and applied by many African people”.  The application was subsequently dismissed. 230
Mildred Mthembu then sought relief in the Supreme Court of Appeal.  Her claim for231
relief was once again based on the four grounds relied on at the second hearing.  At232
the outset, the court said that in African customary law, a child is legitimised by a
marriage (customary union) and the payment of lobola.  In the case under233
consideration, there was no customary union in existence between the appellant
(Mildred Mthembu) and the deceased (Tebalo Watson Letsela), at the time of Tembi’s
birth. No customary union was either concluded after her birth. As a result thereof,
Tembi was illegitimate, because although a part of the lobola had been paid, no
marriage existed between her biological parents.  The court then moved to consider234
each of the four grounds of relief individually. 
They resolved that regulation 2(e) merely attributed statutory credence to a system
which had been observed and adhered to for many years by the African population. In
their opinion, and in accordance with current law,  Blacks had a choice as to how their235
estates could devolve. By doing so, they could circumvent the negative consequences
associated with the application of the customary law of intestate succession; if that was
their desire.  The regulation  in question could therefore not be said to be ultra vires236 237
at common law, as it honoured the wishes of the deceased.  The learned judge238
agreed with the reasoning of the court a quo, and concluded that regulation 2(e) had
not been impliedly repealed by the Intestate Succession Act.  Like the court a quo, the239
Id 688.230
Mthembu v Letsela 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA).231
See Mthembu v Letsela 1998 (2) SA 675 (T) op cit at 681.232
Mthembu (2000) op cit para 17.233
Id para 18.234
See specifically section 23(3) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927.235
Mthembu (2000) op cit para 23.236
Regulation 2(e).237
Mthembu (2000) paras 23-24.238
Id para 29.239
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appeal court held that Tembi’s ineligibility to succeed was based purely on the fact that
she was an illegitimate child. Her circumstances would not be altered even if she was
a male child. There was therefore no gender discrimination in the case at hand.  The240
court also felt inadequate to develop the rule of male primogeniture for lack of sufficient
information. The court stated that any development of the rule of primogeniture would
ideally be left to the legislature.  241
The decisions of the courts in the Mthembu cases were disappointing to say the least.
The courts were presented with a perfect opportunity to develop the rule of male
primogeniture, but declined to do so, even though it was under an obligation to develop
the rule in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.  The decisions in242
Mthembu have thus been extensively criticised and in the paragraphs that follow, some
of these criticisms are highlighted. 
According to Janse van Rensburg,  the crucial failure in the three Mthembu cases was the243
lack of an enquiry into whether a valid customary union existed between Mildred Mthembu
and the deceased. In all three Mthembu cases, the court maintained that Tembi was not
eligible to inherit the deceased’s estate because she was an illegitimate child. In other
words, the non-existence of a valid marriage between Tebalo Letsela and her mother,
Mildred disqualified her from inheriting the intestate estate of the deceased. The court
(without examining the leading cases and literary authorities on the subject matter)244
resolved that the applicant and the deceased were not married because one of the
requirements for the conclusion of a valid marriage was not satisfied namely; the entire
amount of lobola stipulated was not fully paid at the time of the deceased’s death.245
In the researcher’s opinion the court erred in its finding. According to all the leading
Id para 33.240
Id para 40.241
Jagwanth S and Murray C “Ten years of transformation: How has gender equality in South Africa242
fared?” (2002) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 297.
Janse van Rensburg AM “Mthembu v Letsela: The non-decision” (2001) Potchefstroom Electronic Law243
Journal 8).
Kerr AJ “Issues arising from a challenge to the constitutionality of the customary law of intestate244
succession: Mthembu v Letsela [2000] 3 All SA 21 (A); 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA)” (2001) Tydskrif vir
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 325.
Mthembu (2000) para 18.245
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authors on the matter, the legal requirement (for the conclusion of a customary union)
relating to the provision of lobola by the family of the husband, merely requires an
agreement that lobola will be paid.  The amount agreed to as lobola need not be paid246
in it’s entirety in order for the marriage to be valid. A mere agreement will suffice.  In247
the researcher’s opinion, the applicant (or appellant) therefore provided sufficient
evidence confirming that an agreement was concluded between her family and the
deceased’s family for lobola in the sum of R2 000.  Although the full amount had not248
been paid at the time of the deceased’s death, this did not render Tembi illegitimate. 
In fact, according to African customary law, a child born into a customary marriage is
presumed to be legitimate and thus part of the father’s family, irrespective of the lobola
amount paid  but subject to the qualification that a failure to comply with the full lobola249
obligation can render the customary marriage null and void, and can ultimately impact
on the status of the children.  It is therefore submitted, that were it not for the250
deceased’s untimely death, he would have performed his obligations with regard to the
payment of the full lobola.  After an assessment of the evidence, the position in251
customary law and that in all matters affecting a child, a child’s best interests are of
paramount importance, one could have only concluded that a customary marriage
existed between the appellant and the deceased and that Tembi was therefore
legitimate and eligible to inherit from the estate of the deceased. 
See Dlamini CRM “Family law” in Bekker JC (et al) Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa Part246
1 Customary law (2002) 44; Olivier Olivier NJJ, Olivier NJJ (jnr) and Olivier W H Indigenous law (1995)
20-21; Bennett TW  Customary law in South Africa (2004) 234-235 and Prinsloo MW  (et al) (1998) 72-
92, 82-84 and 87.
See Bekker JC Seymour’s customary law in southern Africa (1989) 112-113; South African Law247
Reform Commission Harmonisation of the common law and the indigenous law: Indigenous marriages
Discussion Paper 74 Project 90 (1998) 43 and Ngcongolo v Parkies 1953 NAC 103 (S) at 104-105.
In the more recent case of Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2004 (2) SA 544 (C)
the court commented that: “It has never been a prerequisite under African customary law to pay lobolo
before marriage is consummated. There must be agreement, however, as regards lobolo. It may be
deferred as long as circumstances do not permit payment. It is not uncommon that lobolo be paid upon
the couple’s eldest daughter being ‘lobolaed’” (551). See also Venter T and Nel J “African customary
law of intestate succession and gender (in)equality” (2005) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 98.
Mthembu (1997) op cit 938-939.248
Taylor DC An historical comparative perspective of normative approaches in indigenous law and249
Roman-Dutch law in South Africa with reference to the case of Mthembu v Letsela and Another 1998
(2) SA 675 (T) (unpublished LLM thesis Unisa) (2000) 35. 
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The third Mthembu judgment came when the legislature was adopting the Promotion
of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.  Therefore, although252
the Court intimated that it was deciding the case on the basis of illegitimacy and not on
gender, the Court failed to identify that discrimination against children on the grounds
of birth is prohibited by the Constitution,  by the Promotion of Equality and Prevention253
of Unfair Discrimination Act,  and is also prohibited international law as well.  254 255
The court could have used regulation 2(d)(iii) as an alternative remedy to resolving the
dispute.  Regulation 2(d) provides that:256
(d) When any deceased Black is survived by any partner –
(i) with whom he had contracted a marriage which, in terms of subsection (6)
of section 22 of the Act, had not produced the legal consequences of a
marriage in community of property; or
(ii) with whom he had entered into a customary union;
(iii) who was at the time of his death living with him as his putative spouse;
(iv) or by any issue of himself and any such partner, and the circumstances
are such as in the opinion of the Minister to render the application of Black
law and custom to the devolution of the whole, or some part, of his
property inequitable or inappropriate, the Minister may direct that the said
property or the said part thereof, as the case may be, shall devolve as if
the said Black and the said partner had been lawfully married out of
community of property, whether or not such was in fact the case, and as
if the said Black had been a European.
The effect of regulation 2 would be that an intestate estate will be distributed according to
African customary law, unless the Minister was of the opinion that such a distribution would
be inequitable. The determination as to whether the distribution according to African
customary law was inequitable can be made on application by the deceased’s surviving
putative spouse who was residing with the deceased at the time of his death.  If the257
Kult AP “Intestate succession in South Africa: The westernization of customary law practices within a252
modern constitutional framework” (2001) Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 723.
See section 9(3) of the 1996 Constitution. 253
See section 1 of the Act under the definition of “prohibited grounds”.254
For example, the European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of W edlock (to which255
South Africa is a signatory) provides that: “a child born out of wedlock shall have the same right of
succession in the estate of its father and its mother and of a member of its fathers and its mothers
family as if it had been born in wedlock” (article 9).
Janse van Rensburg (2001) op cit 11.256
Ibid.257
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Minister finds the distribution to be inequitable, then he may direct that the intestate’s
property be distributed as if the parties had been lawfully married out of community of
property and if the Black person had been a European, in other words, section 1(1)(c) of
the Intestate Succession Act would be applicable.  A putative marriage would then be258
applicable here. “A putative marriage comes into existence when one or both of the parties
bona fide believe that a lawful marriage was indeed contracted; or were bona fide unaware
of the existence of a fact nullifying their union, such as non-compliance of an essential
requirement”.  Such a shortcoming renders the marriage contract null and void ab initio,259
but irrespective of this fact, the children born out of such a union are regarded to be
legitimate.  It is therefore contended, that the court in the three Mthembu cases could260
have regarded Mildred Mthembu as a putative spouse, as she clearly believed (in good
faith) that she was legally (and customarily) married to Tebalo Watson Letsela due to the
fact that part payment of the agreed lobola had been furnished. This would have meant that
a determination (in terms of regulation 2) had to be made by the Minister regarding the
application by Mildred Mthembu.  Further, if the court had proceeded in this manner,261
Mildred would have been entitled to claim half of the difference in accrual, as well as a
child’s share or an amount not exceeding R125000, whichever amount was greater.262
Tembi would have also inherited something here despite her illegitimate status as the
Intestate Succession Act does not distinguish between children based on birth.263
Alternatively, granting Tembi legitimate status would have meant that the deceased’s father
as the lawful successor, was bound to maintain her and her mother.  264
Furthermore, section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act makes provision for
the calling of an expert witness by a court to give evidence as to the existence or not
of a valid customary marriage. In other words, the mere calling of an expert could have
resolved the evidentiary burden pertaining to the existence of a valid customary
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Another criticism leveled against the Mthembu decisions was that the courts merely
applied “official” customary law without enquiring into whether a specific system of
“living” law governed the cause of action.  The courts in Mthembu ignored the fact that266
a particular system of African customary law could have been in issue and that a
revolutionary rule could have developed in the community in which the parties had
resided. In fact, one of the courts declined to engage in such an investigation by relying
on a statement in S v Makwanyane and Another,  which proclaimed “public opinion”267
to be superfluous when courts are required to interpret and apply the Constitution.  268
In the Mthembu decisions, “the passive development of customary law might have
considerably mitigated the conflict with human rights, since by contrast with the ‘official’
customary law, in the ‘living’ law, the principle of male primogeniture is, in fact, not
strictly applied”.  Field research conducted into the customary law of succession in269
South Africa and other Southern African countries illustrates that women are entitled
to inherit.  There is also customary evidence that illegitimate children are also granted270
rights of inheritance.  By simply considering the application of “living” customary law,271
the courts could have allowed the two daughters to inherit and could have circumvented
making a determination into the discriminatory nature of the rule of male
primogeniture.272
By presuming that the successor had a duty to support and maintain the surviving
spouse and children of the deceased, the court neglected to discern that the socio-
economic standing in communities living under customary law are constantly
evolving.  Academic research shows that successors in both rural and urban273
Bennett TW  “Re-introducing African customary law to the South African legal system” (2009) The266
American Journal of Comparative Law 11-12.
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).267
Mthembu (1998) op cit para 685.268
Lehnert W  “The role of the courts in the conflict between African customary law and human rights”269
(2005) South African Journal on Human Rights 256.
Himonga C “Implementing the rights of the child in African legal systems:The Mthembu Journey in search270
of Justice” (2001) International Journal of Children’s Rights 89 and 107 and Mbatha L “Reforming the
customary law of succession” (2002) South African Journal on Human Rights 269 and 271.
Mbatha op cit 268-269 and 271-272.271
Lehnert op cit 257.272
Ibid.273
91
communities are incrementally disregarding their inherent duty of support.  “Because274
heirs are becoming increasingly disobedient with regard to performing their duties,
customary law no longer achieves its social purpose of protecting the interests of all
family members, and the formal recognition of women’s and children’s rights under
customary law does not ensure that they will be respected”.  275
Maithufi argues that when the validity of the principles of customary law are evaluated
in terms of our current constitutional dispensation, the dynamic nature of customary law
should always be borne in mind.  Because customary law is always changing, the276
rules relating to male primogeniture may have also changed. Although the judgments
in Mthembu did not prove to be a satisfactory one for improving the property rights of
African women, it nevertheless provided the necessary impetus for the challenges to
the customary law rules of intestate succession that were to follow. 
 3.6.1.2 Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others
(Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae; Shibi v
Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights
Commission and Another v President of the Republic of
South Africa and Another277
 
The following case is unique as the case was heard together with another application.278
In this section, each application is treated separately and is discussed individually. The
facts and judgment of the court a quo in the case of Bhe will be discussed first and it
will then be followed by a discussion of the facts and judgment of the court a quo in
Shibi. In the next part of this section of the thesis, the researcher will then examine the
single judgment of the Constitutional Court in both these matters. 
Himonga op cit 106 and Maithufi IP “The constitutionality of the rule of primogeniture in customary law274
of intestate succession” (1998) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 146.
Lehnert op cit 257.275
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Shibi v Sithole and Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development Case no 7292/01, 19 November278
2003 (unreported) and South African Human Rights Commission and Women’s Legal Centre Trust v The
President of the Republic of South Africa and Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development.
92
The facts of the Bhe case are briefly as follows: Nontupheko Marena Bhe (the third
applicant) and the deceased had lived together as husband and wife for twelve years.
Nontupheko bore the deceased two minor children namely Nonkululeko, a nine year old
girl (the first applicant) and Anelisa, a two year old girl (the second applicant). Due to
the fact that the first and second applicants were minors and female, they could not
bring the application themselves, but had to be assisted by their mother. It is important
to note that all three applicants were African and of Xhosa descent. During their lives
as husband and wife, the deceased and Nontupheko purchased immovable property
(which they and their children inhabited) with the aid of a state housing subsidy
procured by the deceased. The deceased intended erecting a house on the said
property, but unfortunately died intestate before fulfilling his plan. The first three
applicants continued to reside on the property after the deceased’s death. 
At the time of the deceased’s untimely death, his father (the second respondent)
contended that he was in fact the rightful intestate heir of the deceased in accordance
with the rules applicable to African customary law. On the basis of this assumption, he
asserted that he was entitled to inherit the immovable property of the deceased. He
intimated that he planned to sell the property in question in order to defray the
expenses of the deceased’s funeral. When the applicants discovered the malicious
intentions of the respondent, they immediately acquired an interdict pendente lite,
thereby restricting him from selling the property pending the outcome of their urgent
application. 
In the court a quo,  the court was called upon to make a determination as to whether279
a female person of African descent, whose parents were not married, or married
according to the tenets of African customary law, was eligible for intestate succession,
upon the death of her biological father. The court approached the case by first engaging
in a detailed discussion of the status and position of African customary law in the
current South African legal system. In that part of the judgment, the court gave a
historical synopsis of the status of African customary law before and after the
Unionisation of South Africa. It referred to various pieces of legislation, like the Codes
Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others 2004 (2) SA 544 (C).279
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of Zulu Law, the Black Administration Act, etc that regulate intestate succession
amongst Black people. The court also referred to a number of cases in which
customary law was marginalised and not recognised.  280
The court then embarked on a brief discussion of the customary law of succession.
Here, the court explained that customary law is unwritten, community orientated and
supports male domination. Family members could only own common property through
the family head. The court distinguished between the terms succession and
inheritance  and explained that intestate succession in African customary law is based281
on the principle of male primogeniture.  282
Before attempting to resolve the issues mentioned immediately above, the court was
first confronted with a dispute pertaining to the legitimacy of the first two applicants. The
court indicated that the answer to the question of legitimacy lay in the payment of
lobolo. The third applicant denied that the deceased paid any lobolo for her, whilst the
second respondent maintained that the deceased did in fact pay the requisite lobolo.
The second respondent then argued that on the basis of the fact that the deceased had
paid the requisite lobolo, he was therefore the legal guardian and custodian of the first
applicant. According to Xhosa custom, the custody and guardianship of a grandchild
can only be affirmed if the deceased has paid the mandatory lobolo for the child’s
mother and irrespective of whether the marriage was consummated or not.  On the283
basis of Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd,  the court found284
the first two applicants to be legitimate. 
The court then engaged into an investigation of the constitutionality of the customary law
rule of male primogeniture. The court began by carefully considering the provisions of
Bhe and Others (2004) op cit 548-549.280
See chapter 1 of this thesis.281
Bhe and Others (2004) op cit 550-551.282
Bekker (1989) op cit 251.283
1984 (3) SA 623 (A). “In this case the court found that in certain cases the denial by a respondent of284
a fact alleged by an applicant may not be such that it raises a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact-
if the respondent in such a case fails to apply for deponents concerned to be called for cross-
examination, the court may proceed on the basis of the correctness of the fact alleged by the applicant
if the court is satisfied as to inherent credibility of the applicant’s averments” (Venter and Nel op cit 88).
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sections 2  and 9  of the 1996 Constitution, and the findings of the courts in Mabuza285 286
v Mbatha,  Moseneke v The Master of the High Court  and Western Cape Provincial287 288
Government and Others: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial
Government and Another  and Mthembu v Letsela.  In the court’s view, when testing289 290
law, be it common law, statute or African customary law, the law must be tested against
the values in the Constitution. The court noted that the rule of male primogeniture had
acquired statutory recognition in the Black Administration Act and the regulations
promulgated there-under.  The court then explained some of the sections of the Black291
Administration Act and the regulations, to show how they made provision for the intestate
succession of Blacks. The court concluded that the Black Administration Act was not a
code of African customary law but was a piece of legislation which was based on racial
inequality.  The Intestate Succession Act applies to all races in South Africa and allows292
descendents (irrespective of race, gender or status) to inherit an intestate estate. The first
and second applicants were however precluded from invoking the provisions of the
Intestate Succession Act because according to section 1(4)(b) “intestate” means any part
of any estate which does not devolve by virtue of a will or in respect of which section 23
of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 does not apply.  In other words, the only293
impediment to the first two applicants inheriting from their father’s estate was because
they were black and female. That amounts to discrimination per se on the specific
grounds of race and gender. The court found the discrimination to be prima facie unfair
and offended against the equality provisions of the Constitution (specifically sections 9(1)
and 9(3)).  After stating that some of the provisions of section 23 of the Black294
administration Act prevented the full realisation of its constitutional goals and was in dire
Section 2 provides that: “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law and conduct285
inconsistent with it is invalid; and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”.
See note 128 above. 286
2003 (7) BCLR 743 (C). In Mabuza op cit para 752E-F the court said:287
The proper approach is to accept that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic. Thus any custom
which is inconsistent with the Constitution cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. In line with this approach,
my view is that it is not necessary at all to say that African customary law should not be opposed to the
principles of public policy or natural justice. That approach is fundamentally flawed as it reduces African law
(which is practiced by the vast majority in this country) to foreign law – in Africa!
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need of modification, the court was still reluctant to develop African customary law. In the
court’s point of view, the case at hand did not support a revision of the whole Black
Administration Act and like the court in Mthembu, resolved that this salient responsibility
lay in the capable hands of the legislature.  295
The court concluded by stating that under our current constitutional dispensation, it will
no longer be possible for a male person to be granted preference over a female person
for purposes of inheritance. That amounted to discrimination, plain and simple. The first
two applicants were declared to be the only heirs to the deceased’s estate and they
were entitled to inherit equally.  The court then issued the following order:296
1 It is declared that section 23(10)(a), (c) and (e) of the Black Administration Act are
unconstitutional and invalid and that regulation 2(e) of the Regulations of the
Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks, published
under Government Gazette 10601 dated 6 February 1987 is consequently also
invalid.
2 It is declared that section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 is
unconstitutional and invalid insofar as it excludes from the application of section
1 any estate or part of any estate in respect of which section 23 of the Black
Administration Act 38 of 1927 applies.
3 It is declared that until the aforegoing defects are corrected by competent
Legislature, the distribution of intestate black estates is governed by section 1
of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987.
4 It is declared that the first and second applicants are the only heirs in the estate
of the late Vuyu Elius Mgolombane, registered at Khayelitsha magistrate’s court
under reference No 7/1/2-484/2002.
5 The second respondent is ordered to sign all documents and to take all other
steps reasonably required of him to transfer the entire residue of the said estate
to the first and second applicants in equal shares. If the second respondent fails
to do so the Deputy Sheriff is authorised and directed to do so in his stead.
6 It is declared that the applicants are exclusively entitled to reside in the house at
35 Jula Street, Makaza situated at erf 39678, Khayelitsha, in the City of
Tygerberg, until its distribution and transfer in accordance with this order.  297
The facts of the Shibi case are briefly as follows: In 1995, Daniel Solomon Sithole died





grandparent. The fact that he died without leaving a will meant that his estate had to be
administered in terms of section 23(10) of the Black Administration Act and the
regulations promulgated thereunder. This would mean that the only persons eligible to
inherit the deceased’s intestate estate would be his male cousins; namely Mantabeni
Sithole (first respondent) and Jerry Sithole (second respondent). After considering the
decision of the court in Mthembu, the magistrate responsible for the administration of
the deceased’s estate designated the first respondent as executor of the deceased’s
estate. The first respondent however squandered the estate’s capital and was
subsequently removed from the appointment. Mr Nkuna (an attorney) was then
appointed as executor, and in accordance with the rules of customary law he appointed
the second respondent as the sole heir to the estate of the deceased. 
Charlotte Shibi (the deceased’s sister and the applicant in the matter) opposed the
magistrate’s findings and objected to the system or law implemented in administering
the estate. She approached the court pursuing an order pronouncing her to be the only
heir in the estate of the deceased. She also sought compensation from the first and
second respondents and the Minister. For reasons analogous to the ones enunciated
in the Bhe case, the court rejected the decision of the magistrate and affirmed Charlotte
Shibi as the deceased’s only heir. She was also granted recompense against the first
and second respondents. 
Both these cases then proceeded to the Constitutional Court,  where the applicants298
(Bhe and Shibi) sought confirmation of the orders they had obtained in the Cape High
Court and the Pretoria High Court respectively. A third application for direct access was
brought jointly by the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)  and the299
The majority judgment was delivered by the Deputy Chief Justice (as he was then known) Pius Langa.298
The following justices concurred in the judgment of Langa DCJ: Chaskalson CJ (as he was then
known), Madala J, Mokgoro J, Moseneke J, O’Regan J, Sachs J, Skweyiya J, Van der W esthuizen J
and Yacoob J. 
W hich was established under chapter 9 of the Constitution and is a State organisation promoting299
constitutional democracy. It’s functions include:
(1) (a) promoting respect for human rights and a culture of human rights;
(b) promoting the protection, development and attainment of human rights; and 
(c) monitoring and assessing the observance of human rights in the Republic.
(2) The Human Rights Commission has the powers, as regulated by national legislation, necessary to perform
its functions, including the power –
(a) to investigate and to report on the observance of human rights;
(b) to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated; 
(c) to carry out research; and
97
Women’s Legal Centre Trust,  who sought an order declaring the whole of section 23300
of the Black Administration Act, or alternatively sections 23(1), (2) and (6), to be
unconstitutional and invalid because they were contrary to the tenets of sections 9, 10301
and 28  of the Constitution.  The Commission for Gender Equality acted as amicus302 303
curiae in the matter. 
The central issues before the Court were the constitutional validity of (a) section 23 of the
Black Administration Act, and (b) the customary law rule of male primogeniture.  The304
majority’s approach in this matter (as per Langa DCJ) proceeded along the following lines.
The Court initially set out the legislative provisions governing the customary law of
intestate succession. It examined section 23 in its entirety, and also contemplated certain
of the regulations promulgated there-under namely regulations 2, 3 and 4. The Court also
considered section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act. The Court took cognisance
of the fact that the Constitution  and the Constitutional Court  has given full recognition305 306
to customary law. However, the Court cautioned that although customary law is
(d) to educate (sections 184(1) and (2) of the 1996 Constitution).
W hich is not a State organisation, but whose primary goal: “is to advance and protect the human rights300
of all women in South Africa, particularly black women who suffer many intersecting forms of
disadvantage (Bhe and Others (2005) op cit para 29). 
Section 10 provides that: “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected301
and protected”.
Section 28 provides that:302
(1) Every child has the right to –
(a) to a name and a nationality from birth;
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family
environment;
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services;
(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation;
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices;
(f) not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that –
(i) are inappropriate for a person of that child’s age; or
(ii) place at risk the child’s well-being, education, physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or social
development.
(g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the rights a child
enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period
of time, and has the right to be –
(i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and
(ii) treated in a manner , and kept in conditions, that take account of the child’s age.
(h) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil
proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result; and
(i) not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict.
(2) A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.
(3) In this section “child” means a person under the age of 18 years.
Bhe and Others (2005) op cit para 31.303
Id para 3.304
See specifically sections 30, 31, 211, 39(2) and 39(3).305
See Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) op306
cit para 51.
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recognised by the Constitution and now forms an integral branch of the general law of the
land, it is still subject to the provisions of the Bill of Rights.307
In the past, customary law was interpreted through common law; nowadays it must be
viewed as a vital component of our legal system. Like all law it depends for its ultimate
force and validity on the Constitution. Therefore, the validity of African customary law
must now be determined by reference to the Constitution and not to the common law.308
The Court averred that customary law is not static, but dynamic. The Constitution
facilitates change and development of customary law through sections 39(2) and
211(3).  309
The Court then dealt extensively with the constitutional rights which the amicus curiae
alleged were being infringed upon namely, the rights to human dignity,  equality  and310 311
the rights of children.  The learned justice made reference to the fact that the312
Constitutional Court has frequently reiterated the importance of human dignity in our
current constitutional dispensation in the cases of S v Makwanyane and Another,313
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and
Other,  S v Mamabolo (E TV and Others Intervening),  and Dawood and Another v314 315
Minister of Home Affairs and Others.  The right to equality was also highlighted in316
numerous judgments of the Constitutional Court. Here the Court referred to the case
Section 39(2)-(3) of the Constitution.307
Bhe and Others (2005) op cit para 43-44.308
Id para 44.309
See section 10 of the Constitution.310
Id section 9.311
Id section 28. 312
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) op cit para 144.313
1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) op cit para 28 where Ackermann J stated that “the314
constitutional protection of dignity requires us to acknowledge the value and worth of all individuals as
members of our society”.
2001 (3) SA 409 (CC); 2001 5 BCLR 449 (CC) op cit para 41 where Kriegler J referred to human dignity315
as one of three “conjoined reciprocal and covalent values which are foundational to this country”.
2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) op cit para 35 where the Court noted that:316
The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot therefore be doubted. The Constitution asserts
dignity to contradict our past in which human dignity for black South Africans was routinely and cruelly
denied. It asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in our democracy respect for the intrinsic worth of all
human beings. Human dignity therefore informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of
levels. It is a value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights. This Court has already
acknowledged the importance of the constitutional value of dignity in interpreting rights such as the right to
equality, the right not to be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way, and the right to life. Human
dignity is also a constitutional value that is of central significance in the limitations analysis. Section 10,
however, makes it plain that dignity is not only a value fundamental to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and
enforceable right that must be respected and protected.
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of Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North, and Others.  “Not only is the achievement317
of equality one of the founding values of the Constitution, section 9 of the Constitution
also guarantees the achievement of substantive equality to ensure that the opportunity
to enjoy the benefits of an egalitarian and non-sexist society is available to all, including
those who have been subjected to unfair discrimination in the past”.  The Deputy Chief318
Justice (as he was then known) noted that numerous international instruments (to which
South Africa is a party) recognise the need to safeguard the rights of women and to
eradicate all laws that discriminate against them as well as to abolish all forms of racial
discrimination in our society.  319
With regards to the rights of children, the Court noted that “our constitutional obligations
in relation to children are particularly important for we vest in our children our hopes for
a better life for all”.  It was thus noted that section 28 is not the only right conferred on320
children but most other rights in the Bill of Rights applies equally to children as well.
Children may therefore not be exposed to unfair discrimination in contravention of
section 9(3) just as their adult counterparts may not be.  In particular, the judge321
highlighted two prohibited grounds of discrimination pertinent to the case at hand,
namely sex and birth.  The Court noted that numerous international instruments,  to322 323
1997 (2) SA 261 (CC); 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC) op cit para 20 where Mahomed DP stated that:317
There can be no doubt that the guarantee of equality lies at the very heart of the Constitution. It permeates
and defines the very ethos upon which the Constitution is premised. In the very first paragraph of the
preamble it is declared that there is a “... need to create a new order ... in which there is equality between
men and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and exercise their
fundamental rights and freedoms”.
Bhe and Others (2005) op cit para 50.318




Here the Court made reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which asserts that323
“children, by reason of their physical and mental immaturity need special safeguards and care” (see the
preamble of the Convention). Article 2 of the Convention also states that: “the rights set forth in the
Convention shall be enjoyed regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status”. The court (ibid) also made
reference to article 24(1) if the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) which provides
that: “Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national
or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measure of protection as are required by his status as
a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State”. The court (ibid) also mentioned article 3 of the
African Charter on the Rights and W elfare of the Child which provides that: “children are entitled to enjoy
the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the Charter irrespective of the child’s or his/her
parents’ or legal guardians’ race, ethnic group, colour, sex…birth or other status” and article 21(1)(b)
which provides that: “States parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
harmful social and cultural practices affecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and development of the
child and in particular”(Bhe and Others (2005) op cit para 55). 
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which South Africa is a party, also protected and enhanced the rights of children.  The324
Court also found it necessary to differentiate between common and customary law
stigmas associated with extra-marital birth.  The meaning of “birth” in section 9(3) of325
the Constitution was important because one of the pertinent issues in the case was
whether the differential claims of legitimate and illegitimate children amounts to unfair
discrimination.  The Court stated that:326
The prohibition of unfair discrimination on the ground of birth in s 9(3) of our
Constitution should be interpreted to include a prohibition of differentiating between
children on the basis of whether a child's biological parents were married either at the
time the child was conceived or when the child was born. As I have outlined, extra-
marital children did, and still do, suffer from social stigma and impairment of dignity.
The prohibition of unfair discrimination in our Constitution is aimed at removing such
patterns of stigma from our society. Thus, when section 9(3) prohibits unfair
discrimination on the ground of “birth”, it should be interpreted to include a prohibition
of differentiation between children on the grounds of whether the children’s parents
were married at the time of conception or birth. Where differentiation is made on such
grounds, it will be assumed to be unfair unless it is established that it is not.  327
The Court concluded that section 23 (in its entirety) and the regulations promulgated
there-under were unconstitutional, on the basis that they were blatantly discriminatory
and based purely on race and therefore contravened sections 9 and 10 of the
Constitution. The Court then had to determine whether section 23 and its regulations
could withstand the justification enquiry in terms of the limitations clause. The learned
justice took cognisance of the fact that:
Section 23 was enacted as part of a racist programme, intent on entrenching division
and subordination. Its effect has been to ossify customary law. In the light of its
destructive purpose and effect, it could not be justified in any open and democratic
society.  328
The court subsequently held that section 23 severely infringed the rights to equality and
human dignity and could therefore not be justified under section 36 of the Constitution.
Bhe and Others (2005) op cit paras 55-56.324





In the court’s opinion and in accordance with section 172(1)(a)  of the Constitution;329
section 23 had to be struck down.  330
The Court then turned to consider the constitutionality of the rule of male primogeniture
which was challenged by both the appellants in the matter. Langa DCJ noted that
customary law must be evaluated in its context and is community oriented.  Each331
family member had a role to play in the extended family structure which would
contribute to the good of the community.  Property was owned communally and was332
managed by the family head for the benefit of the family as a whole.  Primogeniture333
disqualified women from succeeding to the intestate property of the family head.  “The334
exclusion of women from heirship and consequently from being able to inherit property
was in keeping with a system dominated by a deeply embedded patriarchy which
reserved for women a position of subservience and subordination and in which they
were regarded as perpetual minors under the tutelage of the fathers, husbands or the
head of the extended family”.335
The Court noted that illegitimate children do not qualify for succession to their father’s
estate in African customary law.  The Court also took cognisance of the fact that the336
social and economic circumstances of Blacks has changed. Extended families have
been substituted with nuclear families. The successor often does not reside with the
entire extended family and as a result thereof, “succession of the heir to the assets of
the deceased does not necessarily correspond in practice with an enforceable
responsibility to provide support and maintenance to the family and dependents of the
deceased”.  Customary law is dynamic and must therefore be given an opportunity to337
adapt and keep pace with changing social conditions and values.  338
This section provides that: 329
When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court –
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its
inconsistency; …










The Court identified that the rule of male primogeniture prohibited the following
categories of persons from inheriting namely widows, daughters, younger sons and
extra-marital children.  This prohibition obviously amounted to unfair discrimination on339
the grounds of birth and gender. In addition to these two grounds, the rule of
primogeniture also contravened the right to human dignity. Since these values form the
foundation of the Constitution, the rule could not be justified under the limitations
clause.  The Court was however emphatic that the judgment reached with regard to340
the rule of male primogeniture, in no way affected the constitutionality of the rule in
other areas of customary law (for example the rules regulating succession to traditional
leadership).  The majority of the Court declined to develop the rule of male341
primogeniture on the basis that it did not have sufficient evidence of “living” customary
law to enable it to do so.  342
After careful consideration of the remedies available, the Court made the following
order. It set aside the orders of the Cape High Court in the Bhe case and the Pretoria
High Court in the Shibi case and subsequently declared the whole of section 23 and the
regulations promulgated thereunder to be unconstitutional and invalid.  It restricted the343
unconstitutionality of the rule of male primogeniture to the customary law of intestate
inheritance alone, since it prevented women and extra-marital children from inheriting
property.  344
Section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 was also found to be
unconstitutional and invalid. Section 1 of the Intestate Succession Act was now
applicable to intestate estates that would have formerly been governed by section 23
of the Black Administration Act.  The Court also held that when applying sections345
1(1)(c)(i) and 1(4)(f) of the Intestate Succession Act to the estate of a deceased person
who was survived by more than one spouse:









calculated by dividing the monetary value of the estate by a number equal to the
number of the children of the deceased who have either survived or predeceased
such deceased person but are survived by their descendants, plus the number
of spouses who have survived such deceased.
(b) each surviving spouse shall inherit a child’s share of the intestate estate or so
much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount fixed from
time to time by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development by notice
in the Gazette, which is the greater; and
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) above, where the assets in
the estate are not sufficient to provide each spouse with the amount fixed by the
Minister, the estate shall be equally divided between the surviving spouses.  346
 
The Court maintained that its order did not operate retrospectively. Finally, it declared
Nonkululeko and Anelisa Bhe and Charlotte Shibi to be the sole heirs of the respective
deceased estates.
The minority’s approach to the issues in dispute differed from that of the majority and
it is that judgment that the researcher will now consider. The judgment of the minority
was delivered by Ngcobo J. He agreed with the majority that section 23 of the Black
Administration Act is unconstitutional and infringes on the rights to equality and
dignity.  He also agreed that the regulations promulgated in terms of section 23 of the347
Black Administration Act and that section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act were
also unconstitutional.  He was also in agreement that the rule of male primogeniture348
was unconstitutional to the extent that it excluded women from succeeding to the
position or status of a family head.  However, Ngcobo J was of the opinion that the349
“rule of primogeniture should be developed to bring it in line with the rights in the Bill of
Rights” as that is what the Constitution instructs us to do.350
In this regard section 39(2) of the Constitution places a duty on courts to develop
customary law so as to bring it in line with the Constitution, in particular the Bill of
Rights.  The development proposed by Ngcobo was to simply remove the reference to351








deceased.  In his opinion, after the burial of the deceased, the family usually meet to352
discuss the devolution of the deceased’s estate. If the family reaches an agreement with
regards to the devolution of the estate, it should be respected and honoured and there
seems to be no reason for any further interference.  In other words, customary law will353
prevail. However, should a dispute arise relating to the choice of law, such dispute (in
Ngcobo’s opinion) should be resolved by the magistrates’ court having jurisdiction. The
magistrate must then make a determination as to the most appropriate system of law to
be applied.  When adjudicating such a dispute, the magistrate must consider what is354
fair, just and equitable. When making a determination as to what is fair, just and
equitable, the magistrate must consider: the assets and liabilities of the estate, the
widow’s contribution to the acquisition of assets, the contribution of family members to
such assets, and whether there are minor children or other dependents of the deceased
who require support and maintenance (to name but a few).  355
This leading decision of the Constitutional Court finally brings the customary law of
intestate succession into line with the values entrenched in the Constitution and
eliminates the gender inconsistencies prevalent with this system of law. However,
numerous criticisms have been levelled against the judgment and these criticisms will
now be considered.
The Constitutional Court invalidated a rule central to African customary law instead of
adapting it to comply with the constitutional principles of equality and dignity.  South356
Africa is a plural society consisting of numerous cultures and ethnic groups, and a
plurality of laws where African customary law is specifically recognised as a legal
system in our Constitution. “Law reform in the country should therefore be aimed at the
establishment of state law pluralism which is based on the equality of the legal











The majority in Bhe, therefore erred in opting to abolish the rule of male primogeniture.
Development or adaptation of the rule in line with section 39(2) of the Constitution would
have been a more appropriate remedy. Courts cannot simply abolish customary law and
substitute it with the common law whenever it conflicts with the Constitution,  as that is not359
in line with section 39(2).  It seems that whenever the Constitutional Court is challenged360
with balancing the values of the Constitution with traditional customary practices, custom
or culture is always sacrificed in favour of the constitutional values which is exactly what
happened in Bhe. However, it is important to note that the values and spirit of African
customary law are not dissimilar to the values and spirit of the Constitution.  In fact, it361
might be possible to harmonise the values of African customary law and the values of the
Constitution (a document based on Western legal tradition) “by following an interpretation
of Western human rights within the traditional, African context”.  Here the concept of362
ubuntu is particularly relevant. Ngcobo J defined “ubuntu” as “encapsulating communality
and the inter-dependence of the members of a community”.  In terms of the African363
customary law of intestate succession, ubuntu would guarantee that in the system of
shared responsibilities and obligations, every family member had access to essential
necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter and healthcare.  In this way, African364
society and African customary law guarantees human dignity “in all material respects, as
within extended families”  and the “powerful ethic of generosity towards all kinfolk assured365
women and children of nurture and protection”.  In S v Makwanyane and Another,  the366 367
Constitutional Court gave ubuntu the status of a legal value and equated it with the right to
human dignity which is one of the cornerstone values of the Constitution.  Therefore, if the368
fundamental values of ubuntu coincide with the foundational values in the Constitution, the
Constitution could be the vehicle for harmonising the laws of South Africa instead of
eliminating them.369
Himonga (2001) op cit 104.359
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) op cit para 214.360
Knoetze E and Olivier M “To develop or not to develop the customary law: That is the question in Bhe”361
(2005) Obiter 131.
Ibid.362
Bhe and Others (2005) op cit para 163.363
Ibid.364
Knoetze and Olivier op cit 131.365
Bennett (1999) op cit 5 as quoted by Knoetze and Olivier op cit 131-132.366
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) op cit para 308.367
Bhe and Others (2005) op cit para 224.368
Van Niekerk (2005) op cit 487.369
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Another problem with the decision of Bhe is that it does not reflect “living” customary
law, and will therefore have little or no consequence for the lives of women living under
customary law, especially in rural communities.  This renders the decision370
inaccessible to the people it was supposed to assist and will in all likelihood “require
more effort and resources to implement it than would have been the case if the decision
had been concerned with ‘living’ customary law”.  If the Court had considered “living”371
customary law, it might have actually been able to develop the rule of primogeniture
without alienating the indigenous communities that live under customary law, from the
new law. “This is especially so since ‘living’ customary law may already have developed
in ways that accommodate egalitarian constitutional values”.  Secondly the scarcity372
of sufficient research data on “living” customary law should not lead courts to simply
decline to develop customary law. In fact, it amplifies the fact that more research data
must be made accessible to the courts so that customary law can be developed.  One373
does not need extensive theoretical research to develop customary law: active
development can be done without determining the complex content of “living” customary
law.  Such development is more desirable than merely replacing customary law with374
the common law rules of intestate succession because “actively developed customary
law can reflect its underlying norms and values”.  375
African customary law was previously regarded as an inferior system of law under
apartheid and colonialism. After the enactment of the Constitution, customary law and
common law have equal status. The decision in Bhe once again creates the impression
that African customary law is inferior to the common law. Moreover, the substitution of
African customary law with the common law may be viewed as preferential treatment
for: one legal system over another and the values of one group of South African society
over another.  This could seriously hamper the implementation of the law as the376
affected communities may simply ignore the “legislation concerned if they do not identify
Himonga C “Advancement of African women’s rights in the first decade of democracy in South Africa:370
The reform of the customary law of marriage and succession” (2005) Acta Juridica 97.
Ibid.371
Ibid.372
Lehnert op cit 269.373
Ibid.374
Id 269-270.375
Himonga (2005) op cit 103.376
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with it, and reduce it to mere paper law that has no relevance to their lives or the lives
of those it intended to protect”.377
The decision in Bhe has created numerous problems of implementation. In this regard,
Higgins  states that in her interviews with South African lawyers and representatives378
of non-governmental organisations working on gender equality issues, the decision in
Bhe has had little or no effect on the adjudication of disputes relating to rights of
intestate succession. Despite the fact that legal services organisations have instituted
training sessions for lawyers and magistrates, numerous intestate estates are still being
administered by members of the family group or traditional leaders in both rural and
urban areas where people are generally ignorant of the Bhe decision.  379
Finally, one of the greatest shortcomings of the Bhe decision is that the Court failed to
encourage active public debate and participation, especially from women. Rather it
imposed a politically motivated decision on the vast majority of South African society.380
Public debate would have created the foundation for extensive knowledge and
acceptance of such a revolutionary standard for the African customary law of intestate
succession.  The Court might even have initiated the development of the rule of male381
primogeniture within communities themselves, thereby allowing communities to “work
out an understanding of the traditions true reflection of the Constitution’s paradigm of
rights”.  After all isn’t that what true democracy is all about?382
3.6.1.3 Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa  383
This was the first case to come before the Constitutional Court dealing with the question
of succession to traditional leadership and gender discrimination. Although this case is
not relevant to the topic of this dissertation, it is an important case to consider as it
contains important principles and has changed the face of customary law forever. 
Ibid.377




Michelman FI “2009 Edward A Seegers lecture – legitimation by Constitution and the news from South382
Africa” (2009-2010) Valparaiso University Law Review 1031.
2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC).383
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The facts of the case were briefly as follows: In 1968, Hosi  Fofoza the traditional384
leader of the Valoyi community died. The only heir born to him from his principal wife,
was a daughter. Hosi Fofoza’s younger brother, Richard, was subsequently appointed
as hosi of the Valoyi community, as women were not allowed to succeed in terms of the
customary law prevalent at the time.  On 22 December 1996 (during the reign of Hosi385
Richard), the Royal family of the Valoyi, in co-operation with Hosi Richard, corporately
affirmed the conferment of traditional leadership on Ms Shilubana.  However, at the386
time of the affirmation, Ms Shilubana was strongly opposed to Hosi Richard being
replaced. Therefore, the Royal Council decided that Hosi Richard would continue to
occupy the position of hosi of the Valoyi community for an indefinite period. 
On 17 July 1997, Hosi Richard acknowleged in the presence of the Chief Magistrate
and 26 witnesses, that Ms Shilubana was the successor to traditional leadership of the
Valoyi community. In keeping with customary protocol and customary law, the Tribal
Authority of the Valoyi, sent a letter to the Commission for Traditional Leaders of the
Limpopo Province, advising them of the decision of the Royal Family to appoint Ms
Shilubana as hosi. On 5 August 1997, the Royal Council agreed to approve the
transferal of Hosi Richard’s powers to Ms Shilubana. On the same day, during a “duly
constituted meeting of the Valoyi tribe”, chaired by Hosi Richard, it was resolved that
“in accordance with the usages and customs of the tribe”, Ms Shilubana would be
designated as hosi.  387
However, on 25 February 1999, Hosi Richard reneged on his support for Ms
Shilubana’s traditional leadership in a letter which was acknowledged by the High
Court  and the Supreme Court of Appeal.  The Royal Family, at a duly constituted388 389
meeting held on 4 November 2001, soon after the death of Hosi Richard, once again
affirmed that Ms Shilubana would succeed as hosi. However, Sidwell (Richard’s son),
contested Ms Shilubana’s planned confirmation as hosi by bringing an urgent interdict
Hosi means traditional leader.384
Shilubana and Others (2008) op cit para 3.385
Id para 4.386
Id para 5.387
Nwamitwa v Phillia 2005 (3) SA 536 (T).388
Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) SA389
432 (SCA).
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and claiming the position of traditional leadership for himself. Sidwell claimed that
because his father was hosi of the Valoyi community, and being the only son of his
father; he was entitled to succeed as hosi.  Ms Shilubana challenged Sidwell’s claim390
on the basis that she was the sole heir of her father (Fofoza) and had a constitutional
right to succeed her father as hosi of the Valoyi. 
In the Pretoria High Court,  Swart J relied on four questions on which oral evidence391
had been led to arrive at a decision. The four questions were:
1.1 Whether in terms of the customs and traditions of the Tsonga/Shangaan tribe,
more particularly the Valoyi tribe, a female can be appointed as Hosi of the
Valoyi tribe?
1.2 Whether [Hosi Richard] was appointed as Hosi or acting Hosi since October
1968?
1.3 Whether when appointing [Ms Shilubana] as a Hosi of the Valoyi tribe the royal
family acted in terms of the customs and traditions of the Valoyi tribe i.e. of the
Tsonga/Shangaan nation?
1.4 Whether decision No 32/2002 by the Executive Council of Limpopo Provincial
Government dated 22 May 2002 appointing [Ms Shilubana] as chief of the Valoyi
tribe, is in accordance with the practices and customs of the Valoyi tribe within
the meaning of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of
1996?392
In response to these questions, the court found that before the enactment of the Interim
Constitution, the customs and the traditions of the Valoyi tribe prevented women from
being appointed as a Hosi.  It was confirmed that Hosi Richard was appointed as393
Hosi.  The court further declared that the appointment of Ms Shilubana was not in394
accordance with custom or tradition as it could find “no precedent in custom or tradition
for the chieftainship to be transferred from the line of a Hosi to another line particularly
by appointing a female”.  The court also dismissed the claim that the Royal family of395
the Valoyi had adapted custom, as the Royal family only has the power to identify and
Shilubana and Others (2008) op cit paras 6 and 7.390
Nwamitwa v Phillia 2005 (3) SA 536 (T).391





confirm a hosi. The Royal Family did not have the power to elect a hosi.  Without396
evidence from all the members of the Valoyi community itself, it was beyond the powers
of the court to conclude that customary law had been altered or adapted.  The court397
further found that the Executive Council’s appointment of Ms Shilubana as chief of the
Valoyi tribe was contrary to the traditions and customs of the Valoyi community.398
According to the court, Ms Shilubana was therefore disqualified from succeeding to hosi
on the basis of her ancestry and not on the basis of her sex.399
The Supreme Court of Appeal  relied on the same four questions as Swart J in the400
Pretoria High Court and substantially confirmed the High Court’s judgment in all
respects.  The case then proceeded to the Constitutional Court. The Commission for401
Gender Equality, the National Movement of Rural Women and the Congress of
Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) were all admitted as amicus curiae
in the matter.  The Constitutional Court had to determine whether the Royal family had402
the requisite power to develop the customary laws of the Valoyi community to prohibit
discrimination based on gender when choosing a successor to traditional leadership.
The Court also had to consider whether the Valoyi community had the power to restore
the position of traditional leadership to the house from which it had been removed by
virtue of pre-constitutional gender discrimination.  403
The Court began addressing the various issues placed before it by asking a question:
What is the proper approach to adopt when seeking to determine a rule of customary
law?  In this regard, the Court noted that the status of customary law is recognised in404
our Constitution; that section 211 recognises the institution, status and role of traditional
leadership, subject to the Constitution; and that a traditional authority that observes a
system of customary law may function subject to applicable legislation and customs,
Id para 545B-F.396
Id para 545D.397
Id paras 546D-547D and 548E-H.398
Id para 548E-H.399
Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) SA400
432 (SCA).
Id paras 46, 47, 49 and 50-51.401




including amendments to or repeal or that legislation and those customs, and that
courts must apply customary law where it is applicable, subject to the Constitution and
relevant legislation.  On the basis of the Constitutional Court’s decisions in Bhe and405
Alexkor v Richtersveld Community the Court found that customary law must comply with
the Constitution, and must be treated with respect and as an intrinsic part of our law.406
Accordingly, the proper approach to adopt when seeking to determine a rule of
customary law “must be informed by several factors”.  First, one must examine the407
customs and practices of the relevant community.  Second, one must honour the right408
of communities that adhere to systems of customary law to develop their law.  Third,409
courts must take into consideration the fact that African customary law controls and
governs the lives of people. The demand for adaptability and the necessity to promote
development must be weighed up against the value of legal certainty, respect for
inherent rights, and the preservation of constitutional rights.  Furthermore, a court410
deliberating on any customary law matter must continue to be diligent to its
constitutional duty under section 39(2) to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the
Bill of Rights.  411
The Court then turned to consider whether Mr Nwamitwa had a lawful right to succeed
under African customary law. In making this determination, the Court began its enquiry
by referring th the classical test for the existence of custom as a source of law as set
out in Van Breda and Others v Jacobs and Others  where it was held that to be412
recognised as law, a practice must be certain, uniformly observed for a long period of
time and reasonable. The standard of reasonableness would now have to be applied
in a manner consonant with the Constitution.  The Court noted that customary law is413
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Development implies some departure from past practice. A rule that requires absolute
consistency with past practice before a court will recognise the existence of a customary
norm would therefore prevent the recognition of new developments as customary law.
This would result in the courts applying laws which communities themselves no longer
follow, and would stifle the recognition of the new rules adopted by the communities in
response to the changing face of South African society. This result would be contrary to
the Constitution and cannot be accepted.415
The Court held that the test in Van Breda could not be applied to customary law, where
the development of “living law” was at issue.  The Court reasoned that although past416
customs are cardinal in African customary law, they merely constitute one integral factor
to be contemplated with other integral factors. Where a cultural pattern is apparent from
traditional practice and there is no further evidence that a modern development has
occurred or is still occurring, past practice will be enough to establish a rule. But where
the modern custom of the community intimates that development has taken place, past
practice alone is insufficient and cannot on its own, confirm a right (in this case a right
of succession) with certainty.  The Court concluded that the past practice of the Valoyi417
community was cardinal, but not conclusive in determining whether Sidwell Nwamitwa
had the right to succeed as hosi.  418
The Court then turned to consider the lawfulness of the actions of the Royal family in
the case. At this point, the Court felt that on the evidence placed before it,  it could not419
clearly ascertain whether the installation of Ms Shilubana as hosi of the Valoyi
community by the Royal family or traditional authorities was permissible or lawful
according to African customary law.  The Court then turned to consider whether the420
decision of the traditional authorities to elect Ms Shilubana as hosi was an attempt to
bring their customary law in line with the Constitution. Here the Court found that the
Royal family of the Valoyi purported to restore the chieftainship to a woman who would
have been appointed hosi in 1968, were it not for the fact that she was a woman. As far








from which it was removed on the basis that he only had a female and not a male
heir.  On this basis the Court concluded that the Royal family or traditional authorities421
had the requisite power to act as they did,  as they are the benchmark of any power422
in the relevant customary community on issues of succession.  423
Section 211(2) specifically provides for the right of traditional communities to function
subject to their own system of customary law, including amendment or repeal of laws.
A community must be empowered to itself act so as to bring its customs into line with
the norms and values of the Constitution. Any other result would be contrary to section
211(2) and would be disrespectful of the close bonds between a customary
community, its leaders and its laws.424
The Court concluded that the traditional authority had the power to consider the
Constitution when determining matters of traditional leadership and that the conduct of
the Royal family in appointing Ms Shilubana as hosi of the Valoyi tribe, amounted to a
development of African customary law.  The next question the Court had to consider425
was whether the development of African customary law by the Valoyi community should
be recognised as law? Although the Valoyi may have detracted from the previously
existing rule that a woman could never be appointed as a chief, they nevertheless
complied with all the other aspects of customary law regulating matters of succession
to chieftainship.  The installation of Ms Shilubana as hosi may require further426
development. Such further developments must first be conducted by the relevant
traditional authorities pursuant to the customs and practical needs of the relevant
community and the Constitution.  The Court deduced that the High Court and the427
Supreme Court of Appeal had erred in concluding that the Royal family did not have the
necessary authority to act as they did. Furthermore, these lower courts did not
deliberate adequately on the historical and constitutional context of the judgment, more
importantly the entitlement of traditional authorities to develop their own customary










chieftainship of the Valoyi. At most, he merely had an expectation that as the oldest
male child of Hosi Richard, he would have been successor. The past practice of the
Valoyi community does not itself ensure that Sidwell Nwamitwa’s expectation must be
realised. The modern customs and traditions of the Valoyi attest to a valid legal change,
thereby effectuating or culminating in the succession of Ms Shilubana to the
chieftainship. Because of this amended position and in terms of the present customary
law of the Valoyi, Sidwell Nwamitwa could not be appointed or installed as chief.429
The judgment of the Constitutional Court in Shilubana has been met with mixed
emotions by the legal fraternity. Some legal scholars have applauded the decision,
whilst others have criticised it extensively. In this section, the researcher will highlight
some of the views of academics on this decision. Ntlama  is of the opinion that the430
Court’s reluctance to consider past practice as establishing a customary law rule,
obviates the essential need to determine and understand the nature of customary law
for the purpose of investigating intestate succession. If no reference is made to past
practice because it is assumed that it will hinder the evolution of new customary
practices, it restricts the potential of a court to confirm the context or history of a rule of
customary law with absolute certainty.  Furthermore, the Court’s acceptance of the431
dynamic nature of customary law not only requires a mere reference to past practice,
but an in depth examination and investigation of the rule of customary law – something
that was clearly lacking in the Shilubana judgment.432
The Court’s reliance on section 211(2) of the Constitution as the foundation for its
development of customary law, was erroneous.  The main purpose of section 211 of433
the Constitution is to recognise the institution, status and role of traditional leadership
and the applicability of customary law to traditional leadership.  Although section434
211(2) alludes to the dynamic nature of customary law, the development of African
Id para 86.429
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customary law is merely implied in these provisions, as express provision for the
development of African customary law is made in other sections of the Constitution.435
In this regard, section 39(2) of the Constitution definitively provides for the development
of customary law by a court, tribunal or forum in accordance with the spirit, purport and
objects of the Constitution. The “obligation imposed on courts is therefore peremptory
in character”.  436
If we read section 39(2) contextually, it is clear that customary law can only be
developed by particular institutions, namely the courts, tribunals and forums. Such
institutions are “independent and impartial” and are bound by the Constitution and all
other laws of South Africa”,  and their principal function is to interpret the law and to437
apply such law in order to find a solution to disputes.  Therefore, in terms of our law,438
customary law can only be developed during an adjudicative process, “which is
amongst others, when a customary law principle is being interpreted. In other words,
courts, tribunals and forums do not have a constitutional mandate to develop customary
law as a mandate separate from their interpretive and adjudicative functions”.  Neither439
the Royal family nor the Royal Council, is a judicial body. A traditional court might
qualify as a judicial body and would thus have the authority to develop customary law
as envisaged in section 39(2) of the Constitution. However, the issue in Shilubana was
never adjudicated on by a traditional court, and thus, there was no development of the
customary law by the relevant customary community within the context of section
39(2).  One could therefore contend that in Shilubana, the Constitutional Court440
relinquished its obligation to develop customary law in accordance with the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Instead of interpreting the rule of male
primogeniture as it applies to succession to traditional leadership and in the context on
section 39(2), the Court merely accepted the development of customary law by the
community as its legal and constitutional yardstick.  Proper interpretation of the courts441
Id 222-223.435
Id 224.436
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obligation in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution would have resulted in the Court
investigating the rule of male primogeniture in the context of succession to chieftaincy,
then weighing it up against the values of the Constitution especially the value of equality
and then finally engaging in a justification analysis in terms of section 36 of the
Constitution.  However, no such procedure ever manifested itself in the Constitutional442
Court in Shilubana. 
According to our Constitution, we have three legislative making bodies, namely national,
provincial and local government. If we grant legislative powers to traditional leaders; we
would be adding a fourth legislator to the dimension and that would be contrary to the
powers afforded to the three constitutionally recognised levels of government.
Secondly, if traditional leaders were assigned powers to create legislation, they might
change other rules of customary law unnecessarily and unilaterally without even
consulting the communities their laws would affect.  443
In this regard, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003
could have been of assistance.  It is rather unfortunate that none of the three courts444
mentioned the relevant Act. Section 2(3) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance
Framework Act 41 of 2003 provides that:
A traditional community must transform and adapt customary law and customs
relevant to the application of this Act so as to comply with the relevant principles
contained in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, in particular by –
(a) preventing unfair discrimination;
(b) promoting equality; and
(c) seeking to progressively advance gender representation in the succession to
traditional leadership positions.
The Shilubana decision has also been criticised for not making reference to the
available literature on the topic of traditional leadership and for failing to adequately
Id 228-230.442
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Journal of Southern Africa 460.
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investigate the rules or practices of customary law in that regard.  According to Bekker445
and Boonzaaier,  no customary law rule permits a royal family to unilaterally make law.446
If a traditional council changes an existing law or practice, such a change must be
referred to a community gathering or pitso for endorsement.  From the facts of the447
Shilubana case it does not appear that such community confirmation occurred. 
The Shilubana judgment has been applauded for being revolutionary, creative and
transformative and has been hailed as a decision that commemorates gender equality
in disputes relating to succession to traditional leadership.  It has also been448
commended for being “consistent with the grand transformative agenda of the
Constitution, the equality jurisprudence progressively developed by the Constitutional
Court since its inception as well as international law obligations in respect of women,
that South Africa has undertaken after its transition from apartheid in 1994”.  One449
academic also argues that one will likely see an improvement in the number of women
appointed to the office of traditional leadership, as a result of the judgment, and that the
approach adopted by the Court is success for the protection and realisation of women’s
rights.  The decision also considers the customary community and honours the ruling450
of a traditional authority especially when it is consistent with the spirit and purport of the
Bill of Rights.  Both the criticisms and praises for the Shilubana judgment are noted.451
Although the decision leaves many unanswered questions like the future succession
of the Valoyi tribe, and although the approach of the Court may be legally defective and
erroneous, the researcher welcomes the decision (to an extent) as it is in keeping with
sections 2  and 39(2) of the Constitution and ultimately brings a rule of customary law452
in line with the values and principles of the Constitution. The researcher also favours
the judgment as it endorses (albeit not explicitly) the community nature of customary
law and accepts that communities may develop existing rules of custom. If a community
Kerr AJ “The Constitution and customary law: Notes” (2009) South African law Journal 41-42.445
Bekker and Boonzaaier (2009) op cit 459.446
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(like the Valoyi) collectively welcome change and progression in a continuously evolving
society; then who are we to judge. 
From the decisions of the courts above, it is self-evident that the Constitutional Court
is a forerunner in amending, developing and abolishing laws inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution. In instances where the lower courts have tread cautiously
regarding the customs of the indigenous African people of South Africa (like in the
cases of Mthembu), the Constitutional Court has rigorously (like in the cases of Bhe and
Shilubana) developed the existing rules of customary law thereby protecting the rights
of the most vulnerable members of our society, ie, women and children, and thus
ensuring that the “systematic discrimination of Black people (especially women and
children) in all aspects of social life”  is slowly being eradicated.453
The Black Administration Act and the regulations promulgated there-under have also
been severely criticised for being racist, outdated and discriminatory. As a result
thereof, both these pieces of legislation have also been at the forefront of South Africa’s
judicial debate. In the following section, the researcher will discuss how the courts have
dealt with the choice of law rules governing the customary law of intestate succession
in South Africa’s constitutional democracy. 
3.6.2 The choice of law rules 
3.6.2.1 Zondi v The President of the Republic of South Africa and
Others454
 
The facts of the case were as follows: On 24 July 1953, Simon Mfana Ngidi and Beauty
Ngidi concluded a marriage out of community of property and of profit and loss in terms
of section 22(6)  of the Black Administration Act. No children were born to them during455
the subsistence of their marriage. Beauty Ngidi died in October 1992 and Simon Ngidi
Brink v Kitshoff No 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) para 40.453
2000 (2) SA 49 (N).454
Section 22(6) has subsequently been repealed but it nevertheless gave a black person the choice to455
enter into one of three types of marriage viz marriage by ante-nuptial contract, marriage in community
of property or marriage out of community of property. 
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(the deceased) died on 24 June 1995. According to the evidence presented to the
court, the deceased was not a partner to another customary union at the time of his
demise. He did however father two illegitimate children. At the time of his death it was
agreed that his estate had to be administered in terms of regulation 2 of the Regulations
for the Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks.  Regulation456
2 contained different rules of succession applicable to different marriages. 
The fact that the deceased’s estate had to be administered in terms of Black law and
custom, meant that the deceased’s brother, Muntu Frederick Ngidi (the fourth
respondent) was the only male person eligible to inherit the intestate estate. This was
in accordance with the rule of male primogeniture. The deceased’s illegitimate children
were excluded from the line of inheritance because customary law disqualified children
born out of wedlock from inheriting property. As a result of this obviously unjustifiable
situation, the applicant (one of the illegitimate female children of the deceased), sought
an order declaring regulation 2 to be unconstitutional.
The court first identified that the Black Administration Act regulated the marriage of
Africans and distinguished between marriages concluded in terms of an antenuptial
contract according to the law of the land, marriages solemnised in community of
property and traditional customary union marriages. The Black Administration Act and
the Regulations promulgated there-under also regulated intestate succession. In cases
where a marriage was concluded out of community of property, intestate succession
would proceed according to the rules found in the Black Administration Act and the
regulations promulgated there-under. However, the regulations provided that where a
marriage was concluded in community of property, intestate succession was regulated
according to the rules applicable in the Intestate Succession Act. In this regard section
1(2) of that Intestate Succession Act provided that: 
notwithstanding the provisions of any law or the common law, but subject to the
provisions of this Act and section 5(2) of the Children’s Status Act 82 of 1987,
illegitimacy shall not affect the capacity of one blood relation to inherit the intestate
estate of another blood relation. 
Contained in Government Notice R200 of 1987 GG  10601 of 6 February 1987. 456
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From the above it is poignantly clear that the Intestate Succession Act makes no
distinction between a child born out of wedlock and a child born in wedlock for purposes
of intestate succession.  The court noted that the drafters of the regulations457
distinguished between the different forms of marriage for purposes of intestate
succession, to ensure that if a male person had contracted a customary union, his
property would be distributed according to customary law.  The court stated that458
customary law is recognised in our Constitution and that African customary law has its
own inherent family support systems. In this regard, children born out of wedlock would
therefore be maintained and supported by their maternal family and would not be
allowed any maintenance and support from the paternal side.  The court further459
pointed out that the fact that the deceased contracted a marriage out of community of
property is evidence that he did not want his property to be distributed according to
customary law.  460
The court pointed out that the distinction between the different types of marriages and
the way in which that distinction affected an individual’s vested right to inherit, had the
effect of differentiating between classifications of illegitimate children. The court
established that both legitimate and illegitimate children were capable of inheriting from
the intestate estates of their natural fathers, under the Intestate Succession Act;
irrespective of the type of marital regime governing the marriage.  The court also461
stated that it was indeed possible for both legitimate and illegitimate children of a
deceased African person to be eligible for inheritance in cases where the deceased was
either married in community of property or by way of an ante-nuptial contract. On the
other hand though, the illegitimate children of a deceased African married out of
community of property did not qualify for inheritance at all, and that amounted to unfair
discrimination.  462
The court then turned to consider the constitutionality of the regulations promulgated
under the Black Administration Act. In this regard, the court considered the supremacy







and equality clauses of the Constitution and concluded that the regulation in question
violated the equality provisions of the Constitution.463
In order to advance the values enshrined in the Constitution, the court held that the
regulation be struck down,  thereby conferring equal rights of succession to all children464
born out of wedlock. The court commented that its decision and approach was in
accordance with international law which provided that: “A child born out of wedlock shall
have the same rights of succession in the estate of it father and its mother and of a
member of its father’s or mother’s family as if it had been born in wedlock”.465
The Zondi decision was well received by the legal fraternity. The general consensus
was that the distinction drawn by regulation 2 was undeniably discriminatory and
warranted invalidity.  However, the decision has also evoked considerable criticism.466
According to Mamashela and Freedman,  the only disappointing omission of the467
judgment was that the court “did not indicate the precise grounds upon which it found
the differentiation to be discriminatory and thus invalid”. In the opinion of the authors,468
the court failed to investigate the differentiation in terms of the equality test pronounced
by the Constitutional Court in the case of Harksen v Lane.  469
Id para 52-53.463
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(a) Does the challenged law or conduct differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does the
differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose? If it does not, then there is
a violation of section 9(1). 
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two-stage analysis:
(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to “discrimination”. If it is on a specified ground, then
discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there
is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributes and
characteristics that have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human
beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.
(ii) If the differentiation amounts to “discrimination”, does it amount to “unfair discrimination”? If it has
been found to have been on a specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an
unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the complainant. The test of unfairness
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When contrasting the scenarios in common law and customary law, the court
erroneously presupposed the rigid application of the rule of primogeniture.  If the court470
employed “living” customary law, it could have circumvented excluding Zondi from
inheriting. In fact, “the development of the customary law in this case would have
achieved the same result as the application of the common law”.  471
The decision in Zondi is also problematic because it assumes that the application of
customary law is discriminatory because people are treated more satisfactorily under
the common law than under customary law.  This argument intimates that472
discrimination is intrinsic in legal pluralism. In order to alleviate this problem, the court
should have therefore contrasted children, who, under customary law, possess or do
not possess rights to inherit instead of contrasting illegitimate children under the
common law and under customary law.473
Another criticism leveled against the judgment is that the methodology employed by the
judge in reaching his decision was substantially flawed. According to some
academics,  the case should have been decided on the basis of the provisions of the474
KwaZulu-Natal Codes of Zulu Law. In this regard, section 81(5) of the KwaZulu Act on
the Code of Zulu Law  and section 79(3) of the Natal Code of Zulu Law  provide that: 475 476
Notwithstanding any provisions in any other law contained, the estate of a Black
married by civil rites shall devolve according to the Succession Act, 1934 (Act 13 of
1934) as amended. 
This meant that in cases where Blacks solemnised their marriages according to civil law
or the tenets of Christianity, their intestate estates would devolve according to the
Intestate Succession Act, regardless of the matrimonial property regime governing the
focuses primarily on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her
situation. 
 (c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to whether the
provision can be justified under the limitations clause (Harksen op cit para 54).
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marriage. It was therefore inessential for the court to investigate the constitutionality of
regulation 2.  477
Although the decision in Zondi was not without considerable shortcomings, it
nevertheless sparked the beginning of a movement by especially the judiciary, to re-
think and re-evaluate the choice of law rules regarding intestate succession. This
movement continued to gain momentum in the cases that are going to be considered
hereafter. 
3.6.2.2 Moseneke v The Master of the High Court  478
Sedise Samuel John Moseneke died intestate in October 1999. His estate comprised
immovable property, motor vehicles, shares, unit trusts and insurance policies. He was
survived by his widow and four sons (the applicants). Shortly after the deceased’s
death, the applicants sent a collection of documents pertaining to the administration of
the deceased’s estate to the Master. They were subsequently informed by the
magistrate, that he was responsible for administering the estate. The reason for this
was governed by section 23(7) of the Black Administration Act which provided that:
Letters of administration from the Master of the Supreme Court shall not be necessary
in, nor shall the Master or any executor appointed by the Master have any powers in
connection with, the administration and distribution of –
(a) the estate of any black who has died leaving no valid will.
Additionally, regulation 3(1)  provided that:479
All the [designated] property in any estate [of a black person who dies leaving no valid
will]… shall be administered under the supervision of the magistrate in whose area of
jurisdiction the deceased ordinarily resided and such magistrate shall give such
directions in regard to the distribution thereof as shall seem to him fit and shall take
all steps necessary to ensure that the provisions of the Act and of these regulations
are complied with.
Freedman and Mamashela op cit 207.477
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In other words, these previously mentioned provisions prohibited the Master of the High
Court from administering the estates of blacks who died intestate. It is important to note
that the Master of the High Court did in fact have the power though to administer the
testate estates of Blacks and the intestate estates of all Whites, Coloureds and Indians
in South Africa. The applicants found this situation to be intolerable and commenced
proceedings in the Transvaal High Court. They sought an order directing the Master to
administer the estate and asked the court to affirm that his refusal to do so was illegal
and unconstitutional.  The Master of the High Court filed a report with the court to the480
effect that, in terms of the Black Administration Act, and the regulations promulgated
there-under, his office did not have the requisite authority to administer the intestate
estates of Blacks.  The family then lodged a supplementary affidavit in which they481
claimed that the Black Administration Act and its regulations were unconstitutional and
invalid.  The High Court found section 23(7) of the Black Administration Act and482
regulation 3(1) to be unconstitutional and invalid.  The Registrar of the High Court483
referred the matter to the Constitutional Court for confirmation of the order of the High
Court in accordance with section 172(2)(a)  of the Constitution. 484
The Master opposed confirmation of the High Court’s order on the basis that his office
was not tasked with the requisite manpower, monetary resources and infrastructure, to
administer intestate Black estates. Both he and the Minister argued that the delegation
of the administration of deceased estates to magistrates was labour-saving and cost
effective.  The Women’s Legal Centre Trust joined the debate as amicus curiae  and485 486
endorsed the nullification of the offending provisions as they discriminated directly and
indirectly against African widows on the grounds of race, gender and culture.487
The Court began its judgment by giving a brief outline of South Africa’s unpleasant
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racist history and its association with the offending Act.  The Court expressed488
dissatisfaction with the plain fact that people were still being treated as “Blacks” instead
of ordinary individuals and contended that such a state of affairs hindered the formation
of a non-racial society.  The Court averred that section 23(7) and regulation 3(1) both489
inflicted differential treatment on the grounds of race, ethnic origin and colour,  and490
as such established discrimination which was presumably unfair in terms of section 9(5)
of the Constitution and also infringed the right to human dignity in section 10.  491
The Court also found that the relevant provision in the Black Administration Act and the
regulation are not reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
equality, freedom a dignity, as no society would condone a distinction of treatment based
exclusively on skin colour.  The Court held section 23(7) of the Black Administration Act492
and regulation 3(1) to be inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.  493
The formulation of a just and equitable order however, posed an enormous challenge
for the court. The Court acknowledged that the immediate and arrant nullification of
section 23(7) and regulation 3(1) would generate operational difficulties.  As a result494
thereof, they reached a compromise and ordered that: (a) settlements or arrangements
already concluded under the relevant section and regulation should not be disrupted
or altered; and (b) African families could opt to either have the estate of a deceased
relative administered by the Master or the magistrate, in cases where a family member
died intestate and their estate does not fall to be administered in terms of the rules of
customary law. In order to give effect to (b), the court ruled that section 23(7)(a) was
invalid with immediate effect, but postponed the invalidity of the relevant regulation for
a period of two years thereby still making it possible for magistrates to administer the
estates of blacks.  495
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Id para 21 and para 22.489
See section 9(3) of the Constitution.490






The recommended resolution expounded upon above was however rejected by counsel
for the amicus curiae. In her opinion, the administration of intestate estates by
magistrates and the continued existence of regulation 3 on our law books had a
negative impact on widows and children. She duly noted that the Administration of
Estates Act  empowered women by allowing them to either appoint an executor or be496
nominated as an executor.  She suggested that the declaration of invalidity of497
regulation 3(1) be suspended for a shorter period than the two years advocated by the
Court.  However, in the Court’s assessment of the case, it felt that it did not have498
sufficient information to warrant an enquiry into the enigmatic issue raised by counsel
for the amicus.  499
It must be emphasised, that application of the decision in Moseneke was only restricted
to estates that are distributed according to the common law and does not affect estates
that are distributed according to African customary law.  The judgment in Moseneke500
also did not have any impact on the other regulations (promulgated in terms of the
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927) and pertaining to the powers and duties of
magistrates to administer property that devolved according to customary law.  In other501
words, magistrates still had the authority to administer the estates of:
(a) a deceased who was a partner to a customary marriage;
(b) a deceased who had never contracted a marriage.502
In pursuance of the judgment in Moseneke, the legislature amended the Administration
of Estates Act 66 of 1965 (as amended by the Administration of Estates Amendment
66 of 1965.496
Section 18(1) provides that the Master may convene a meeting with: “the surviving spouse … the heirs497
of the deceased and all persons having claims against the estate … for the purpose of recommending
to the Master for appointment as executor or executors, a person or specified number of persons”.
Moseneke op cit para 29.498
Id para 30.499
Id para 27.500
Rautenbach C “Moseneke v The Master 2001 2 SA 18 (CC): Racial discrimination laws and the501
interests of justice” (2003) Potchefstroom Electronic Journal 14.
Bekker JC “The official status of customary law – ten years later” (2003) Anthropology Southern Africa502
127. See also Rautenbach C “The administration of black estates: Life before and after 5 December
2002” (2004) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 227.
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Act 47 of 2002) with the insertion of a section 2A  which provided for the creation of503
“service points” throughout the country where authorised persons acting on behalf of
and under the direction of the Master could assist the families of Blacks whose estates
devolve according to the common law. With regards to this development, it is rather
interesting that although the legislature is against discrimination on the grounds of race,
it still finds it acceptable to discriminate on the ground of the applicable rules of
succession,  especially those pertaining to the continued authority of magistrates as504
explained above. 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act,  together with the cases of Zondi and505
Bhe have eliminated some of the problems associated with the choice of law rules. For
example, one could assert that marriage has no rational connection to a deceased’s
cultural affiliation therefore regulation 2(c) is no longer necessary.  Secondly, the506
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has eliminated the justification for the rules,
since all monogamous customary marriages are now naturally in community of property
unless the spouses concluded and antenuptial contract which makes provision for an
alternative matrimonial property system. 
Section 2A provides that:503
(1) The Minister may designate posts in, or additional to, the fixed establishment of the Department of Justice
and Constitutional Development for the purpose of this section.
(2) Persons appointed to, or acting in, posts which have been designated by the Minister, must exercise the
powers and perform the duties delegated to them on behalf of, and under the direction of the Master.
(3) The Minister may designate places within the area of jurisdiction of a Master as service points where the
powers are exercised and the duties are performed on behalf of the Master in terms of subsection (2).
(4) The Minister may delegate any power conferred on him or her in terms of this section to the Director-General:
Justice and Constitutional Development or to a person in the Department holding the rank of a deputy-
Director-General. 
Bekker (2003) op cit 127.504
120 of 1998.505
Knoetze op cit 142.506
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3.6.2.3 Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others
(Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae; Shibi v
Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights
Commission and Another v President of the Republic of
South Africa and Another507
The case of Bhe is also relevant to the issue of the choice of law rules. However the
case was discussed at length under section 3.5 of this thesis and will not be elaborated
upon any further at this juncture. All that needs to be said is that in Bhe, the
Constitutional Court took the debate concerning the administration of black estates one
step further than Moseneke and declared the whole of section 23 of the Black
Administration Act to be fundamentally unconstitutional, as from 15 October 2004.  508
As a result of the orders made in Bhe, Moseneke and Zondi, the legislature was then
tasked with the responsibility of enacting legislation developing the customary law of
intestate succession in order to give effect to the rulings of the various courts. In the
next section of this chapter, we consider the legislative inroads made in the area of the
customary law of intestate succession. 
3.7 The role of the legislature in the development of the
customary law of intestate succession
3.7.1 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000
3.7.1.1 Introduction and general provisions of the Act
 
Section 9(4) of the Constitution obliges government or Parliament to enact national
legislation preventing or prohibiting unfair discrimination. In 2000, the legislature
discharged the obligation imposed by this section and enacted the Promotion of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (hereafter the Equality
2005 (1) SA 580 (CC).507
Bhe (2005) op cit paras 130, 132 and 136.508
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Act). The Equality Act also complies with South Africa’s obligations under international
law with particular reference to the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination  and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms509
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  510
The Act applies both horizontally and vertically as it “binds the State and all persons”.511
Any person acting in their own interest; any person acting on behalf of another person
who cannot act in their own name; any person acting as a member of, or in the interest
of, a group or class of persons; any person acting in the public interest; any association
acting in the interest of its members and the South African Human Rights Commission,
or the Commission on Gender Equality may institute proceedings in terms of or under
the Act.  The Act establishes Equality Courts whose sole jurisdiction involves the512
hearing of complaints instituted under the Act.  In terms of the Act, every magistrate’s513
court and every High court is regarded as an equality court for the area of its
jurisdiction  and the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the Commission on514
Gender Equality (CGE) is recognised as “alternative forums”. 
3.7.1.2 Specific provisions relating to the customary law of
succession
For purposes of this chapter, only the sections relating to or affecting the customary law
of intestate succession will be discussed. In this regard section 6 is of particular
importance as it prohibits the State and any other person from unfairly discriminating
against any person. The Act defines discrimination as:
Any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation which
directly or indirectly – 
(a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or
(b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on one or more
of the prohibited grounds.  515
Adopted in 1965 and came into operation in 1969.509







The Act sets out the meaning of unfair discrimination and lists the factors to take into
account in determining fairness or unfairness,  since discrimination is only unlawful516
if it is unfair. In addition to the general prohibition against discrimination in section 6, the
Act makes provision for the prohibition of discrimination on specified listed grounds
which include race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin,
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language
and birth.  This list is not exhaustive as the Act also sets out “additional criteria for517
determining whether an unlisted ground is a prohibited ground”.  Although the518
seventeen listed grounds are important, the Act takes special cognisance of three
grounds: race, gender and disability. Of these three grounds, gender has the most
significant impact on customary succession laws and it is this particular ground that I
now focus on. 
Section 8 of the Act provides that:
Subject to section 6, no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the
ground of gender, including –
(a) gender-based violence;
(b) female genital mutilation;
(c) the system of preventing women from inheriting family property;
(d) any practice, including traditional, customary or religious practice, which impairs
the dignity of women and undermines equality between women and men,
including the undermining of the dignity and well-being of the girl child;
(e) any policy or conduct that unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance,
and any other resources;
(f) discrimination on the ground of pregnancy;
(g) limiting women’s access to social services or benefits, such as health, education
and social security;
(h) the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual
opportunities for rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to
reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons;
See section 14(1)-(3).516
Section 1(1)(xxii)(a).517
Albertyn C, Goldblatt B and Roederer C Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of518
Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2001) 55. In this regard, section 1(1)(xxii)(b) provides that:
any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground –
(i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage;
(ii) undermines human dignity; or
(iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious manner that is
comparable to discrimination on a ground in paragraph (a). 
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(i) systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women as a result of the sexual
division of labour. 
 
Section 8(c), (d) and (e) endeavours to eliminate discrimination arising from cultural and
religious laws and practices. The Act identifies that women experience discrimination
in cultural and religious communities whereby men are granted certain rights and
privileges to the exclusion of women. One such example is the customary law
prohibition on the inheritance of property by women (the rule of primogeniture) and their
inability to participate in traditional decision-making organisations in their social
groups.  Such discrimination is grossly unfair and in need of eradication, which is what519
the Act purports to do. 
The inequality and injustice experienced by the majority of South Africa’s citizens is
finally being eradicated by the enactment of legislation aimed at eliminating
discrimination of any kind. The Act supplements section 9 of the Constitution and once
again highlights Government’s continued commitment to the promotion of the
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights
and freedoms.  The Equality Act also seeks to alter existing “social relations in the520
country”  by obliging persons operating in the public domain to promote equality  and521 522
the social commitment by all persons to promote equality.523
The Act is however not free from problems. Section 8(c) of the Equality Act seems to
eradicate the whole system of the customary law succession, without considering the
cultural consequences of such an extreme measure.  In this regard, the Equality Act524
does not determine what will replace the system that it has appeared to eradicate. This
situation creates a legal void, which will negatively affect the lives of millions of South
Africans who follow customary law. A mere replacement of customary law with the
common law will not suffice here, as common law cannot accommodate the needs or
Albertyn (et al) op cit 63.519
Section 1 of the 1996 Constitution.520




Pieterse M “The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000: Final nail524
in the customary law coffin” (1999) South African Law Journal 633. 
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realities or extended families.  “Whereas the right to culture in the Constitution does525
not permit discriminatory practices to perpetuate, it at least, mandates that indigenous
law not merely be replaced by common law without first considering more culture-
tolerant options”.  Furthermore, section 8(d) of the Act is phrased in very wide and526
evasive terms, and therefore has the potential for jeopardising the continued existence
of a significant number of customs like lobolo and polygyny which are fundamental to
African customary family law.  527
The fact that the Equality Act establishes Equality Courts which must be easily
accessible to the people and which must provide them with rapid justice, thereby
improving the socio-economic rights of women in particular,  might prove to be528
irrelevant for most people (especially women) living under African customary law, as
disputes are usually and traditionally settled within the family group and not within the
arena of a court of law.  529
3.7.2 Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of
Certain Laws Act530
A declaration of invalidity by the court in Bhe did not mean that the Black Administration
Act together with its regulations was immediately expunged from South Africa’s law
books. Only the legislature has the power to change, amend or repeal legislation. In
2005, after considerable debate and strong opposition,  the legislature promulgated531
the Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain Laws Act
(hereafter referred to as “the Act”).  A discussion of the provisions of this Act forms the532




Liebenberg S and O’Sullivan M “South Africa’s new equality legislation a tool for advancing women’s528
socio-economic equality” (2001) Acta Juridica 103. See also Pityana op cit 8.
Myburgh AC Indigenous public law in KwaNdebele (1985) 111.529
28 of 2005.530
W hich mostly came from CONTRALESA (Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa).531
CONTRALESA was formed in 1987 and is “the sole and authentic representative of progressive




The preamble of the Act is important here as it gives us some insight into the additional
reasons for the enactment of the Act. The preamble of the Act begins by stating that the
Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, and was adopted in order to – (a)
create a society based on democratic values, social and economic justice, equality and
fundamental human rights; (b) improve the quality of life of all citizens; and (c) free the
potential of each person by every means possible.
The preamble recognises that the Black Administration Act must be repealed since it
is regarded as a law that – (a) is repugnant to the values set out in the Constitution,
particularly section 1 and the Bill of Rights in chapter 2 thereof; and (b) is reminiscent
of past divisions and discrimination. Finally, the preamble concludes that for reasons
of legal certainty and good governance, the Act could not be implemented fully, but
rather incrementally; thereby allowing the legislature sufficient time to effect the
necessary legislative alternatives. 
 
Section 1(1) of the Act repeals various sections of the Black Administration Act,
including sections 1,  2(1), (2), (3), (5), (6) and (9),  533 534
Section 1 provided that: 533
The Governor-General shall be the supreme chief of all Natives in the Province of natal, Transvaal and
Orange-Free State, and shall in any part of the said Provinces be vested with all such powers and authorities
in respect of all Black persons as are, at the commencement of this Act, vested in him in respect of Natives
in the Province of Natal.
Section 2(1) provided that: 534
The Governor-General may. Subject to the law relating to the public service, appoint for any area an officer,
to be styled chief native commissioner, who shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as the
Minister may from time to time prescribe.
Section 2(2) provided that:
The Governor-General may, subject to the law relating to the public service, appoint for any area in which
large numbers of Black persons reside a native commissioner and so many assistant native commissioners
as he may deem necessary. Such officers shall perform such duties as may be required by any law or
assigned to them by the Minister, and shall, within the area for which they are appointed, have the powers
of justices of the peace.
Section 2(3) provided that: 
Any person who at the commencement of this Act holds the position of native commissioner or sub-
commissioner shall be eligible for appointment under sub-section (2). No person other than an officer in the
public service who has since the 31st day of May, 1910, been on the fixed establishment of either the
Department of Native Affairs or the Department of Justice shall thereafter be appointed to be a native
commissioner or assistant native commissioner unless he has passed the civil service lower law examination
or an examination determined by the Public Service Commission for the purposes of this section to be
equivalent thereto.
Section 2(5) provided that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section 3, the Minister may, when circumstances require, appoint any
person to act temporarily as a native commissioner or assistant native commissioner in the place of or in
addition to the ordinary incumbent of the post.
Section 2(6) provided that: 
The Minister may appoint superintendents to assist in the control and supervision of locations, and may
prescribe duties. 
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3,  5(1)(a),  11(3)(a),  11A,  21A,  26(1),  27,  31,  33,  34  and the535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544
Section 3 provided that: 535
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Black person or tribe shall not be responsible for the personal
obligations of its chief; nor shall a tribe or the ground occupied by a tribe be bound in any way whatsoever
by any contract entered into or any liability incurred by a chief unless it has been approved by the Minister
after having been adopted by a majority of the adult male members of the tribe present at a public meeting
convened for the purpose of considering such contract or liability.
(2) The written certificate of a native commissioner that the contract or liability referred to therein has been
adopted in terms of sub-section (1) shall be conclusive evidence of that fact.
Section 5(1)(a) provided that: “The Governor-General may – define the boundaries of the area of any536
tribe or of a location, and from time to time alter the same, and may divide existing tribes into one or
more parts or amalgamate tribes or parts of tribes into one tribe, or constitute a new tribe, as necessity
or the good government of the Blacks may in his opinion require…”.
Section 11(3)(a) provided that: 537
The capacity of a Black person to enter into any transaction, or to enforce or defend his rights in any court
of law shall, subject to any statutory provisions affecting any such capacity of a Black person, be determined
as if he were a European; provided that:
(a) if the existence or extent of any right held or alleged to be held by a Black person or of any obligation
resting or alleged to be resting (whether codified, or uncodified) the capacity of the Black person
concerned in relation to any matter affecting that right or obligation shall be determined according to the
said Black law; … 
Section 11A provides that: “Notwithstanding any law affecting the status of contractual capacity of any538
person by virtue of Black law and custom, the capacity of a Black woman to perform any juristic act
with regard to the acquisition by her of a right of leasehold or ownership under the Black Communities
Development Act 4 of 1984 or the disposal of such right or the borrowing of money on security of such
right or the performance of any other juristic act in connection with such right or to enforce or defend
her rights in connection with such right in any court of law, shall be determined and any rights acquired
by her shall vest in her and any obligation incurred by her shall be enforceable by or against her as if
she were not subject to Black law and custom”.
Section 21A provides that:539
(1) The Minister may, after consultation with any community council established under section 2(1) of the
Community Councils Act, 1977 (Act no 125 of 1977) confer on a Black in respect of the area of such council
or of such portion of such area as the Minister may determine, the same judicial power as in terms of sections
12 and 20 of this Act may be conferred on a Black chief or headman.
(2) The appropriate provisions of the said sections 12 and 20 and any regulations made thereunder shall, subject
to such exceptions and to such adaptations and modifications with reference to such regulations as the Minister
may in general or in a particular case deem necessary and make known by notice in the Gazette, mutatis
mutandis apply in connection with the judicial power conferred on any person in terms of subsection (1).
Section 26(1) provided that: “Every proclamation issued by the Governor-General under the authority540
of this Act shall be laid upon the Tables of both Houses of Parliament within fourteen days after its
promulgation if Parliament is then in ordinary session, or if Parliament is not then in ordinary session
within fourteen days after the commencement of its next ensuing ordinary session, and every such
proclamation shall be in operation unless and until both Houses of Parliament have, by resolutions
passed in the same session, requested the Governor-General to repeal such proclamation or to modify
its operation, in which case such proclamation shall forthwith be repealed or modified as the case may
be, by a further proclamation in the Gazette”.
Section 27 provided that:541
(1) The Governor-General may make regulations with reference to all or any of the following matters:–
(a) the exhibition of pictures of an undesirable character in any location or Black compound or in any
urban location or Black village constituted under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, 1923 (Act no 21 of
1923);
(b) the carrying of assegais, knives, kieries, sticks or other weapons or instruments by Blacks;
(c) the prohibition, control or regulation of gatherings or assemblies of Blacks;
(d) the observance by Blacks of decency; and
(e) generally for such other purposes as he may consider necessary for the protection, control,
improvement and welfare of the Blacks, and in furtherance of peace, order and good government.
(2) Any such regulation may be made applicable only in any particular areas or in respect only of particular
classes of persons, and or in respect of different classes.
Section 31 provided that: 542
(1) In any case in which he may deem fit, the Governor-General may grant to any Black person a letter of
exemption exempting the recipient from such laws, specially affecting Blacks, or so much of such laws as
135
Second Schedule of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927). Sections
2(7),  (7)bis, (7)ter and (8)  of the Act were also repealed to the extent that they545 546
applied to the provinces of Gauteng, the Western Cape and the Northern Cape.  The547
Act also repeals section 23(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7)(b), (8), (9), (10)(a), (b), (c), (e) and
(f) and (11),  ie, the sections specifically affecting the customary law of intestate548
succession. 
Section 2(7), (7)bis, (7)ter and (8) were repealed on 31 July 2006 or on the date at
which the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal, Free State, Mpumalanga, North West, Limpopo
and the Eastern Cape repeal those sections that were allocated to them and enact
correlating provincial legislation governing the issues dealt with in the afore-mentioned
sections.  Sections 12(1), (2), (3), (4) and (6); 20(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (9); the549
Third Schedule of the Act; section 22(7) and (8) and section 24 are repealed on 31 July
2006 or on the date upon which national or provincial legislation (whichever one
applies) is enacted to manage the matters dealt with in those sections.550
The Act has retroactive effect, as the repeal of any section of the Act does not alter or
affect “any right which was acquired in terms of any section of the Black Administration
Act, 1927”.  Section 2 of the Act amends numerous other Acts. For example, it551
may be specified in such letter: Provided that no such exemption shall be granted under this section from
any provision of law regulating the ownership or occupation of land, or imposing taxation or controlling the
sale, supply or possession of intoxicating liquor.
(2) Any such exemption may be made subject to any condition imposed by the Governor-General and specified
in such letter.
(3) Any letter of exemption issued under any law included in the Schedule to this Act shall be deemed to have
been granted under sub-section (1).
(4) Any letter of exemption granted under sub-section (10, or referred to in sub-section (3), may at any time
be cancelled by the Governor-General without assigning any reason.
Section 33 provided that: “Notwithstanding anything in any other law contained, no stamp duty or fee543
shall be payable in respect of any declaration made under the provisions of this Act”. 
Section 34 provided that: “The Governor-General may, by proclamation in the Gazette, apply mutatis544
mutandis the provisions of Chapter III of this Act or of any portion thereof to any area or piece of land
in the district of Namaqualand in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope, which has been granted, set
apart, reserved or made available for occupation by persons commonly described as Hottentots”. 
Section 2(7) provided that: “The Governor-General may recognise or appoint any person as a chief545
or headman in charge of a tribe or of a location, and is hereby authorised to make regulations
prescribing the duties, powers and privileges of such chiefs or headman. The Governor-General may
depose any chief or headman so recognised or appointed”.
Schedule 2 contained a list of all the laws repealed by the Act.546
Section 1(2).547
These sections were discussed in detail above.548
Section 1(2)(a) and (b).549
Sections 2(3)(a) and (b); (4)(a) and (b) and (5)(a) and (b). 550
Section 8(a).551
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amends section 4 of the Administration of Estates Act  by replacing subsection (2)552
with a provision that augments the jurisdictional powers of the Master in matters relating
to property belonging to a minor, including property of a minor governed by the
principles of customary law, or property belonging to a person under curatorship or to
be placed under curatorship.553
3.7.3 Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of
Related Matters Act554
The Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act
(hereafter referred to as “the Act”) was promulgated for the purpose of “transforming the
customary law of succession by making provision for the devolution of certain property
in terms of the law of intestate succession; to make clear certain matters relating to the
law of succession and the law of property in relation to persons subject to customary
law; and to adapt certain laws in that regard”.555
The preamble of the Act makes the following declarations: (a) “under the customary law
of succession, a widow in a customary marriage whose husband dies intestate, does
not enjoy sufficient protection and benefit; (b) children born out of wedlock, also do not
enjoy satisfactory protection under customary law; (c) section 9(3) of the Constitution
provides that everyone has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law; (d) due
to a change in social circumstances, customary law no longer has the capacity to make
suitable provision for the welfare of family members; and (e) the Constitutional Court
has confirmed that the principle of male primogeniture, as applied in the customary law
of succession, cannot be reconciled with the current notions of equality and human
dignity as contained in the Bill of Rights”.556
The Act provides that the whole or partial estate of any person subject to the application
66 of 1965.552
Subsection (2)(a) and (b).553
11 of 2009.554
The long title of the Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters555
Act 11 of 2009.
The preamble of the Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters556
Act 11 of 2009.
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of customary law and who dies intestate after the commencement of the Act must be
administered according to the law of intestate succession as governed by the Intestate
Succession Act. 58 When applying the Intestate Succession Act to such a case – (a)557
if the deceased referred to in section 2(1) of the Act, is survived by a spouse, as well
as a successor, “the spouse must inherit a child’s share of the intestate estate or so
much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount fixed from time to
time by the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice by notice in the
Gazette, whichever is the greater”;  (b) if the deceased had entered into a union (in558
accordance with the tenets of customary law) with another women for the purpose of
procreating children for his wife’s house, that women must be regarded as a
descendant of the deceased , if she survives him;  (c) “if the deceased was a women559
who was married to another woman under customary law for the purpose of providing
children for the deceased’s house, that other woman must, if she survives the
deceased, be regarded as a descendant of the deceased”.560
The Act then goes on to state how certain provisions in the Intestate Succession Act
should be interpreted. For example, “any reference in section 1 of the Intestate
Succession Act to a spouse who survived the deceased must be interpreted to include
every spouse and every woman referred to in sections 2(2)(a)-(c) above”.  When561
interpreting section 1(1)(c) of the Intestate Succession Act, the following subparagraph
must be regarded as having been added to that section: “where the intestate estate is
not sufficient to provide each surviving spouse and woman referred to in paragraphs
(a), (b) and (c) of section 2(2) of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and
Regulation of Related Matters Act, 2008, with the amount fixed by the Minister, the
estate shall be divided equally between such spouses”.  562
When determining a child’s portion for purposes of dividing the estate of a deceased in
terms of the Intestate Succession Act, paragraph (f) of section 1(4) of that Act must be read
as follows: “a child’s portion, in relation to the intestate estate of the deceased, shall be







calculated by dividing the monetary value of the estate by a number equal to the number
of children of the deceased who have either survived the deceased or have died before the
deceased but are survived by their descendants, plus the number of spouses and women
referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section 2(2) of the Reform of Customary Law
of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act, 2008”.563
Section 4 of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related
Matters Act, 2008, makes provision for the disposition of property allotted or accruing
to women in customary marriages to be disposed of by means of a will. In this regard,
the Act provides that: “property allotted or accruing to a woman or her house (ie, house
property) under customary law by virtue of her customary marriage may be disposed
of in terms of a will of such woman”.  “Any reference in the will of a woman referred564
to in subsection (1) to her child or children and any reference in section 1 of the
Intestate Succession Act to a descendant, in relation to such a woman, must be
interpreted as including any child – (a) born of a union between the husband of such
a woman and another woman entered into in accordance with customary law for the
purpose of providing children for the first-mentioned woman’s house; or (b) born to a
woman to whom the first-mentioned woman was married under customary law for the
purpose of providing children for the first-mentioned woman’s house”.  Section 4 does565
not prevent any person subject to customary law; other than the woman referred to in
subsection (1), from disposing of their assets by means of a will.  566
If any dispute or uncertainty arises pertaining to “(a) the status of or any claim by any
person in relation to a person whose estate or part thereof must, in terms of the Reform
of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act, 2008, devolve
in terms of the Intestate Succession Act; (b) the nature or content of any asset in such
estate; or (c) the devolution of family property involved in such estate, the Master of the
High Court having jurisdiction under the Administration of Estates Act, 1965,  may,567







order to resolve the dispute or remove the uncertainty”.  Before making a decision under568
subsection (1), the Master of the High Court may direct an inquiry into the matter, to be
conducted by a magistrate or a traditional leader in the area in which the Master has
jurisdiction.  After the inquiry, the magistrate or traditional leader must make a569
recommendation to the relevant Master.  When making a determination or a570
recommendation, the respective Master and/or magistrate or traditional leader must take
into consideration the best interests of the deceased’s family members and the equality
of spouses in customary and civil marriages.  Section 5(5) of the Reform of Customary571
Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act, 2008 empowers the Cabinet
member responsible for the administration of justice to make regulations regarding any
aspect of the inquiry referred to above.
The customary law regulating the disposal of the property of a deceased traditional leader
and which was held in his or her official capacity on behalf of a traditional community
referred to in the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003
remains unchanged.  Marriages concluded on or after 1 January 1929,  but before 2572 573
December 1988  in terms of the Marriage Act,  or civil marriages concluded during the574 575
subsistence of any customary marriage between the husband and any woman other than
the spouse of the marriage under the Marriage Act; have no effect on the proprietary
rights of any spouse of a customary marriage or any issue thereof.  “The widow of the576
marriage under the Marriage Act, and the issue thereof have no greater rights in respect
of the estate of the deceased spouse than she or they would have had if the marriage
under the Marriage Act, had been a customary marriage”.  577
In conclusion, it is important to note that the Reform of the Customary Law of
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limited in application to intestate customary estates alone, and essentially substitutes
the customary law with the Intestate Succession Act, ie, the common law.  It also578
introduces unfamiliar concepts to the existing body of African customary law like
feedom of testation which may create problems of implementation in the future. For
example, in African customary law, the eldest son is obliged to support his family (from
the inheritance he receives) on the death of his father. If a deceased bequeaths his
property in terms of a will, to someone other than the oldest male, that would seriously
frustrate the successor’s concomitant duty to support his family. Such situations have
not been sufficiently addressed by the legislature and it might be that that is why the
legislation still remains inoperational. 
3.8 Conclusion
In the past in South Africa, customary law (which was the law of the majority of the South
African population) received very little recognition. In fact, laws were generally created to
meet the needs of “that section of the community whose traditions and way of life may be
classified as Western and capitalist”,  ie, the minority. However, the inception of a579
Constitution, guaranteeing human rights to all South Africans irrespective of race or
gender, has forced South Africa’s judiciary and legislature to reconsider and re-evaluate
the existing rules of customary law including the rules regulating intestate succession. In
this regard, vast inroads have been made into the promotion of equal rights for both men
and women for example, eradicating rules such as the rule of male primogeniture which
has long prevented women from inheriting property. Racist and defunct legislation like the
Black Administration Act have been repealed and new legislation has been put in place
to regulate the customary law of intestate succession. As a result thereof, South Africa
has not only emerged as a country where customary law is simply recognised; but it is
also a country in which customary law is constantly evolving in order to accommodate the
changing needs of the communities it regulates: or so it seems.580
 
Rautenbach C and Du Plessis W “Reform of the customary law of succession: Final nails in the customary578
law coffin” in Fenrich J, Galizzi P and Higgins T (eds) The future of African customary law (2011) 347.
Van Niekerk GJ “Legal pluralism” in Bekker JC, Labuschagne JMT and Vorster LP Introduction to legal579
pluralism in South Africa Part 1 Customary law (2002) 3.
See chapter 6 of this thesis.580
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3.9 Summary of chapter
Chapter 3 begins with a general overview of the historical development of the
recognition of customary law in South Africa. The fact that the South African legal
system makes provision for two different systems of succession: the common law
(together with the statutes amending it) which is founded on Roman-Dutch law and
various customary laws and how this affects the customary rules of intestate
succession, is then considered. The impact of the adoption of both the interim and final
Constitutions with their Bills of Rights, on the recognition and application of the
customary law of intestate succession is also highlighted in this chapter. Attention is
also given to the role of the South African Law Commission, the judiciary and the
legislature in the development of the customary law of intestate succession so as to
ensure that customary law is brought in line with the provisions of the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER 4
INTESTATE SUCCESSION IN GHANA
4.1 Introduction
Ghana is a country located in West Africa with a diverse religious  and ethnic1
population. It consists of numerous tribal communities including the Akan (who
comprise most of the population of Ghana), the Ashantis, Fantis, Gas, Ewes, Ga-
Dangmes and Gonjas to name but a few.  Like most other countries in Africa, Ghana2
was a former British colony. As a result thereof, various legal systems currently operate
in Ghana, viz English law, African customary law and Islamic law. It must be noted
however, that African customary law and Islamic law “do not subsist as independent
entities in Ghanaian law”.  This chapter examines some of the general principles and3
laws governing intestate succession and the historical development of customary law
in Ghana. It also investigates the successfulness of innovative statutory enactments
aimed at promoting the empowerment of women in the field of intestate succession. 
4.2 Intestate succession under customary law
4.2.1 General principles 
The law of intestate succession in Ghana has two sources: customary law and
legislation governing succession. Intestate succession under Ghanaian customary law
hinges on the concept of the family (referred to as abusua).  Under customary law, the4
term “family” encompasses much more than the traditional Western concept of a
nuclear family which is usually constituted by a husband, wife and their children.  In5
Ghanaian customary law the “family” may be defined as:
See Elom D “Religion in the public sphere: challenges and opportunities in Ghanaian lawmaking”1
(2005) Brigham Young University Law Review 629-658.
Bankas EK “Problems of intestate succession and the conflict of laws in Ghana” (1992) International2
Lawyer 438.
Allott AN “Marriage and internal conflict of laws in Ghana” (1958) Journal of African Law 166.3
Sarbah JM, Danquah JB and Ollennu NA “African legal tradition” (1987) Journal of African Law 47.4
Kludze AKP Modern law of succession in Ghana (1988) 238. 5
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a group of persons lineally descended from a common ancestor exclusively through
males (in communities called patrilineal for this reason) or exclusively through females
starting from the mother of such ancestor (in communities called matrilineal for this
reason) and within which group succession to office and to property is based on this
relationship.  6
 
From the definition above we can deduce that Ghanaian customary law recognises two
distinct types of family organisations namely, the patrilineal family and the matrilineal
family. A person’s right to succession is therefore dependent upon their tribal affiliation
and the kind of family system common to or prevalent within the particular tribe.  These7
important concepts and distinctions will become clearer in the sections that follow. At
this point however, we need to consider some of the general principles affecting
intestate succession.
In Ghanaian society, property is owned communally and not individually and it is for this
reason that the successor of a Ghanaian is never an individual, but is his or her family.8
It is generally understood that because the family is responsible for the burial of the
deceased, it is them who must succeed to the property of the deceased.  This rule is9
confirmed by the Ga proverb which says Moni fuo kpitiyelo le le enoo etokota (he, who
buries the leper, is entitled to the leper’s sandals).  The status of an individual is10
dependent upon his or her membership of the group.  The family is therefore viewed11
as the most important social group in society, since it determines a person’s right to
succeed to property and political position, but also regulates the family’s entitlement to
the use and possession of land.  12
The most general rule of Ghanaian customary law is that when a person dies intestate,
his or her self-acquired property becomes family property which must be administered
Bentsi-Enchill K Ghana land law (1964) 25.6
Dowuona-Hammond C “W omen and inheritance in Ghana” in Women and law in West Africa:7
Situational analysis of some key issues affecting women (1998) 135.
Ollennu NA “The changing law and law reform in Ghana” (1971) Journal of African Law 150.8
Ollennu NA The law of testate and intestate succession in Ghana (1966) 69. 9
Ibid. See also Vanderpuye v Botchway (1951) W ACA 164 at 168, where the Court stated that: 10
The family is the unit for the purpose of ownership of property. All the members have a joint interest in the
family property which is indivisible. 
Sarbah (et al) (1987) op cit 47.11
Dowuona-Hammond (1998) op cit 134.12
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by the family in accordance with the conventions of customary law.  In Ghana, the13
principles of primogeniture, although not strictly adhered to,  and joint heirship (or14
coparcenary) applied to the customary law of succession.  For example, where there15
were two males of equal status in a family, the eldest would be given preference as the
rightful successor.  Like the former rules of customary law in South Africa, a wife could16
not succeed to the intestate property of her deceased husband under Ghana’s
customary law.  Unlike South Africa however, daughters were not prohibited from17
succeeding to the intestate property of their fathers. In fact, if a family was only
constituted of daughters, all the daughters would succeed to the estate of the deceased
as joint heirs.  The rules of intestate succession prevented a person from electing or18
designating his own successor.  In fact, if a person wished to dispose of his property19
to a specific family member/s, the only legal options available to him were to: (1) to
make provision for a gift inter vivos to the particular individual;  (2) to execute a donatio20
mortis causa in favour of the person he wishes to appoint; (3) to draft a customary law
will (samansiw)  specifically outlining his wishes; or (4) to draw up a statutory will  in21 22
Freeman DA “Ghana: Legislation for today” (1988-1989) Journal of Family Law 159. See also13
Woodman G “The family as a corporation in Ghanaian law and Nigerian law” (1974) African Law
Studies 7 and Kludze AKP “A century of changes in the law of succession” in Ekow Daniels W C and
W oodman GR Essays in Ghanaian law: Supreme Court Centenary Publication 1876-1976 (1976) 263.
See also Larkai v Amorkor (1933) 1 W ACA 323 at 329 where the Court stated that:  
Now the presumption of law on the Gold Coast is that property held by an individual became family property
on his death intestate, and that pre3sumption can only be displaced by satisfactory evidence that during his
lifetime he parted with the property by giving it to another.
See also Kwakye v Tuba [1961] GLR 535 at 538 where the Court stated that:
…upon the death of a person intestate…his self-acquired property becomes the property of his whole family,
the immediate and extended, together. 
See Rattray RS Ashanti law and the Constitution (1929) 3 and 85.14
Bankas op cit 436.15
Ibid.16
Adinkrah KO “Ghana’s Marriage Ordinance: An enquiry into a legal transplant for social change” (1980)17
African Law Studies 14.
Dowuona-Hammond (1998) op cit 132.18
Kludze (1988) op cit 276. 19
See Asare v Kumoji [2000] SCGLR 298 at 302 where the Court stated that for an inter vivos disposition20
to be lawful, the presentation of the gift must be made and acknowledged and accepted by the donee
in the presence of witnesses. See also Mahama Hausa v Baako Hausa [1972] 2 GLR 469 at 474-475
where the Court stated the advantages of the rule:
This requirement serves many purposes, and solves many problems relating to gifts. In the first place, a
proffered gift which the donee does not accept is thereby prevented from becoming a gift. Secondly, where
no gift was intended by a putative donor, a purported acceptance in the presence of witnesses affords an
opportunity for express denial of a donative intent. Thirdly, the requirement of acceptance in the presence
of witnesses ensures publicity and makes the gift not only impossible or difficult to deny afterwards, but
operates as a double check preventing the donor from making a gift of what is not his own, namely, family
property, and preventing fraud.
Such wills must be drafted in accordance with the rules of customary law and where such wills are oral21
in nature, the courts must be convinced by the reliability of the evidence of the witnesses called to
prove them (Ekow Daniels W C “The interaction of English law with customary law in W est Africa”
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favour of the nominated legatee.  The inability of a person to choose his own23
successor did not however prevent the individual from nominating a caretaker to
manage his property.  The nominee could be any family member and need not24
necessarily be his successor or the family head. However, the nominee would definitely
be male and would be entirely responsible for the property of the nominator.  25
Three types of property are identifiable under Ghanaian customary law namely family (or
patriarchal) property, ancestral property including stool property and self-acquired (or
private) property.  Family property refers to the property generated by the labour of two26
or more family members or property obtained by them during their lifetime. Immovable
family property may only be sold with the approval of the senior members of the family27
however movable property may be alienated by the head of the family. Stool or ancestral
property simply refers to all property that is inherited. In this regard, where stool property
comprised of land it could easily be transferred from one family to another however, stool
property could never be transferred to aliens.  Self-acquired or private property referred28
to property acquired by an individual through his own personal labour. 
Ghanaian customary law maintains that the family rightfully bears the responsibility of
electing a suitable successor.  This rule is so strictly adhered to that even the courts29
decline to make declarations concerning the appointment of successors. A court may
confirm the election of a successor by the family, but must refrain from appointing the
suitable successor itself.  The rule empowering the family to elect the successor does30
not give them carte blanche to appoint anyone they feel. They must abide by the
customary law principles and appoint the rightful successor unless there is proof of his
(1964) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 611).
In order to be valid, such wills must be in writing, must be signed by the testator, or by someone else22
in his presence and by his direction, a signature must appear at the end of the will, the signature must
be attested to by two witnesses present at the same time, and the witness must also sign the will in
the presence of the testator (Ekow Daniels (1964) op cit 610). 
Kludze (1988) op cit 276.23
Id 279. 24
Ibid.25
Sarbah (et al) (1988) op cit 48.26
Lintott v Solomon (1888) Sar FCL 122 at 124.27
Sarbah (et al) (1988) op cit 48-4928
Allott AN The Ashanti law of property (1966) 180. See also Serwah v Kesse (1959) PCLLG (1  ed) 20129 st
at 204. 
Kludze (1988) op cit 279. 30
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or her inability to carry out the responsibility.  This means that although succession is31
automatic it is not absolute;  as the family is authorised to and may, in extraordinary32
circumstances and on just grounds elect to by-pass the person bearing the right of
succession in favour of another family member.  33
When a family is called upon to elect a successor, they need to consider three
important rules. These rules will now be discussed individually. Rule 1 compels the
family to consider the principle of seniores priores  which requires the family to identify34
the most senior individuals eligible for succession first. The maxims illustrating this
primary principle are: Nuanom nsai a, wofase nni adi which translated means “when
one’s brothers are not exhausted the sister’s child does not inherit”,  and Nniwa mma35
nsae a wofase nni adee which means “except there are no mother’s sons (ie, brothers),
no nephew inherits”.  In other words, the most senior generation of successors is36
preferred over all other suitable generations  and both men and women qualify for37
succession. This rule operates as follows:
When an individual dies in a matrilineal family, with the exception of the mother, the first
group of persons that the family should look to, when appointing a successor, is the
group of the same generation as the successor, ie, the group formed by his brothers
and sisters. In cases where the deceased is not survived by any brothers or sisters or
in instances where the siblings of the deceased are ineligible to succeed for good
reasons, the next group of successors, ie, the nieces and nephews of the deceased’s
sisters will be considered. If the deceased is not survived by any nieces or nephews,
Krabah v Krakue [1963] 2 GLR 122 at 145 where the minority judgment is this case expressed the31
following opinion:
since family rights are always enjoyed in lineal groups, the successor appointed, as I have already indicated,
must come from the group entitled to the inheritance. Thus there is a limit on the exercise of the rights of the
family in this respect.
 See Okoe v Ankrah [1961] GLR 109 at 119, where the Court stated that: “another well established32
principle of our customary law of intestate succession is that succession is not as of right, that is, no
person has an inherent right to succeed, succession is by appointment”. 
Ollennu (1971) op cit 150-151. See also Poh v Konamba (1957) 3 W ALR 74 at 81, where the Court33
held that:
The right given to the family to elect or approve a person entitled to succeed cannot be exercised capriciously
and contrary to customary law. A person who, by virtue of his relationship to the deceased, is entitled to
succeed, cannot be passed over by the family unless he has disqualified himself. 
Ollennu (1966) op cit 98.34
Rattray (1929) op cit 40.35
Danquah JB Akan Laws and Customs (1928) 182. 36
Ollennu (1966) op cit 99.37
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or in instances where the nephews or nieces of the deceased are ineligible to succeed
for good reason, the next group of successors, ie, children of uterine nieces will be
considered. The same rules of succession apply in a patrilineal family.  38
The second rule is also quite remarkable and distinct from other African countries like
South Africa and Swaziland, as it moves away from the discriminating principle of
primogeniture. According to this rule, when electing a suitable successor for a man, a
male is favoured over a female and when choosing a successor for a woman, a female
is favoured over a male.  The relevant maxim here is: Oba di oba adie na obarima adie39
which means “a woman inherits from a woman and a man from a man”.  The rule is40
complied with in order to necessitate expediency and interestingly, does not form part
of customary law.  It is also important to note that this rule is not absolute and that41
depending on the circumstances of the case, it is possible that a man may succeed a
female and a female may succeed a male.  42
The third rule is rather complicated in that it provides that eligible persons of the
deceased’s own generation are preferred over those of succeeding generations and
prohibits senior members of the family from succeeding younger or junior persons in
the family.  The rationale for this principle is that senior family members (including43
senior individuals in the same generation), may in fact occupy the position of family
head, either by selection or by virtue of the fact that they are the eldest person in the
family. This means that the oldest person would qualify for customary succession in the
event of there being no official appointment of a successor and may therefore preside
over the body responsible for the appointment of the successor, ie, the family council.44
This rule may be explained diagrammatically as follows:
Ibid.38
Kronenfeld DB Fanti kinship and the analysis of kinship terminologies (2009) 310.39
Ollennu (1966) op cit 100.40
Id 159.41
Id  158.42
Kronenfeld op cit 310.43
Ollennu (1966) op cit 101.44
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                                                                                   X and Y
                               A                                                      B                                                    C
               D             E             F                      G               H                 I                   J             K              L
                     M               O             P                      R               S                U                 V             X              Y
                      N                              Q                                         T                                  W                             Z
Figure 6: Ghanaian rules affecting the choice of a successor
The diagram above represents a matrilineal Ghanaian family, where left to right
represents older to younger. A, B and C are the children of X and Y and therefore
belong to the first generation of descendants of X and Y. A, B and C respectively had
3 children each namely, D, E and F, G, H and I and J, K and L. The children of A, B and
C belong to the second generation of descendants of X and Y. The children of A, B and
C also had children of their own namely, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y and Z. The
grandchildren of A, B and C belong to the third generation of descendants of X and Y.
If H of the second generation dies, none of the persons in the first generation, ie, his
mother Y, nor his uncles and aunts A, B and C can succeed him. His older sisters F and
G and his older brothers D and E are also prohibited from succeeding H. However, his
younger sisters and brothers, ie, I, J, K and L and all his nieces and nephews, ie, M, N,
O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X Y and Z are all eligible to succeed H. 
Rule 3 therefore rules out any conflicts of interest. The third rule does not however
prevent an individual belonging to a younger generation and who is senior in age to the
deceased of an older or previous generation; to be elected as a successor.  The45
principle underlying this rule is therefore: a person’s eligibility for succession is not
Id 103.45
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dependant on his or her age, but is rather dependant upon the generation to which he
or she belongs.  It must be noted that the rules enunciated above are not rules of law,46
but are all general rules of practice.  47
 
4.2.2 Matrilineal and patrilineal succession
As stated earlier, Ghanaian customary law distinguishes between succession in a
matrilineal family and succession in a patrilineal family.  In other words, different rules48
of succession exist for the succession to property of women and men in matrilineal
societies and succession to the property of women and men in patrilineal societies. The
next section of this chapter highlights the main features of these two systems of
succession. 
4.2.2.1 The matrilineal family 
 
Some of the tribal communities of Ghana which are matrilineal include the Akan, Lobi,
Tampolense and the Vagala or Baga.  The matrilineal family consists of all members49
of the family who are “lineally descended in a direct female line”  from a mutual female50
ancestor. In order to qualify for succession to and ownership of property in a matrilineal
family, each individual family member must have received nourishment from the
common blood in the mother’s uterus.51
For further in this regard see Kronenfeld op cit 310-311.46
Ollennu (1966) op cit 103.47
Higgins T “A reflection on the uses and limits of western feminism in a global context” (2005) Thomas48
Jefferson Law Review 425.
Dowuona-Hammond (1998) op cit 135.49
Kuenyehia A “W omen and family law in Ghana: An appraisal of property rights of married women”50
(1986-89) University of Ghana Law Journal 72.
Ollennu NA Principles of customary land law in Ghana (1962) 141. Also see Amarfio v Ayorkor (1954)51
14 W ACA 554 at 556, where the Court had to determine who was eligible for succession to the
intestate estate of a man named, Ayiku and whom belonged to the Ga-Mashi tribe. The court began
its investigation by firstly determining “which family” the deceased belonged to during his lifetime.
Because the deceased belonged to his mother’s family, the court concluded that his estate should be
distributed according to matrilineal succession. In the case of Mills v Addy (1958) 3 W ALR 357 at 362-
363, the Court described a matrilineal family as:
In the matrilineal areas of Ghana every woman who, being married, has children, originates a family. The family
so originated is a branch of the wider family to which the originator belongs. The self-acquired property of such an
originator, dying intestate, becomes the family property of her family (although it may be subject to prior life
interests in the mother and the collaterals of the deceased). upon the failure of her family and the sub-families
created within it by her daughters or remoter female issue in the female line, this family property reverts to the wider
family of which the originator was a member: thus, “once family property, always family property” – the fact that the
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4.2.2.1.1 Succession to the property of a man in a matrilineal
community 
When a man died intestate in a matrilineal community his self-acquired property became
family property and was divided in accordance with the tenets of customary law. This meant
that the deceased’s mother and her offspring were the only persons eligible to succeed.52
Thus the only persons that qualified for succession in this regard were: the deceased’s
mother, the brothers of the deceased according to their rank, nephews according to their
rank and sisters, and daughters of the deceased’s sisters. If the afore-mentioned groups
were incapable of inheriting, then the deceased’s property would fall to his maternal uncles
by rank or selection, maternal aunts and maternal sister’s children.  The general rule53
therefore precluded the deceased’s wife and children from succeeding to or receiving any
particular share of the deceased’s estate because the constitution of the man’s matrilineal
family did not incorporate his wife and children.  In fact, women almost never owned54
property during their lifetimes;  even in cases where they acquired property with the55
assistance of their husbands, such property became the sole property of the husband.56
The only rights enforceable by the surviving wife and children against the estate of the
deceased were in respect of maintenance and accommodation in the matrimonial home.  57
members of a class entitled for the time being to the enjoyment of family property are reduced to one does not
cause the property to lose its character as family property and become the absolute property of that person.
In Ampamah v Budu (1989-90) 2 GLR 291 at 299 where the Court stated that:
In a matrilineal society, however, the family is originated by a female, who is a member of her own mother’s
family by right of birth. Her children constitute her own or personal family, with her at the apex. Her male issues
will not be able to originate their own branches of the successional family, since by custom their accretions or
issues cannot be incorporated in her family as their personal family. The male members only continue to remain
in their mother’s personal family, “as the nearest successional family they can have”. 
Sarbah JM Fanti customary laws: A brief introduction to the principles of the native laws and custom52
of the Fanti and Akan districts of the Gold Coast: With a report of some cases thereon decided in the
law courts (1968) 101-102.
Id 102.53
Woodman GR “Ghana reforms the law of intestate succession” (1985) Journal of African Law 119. See also54
In Re Antubam (dec”d): Quaicoe v Fosu and Anor [1965] GLR 138 at 145, where the Court stated that:
The proposition that children are not considered members of the father’s family is contrary to all biological
principles, alien to well-known doctrines of all accredited religions and opposed to common sense. The logic
of the customary rule is that because children are not considered members of the father’s family, therefore
they are completely excluded from any share of or right to his property. As I have already argued if the basis
for this exclusion does not make sense then the exclusion itself cannot stand. 
Higgins (2005) op cit 428.55
Ollennu (1962) op cit 39-40. See also Quartey v Martey and Another [1959] GLR 377 at 380 where the56
Court stated that: 
By customary law, it is the domestic responsibility of a man’s wife and children to assist him in the carrying
out of the duties of his station in life, eg, farming or business. The proceeds of this joint effort of a man and
his wife and/or children and any property which the man acquires with such proceeds are by customary law
the individual property of the man. It is not the joint property of the man and his wife and/or children. 
Rattray (1929) op cit 28. 57
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This group of successors mentioned above, were obliged (under the principles of
customary law) to share the entitlement to ownership and benefit of the estate with the
dependants of the deceased, especially the children and widow or widows of the
deceased for whom the successor is required to be accountable for.  This important58
obligation however was seldom upheld and often resulted in severe adversity for the
living widow as she was now tasked with the responsibility of caring and providing for
her children without the assistance of any financial or social resources she could have
acquired from her deceased husband’s estate.  59
4.2.2.1.2 Succession to the property of a woman in a matrilineal
community
The general rule here is that the real successors of a woman’s individually acquired
property are her mother, her children and her maternal brothers and sisters.  Thus the60
only persons eligible for succession in this regard were: the intestate’s mother, her
sisters (by order of rank), her female children (by order of rank), her nieces (born of her
sisters), her female grandchildren (born of her daughters), her sister’s female
grandchildren (born of her nieces), her maternal aunts and her female cousins (born of
her maternal aunts). If the afore-mentioned groups were incapable of inheriting, then
the deceased’s property would fall to the male beneficiaries in the same order as given
above.  The deceased’s mother ranks the highest in the order of succession.61 62
Possessions of a strictly feminine nature are characteristically given to women in the
family circle.  When choosing a successor, the members of the immediate family take63
precedence over all other family members and if a successor cannot be found in that
generation, then the family considers the next generation of successors and so the
process goes on until a suitable successor is found.  64
Dowuona-Hammond (1998) op cit 138.58
Ibid.59
Ollennu (1966) op cit 155.60
Manoukian M Akan and Ga-Adangbe peoples of the Gold Coast (1950) 29.61
Rattray (1929) op cit 39.62
Manoukian op cit 29.63
Ollennu (1966) op cit 157.64
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4.2.2.2 The patrilineal family65
Some of the tribal communities of Ghana which are patrilineal include the Ewe, the Ga-
Dangmes, the Guan and Kyerepong.  The patrilineal family consists of all members of the66
family who are “lineally descended in a direct male line”  from a mutual male ancestor. In67
this type of family, an individual’s affiliation to the group is determined by the “possession
of a common spirit”  (called Ntoro among the Akan) which may be defined as:68
the force, personal magnetism, character, personality, power or soul; we call it the
common sacred germ or spirit which, it is believed, conceives the child and is the
dominant influence which directs his or her course through life and upon which depend
health, wealth, worldly power, possession, success in any venture, in fact, everything
that makes life at all worth living.  69
It is believed that the Ntoro is possessed by all members lineally descended from a
common male ancestor in the direct male line and that it is passed on by a man to each
child borne of him.  70
4.2.2.2.1  Succession to the property of a man in a patrilineal
community
 When a man died intestate in a patrilineal community his self-acquired property also
See In Re Adum Stool; Agyei and Another v Fori and Others [1998-99] SCGLR 191 at 199 and Ampomah65
v Budu [1989-90] 2 GLR 291 at 298-299 where the Court explained the patrilineal family as:
In the patrilineal community those who belong to a man’s family are his children (male and female), his paternal
brothers and sisters, children of his paternal brothers, his paternal grandfather and the descendants of the
paternal uncles in the direct male line. For example, if a person from a patrilineal community, A, has four
children, two sons and two daughters, his family is constituted by all his sons, his two daughters (as his own or
personal family of which he stands at the apex) and all descendants, male and female, of the two sons in the
direct line of males, but the children of his female daughters are in my view outside that family, they customarily
belong to their father’s family. When any of the two sons of A dies, it seems to me that the real successor is his
father Mr A, Mr A’s brothers and sisters, the deceased’s other brother and sisters and his children (both male
and female), if any. These constitute the deceased’s immediate family, and they together with the brothers and
sisters of Mr , assisted by the family of the deceased’s mother, are responsible for the appointment of a
successor to the deceased. Under normal circumstances, the first set of people to consider will be the
deceased’s brother and sisters of the whole blood, but failing a suitable candidate from the group, the next set
for consideration are the deceased’s own sons, then his paternal half-brothers, his paternal uncles, etc.  
Dowuona-Hammond (1998) op cit 135.66
Kuenyehia (1986-1989) op cit 72.67
Ollennu (1966) op cit 79.68
Rattray (1929) op cit 46.69
Ollennu (1962) op cit 141.70
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became family property and was divided in accordance with the rules of customary law.
The general rule here once again excluded the deceased’s wife, but included his
children (irrespective of their gender) for succession to the estate of the deceased.
Other persons eligible to succeed included the deceased’s “paternal brothers and
sisters, children of his paternal brothers, his paternal grandfather, paternal brothers and
sisters of the grandfather and the descendants of the paternal uncles in the direct male
line”.  When electing a successor in a patrilineal community it is common for a father71
or paternal uncle to rank higher and therefore take precedence over a paternal brother,
sister, children and grandchildren of the deceased.  72
 
4.2.2.2.2 Succession to the property of a woman in a patrilineal
community
The general rule here is that the father of the deceased women is the rightful successor
to her estate.  This does not disqualify the deceased woman’s female relatives from73
being appointed as successors. Female relatives who do in fact qualify in this regard
include “a sister of the whole blood, where one exists, failing which, a paternal half-
sister or a paternal aunt”.  The mother and children (regardless of their gender) of the74
deceased only acquire a “life interest” in the deceased’s property. 
As in the case of succession to the self acquired property of a woman in a matrilineal
society, traditional female articles are awarded to other females in the family.  In the75
event of death of either the paternal sister or aunt, the children of the deceased may
control the property as family property. This type of succession therefore displays
elements of both matrilineal and patrilineal succession because both male and female
children are equally entitled to benefit from the deceased’s property. When electing a
suitable successor, the immediate family of the primary female proprietor designates
one of them to administer the property on behalf of all interested parties.  76





Ollennu (1966) op cit 179.76
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4.2.3 The rights and responsibilities of the successor at
customary law
Like South African customary law, a successor in Ghanaian customary law generally
assumes all the functions and duties of the deceased as he “steps into the shoes of the
deceased”. However, it must be noted, that the manner in which the successor deals
with the property of the deceased differs in matrilineal communities and in patrilineal
communities. This section takes note of these differences and thereafter investigates
the impact of the responsibilities of the successor on the lives of people in his or her
particular social group. 
4.2.3.1 The nature of the successor’s interest at customary law
In matrilineal communities the intestate successor only obtains a “life interest in the
inherited property”.  This principle has been confirmed by many authors  on the77 78
subject and is consonant with the rule stating that the self-acquired property of the
deceased becomes family property upon his death, intestate.
In patrilineal communities, the intestate successor acquires an “absolute interest” in the
property left by the deceased.  This means that the successor or successors (whatever79
the case may be) may do with the property as they please and includes the right to
alienate the inherited property.  This unique circumstance is contrary to the generally80
accepted rule concerning succession to the self-acquired property of a deceased. In
other words, in patrilineal communities the self-acquired property of an intestate
deceased could never become family property as this fact alone would prevent
successors from alienating such property and that is obviously not the case here.81
There is however an exception to the “absolute interest rule” amongst patrilineal Ewe
communities: in instances where an Ewe woman succeeds to her father’s intestate
estate, she merely acquires a life interest in the said property as such property must
Kludze (1988) op cit 292.77
See Bentsi-Enchill op cit 154 and Ollennu (1966) op cit 231.78
Kludze (1973) op cit 310.79
Id 293.80
Kludze (1973) op cit 306-307.81
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remain in the control of the patrilineal family.  82
 4.2.3.2 The successor’s responsibilities to the children of the
deceased
Ghanaian customary law provides that the surviving children of the deceased (even in
a matrilineal community) have a right to inhabit and occupy the home of their deceased
father  and they also have a right to be maintained from their father’s estate.  The right83 84
to reside in the family home is however not without restriction, but is dependant upon
the behavioural conduct of the children.  This means that if any child residing in the85
home disputes the entitlement of the rightful successor, or engages in unlawful conduct
such as vandalising the property, selling it or restricting the sale of it; he loses his right
to live in the paternal home.  86
Ghanaian customary law provides that the duty to maintain a child rests solely upon the
father. His liability for maintenance generally exists from birth till puberty.  Since the87
successor steps into the shoes of the deceased he subsequently bears the
responsibility of maintaining the children of the deceased.  88
4.2.3.3 The successor’s responsibilities to the surviving spouse of
the deceased
During his lifetime, a husband must ensure that his wife has a home to live in, is
Ibid. The rule was also confirmed in Golo v Doh [1966] GLR 447 at 448 where the Court held that:82
Children, sons and daughters inherit their fathers as of right but the daughters have only a life interest in the
property descending to them from their father … On the death of a daughter her father’s property reverts to her
father’s family. A daughter cannot therefore make any absolute disposition of property inherited from her father.
See Boham v Marshall (1892) Sar FCL 193 at 194 and Barnes v Mayan (1871) Sar FCL 180 at 181.83
Sarbah (1968) op cit 50. 84
Ibid. See also Amissah Abadoo v Abadoo [1974] 1 GLR 110 at 131, where the Court expressed his85
dissatisfaction with the Akan customary law and rule that on the death intestate of a husband, the surviving
widow and her children could only reside in his home during widowhood and subject to good behaviour.
Sarbah (1968) op cit 90. 86
Danquah (1928) op cit 188-189.87
This rule was confirmed in the case of Manu v Kuma (1963) 1 GLR 464 at 469 where the Court held that:88
The responsibility of a successor to maintain and train the child of his predecessor is a legal one, and the
right enuring therefrom to the child is different in its nature from a right to succeed to or have a share in the
estate of his deceased father… We say therefore that a successor under customary law is under an
enforceable obligation not only to maintain but also to educate the children of his predecessor to the extent
of the property of the deceased which has come to his possession and his dealings therewith.
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maintained and that she receives adequate medical treatment when needed. His liability
for maintenance continues, even if the spouse in question has the necessary skills and
knowledge to support and maintain herself.  The husband’s duty to maintain his wife89
is not unfettered and only extends to the provision of household necessaries. He is
subsequently not accountable for any contracts entered into by his spouse nor is he
responsible for any liabilities she may have sustained and which extend beyond the
scope of his provision of household necessaries.  The husband’s duty to maintain his90
wife falls on his successor at death.  91
If the deceased had more than one surviving spouse or widow the rule of Ghanaian
customary law states that he has a right to the widows and is obliged to marry them, as
death does not dissolve the union.  In Ghana, this practice is referred to as the levirate.92
Kludze  argues (and rightly so) that the previous mentioned principle disregards the93
framework of the family in patrilineal communities. In such communities it is a basic
principle that children succeed their fathers; which would mean that they would succeed
to their father’s widows. The application of this rule in patrilineal communities is quite
absurd, as it would mean that children would have to marry their own mothers. In the
author’s opinion, the preferred position in patrilineal communities is that a potential
husband is sought for the wife or wives from the deceased’s family.  The widow or94
widows may choose to accept or reject the proposal and the chosen male is also under
no obligation to marry the widow or widows.  The rules of the levirate custom in95
Ghana  are similar to the rules explained in chapter 2 of this thesis, with one major96
difference however; the children born of the levirate under Ghanaian customary law
belong to the successor and not to the deceased husband.97
Ollennu (1966) op cit 224.89
Ibid.90
Kludze (1973) op cit 306.91
Allott AN Essays in African law (1960) 234.92
Kludze (1988) op cit 297.93
Ibid.94
Kludze (1973) op cit 311.95
Id 310-313 and Sarbah (et al) (1988) op cit 50-51.96
Allott (1960) op cit 234.97
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4.2.3.4 The successor’s liability for debts 
Generally, every member of the family was responsible for the payment of family debts.98
With regards to debts incurred by the intestate, Ghanaian customary law operates on the
principle of universal succession. In other words, the successor acquires the deceased’s
property and the debts incurred by the deceased during his lifetime and which are still
outstanding at the time of his death.  All creditors of the intestate must formally appear99
and declare the debts owing to them.  Generally, the debts owed by the deceased would100
be settled from the monetary resources in the estate itself, provided the estate was
solvent.  If there were insufficient funds available in the estate to discharge the liability,101 102
the successor would (if he could afford to) pay the debt from his personal financial
resources. If he did not have the pecuniary means to extinguish the debts himself, he
would seek assistance from the family who were obliged to assist him in this regard.103
Corresponding to the successor’s right to settle the liabilities of the deceased, is the right
to exact and recover the debts owed to the deceased.  104
4.2.4 The family head in Ghanaian customary law
The family head (referred to as penin or egya) in Ghanaian customary law is distinguishable
from the concept explained in chapter 2 of this thesis. The family head in Ghanaian
customary law is not generally the successor but is usually a senior or other male kinsmen
(usually the father of the family) who manages the family and is its spokesperson.  The105
family head is therefore the sole guardian of every family member and is the only person
that has legal capacity, ie, he can sue and be sued.  A person may become a family head106
by official appointment, by popular commendation, or failing which, the oldest male member
of the family becomes the family head or failing him, the oldest female member of the
Ollennu (1962) op cit 143 and Kludze (1973) op cit 69.98
Kludze (1988) op cit 298.99
Ollennu (1966) op cit 216.100
Kludze (1988) op cit 300. 101
Id 301.102
Danquah (1928) op cit 184.103
Ollennu (1966) op cit 232.104
Sarbah (1968) op cit 37.105
Ibid.106
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family becomes the head of the family.  A family head is usually elected by the older and107
more senior blood relatives  and may also be removed from office for misconduct.  108 109
Under Ghanaian law, the family head is a “caretaker, trustee or a manager of family
property”  and is immune from actions from younger members of the family for an110
account of the manner in which he has used family property; in this regard they can
merely ask that he be removed from office.  However the family head is accountable111
to senior members of the family, at a family meeting, for an account of the way in which
he has used the family property. If it is found that he has misappropriated or
squandered the family property, he must be removed from office.
The family head’s accountability towards the family group for family property entrusted
to his care has been codified in The Head of Family Accountability Law, 1985.112
According to this very short law, “any head of family or any person who is in possession
or control of, or has in his custody, any family property shall be accountable for such
property to the family to which the property belongs”.  Section 1(2) then provides that:113
Every head of family or any person who is in possession or control of, or has in his
custody, any family property shall cause to be taken and filed an inventory of all such
family property.
In terms of section 2 of the Law, any member of the family may apply to court for an
order to compel the family head to produce or file the inventory referred to in section
1(2), subject to the proviso that he has in fact made an attempt to resolve the matter
within the family, and that such resolution was unsuccessful. 
 
4.2.5 Disinheritance 
Serious grounds must exist for the removal of a successor.  A successor may be114
Ollennu (1962) op cit 145.107
Sarbah (et al) (1987) op cit 38.108
Bentsi-Enchill op cit 187. See also Mould v Agoli (1871) Sar FCL 202 at 203 and Ankrah v Allotey109
(1943) PCLLG (1  ed) 167 at 168.st
Ekow Daniels W C “Recent reforms in Ghana’s family law” (1987) Journal of African Law 93.110
See Fynn v Gardiner (1953) 14 W ACA 260 at 261.111
PNDCL 114.112
Section 1(1).113
Sarbah (et al) (1987) op cit 53.114
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disinherited for the following reasons: maladministration, squandering and wasting of
the property in his charge, failure to discharge obligations to the dependents of the
deceased.  An act of disinheritance is complete when the person who is intended to115
be disinherited, is driven away.  116
4.3 Legislation governing intestate succession in Ghana
4.3.1 Historical context  
Prior to British occupation, the traditional communities of Ghana were governed
exclusively by customary law.  The customary law of the day was diverse as it varied117
from one tribal group to the next, but was voluntarily implemented and adhered to by
both kings and their subjects.  However, on 24 July 1874, the Gold Coast (Ghana)118
was proclaimed a British colony, with its own legislature and executive.  The colonial119
legislature soon passed the Supreme Court Ordinance 4 of 1876 (hereafter referred to
as “the Supreme Court Ordinance”) in an attempt to introduce English common law to
Ghana. The effect of the Ordinance was the introduction of a dual legal framework in
the country  that comprised of English common law  and Ghanaian customary law.120 121
Section 19 of the Ordinance established the right of a citizen of Ghana to be governed
by his or her own customary law by guaranteeing the right of the Supreme Court to
adhere to and implement the observance of any law or custom in the colony. The
Supreme Court Ordinance created a choice of law in that judges had to make a
determination as to the system of law to apply, ie, either English law on the one hand
or Ghanaian customary law on the other hand. In other words, judges had a choice of
law when determining a particular case.122
Ollennu (1971) op cit 152.115
Welbeck v Brown (1876) Sar FCL 185 at 186.116
Quashigah K “The historical development of the legal system of Ghana: An example of the coexistence117
of two systems of law” (2008) Fundamina 96.
Archer PENK “Codification of the law: Ghana’s experience” (1987) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1044.118
Akamba JB and Tufuor IK “The future of customary law in Ghana” in Fenrich J, Galizzi P and Higgins119
T (eds) The future of African customary law (2011) 204.
Luckman Y “Law and the status of women in Ghana” (1976) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 73.120
Section 14 of the Ordinance provided that: “The Common law, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes of121
general application which were in force in England at the date when the colony obtained a local legislature,
that is to say, on the 24  day of July, 1874, shall be in force within the jurisdiction of the Court”. th
Allott (1960) op cit 155.122
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The legal recognition of customary law “brought with it the question of ascertainment
of its content”.  The Supreme Court Ordinance established complex rules for the123
terms and conditions according to which “native law and custom” should be adhered to
and implemented by the court.  In terms of the Ordinance, “native law and custom”124
could only be applied and enforced by the courts if they were not “repugnant to natural
justice, equity and good conscience”.  The application of Ghanaian customary law was125
therefore subject to a repugnancy clause. In order to be enforceable, customary law
had to comply with the following criteria:
(1) Evidence had to be provided that the law or custom was in existence in the
relevant colony before the promulgation of the Supreme Court Ordinance.
(2) The law or custom must not be repugnant to natural justice, equity and good
conscience.
(3) The law or custom must not be directly or implicitly irreconcilable with any other
law in the country for the period of its enforcement.
(4) The customs must not be contrary to public policy.126
Furthermore, under the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of 1954, customary law
had to be ascertained as a question of fact by the proof or evidence of witnesses.127
The courts also accepted commentaries in authoritative textbooks and sources, the
views of native courts, the counsel of expert assessors and reports of referees as proof
of customary law.  128
In 1883, the colonial legislature passed the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance 5 of 1883
which made provision for the establishment of native courts, which primarily adjudicated
on matters of customary law and which would be presided over by chiefs and their
Akamba and Tufuor op cit 208.123
Ibid.124
Section 19 of the Ordinance provided that: “Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the Courts of the125
right to observe and enforce the observance, or shall deprive any person of the benefit, of any native
law or custom not being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience”. 
Akamba and Tufuor op cit 208-209.126
Ollennu (1966) op cit 56. See also Angu v Attah (1916) PC ’74-’28, 43 at 44.127
W oodman GR “Customary law, state courts, and the notion of institutionalization of norms in Ghana128
and Nigeria” in Allott AN and W oodman GR (eds) Peoples law and state law: The Bellagio papers
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councillors. The native courts could hear both civil and certain criminal matters129
subject to the restrictions placed on the value of the property involved.  Appeals130
arising from the native courts had to be heard by the Supreme Court. There were
therefore two systems of courts in place in Ghana during colonialism: the first system
comprised of the Privy Council, West African Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of the
Gold Coast and Magistrates’ Courts which heard cases involving common law or British
law, and the second system comprised of native courts, which presided over cases
involving customary law alone.  This established a type of internal conflict of law and131
gave the courts a choice when determining whether the normal courts (ie, those courts
enforcing English law) or the native courts had jurisdiction in a particular case.  This132
situation persisted until Ghana obtained independence.133
On 6 March 1957, Ghana gained independence from Britain. In 1960, the legislature
adopted its First Republican Constitution  and a new Courts Act (CA 9) 1960134 135
(hereafter referred to as “the Courts Act, 1960”) which altered the existing position of
customary law dramatically. For example, section 67(1) of the Courts Act, 1960 made the
ascertainment of any rule of customary law a question of law and no longer one of fact.136
This situation has been retained in the current Courts Act 459 of 1993.  Any issues137
arising from the internal conflict of laws (ie, whether to apply customary law or English
common law to an issue) were initially regulated by the Courts Act, 1960, but are now
regulated by the choice of law rules found in section 54 of the current Courts Act 459 of
1993.  The Courts Act 459 of 1993 consolidated both the British and native judicial138
See section 10. 129
See section 11.130
Davies JA and Dagbanja DN “The role and future of customary tort law in Ghana: A cross-cultural131
perspective” (2009) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 305-306.
Allott (1960) op cit 155.132
Quashigah op cit 104.133
W hich became effective on 1 July 1960. 134
Followed by the Courts Act 732 of 1971 and eventually the Courts Act 459 of 1993. 135
Davies and Dagbanja op cit 306. See also Ibrahim v Amalibini (1978) GLR 368 at 397. 136
Section 55(1) of the Act provides that: “Any question as to existence or content of a rule of customary137
law is a question of law for the court and not a question of fact”.
Section 54 provides that: 138
(1) Subject to this Act and any other enactment, a court when determining the law applicable to an issue
arising out of any transaction or situation, shall be guided by the following rules in which references to the
personal law of a person are references to the system of customary law to which he is subject or to the
common law where he is not subject to any system of customary law:
Rule 1 An issue arising out of a transaction shall be determined according to the system of law intended
by the parties to the transaction to govern the issue or the system of law which the parties may,
from the nature or form of the transaction be taken to have intended to govern the issue.
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systems into a single hierarchy of courts.  The court system on Ghana now only makes139
provision for a Supreme Court,  Courts of Appeal,  High Courts,  Regional140 141 142
Tribunals,  Circuit Courts,  District Courts  and Juvenile Courts.  All these courts143 144 145 146
have jurisdiction to preside over matters pertaining to customary law. Section 39(d) of the
Courts Act 459 of 1993 however, restricts the jurisdiction of regular courts in matters
affecting chieftaincy to traditional adjudicatory bodies, particularly the National House of
Chiefs, Regional Houses of Chiefs, and Traditional Councils. Appeals arising from such
tribunals however still vest in the Supreme Court of Ghana.  The legislation enacted to147
regulate courts in Ghana, significantly affected the customary law of intestate succession.
It is these laws that the researcher will now consider.
4.3.2 Ghana’s Courts Acts and their effect on intestate succession
As stated at the outset of this chapter it was stated that the Ghanaian legal system
makes provision for a multiplicity of legal systems of intestate succession, ie, common
law, English law, African customary law and Islamic law. This meant that when
Rule 2 In the absence of any intention to the contrary, the law applicable to any issue arising out of the
devolution of a person's estate shall be the personal law of that person.
Rule 3 In the absence of any intention to the contrary, the law applicable to an issue as to title between
persons who trace their claims from one person or group of persons or from different persons all
having the same personal law, shall be the personal law of that person or those persons.
Rule 4 In applying Rules 2 and 3 to disputes relating to titles to land, due regard shall be had to any
overriding provisions of the law of the place in which the land is situated.
Rule 5 Subject to Rules 1 to 4, the law applicable to any issue arising between two or more persons
shall, where they are subject to the same personal law, be that law; and where they are not
subject to the same personal law, the court shall apply the relevant rules of their different systems
of personal law to achieve a result that conforms with natural justice, equity and good conscience.
Rule 6 In determining an issue to which the preceding Rules do not apply, the court shall apply such
principles of the common law, or customary law, or both, as will do substantial justice between
the parties, having regard to equity and good conscience.
Rule 7 Subject to any directions that the Supreme Court may give in exercise of its powers under article
132 of the Constitution, in the determination of any issue arising from the common law or
customary law, the court may adopt, develop and apply such remedies from any system of law
(whether Ghanaian or non-Ghanaian) as appear to the court to be efficacious and to meet the
requirements of justice, equity and good conscience.
(2) Subject to this Act and any other enactment, the rules of law and evidence (including the rules of private
international law) that have before the coming into force of this Act been applicable in proceedings in
Ghana shall continue to apply, without prejudice to any development of the rules which may occur.
Asante SKB “Over a hundred years of a national legal system in Ghana: A review and critique” (1987)139
Journal of African Law 70.







Article 131(4) of the Constitution of Ghana, 1992.147
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presented with a case, the courts had to determine (on a case-by-case basis) which of
these legal systems to apply to a given set of facts.  Like South Africa, in cases where148
a Ghanaian died intestate, the law regulating the devolution of the estate was governed
by choice of law rules. The choice of law rules governing the intestate succession of
Ghanaian estates were originally embodied in the Courts Act, CA 9 of 1960 (hereafter
referred to as “the Courts Act, 1960”) and thereafter the Courts Act 732 of 1971
(hereafter referred to as “the Courts Act, 1971”) and also to an extent in the Marriage
Ordinance. In the sections that follow, the researcher considers the relevant provisions
of both Courts Acts and the Marriage Ordinance as it affected the customary law of
intestate succession and she also examines how the introduction of the Intestate
Succession Law 1985 (PNDCL 111) (hereafter referred to as “the Intestate Succession
Law”) affected the existing rules of the customary law of intestate succession in Ghana. 
The Courts Act, 1960 repealed the former Supreme Court Ordinance. The choice of law
rules governing the intestate succession of Ghanaian estates were embodied in Part
III of the Courts Act, 1960 and provided that:
(1) Subject to the provisions of any enactment other than this subsection, in deciding
whether an issue arising in civil proceedings is to be determined according to the
common law or customary law, and if the issue is to be determined according to
customary law, in deciding which system of law is applicable, the court shall be
guided by the following rules, in which references to the personal law of a person
are references to the system of customary law to which he is subject or, if he is
not shown to be subject to customary law, are references to the common law: –
Rule 1 Where two persons have the same personal law one of them cannot,
by dealing in a manner regulated by some other law with property in
which the other has a present or expectant interest, alter or affect that
interest to an extent which would not in the circumstances be open to
him under his personal law.
Rule 2 Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises out of a transaction the parties
to which have agreed, or may from the form or nature of the transaction
be taken to have agreed that such an issue should be determined
according to the common law or any system of customary law effect
should be given to the agreement.
In this rule “transaction” includes a marriage and an agreement or
arrangement to marry.
Rule 3 Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises out of any unilateral disposition
Allott (1958) op cit 164.148
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and it appears from the form or nature of the disposition or otherwise
that the person effecting the disposition intended that such an issue
should be determined according to the common law or any system of
customary law effect should be given to the intention.
Rule 4 Subject to the foregoing rules, where an issue relates to entitlement to
land on the death of the owner or otherwise relates to title of land –
(a) If all the parties to the proceedings who claim to be entitled to the
land or a right relating thereto trace their claims from one person
who is subject to customary law, the issue or from one family or
other group of persons all subject to the same customary law, the
issue should be determined according to that law;
(b) If the said parties trace their claims from different persons, or families
or other groups of persons, who are all subject to the same cus-
tomary law, the issue should be determined according to that law;
(c) In any other case, the issue should be determined according to
the law of the place in which the land is situated.
Rule 5 Subject to Rules 1 to 3, where an issue relates to the devolution of the
property (other than land) of a person on his death it should be
determined according to his personal law.
Rule 6 Subject to the foregoing rules, an issue should be determined according
to the common law unless the plaintiff is subject to any system of
customary law and claims to have the issue determined according to
that system, when it should be so determined.
(2) Where under this section customary law is applicable in any proceedings but a
relevant rule of customary law has been assimilated by the common law under
any enactment such as is mentioned in section 18(1) of the Interpretations Act,
1960, that rule shall nevertheless apply in those proceedings, but in the form in
which it has been assimilated.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section,
but subject to the provisions of any other enactment –
(a) the rules of the common law relating to private international law shall apply
in any proceedings in which an issue concerning the application of law
prevailing in any country outside Ghana is raised;
(b) the rules of estoppels and such other of the rules generally known as the
common law and the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity as
have heretofore been treated as applicable in all proceedings in Ghana
shall continue to be so treated.149
From the above provisions, it is obvious that the Courts Act attempted to regulate matters
of succession more effectively by simplifying the law applicable to the process of
distribution thereby making it easier for judges to determine cases of contestation brought
Section 66.149
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before them. The Courts Act, 1960 however, failed to alleviate many of the burdens
associated with the regulation of intestate succession. For example, the rules of the
statute were unable to resolve inter-tribal conflicts of law.  For obvious reasons, Rules150
1 and 3 of the statute will not be applicable in the afore-mentioned instance and will also
be irrelevant to cases of dispositions inter vivos. Rules 4 and 5 of the Act did not provide
any considerable assistance to the court when dealing with matters pertaining to the title
to land. Rule 2 may provide some assistance as far as title to land is concerned however;
it is phrased too widely and is ill defined. The fact that a court may apply common law
unless the plaintiff is subject to any customary law in Rule 6 which makes provision for
a court to apply common law unless the plaintiff is subject to customary law, provides the
plaintiff with an unjustifiable advantage in almost each case of conflict.  One of the151
general problems with these rules was that they gave the judge extensive (theoretical)
leeway to adapt the customary law on the ground of repugnancy and therefore allowed
the courts to formulate their own guidelines and procedures in the pursuit of justice.152
The rules embodied in the Court’s Act, 1960 places the common law on an elevated level
to customary law. Prior to the enactment of the legislation there was a presumption in
favour of the application of customary law in instances where the parties were “natives”
or of “African descent”. Under the Courts Act, 1960, “the initial presumption favours the
application of the common law in many instances where previously a contrary presump-
tion would have prevailed”.  None of the six rules found in the Courts Act, 1960 forces153
the court (on its own enterprise) to investigate a foundation for applying customary law.
The court must apply the common law, unless the affected person can substantiate the
correctness of applying a personal law from the customary systems.  154
The Courts Act, 1960 was later amended by the Courts Act 732 of 1971. The choice of
law rules governing the intestate succession of Ghanaian estates in the 1971 Courts
Act are still embodied in Part III of the Act and provided that:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other enactment, the Court when
Bankas op cit 451. See also Ghamson v Wobill [1947] 12 W ACA 181 at 181-182.150
Bankas op cit 451151
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Harvey op cit 600.154
166
determining the law applicable to an issue arising out of any transaction or situation,
shall be guided by the following rules in which references to the personal law of a
person are references to the system of customary law to which he is subject or to
the common law where he is not subject to any system of customary law:
Rule 1 An issue arising out of a transaction shall be determined according to the
system of law intended by the parties to the transaction to govern the
issue or the system of law which the parties may, from the nature or form
of the transaction be taken to have intended to govern the issue.
Rule 2 In the absence of any intention to the contrary, the law applicable to any
issue arising out of the devolution of a person's estate shall be the
personal law of that person.
Rule 3 In the absence of any intention to the contrary the law applicable to an
issue as to title between persons who trace their claims from one person
or group of persons or from different persons all having the same
personal law, shall be the personal law of that person or those persons.
Rule 4 In applying Rules 2 and 3 to disputes relating to titles to land due regard
shall be had to any overriding provisions of the law of the place in which
the land is situated.
Rule 5 Subject to the foregoing Rules, the law applicable to any issue arising
between two or more persons shall, where they are subject to the same
personal law, be that law; and where they are not subject to the same
personal law, the Court shall apply the relevant rules of their different
systems of personal law to achieve a result comfortable to natural
justice, equity and good conscience.
Rule 6 In determining an issue to which the foregoing Rules do not apply, the
Court shall apply such principles of the common law, or customary law,
or both, as will do substantial justice between the parties, having regard
to equity and good conscience.
Rule 7 Subject to any directions that the Supreme Court may give in exercise of
its powers under article 107 of the Constitution, in the determination of any
issue arising from the common law or customary law, the Court may adopt,
develop and apply such remedies from any system of law (whether
Ghanaian or non-Ghanaian) as appear to the Court to be efficacious and
to meet the requirements of justice, equity and good conscience.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other enactment, such rules of law
and evidence (including the rules of private international law) as have hitherto
been applicable in proceedings in Ghana shall continue to apply, without
prejudice to any development of such rules which may occur.155
The choice of law rules embodied in the Courts Act, 1971 are a complete departure from
the previous rules found in the Courts Act, 1960. Although the rules are similar in
Section 49. The Courts Act, 1971 has further been amended by the Courts Act 459 of 1993, however,155
section 49 of the Courts Act, 1971 has not been altered substantially, but for a few minor changes in
language.
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structure and form to the 1960 rules, they differ in many respects. For example, the 1971
rules are constructed in much broader terms than the 1960 rules in that the 1960 rules
aided the courts by allowing them to choose between either “common law or customary
law”; whereas the 1971 rules aid the courts “when determining the law applicable”.  The156
new rules,  allow the parties to choose “any system of law” (and may apply to law within157
or outside Ghana) whereas the previous rule restricted the court to give effect to their
choice of either the common law or any system of customary law.  The new Rule 1 is158
phrased wide enough to cover contracts, including the contract of marriage and Rule 2
has been clearly amended to incorporate succession on death.159
However, although the new rules are admirable, they are not faultless. For example,
Rule 2 of the Courts Act, 1971 is vague in the sense that the phrase “whose intention”
is not defined or qualified and it is therefore unclear as to “whose intention” is relevant
under the rule. The same criticism applies to Rule 3. In Rule 2 however, one would be
willing to limit the intention to that of the person whose estate is for distribution; however
such a restriction of intention is unclear under Rule 3.160
Rule 4 is also phrased in imprecise terms as there is no clarity as to what “due regard” or
“overriding provisions of the law of the place in which the land is situated” means. For
example, does the phrase “law of the place in which the land is situated” refer to “the
customary law of the place; or to that law as it has been modified or influenced by statute;
or does it refer to that law incorporating its own indigenous internal conflict rules?”  161
Rule 5 is problematic because it may still entice judges to disregard or manipulate the
rules to conform to the case at hand; thereby promoting disorder and unfairness which
was the modus operandi when the 1960 rules were in operation.  Another difficulty162
with Rule 5 is that in a case involving more than two parties, some of the parties may
practice the same personal law inter se, whilst the other parties may practice conflicting
Allott AN “Courts Act, 1971” (1972) Journal of African Law 60.156
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systems of personal law. In such cases, Rule 5 authorises the courts to hypothesise,
intertwine and implement the “relevant rules” of the conflicting systems of personal law
in order to “achieve a result comfortable to natural justice, equity and good conscience”.
This will certainly pose to be a challenging task for judges, particularly when the
germane rules of the conflicting systems express or display incompatible results or
outcomes; which are by no means uncommon.  It is also unfortunate that the163
contentious concepts of natural justice, equity and good conscience have once again
found their way into Ghana law,  years after having been substituted by the Courts164
Act, 1960.  165
Rule 7 is quite fascinating in that it gives one the distinct impression that the Ghana
courts are empowered to adopt the legal system of any other country or countries even
if that legal system does not form part of Ghana’s common law tradition.  This might166
have the effect that the court may impose a remedy on parties from any system of law,
ie, Ghanaian or non Ghanaian which might be contrary to the actual law applicable to
the parties involved.  167
In addition to the choice of law rules found in the Courts Acts, the type of marriage
contracted also affected the customary law of intestate succession. In Ghana, parties
could conclude customary marriages, ie, marriages in accordance with the rules and
tenets of Ghanaian customary law or could opt to enter into so-called English common
law type marriages in terms of the Marriage Ordinance Cap 127  (hereafter referred168
to as “the Marriage Ordinance”) or could conclude a marriage in terms of Islamic Law
and which was regulated by the Marriage of Mohammedan Ordinance.  The Marriage169
Ordinance affected the customary law of intestate succession and it is this important
piece of legislation that the researcher considers in the next section of this thesis. 
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4.3.3 The Marriage Ordinance170
4.3.3.1 General
Until its repeal in 1985 by the Intestate Succession Law,  the Marriage Ordinance allowed171
couples subject to customary law to conclude a monogamous marriage either by a civil or
religious ceremony.  This meant that where an Ordinance marriage was concluded, it172
gave an indication that the person choosing that type of marriage purposed that succession
to his property will be regulated by English law and not customary law.  Of particular173
importance was section 48 of the Ordinance which impacted on succession to the intestate
property of persons married in terms of the Ordinance and who were survived by a spouse
and children born of such a marriage.  The relevant provision provided that:174
Subject to the provisions of the succeeding sub-section, where any person who is
subject to native law or custom contracts a marriage, whether within or without Ghana,
in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance or of any other enactment relating
to marriage or has contracted a marriage prior to the passing of this Ordinance which
marriage is validated hereby and such person died intestate on or after the 15  day ofth
February, 1909, leaving a widow or husband or any issue of such marriage;
And also where any person who is issue of any such marriage dies intestate on or after
the said 15  day of February 1909, the personal property of such estate, and also anyth
real property of which the said intestate might have disposed by will, shall be
distributed or descend in the manner following, viz
Two thirds in accordance with the provisions of the law of England relating to the
distribution of the personal estate of intestates in force on the 19  day of November,th
1884, any native law or custom to the contrary notwithstanding; and one-third in
accordance with the provisions of the native customary law which would have obtained
if such person had not been married under this Ordinance.  175
This section amended the existing customary law by subjecting two-thirds of the
intestate estate of a person married under the Ordinance, to the principles or rules of
English law.  This meant that the remaining one third was distributed according to the176
Cap 127 (1951 edition of the Laws of the Gold Coast).170
1985 (PNDCL 111).171
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conventions of customary law.  In order for section 48 to apply, the following factors177
had to be established: 
(i) the intestate must have been subject to the customary law; and
(ii) must have contracted a marriage under the Marriage Ordinance or any other law
relating to marriage, whether in Ghana or outside (as in England); and 
(iii) must be survived by a spouse of such marriage or offspring of such marriage.178
In addition to the factors listed immediately above, section 48 of the Ordinance provided
that it was also applicable if:
(i) the deceased’s father or mother was subject to customary law, and
(ii) the deceased’s parents were married under the Marriage Ordinance or any other
law relating to marriage, whether such marriage was concluded in Ghana or
outside, and
(iii) the deceased was a legitimate child under the marriage in (ii).179
The Marriage Ordinance therefore widened the net of persons qualifying for inheritance
by not only including surviving husbands, wives or children, but also incorporating the
parents of the deceased. 
4.3.3.2 The division of intestate property under the Marriage
Ordinance 
As stated earlier, the Ordinance provided that two-thirds of the deceased’s intestate
estate would devolve according to the laws of England. In order to gain an
understanding of the complex “accounting principles” involved in the distribution of this
part of the intestate estate, reference must be made to the English rules mentioned in
the Ordinance. The English rules were developed in accordance with the Statute of
Distribution,  the Statute of Frauds,  the Administration and Distribution of Estates180 181
Bentsi-Enchill op cit 173.177
Kludze (1988) op cit 210.178
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Act,  and the Matrimonial Causes Act.  It is these important rules that the researcher182 183
will now consider. 
Rule 1: The English law provided that if a woman died intestate leaving a surviving
spouse, her entire estate would be inherited by her husband.  In cases184
where the wife had attained a decree of judicial separation; subsequent to
her death intestate, all the property she accumulated from the date of the
decree, would be distributed as if her husband was dead.  In Ghana, the185
rule manifested itself as follows:
(i) Where a woman married under the Marriage Ordinance died intestate and
was survived by a husband, the husband was solely entitled to 2/3 of her
estate, irrespective of whether she was survived by offspring or not.  186
(ii) If the intestate was a woman who was the offspring of a marriage
concluded under the Marriage Ordinance and she was survived by a
husband, irrespective of whether or not she was also survived by
offspring, her husband was entitled to 2/3 of the estate to the exclusion
of any surviving issue. The children here got nothing.  187
Rule 2: In English law this rule provided that if a man died intestate and was survived
by a widow and children, the widow would inherit 1/3 of the estate. In cases
where the deceased was only survived by a widow, the widow would inherit
1/2 of the estate.  In Ghana, the rule was expressed as follows: 188
(i) If the intestate was a man who had concluded a marriage in terms of
the Marriage Ordinance and was survived by a wife of the said
marriage or any other wife or wives, and left behind issue, the widow
or widows took 1/3 of the 2/3, that is 2/9 of the estate. The surviving
issue were entitled to share the remaining 2/3 equally, that is 2/9 of the
estate. Under section 49 of the Ordinance, illegitimate children did not
1685 (1 Jac 2, c 17), section 7.182
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qualify for inheritance in this regard. 
(ii) If the intestate was a man married under the Marriage Ordinance and
who was survived by a widow of the said marriage but no offspring, the
widow took 1/2 of the 2/3 of the estate that is 1/3 of the whole estate.
The residue of the estate, was distributed to the persons entitled under
the other rules, including Rule 8. 
(iii) If the intestate was a man who was the offspring of a marriage under
the Marriage Ordinance and was survived by (a) a spouse or spouses
with whom he had contracted either a marriage under customary law
or under the Ordinance, and (b) legitimate children; the spouse or
spouses would take 1/3 of the 2/3, that is 2/9 of the entire estate; the
children took the 4/9 residue, and the remaining 1/3 was distributed
according to the rules of the applicable customary law. 
(iv) If the intestate was the offspring of a marriage under the Marriage
Ordinance and was survived by a wife or wives, however married, but
no offspring, the wife or wives were entitled to 1/2 of the 2/3 of the
estate, that is 1/3 of the entire estate. The remaining 1/3 went to the
deceased’s surviving father (if any).189
Rule 3 of the English rules is no longer applicable  and will not be discussed as a190
result thereof. 
Rule 4: The English rule provided that subject to the rights of the husband or the surviving
spouse; where the deceased was survived by children, each child (or their legal
representative if the child was deceased) would receive an equal share of the
personal estate of the deceased.  In Ghana the rule was phrased as follows:191
(i) If the intestate was a man or a woman who were married under the
Marriage Ordinance and was not survived by a spouse, but was only
survived by issue; if any such child was an issue of a marriage under
the Ordinance, section 48 of the Marriage Ordinance would apply and
the children proportionally shared 2/3 of the whole estate. If any such
Kludze (1988) op cit 223-224.189
Ollennu (1966) op cit 247.190
Sections 3, 6 and 7 of the Statute of Distribution.191
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heir was deceased, his or her descendants were entitled per stirpes to
his or her share.  192
(ii) If the intestate was the offspring of a marriage under the Marriage
Ordinance, and he or she died without a surviving spouse, the 2/3 of
the whole estate was divided in equal shares to any surviving children
per stirpes to his or her portion.193
Rule 5: Here the English rule provided that where the deceased left no heirs (i.e. no
children, father, brothers, sisters, or nieces or nephews) besides his surviving
wife; his mother inherited his entire estate, subject to the rights of the
widow.  However, if the deceased left brothers or sisters, or children of194
brothers or sisters or the deceased was survived by his mother, the estate
would be divided equally amongst these heirs.  The grandchildren of the195
deceased’s brother did not qualify for inheritance under this rule and if they
were the only surviving heirs left, the deceased’s mother inherited
everything.  In Ghana, the rule was formulated as follows:196
(i) If the intestate was a man was married under the Marriage Ordinance
and was survived by the widow of such marriage (not a customary law
wife) as well as his mother, brothers or sisters, and nieces and
nephews, but had no offspring himself, the widow took 1/2 of the 2/3,
that is 1/3 of the entire estate; the mother shared the other 1/3 of the
entire estate proportionally with any brothers or sisters of the deceased. 
(ii) If the intestate was a man or woman who were married under the
Marriage Ordinance and who were survived by a mother, brothers and
sisters, but not by a spouse, nor children of the marriage, neither
section 48 of the Marriage Ordinance nor the English rules of 1884
were applicable to his or her estate.
(iii) If the male intestate was a child of a marriage concluded under the
Marriage Ordinance, and was not survived by a spouse, or offspring or
a father, brother, sister or nieces or nephews, but was solely survived
Ollennu (1966) op cit 250.192
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by his mother, the mother was entitled to 2/3 of the whole estate.
(iv) If the male intestate was the child of a marriage concluded under the
Marriage Ordinance and was survived by a spouse (whether married
under customary law or under the Ordinance), his mother, brothers,
sisters or nieces and nephews, but had no offspring of his own or father
surviving him, the spouse was entitled to 1/2 of the 2/3, that is 1/3 of
the entire estate; the mother shared the remaining 1/3 of the estate
equally with the brothers, sisters and nieces and nephews of the
deceased (whether of the full blood or not).
(v) If the male intestate was a child of a marriage contracted under the
Marriage Ordinance and was not survived by a spouse but only by his
mother and his nieces and nephews, the mother shared the 2/3 of the
entire estate equally with the deceased’s nieces and nephews.197
Rule 6: In English law this rule provided that if the deceased left no surviving spouse,
children or parent, but was in fact survived by a grandparent/s and brothers
or sisters, the brothers and sisters took precedence over the grandparent/s
and inherited 2/3 of the entire estate.  The English rule did not apply to the198
intestate estate of a man or woman who only married under the Marriage
Ordinance but died without a husband or wife or children of such a marriage
surviving him; for, in such instances, section 48 of the Marriage Ordinance
could not be relied upon.199
Rule 7: For this rule, if the intestate was survived by brothers and sisters and
children of deceased brothers or sisters, the estate was divided amongst
them per stirpes; this rule was restricted to instances where at least one
brother or sister was alive. In a case where all the descendants were children
of brothers and sisters who were no longer living, the estate was divided
among them per capita.  In Ghana the rule applied as follows:200
(i) If the intestate was a man married under the Marriage Ordinance and
Ollennu (1966) op cit 251.197




was survived by a spouse and only brothers and sisters (whether of the
whole-blood or of the half-blood) and nieces and nephews, the wife took
1/2 of the 2/3, that is 1/3 of the entire estate; the brothers and sisters of
the deceased and his nieces and nephews shared the other 1/2 of the
estate equally, the nieces and nephews taking per stirpes the share of
the deceased brother or sister. If the intestate was not survived by a
brother or sister and was only survived by nieces and nephews, the
nieces and nephews shared the 1/3 of the entire estate per capita. The
same rules of distribution were applicable where the intestate was the
child of a marriage concluded under the Marriage Ordinance, and he was
(a) survived by a spouse, whether married under customary law or under
the Ordinance, and (b) brothers, sisters and nieces and nephews.
(ii) ...
(iii) If the male intestate deceased was the child of a marriage contracted
under the Marriage Ordinance but left no surviving spouse, but was
survived by brothers or sisters and nieces and nephews, they shared
the 2/3 of the estate equally, the children of a deceased brother or
sister taking per stirpes the share of the deceased brother or sister. If
the deceased was only survived by nieces and nephews, the nieces
and nephews were equally entitled to the 2/3 of the entire estate and
they took per capita.
(iv) If the male intestate was not a child of a marriage under the Marriage
Ordinance, even if he himself was married under the Ordinance, and
he was not survived by a spouse or children from the Ordinance
marriage, this rule did not apply because section 48 of the Marriage
Ordinance could not be relied on.  201
This also meant that in cases where the deceased was an issue of a marriage under
the Marriage Ordinance, the rule enunciated immediately above applied to 2/3 of his
whole estate.  If the deceased was not an issue of a marriage under the Marriage202




behind a living wife, the English rule was relevant, allotting 1/3 to the surviving spouse
and the other 1/3 was sub-divided amongst the next-of-kin.  203
Rule 8: Here the English rule provided that:
in all other cases, subject to the rights of the widow (if any), the estate went to the
next-of-kin ascertained in accordance with the civil law rule, namely, quot personae
tot gradus, computing up from the intestate to the common ancestor and then down
again to the claimant, the next-of-kin of equal degree sharing equally inter se and no
priority being given to males over females, or to the whole blood over the half-blood.204
In Ghanaian customary law this rule operated on the same basis as the English rule
with one significant difference; Ghanaian customary law was inclined to favour males
over females and “relations of the whole-blood were preferred to those who were of the
half-blood”.  In terms of the Marriage Ordinance, a child only included legitimate and205
posthumous children,  and according to the Statute of Distribution, a wife meant a wife206
whose marriage to a man is recognised by the law of domicile as valid.  The Marriage207
Ordinance prevented the conclusion of a customary marriage to someone other than
the person with whom the Ordinance Marriage was contracted.208
The Marriage Ordinance was introduced into Ghanaian law, to impose English law on the
citizens of Ghana and to slowly eradicate customary law. The Ordinance however failed
in its purpose as it did not evoke a considerable number of statutory marriages in
Ghana.  In others words, the people of Ghana remained faithful to Ghanaian customary209
law. Research has shown that marriages under the marriage Ordinance were only
concluded because of pressure placed on the parties by their intermixed families,  and210
it was also concluded for reasons of prestige, marriage stability and for purposes of
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satisfying the evidentiary burden in cases requiring proof of marriage and paternity.211
Although the Marriage Ordinance was an ambitious piece of legislation, it was not without
problems. These problems will be highlighted in the next section of this thesis.
4.3.3.3 Criticisms of the Marriage Ordinance 
The Marriage Ordinance (in general) contributed to inequality. For example, it allowed
a woman to invoke section 48 of the Marriage Ordinance and claim a widow’s share in
her husband’s estate, but prevented a man in the exact same circumstances as the
woman from obtaining any benefit from the estate of his deceased wife.  212
Another difficulty experienced was the impreciseness of the concepts of “child” and
“wife” in the Ordinance.  These problematic concepts were subsequently ascribed213
definite meanings by the judiciary. In Coleman v Shang  the Court of Appeal held that:214
in determining whether a person was a legitimate “child” (my emphasis) under section
48 of the Marriage Ordinance, the applicable law should be the Ghanaian lex domicilii,
which includes the customary law. Applying that law, the rule in Ghana is that every
child, however born, is legitimate provided that his or her paternity was duly
acknowledged by the father or on behalf of the father. 
The same court referred to the following in their definition of “wife”:
under the Statute of Distribution, a “wife” means a “lawful wife”… The question of “lawful
wife” (is a question) of status to be decided by the law of domicil. Therefore if a
marriage between a man and a woman is by the law of their domicil a valid marriage,
the “wife” is a lawful wife for the purposes of the statute no matter whether or not the
marriage is invalid by the law of England or any other place … In such cases the law of
England recognises and acts on the status declared by the law of the domicil, and such
persons will be (a) wife for the purposes of the statute of Distribution.215
Id 17-21.211
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The above definition also included customary wives who were married after the death
of the Ordinance wife.  216
The ascribing of English law rules to African customary law was problematic. For
example, the Ordinance failed to consider the degree and descent of the persons that
are disallowed from lawfully marrying each other under Ghanaian customary law.  The217
Ordinance promotes a nuclear family which is contrary to customary law. The rules do
not consider “living” customary law. For example, Rule 1 of the Ordinance is contrary
to “living” customary law because the property of females usually included things like
household utensils, beads and other female paraphernalia, and it was traditionally
inherited by females and not males. Secondly, no consent is required from persons who
are traditionally expected to give their consent (like the family head) to a union under
the Ordinance.  Another undesirable feature of the Ordinance was that the rules which218
were applicable in 1884 remained the same and were never amended in Ghana, even
though the rules in England were changed regularly.  A final frustrating feature of219
section 48 of the Ordinance was that it created a complicated system of mathematical
calculations.  In order to eliminate the problems associated with the Marriage220
Ordinance, the legislature promulgated the Intestate Succession Law, 1985. The
researcher focuses on this Law in the next section of this thesis. 
4.4 The Intestate Succession Law, 1985221
4.4.1 Background
Prior to the enactment of the Intestate Succession Law, the Constitution of the Third
Republic, 1979 further amended the law of intestate succession by providing that:
(2) No spouse may be deprived of a reasonable provision out of the estate of a
spouse whether the estate be testate or intestate.
Ibid.216
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(3) Parliament shall enact such laws as are necessary to ensure – ...
(b) that every child, whether or not born in wedlock, shall be entitled to
reasonable provision out of the estate of its parents ...222
The introduction of this section into the Constitution however, did not have any significant
impact on the provision for spouses and children out of the intestate estates of their
deceased husbands or fathers.  The fact that customary law legislation made inadequate223
provision for intestate wives and children and that the system of inheritance promulgated
under the Marriage Ordinance introduced a foreign legal system into Ghanaian law, at the
expense of local customary law,  prompted the Ghanaian government to issue an224
investigation into the existing inheritance laws by publishing the Report of the Inheritance
Commission of Inquiry (the Ollennu Commission) in 1959. The Ghanaian government
proposed reforms in the areas of marriage, divorce and inheritance and in 1961 it issued
a White Paper on Marriage Divorce and Inheritance.  The legislature subsequently225
passed three successive Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance Bills in 1961, 1962 and 1963
respectively. The Divorce and Inheritance Bills were unfortunately not enacted as it was not
possible to attain sufficient agreement to enact the legislative change. 
In 1968, the Law Reform Commission was then set up under the Law Reform
Commission Decree, 1968 (NLCD 288), and it was decided that the above-mentioned
matters be treated individually.  The Law Reform Commission published numerous226
papers on intestate succession, eventually producing a proposed Intestate Succession
Decree, 1975.  However no enactment of any legislation ensued.  Only in 1983227 228
again, did the Provincial National Defence Council (PNDC) publish a proposed Intestate
Succession law which comprised substantially of the 1975 proposed decree plus some
amendments.  It was only after this intervention, that the Intestate Succession Law229 230
was finally promulgated in 1985 after considerable public debate.  231
Article 32(2) and (3).222




Ghana Law Reform Commission W orking Paper no 5/75. 227
W oodman (1985) op cit 121.228
Ibid.229
PNDC Law 111.230
For further background see Ekow Daniels W C “The impact of the 1992 Constitution on family rights231
in Ghana” (1996) Journal of African Law 183-193.
180
The Intestate Succession Law is now the uniform statute regulating matters concerning
intestate succession in Ghana.  That means that the law governs all types of232
marriages, ie, marriages concluded according to the Marriage Ordinance, customary
marriages and marriages concluded according to the Marriage of Mohammedans
Ordinance.  The new law substantially alters the rules of customary law, especially as233
it affects members of matrilineal communities.  The Law also demonstrates234
government’s commitment to adhere to international law and certain proposals that
advocated for a re-examination of laws “relating to the rights of women and children in
order to end discrimination against them”.  235
4.4.2 General provisions
The Intestate Succession Law, as the name suggests, governs the devolution of
intestate estates alone.  The Law does however accommodate estates which have236
been devolved partially by a will. In this regard, section 2(2) provides that:
Any person who dies leaving a will disposing of part of his estate shall be deemed to have
died intestate under this law in respect of that part of his estate which is not disposed of
in the will and accordingly the provisions of the Law shall apply to such part of his estate. 
In respect of the Law the term “property” has a restrictive meaning and excludes “any
stool, skin or family property, or the self-acquired property or share of property of the
descendant’s spouse”.  237
The Memorandum to the Intestate Succession Law states that:232
This law is aimed at removing the anomalies in the present law relating to intestate succession and to provide
a uniform succession law that will be applicable throughout the country irrespective of the class of the
intestate and the type of marriage contracted by him or her.
In this regard, section 1(1) provides that:
On the commencement of this Law, the devolution of the estate of any person who dies intestate on or after
such commencement shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Law subject to subsection
(2) of this section and the rules of private international law.
Section 18 provides that a “spouse” includes “a person married under the Marriage Ordinance (Cap233
127), the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance (Cap 129), customary law, or a person who is the
surviving partner of a customary law marriage where the customary rites were not performed but where
the parties lived together as husband and wife and obtained the actual or implied consent of their two
families to the marriage”. For an exposition on the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance see Kludze
(1988) op cit 229-236. 
Kludze (1988) op cit 161.234
Grant, Bowman C and Kuenyehia A Women and law in sub-Saharan Africa (2003) 210. 235
Kludze (1988) op cit 165. See section 1(1) and section 2(1) which provides that:236
A person shall be deemed to have died intestate under this Law if at the time of his death he had not made
a will disposing of his estate.
Section 1(2).237
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Prior to the enactment of the Law, customary law governed cases of intestacy with
certain exceptions. For example, section 48 of the Marriage Ordinance awarded a
surviving spouse a specific portion of the deceased’s intestate estate whilst section 10
of the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance  had the same effect as section 48 of238
the Marriage Ordinance but applied to spouses who had contracted a marriage in terms
of Islamic Law. In order to create and foster uniformity, both sections 10 and 48 of the
afore-mentioned Ordinances were repealed by the Intestate Succession Law.  This239
meant that the differentiation based on the form of marriage concluded by the deceased
intestate has finally been eradicated.  The Intestate Succession Law makes provision240
for the allotment of a specific portion of the deceased’s intestate estate to the surviving
spouse and children.  In this regard, section 3 of the Law states that:241
Where the intestate is survived by a spouse or child or both, the spouse or child or
both of them, as the case may be, shall be entitled absolutely to the household chattels
of the intestate.
“Household chattel” is defined very broadly by the Law and includes things like:
Jewellery, clothes, furniture and furnishings, refrigerators, television, radiogram, other
electrical and electronic appliances, kitchen and laundry equipment, simple agricultural
equipment, hunting equipment, books, motor vehicles other than vehicles used wholly
for commercial purposes, and household livestock.  242
Section 3 therefore grants spouses and children an “absolute interest” in the household
chattels of the intestate estate. This means that each heir takes his or her share as a
proprietor and may dispose of it either by a disposition inter vivos or by will.  Section243
4(a) of the Law provides that if the intestate estate comprises of only one house:
the surviving spouse or child or both of them, as the case may be, shall be entitled to
that house and where it devolves to both spouse and child, they shall hold it as
tenants-in-common.
Cap 129 (1951 Rev).238
See section 19. The Law also states that The Statutes of England relating to intestate succession239
applicable in Ghana immediately before the coming into force of the Law shall cease to apply (see
section 20(1).
Kludze (1988) op cit 166.240
Kuenyehia (1986-1989) op cit 88.241
Section 18. Please note that this list is not exhaustive.242
Ibid.243
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This section seeks to redress past practices which often resulted in the eviction of the
spouse and the children from the matrimonial home by members of the extended family
upon the death of the intestate.  By granting a surviving spouse and children a specific244
right to the matrimonial home, the Law prevents the unjustifiable practice of ejectment. 
In instances where the intestate estate comprises of more than one house, the Law
provides that:
the surviving spouse or child or both of them, as the case may be, shall determine which
of those houses shall devolve to the such spouse or child or both of them and where it
devolved to both spouse and child they shall hold such house as tenants-in-common.  245
 
Section 4(b) also contains the proviso that in cases of dissension as to which of the
houses is to devolve to the surviving spouse and/or children, the entitled parties can
approach the High Court to render a decision in this regard. 
The Intestate Succession Law makes provision for the sub-division of the intestate
estate into specific “fractitional entitlements”.  From what was discussed above it is246
quite obvious that the surviving spouse and children acquire the biggest portion of the
intestate estate in all instances. The manner in which the remainder of the estate is
divided is dependant upon the identity of the other survivors and the number of eligible
survivors.  In this regard, section 5 of the Law provides that where the intestate is247
survived by a spouse and child the residue of the estate is sub-divided as follows: (1)
three-sixteenth to the surviving spouse; (2) nine-sixteenth to the surviving child; (3) one-
eighth to the surviving parent; and (4) one-eighth in accordance with customary law.
If the intestate is survived by more than one child, each child shares equally in the nine-
sixteenth.  If the intestate is survived by either his or her parents, each parent shares248
Kludze (1988) op cit 169. See also Swapim v Ackuwa (1888) Sar FCL 191 at 192 where the Court held244
that the family of the deceased has a right to eject the wife and children from their matrimonial home,
as the wife and her children belong to her family. A wife and her children may only remain in the
matrimonial home with the permission of her husband’s family.
Section 4(b).245




equally in the one-eighth portion of the estate.  In cases where the intestate is not249
survived by a parent one-fourth of the remainder of the estate devolves according to
customary law.  250
Section 6 of the Law provides that where the intestate is survived by a spouse alone,
the remainder of the estate is sub-divided as follows: (1) one-half to the surviving
spouse; (2) one-fourth to the surviving parent; and (3) one fourth in accordance with
customary law. Once again, if the intestate is survived by both parents, each parent
shares equally in the one-fourth portion of the estate.  In cases where the intestate is251
not survived by a parent one-half of the residue of the estate devolves according to
customary law.252
Section 7 of the Law makes provision for the situation where the intestate is survived
by a child or children alone. In such cases the residue of the estate devolves as follows:
(1) three-fourths to the surviving child; (2) one-eighth to the surviving parent; and (3)
one-eighth in accordance with customary law. Section 7 also contains the proviso that
where the intestate is not survived by a parent the whole of the one-fourth of the
residue of the estate devolves according to customary law. Where the intestate is
survived by a parent alone, the residue is sub-divided as follows: (1) three-fourths to the
surviving parent; and (2) one-fourth in accordance with customary law.  Here, the253
three-fourths of the intestate estate includes the household chattels and the house as
sections 3 and 4 cease to apply for obvious reasons.  The portion devolving in254
accordance with customary law will be allotted to either of the parents in accordance
with the rules regulating patrilineal and matrilineal succession.  255
Section 11(1) of the Law makes provision for the situation where the intestate is not
Section 14.249
Section 5.250
Kludze (1988) op cit 172.251
Section 6.252
Section 8. In this regard section 9 also provides that:253
Where no customary law is applicable to the devolution of that part of the residue which by virtue of section
5, 6, 7 or 8 of this Law shall devolve in accordance with customary law such part of the residue shall devolve
in equal shares to those beneficiaries otherwise entitled to share the residue under the relevant provisions
of this Law.
Kludze (1988) op cit 172.254
Ibid.255
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survived by a spouse, child or parent. In such instances, the residue of the estate
devolves according to customary law; making the customary family the sole successor.
Section 10 of the Law defines the term “family” and provides that:
Where the rules of succession under customary law applicable to any portion of the
estate provide that the family of the intestate shall be entitled to a share in the estate:
–
(a) That family shall be the family to which the intestate belonged for the purposes
of succession in accordance with customary law in the community of which he
was a member;
(b) In the case of the intestate who, being a member of two customary law
communities belonged to two families for the purposes of succession, that family
shall be the two families;
(c) In the case of an intestate not being a member of any family, that family shall be
the family with which the intestate was identified at the time of his death or,
failing that, to the families of his parents or failing that to the Republic.
Sections 12,  13,  14,  15  and 16  of the Law require mere mentioning, as they256 257 258 259 260
do not affect intestate succession that drastically. Sections 16A and 17 of the Law are
very important as they enforce the right of the surviving spouse or child to remain in the
matrimonial home before the distribution of the estate of the deceased person. These
sections provide that:
Section 12 provides that:256
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 4 and 5 to 8 of this Law –
(a) Where the total value of the residue does not exceed ¢50,000.00 the residue shall devolve to any
surviving spouse or child of the intestate or where both the spouse and child survive the intestate to both
of them;
(b) Where the intestate is survived only by the parent and the total value of the estate does not exceed
¢50,000.00 the estate shall devolve to the surviving parent.
Section 13 provides that:257
The Provisional National Defence Council Secretary responsible for Justice may by legislative instrument vary
the maximum value of the residue or estate prescribed under section 12 of this Law.
Section 14 provides that:258
Subject to the rules of customary law relating to a member's interest in communal property, where two or
more persons are entitled to share a portion of an estate under this Law they shall divide it among
themselves in equal shares.
Section 15 provides that:259
Where spouses die in circumstances –
(a) in which it appears that their deaths were simultaneous; or
(b) rendering it uncertain which of them survived the other, the older shall for the purposes of this Law, be
presumed to have predeceased the younger.
Section 16 provides that:260
Where a child of the intestate who has predeceased him is survived by a child (being the grandchild of the
intestate) the grandchild shall, if he is dependent upon the intestate at the time of his death be entitled to the
whole or a portion of the estate which would have otherwise devolved to his parent if he had not predeceased
the intestate.
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(1) No person shall before the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether testate or intestate eject a surviving spouse or child from the
matrimonial home –
(a) where the matrimonial home is the self-acquired property of the deceased;
(b) where the matrimonial home is rented property unless the ejection is
pursuant to a court order;
(c) where the matrimonial home is the family house of the deceased, unless
a period of six months has expired from the date of the death of the
deceased; or
(d) where the matrimonial home is public property unless a period of three
months has expired from the date of the death of the deceased.261
(2) For the purposes of this section “matrimonial house” means –
(a) the house or premises occupied by the deceased and the surviving
spouse, or the deceased and a surviving child or all as the case may be,
at the time of the death of the deceased; or
(b) any other self-acquired house of the deceased occupied by the surviving
spouse or child or both at the time of death of the deceased.262
Any person who before the distribution of the estate of a deceased person whether
testate or intestate;
(a) unlawfully ejects a surviving spouse or child from the matrimonial home
contrary to the section 16A of this Law
(b) unlawfully deprives the entitled person of the use of –
(c) (i) any part of the property of the entitled person;
(ii) any property shared by the entitled person with the deceased to
which the provisions of Law apply; or
(iii) removes, destroys or otherwise unlawfully interferes with the
property of the deceased person
commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a minimum fine of
¢50,000.00 and not exceeding ¢500,000.00 or a term of imprisonment not exceeding
one year and the court or tribunal shall make such other orders as it considers
necessary for the re-instatement of or reimbursement to the person thus ejected or
deprived.263
The afore-mentioned sections have significantly altered the previous customary law
position by restricting the interest of the family in intestate estates  in favour of264
protecting the interests of the widow and children.  This development is commendable265




Kludze (1988) op cit 180.264
Dowuona-Hammond (1998) op cit 157.265
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and disadvantages of the Intestate Succession Law and investigate whether the
revolutionary amendments to Ghanaian customary law have in fact improved the
intestate succession rights of both women and children in Ghanaian society or whether
it has merely amounted to paper law.
4.4.3 Comments and criticisms
4.4.3.1 General
Women and children represent one of the most vulnerable groups in Ghanaian
society.  The Intestate Succession Law, 1985 boldly endeavours to empower these266
social groups as far as intestate succession is concerned. In addition to granting
widows and children rights to the self-acquired property of their husbands/fathers, the
Law also takes cognisance of a wife’s involvement in her husband’s economic activity;
a fact which Ghanaian customary law ignored;  and also recognises the “growing267
importance of the nuclear family in the Ghanaian family system”.  The Law creates a268
homogeneous system of law governing intestate succession in Ghana and also
replaces the complicated rules of succession (applicable under the Marriage Ordinance)
with simple rules of succession.  The Law does not make distinctions according to the269
gender of the deceased and/or the successors as was the case under the Marriage
Ordinance.  270
Although the Law is commendable, it has nevertheless generated its own novel
difficulties because of its adoption of a perfunctory and facile resolution to an intricate
problem with profound social implications.  For example, the Law disregards the group271
See In re Ackom-Mensah (Decd); Ackom-Mensah v Abosompem  [1973] 2 GLR 18 at 22, where the266
Court stated that: 
In the lifetime of their relative, they cannot vent their spleen on his wife. The opportunity comes when he dies. The
poor widow and her children are subjected to a vulgar and humiliating abuse; they are made to pay unreasonable
and unjustifiable funeral dues, to incur other liabilities in respect of the funeral which can find no foundation in
customary law; and after the funeral are harassed and driven to desperation by unnecessary litigation. 
Fenrich J and Higgins TE “Promise unfulfilled: Law, culture and women’s inheritance rights in Ghana”267
(2001-2002) Fordham International Law Journal 287.
Ibid.268
W oodman (1985) op cit 126.269
Id 127.270
Kludze (1988) op cit 163.271
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in favour of the nuclear family  which is contrary to customary law. It applies uniformly272
amongst all tribes in Ghana and is not cognisant of the fact that the customary rules of
intestate succession differ from tribe to tribe.  The rules of succession applicable273
under the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance were merely excluded or deleted.274
The Law also fails to recognise the changed role of women in society. Women have
become economically active and can produce or possess property of their own.  275
4.4.3.2 Specific criticisms
The Intestate Succession Law applies to intestate estates alone. This fact could
encourage Ghanaian citizens to draft wills regulating the devolution of their estates,
thereby circumventing the consequences of the Law,  subject only to the restricting276
article 22(1) provision of the Ghana Constitution, 1992 which states that:
(1) A spouse shall not be deprived of a reasonable provision out of the estate of a
spouse whether or not the spouse died having made a will.
Secondly, the Law applies to the intestate’s self-acquired property alone, and disregards
family property entirely.  This is problematic because what constitutes self-acquired277
property and what constitutes family property may not always be readily distinguishable
and may at times even overlap. For example, Kludze  notes that there is evidence that278
any property that has not been disposed of at customary law is family property.  If that279
is an accurate reflection of the law, and it seems to be the law in many matrilineal
communities, property held allegedly as individual property by successors, as well as
refurbishments to such property, may be categorised as family property. 
The vagueness of the concept of self-acquired property could create numerous
Freeman op cit 160.272
W oodman (1985) op cit 126.273
Ibid.274
Mikell G “Culture, law and social policy: Changing the economic status of Ghanaian women” (1992)275
Yale Journal of International Law 233. See also Chanock M “Neither customary nor legal: African
customary law in an era of family reform” (1989) International Journal of Law and the Family 77-78.
Kludze (1988) op cit 164.276
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 287-288. Section 18 of the Law defines an estate as:277
self-acquired property which the intestate was legally competent to dispose of during his lifetime and in
respect of which his interest has not been terminated by or on his death.
Kludze (1988) op cit 165.278
See also Ollennu NA Principles of customary land law in Ghana (1962) 38 and 160. 279
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additional difficulties for surviving spouses and/or children and may even result in their
not being able to inherit or claim the entitled property successfully.
The law affects both patrilineal and matrilineal communities. As stated above, in
matrilineal communities, the self-acquired property of an intestate becomes family
property. Under conventional Ghanaian law, “family” is classified in such a way that it
prevents wives and husbands from belonging to each other’s families. Secondly, in both
matrilineal and patrilineal communities widows do not belong to their husband’s family
nor do they share in his intestate estate upon death.  The new law effectively alters280
the order of the family as conventionally understood by patrilineal and matrilineal
communities.281
The sub-division of the intestate estate into fractions merely complicates the devolution
process. The fractional formula used in the distribution of the estate to the successors
under the Law inevitably results in the disintegration of the estate, especially where there
is more than one spouse and multiple sets of children. In instances where there is one
legitimate wife and other illegitimate children, the legitimate wife may find that what was
to go to her and her children would have to be re-distributed among her children and the
illegitimate children of her husband, some of whom she may never have even been aware
of until the demise of her husband. It often happens that different wives and different sets
of children have competing interests, thus rendering it impossible for them to control and
preserve the property as co-proprietors. In practice, therefore, the parties are forced to
convert the property into cash and distribute the return it yields instead of retaining it. 
In some instances determining the various shares of the estate which should be
distributed to particular heirs is virtually hopeless without converting the property into
cash. Where the remainder of the estate consists of one large property only, such as
a house or a farm, it is virtually impossible to determine or distribute specific shares as
prescribed by the Law without converting the property to cash and thereby decimating
the economic worth of the property entirely.
Bond J “Pluralism in Ghana: The perils and promise of parallel law” (2008) Oregon Review of280
International Law 406-407.
Dovlo op cit 638-639.281
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Furthermore, if the intestate is a member of two customary families, the share which
has to be distributed according to customary law would have to be divided, requiring
that the one-eighth portion be further split into two. When the intestate is survived by
both parents, separated or divorced, the share allotted to them would have to be split
into two, leading to the further disintegration of the estate.282
The Intestate Succession Law fails to consider that customary law recognises a system
of polygyny.  This omission introduces numerous additional problems. In this regard,283
sections 4(b) and 3(1) of the Law are especially problematic. For example, section 4(b)
grants a surviving spouse and/or child a choice of house, if the estate comprises of
more than one house. This means that the surviving spouse and/or children could
select any house in the estate even if the house belonged to another wife. This situation
is intolerable as it could result in the unlawful ejectment of another spouse and her
children from their matrimonial home.  284
In addition to that, where the estate comprises of only one house but more than one
surviving spouse with several children, this often results in prolonged conflicts which in
most cases can only be resolved by alienating the house and the chattels and dividing
the profits.  These outcomes are contrary to the objectives of the Act and often result285
in the fragmentation of the intestate estate.  Although the Law empowers the High286
Court to resolve such disputes, the Law gives no guidelines on the criteria to be applied
by the court in resolving such challenges.  The Intestate Succession Law creates287
further problems for polygynous wives as they may now receive as little as 3-5% of their
husband’s estates if he dies intestate.288
Section 18 defines a child as:
Includes a natural child, a person adopted under any enactment for the time being in
Dowuona-Hammond (1998) op cit 157-158.282
Fenrich (2005) op cit 439. See also Baindall (Orse Lawson) v Baindall [1946] 1 All ER 342 at 346 and283
Official Solicitor v Yemoh and Others [2011] 4 All ER 200 para. 14.
Duwuona-Hammond (1998) op cit 155. 284
Ibid. 285
Id 157.286
Kludze (1988) op cit 170. 287
Schnier D and Hintmann B “An analysis of polygyny in Ghana: The perpetuation of gender based288
inequality in Africa” (2001) Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 803.
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force or under customary law related to adoption and any person recognised by the
person in question as his child or recognised by law to be the child of such person.
This broad definition creates numerous implementation problems. The Intestate
Succession Law presupposes that each and every child of the deceased is “equally
dependant on him and thus makes no distinction between dependant children and
those who are self-supporting adults, who in no way are dependant on the intestate”.289
Although the Memorandum to the Law claims to safeguard the entitlement rights of both
widows and young children in the deceased’s intestate estate “its provisions do not
allow for fluidity in the devolution of the estate to guarantee that the surviving widow and
dependent children are given priority (above all others) with regards to maintenance and
care. A situation is, therefore, created where an independent adult child of the
deceased could claim equally as a minor child who is fully dependant on the intestate.
Also under the Law, such independent adult children are entitled to a bigger share of
the estate than a dependant and old surviving parent. Although all the children of the
deceased should be allotted a share in the estate, greater fairness would be achieved
if the Law made adequate provision, first of all, for the widow and minor children before
the distribution of the residue of the estate to others”.  Lastly, many rural and urban290
women may be totally unaware of the existence and benefits of the Law or its effect or
their entitlement rights to the intestate estate of a deceased spouse, due to the high
rates of illiteracy in Ghana.  291
The promulgation of a uniform law regulating intestate succession in Ghana is indeed
admirable. Sadly though, the Law itself hasn’t achieved its objectives entirely and has
had little effect on improving the position of women in Ghana. In the section that follows,
the researcher examines the Report of a yearlong research study conducted by the
Joseph R Crowley Programme in International Human Rights at Fordham Law School292
which focused on women’s inheritance rights in Ghana post 1985 generally. The Report
is important because it assesses the effectiveness of the Intestate Succession Law by
engaging in or conducting interviews with lawyers, judges, legislators, government
Dowuona-Hammond (1998) op cit 156.289
Ibid.290
Ibid.291
The report is contained in Fenrich J and Higgins TE “Promise unfulfilled: Law, culture and women’s292
inheritance rights in Ghana” (2001-2002) Fordham International Law Journal 259-341.
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officials, academics, local leaders and ordinary Ghanaian women and men.  293
4.4.4 Evaluating the Intestate Succession Law, 1985 through the
Report of the Joseph R Crowley Programme in International
Human Rights 
One of the first things the research group observed was that the implementation of the
Intestate Succession Law presented new impediments for women realising their rights
of succession. They noted that the family of a deceased Ghanaian man would often
thwart the efforts of his widow in claiming a share of the estate by asserting that she
was not a legal wife but rather a girlfriend or a “concubine”.  This places an294
unjustifiable burden on the widow to prove the existence of her customary marriage to
the deceased.  In such instances, the burden of proof may not be readily discharged295
as registration is not a legal requirement for the validity of a Ghanaian customary
marriage.  Requiring a wife to provide evidence of the existence of a customary296
marriage also has the negative result of obstructing the administration of the estate.297
Another technique employed by the intestate’s family to frustrate a wife’s entitlement
would be to claim that the customary marital rituals were not fully completed at the time
of the intestate’s death.  The failure to perform the customary marital rights timeously,298
could be attributed to one of the following facts: (1) it was merely an oversight on the
part of the intestate;  (2) it was a calculated omission by the intestate in order to299
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 261.293
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 304. This was confimed by some of the interviewees viz Mrs294
Ellen A Sweetie Asiedu Akrofi Sowa, Regional Director, Legal Aid Board, W estern Region, Takoradi
(8 June 2001); Hilary Gbedemah, Legal officer, SNV/W iLDAF Legal Awareness Programme, Ho (7
June 2001); Mrs Patience Diaba, SNV/W iLDAF Legal Awareness Programme, Takoradi (8 June 2001);
and Hich Court Justice Mariama Owusu, Kumosi (7 June 2001) footnote 227.
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 306.295
Ibid. Section 1 of the Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law, 1985 states that:296
On the commencement of the Law any marriage contracted under customary law before or after such
commencement may be registered in accordance with the following provisions.
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 307.297
Id 308. See also the interviews with The Very Reverend Kofi Ampansah, W esley Methodist Church,298
Kumasi (7 June 2001) and Dorothy Holbrook, W esley Methodist Church, Kumasi (7 June 2001) at
footnote 248.
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 308-9.299
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continue exerting dominion over the women;  (3) the intestate’s family declined to300
complete the requisite rites;  or (4) it was too expensive to perform the customary rites301
fully.  In such cases the court could be of assistance to such a wife as they have in302
fact recognised putative customary marriages.303
In addition to the evidentiary problems experienced, a widow could also be expected
to authenticate the nature of the property in the intestate’s estate before she is able to
derive benefit from the Intestate Succession Law.  In order to qualify for the benefit304
under the Intestate Succession law, a widow must establish that the “property is self-
acquired property rather than family property”.  A widow’s ability to prove the two points305
mentioned immediately above, may often be circumvented by the family members of the
intestate. Such family members may usually contend that they contributed to the
acquisition of the property in question and for that reason alone, claim that the property
should not be classified as self-acquired property but rather family property, and therefore
falls out of the scope of the Law.  In one of the research group’s interviews, a High Court306
Justice approximated that in nearly sixty percent of the cases she had to adjudicate upon,
relating to matters of intestate succession, the family made such claims.  A widow’s307
capacity to contest the nature and scope of the contributions of family members may also
be frustrated by the simple fact that she may be ignorant “about the acquisition of property
or the conduct of her husband’s business”.  308
The law of Ghana only recognises a system of total or complete separation of
Id 309. See interviews with Hilary Gbedemah, Legal Officer, SNV/W iLDAF Legal Awareness300
Programme, Ho (7 June 2001); Mrs Betty Adunyame, Regional Director, Natyional Council on W omen
and Development (“NCW D”), Kumasi (7 June 2001); and The Very Reverand Kofi Ampansah, W esley
Methodist Church, Kumasi (7 June 2001) footnote 250. 
Ibid. See interview with Hilary Gbedemah, Legal Officer, SNV/W iLDAF Legal Awareness Programme,301
Ho (7 June 2001) footnote 251.
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 309. See Interview with Faustina Quaye, Kwanfifi (6 June302
2001) footnote 252.
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 310. 303
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Ibid. See also section 1(2) of the Intestate Succession Law PNDCL III (1985).305
See also Fenrich and Higgins op cit 314 and section 2 of the Intestate Succession Law PNDCL III (1985).306
Fenrich and Higgins (2001) op cit 315 where they interviewed High Court Justcie Mariama Owusu,307
Kumasi (7 June 2001-2002) at footnote 272.
Id 316. See also Kuenyehia A and Ofei-Aboagye E “Family law in Ghana and its implications for308
women” in Kuenyehia A (ed) Women and law in West Africa: Situational analysis of some key issues
affecting women (1998) 33.
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property  before and after marriage.  This rule makes it virtually impossible for309 310
spouses to benefit from property they jointly acquired or contributed to the acquisition
of during the subsistence of the marriage. Women are especially at a disadvantage
here as marital property is generally considered as belonging to a man.  There is in311
fact an old Akan saying that, if a wife buys a gun, it is a man who keeps it.  The312
following case discussions exemplify this crucial point.
“In Kpando, the Crowley Programme interviewed Comfort Bribinti Ayeduvor, the second
wife of her late husband. Early in their customary marriage, her husband had been the
owner of a school and an educator. During that time he was rich and supported four wives
and several concubines and fathered sixteen children, including Ms Ayeduvor’s three
surviving children. When the school began to face pecuniary problems, the other wives
and concubines deserted him. Ms Ayeduvor was the only wife who remained, and the
family counted on her salary as an educator during this period. According to Ms
Ayeduvor, the family of her husband refused to provide him with any financial assistance. 
After her husband retired, they survived on his pension and her salary. On the basis of
this income, they were able to construct a house in which they resided for several
months before he died. Ms Ayeduvor also purchased a piece of land next to the house,
from her own means. When her husband died, his family for the first time discovered
that they owned a house and promptly sought to remove her from both the house and
the adjacent piece of land. Ms Ayeduvor had legal documents proving that she was in
fact the owner of the adjacent property; however, the house had been registered in the
sole name of her husband. The family banished her from the matrimonial home during
the widowhood ceremonies, thereby transgressing the Intestate Succession Law, 1985.
At the time of her interview, ie, as at June 7, 2001, Ms Ayeduvor, had completed the
widowhood rights but the house was still bolted. She had expected that the family would
Similar to South Africa’s ante-nuptial contract.309
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 316.310
Ibid. See interviews with Mr Kwaku Frimpong, Director, Legal Aid Board, Ashanti Region Kumasi (5 June311
2001-2002) and Rosaline Obeng-Ofori, Actionaid, Accra (4 June 2001) footnote 284. To add to the problem,
most women are reluctant to register properties on their own names in order to avoid marital conflicts.
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 318. See interview with Betty Adunyame, Regional Director,312
National Council on W omen and Development (“NCW D”), Kumasi (7 June 2001) at footnote 291.
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fulfil its undertaking to unlock the house by April, but, as of June, they had still not”.  313
“Ms Mercy Dixon, who was interviewed in Kpando in the Volta Region, persuaded her
husband to construct a house for them after their marriage. Although she did not buy
the building materials, she purchased food and other household items while her
husband entrusted his funds to the building of the house. Her husband later became
sick, and she continued to support him and sustain the household. After her husband
died, his mother demanded that Ms Dixon evacuate the house. In Ms Dixon’s case, the
establishment of her contribution and share of ownership in the property was absolutely
vital because she was the second wife of her husband, and they did not procreate any
offspring. If she failed to prove part ownership, she would be compelled to share the
house equally as tenants- in-common with her husband’s first wife and her four children,
despite the fact that they made no monetary contribution to the property”. 314
In addition to the problems of proving ownership, widows also face problems of
administration of the intestate estate.  In Ghanaian Law, if a person wants to administer315
an intestate’s estate, he or she must acquire a grant of letters of administration.  In terms316
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 319. See interview with Ms Comfort Bribinti Ayeduvor, Kpando313
(7 June 2001) footnote 298.
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 320. Interview with Ms Mercy Dixon, Kpando (7 June 2001) footnote314
300.
Intestate estates are administered according to the Administration of Estates Act 63 of 1961.315
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 323. See also sections 19 and 20 of the Administration of316
Estates Act 63 of 1961 which provides that:
Section 19 – Uncertainty as to Succession
(1) Whenever: –
(a) any person dies leaving assets in Ghana and the court is not satisfied that there is any person
immediately available who is legally entitled to succession to the assets, or that danger is to be
apprehended of misappropriation, deterioration, or waste of the assets before the succession thereto
can be determined, or whether the Administrator-General is entitled to a grant of probate or of letters
of administration of the estate of the deceased in respect thereof, or
(b) the agent in charge of any assets in Ghana belonging to any person not residing in Ghana or
belonging to a company not incorporated in Ghana dies without leaving any responsible person in
charge thereof, the court may, upon the application of the Administrator-General or any person
interested in the assets or in the due administration thereof, direct the Administrator-General to collect
and take possession of the assets and to hold, posses, realise, and dispose of them according to the
direction of the court, and in default of any such directions, to the provisions of this Act so far as
applicable to the assets.
(2) Any order of the court made under this section shall entitle the Administrator-General –
(a) to maintain any suit or proceedings for the recovery of the assets; and
(b) if he thinks fit to apply for a grant of probate or of letters of administration of the estate of the
deceased; and
(c) Subject to section 54 of this Act, to retain out of the assets of the estate any fees chargeable under
rules made under this Act and to reimburse himself for all payment made by him in respect of the
assets which a private administrator might lawfully have made. [As Substituted by Administration of
Estates (Amendment) Law, 1985 (PNDCL 113) s 1].
195
of the law, only certain individuals qualify for a grant of letters of administration and they are
ranked as follows: (1) a spouse; (2) children; (3) a parent of the intestate; and (4) a
customary successor. Despite this hierarchical list, the courts have generally regarded the
lineage of the deceased as the most suitable party to administer the property of the
intestate.  In fact, courts will often deny letters of administration to a widow without an317
affidavit from the family backing the application.  For example, “in the case of Mrs. Cecilia318
Ackah, the family of her husband forestalled the application for the letters of administration
for over a year. Such delays place excessive burdens and adversity on widows whose
financial livelihood is often dependent upon property within the intestate estate”.319
This practice could result in serious administrative delays if the family fails or refuses
to support the widow in her application.  Sometimes the family may even make the320
application for the letters of administration without the knowledge of the widow.  Such321
a situation ensued “in the cases of Beatrice Avorkliyah and Bernice Segbawu”. In Ms
Avorkliyah’s case, the oldest son from a previous marriage of her husband filed for
letters of administration without her. M. Avorkliyah acquired legal assistance from the
SNV/WiLDAF Legal Awareness Programme in Ho and filed a caveat in the Circuit Court
to obstruct the grant of the letters of administration. The case was still pending at the
time of the interview.  In Ms Segbawu’s case, her husband’s family secretly322
endeavoured to acquire the letters of administration. However, Ms Segbawu became
aware of their attempts, and WiLDAF filed a caveat on her behalf. The High Court
Justice presiding over the case ruled that Ms Segbawu and her two elder sons be
included in the letters of administration. Since this judgment, however, the family has
declined to move forward with the administration of the estate.  323
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 323. See interviews with Charles Gyamfi Danquah,317
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Kumasi (5 June 2001) and Justice Kwadwo
Owusu, Community Tribunal Chairman, Accra (14 June 2001) footnote 310. 
Ibid.318
Id 324. See Interview with Mrs Cecilia Ackah, Client of SNV/W iLDAF Legal Awareness Program,319
Takoradi (7 June 2001) at footnote 314.
Id 323-324. See interview with Justice Kwadwo Owusu, Community Tribunal Chairman, Accra (14 June320
2001); Mrs Ellen A Sweetie Asiedu Akrofi Sowa, Regional Director, Legal Aid Board, W estern Region,
Takoradi (8 June 2001); John Bosco Nabarese, Court Registrar, Takoradi (8 June2001) and Mrs
Patience Diaba, SNV/W iLDAF Legal Awareness Programme, Takoradi (8 June 2001) footnote 313.
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 323-324. 321
Id 324. See interview with Ms Beatrice Avorkliyah, Ho (5 June 2001) footnote 316.322
Fenrich and Higgins (2001-2002) op cit 324. See interview with Ms Bernice Segbawu, Ho (5 June323
2001) footnote 317.
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When drafting a list of property in the intestate estate, the family may falsify this
information in order to overvalue family property thereby giving them a greater portion
or share of the estate.  Such a situation ensued “when Ms Regina Papawu’s husband324
died in 1999 following a long illness. According to Ms Papawu, her husband’s family
failed to take care of him and neither did they ask about his health. Nevertheless, after
he died, the family compelled her to participate in the ceremonies associated with
widowhood which was supervised by her husband’s older brother. Another brother of
the deceased undertook to obtain the administration of the estate. He drafted an
application for a grant of letters of administration making an inventory of all of their
property and household chattels with the exception of the house in which she had
resided with her husband. Ms Papawu declined to sign the application unless the house
was incorporated. She later received a duplicate of the letters of administration with her
name removed. She then solicited assistance from the WiLDAF”.  From the above,325
we can conclude that the Intestate Succession Law, 1985 has created numerous
practical problems for spouses, especially the wife of the intestate. As a result of these
difficulties, the Ghana legislature drafted a new Intestate Succession Bill in 2009. The
provisions of that legislation will now be examined. 
4.5 The Intestate Succession Bill326
The Intestate Succession Bill applies to the distribution of the estate of a person who
has died intestate and which shall be determined according to the Act and the rules of
private international law.  Clause 1(2) stipulates that the Act will also be applicable to327
matters pending before a court at the time of its commencement. Clause 1(3) restricts
the application of the Act to the self-acquired property of the intestate and excludes
stool, skin or family property from its application. Clause 2 distinguishes between
intestacy and partial intestacy by providing that:
(1) A person dies intestate under this Act if at the time of death, the person had not
Ibid.324
Id 324-325. See interview with Ms Regina Papawu, Kpando (7 June 2001) footnote 318.325




made a will disposing of the estate of that person.
(2) A person who dies leaving a will disposing of part of the estate of that person
shall be deemed to have died intestate under this Act in respect of that part of
the estate which is not disposed of in the will and accordingly this Act shall apply
to that part of the estate. 
Under clause 3, the spouse and the children of the deceased are entitled absolutely to
the household property of the intestate. In terms of clause 4(1), if the intestate estate
comprises of one house only and the surviving spouse made a contribution to the
acquisition of the house, the surviving spouse is entitled to more than fifty percent of the
deceased’s estate (this clause is subject to the provisions of clauses 8 and 9).
According to clause 4(2), if the intestate estate comprises of more than one house, the
surviving spouse is entitled to one house and the children are entitled to another (this
clause is subject to the provisions of clause 8). However, in cases of opposition as to
which of the houses is to be devolved to the surviving spouse or child, the surviving
spouse takes precedence over the child and has the exclusive right to select any one
of the houses.  If any of the spouses, or a spouse and child are incapable or averse328
to rendering a selection, the court will determine which of the houses should be
devolved to the surviving spouse or child on application made to it by the administrator
of the estate.329
Clause 5(1) makes provision for the distribution of the remainder of the estate of an
intestate in instances where the intestate is survived by both a spouse and a child. In
such cases the residue of the estate is distributed as follows:
(a) thirty-five percent to the surviving spouse,
(b) forty percent to the surviving child,
(c) fifteen percent to the surviving parent, and
(d) ten percent in accordance with customary law.
Clause 5(2) makes provision for the distribution of the remainder of the estate of an
intestate in instances where the intestate is not survived by a parent. In such cases the




(a) forty-five percent to the surviving spouse,
(b) forty-five percent to the surviving child, and
(c) ten percent in accordance with customary law.
Clause 6 deals with the distribution of the remainder of the estate of an intestate in
instances where the intestate is survived by more than one spouse. In such cases the
residue of the estate is distributed as follows:
(a) fifty percent to the surviving spouses,
(b) forty percent to the surviving child,
(c) five percent to the surviving parent, and
(d) five percent in accordance with customary law. 
 
Clause 7 gives a discretion to a judge when regarding the percentage of the estate to
award to a surviving spouse who has been estranged or separated from the intestate
for three years or more. The percentage awarded in this regard shall not be less than
thirty percent on the death intestate of one of the spouses.
In terms of clause 8(1), the surviving spouse will have a fifty percent interest or share
in the matrimonial home. In cases where the surviving spouse contributed to the
acquisition of the matrimonial home, the surviving spouse’s interest or share in such
shall be more than fifty percent.  If the surviving spouse contributed to the acquisition330
of a house, and the intestate estate comprises of that house alone, the surviving
spouse may choose to buy out the other heirs.  Clause 10 makes provision for331
instances in which the surviving spouse corporately owns property (excluding the
matrimonial home) with the intestate; such surviving spouse shall be entitled to an extra
twenty-five percent share of the said property by virtue of being a spouse and in
addition to the fifty percent entitlement obtained in the jointly owned property. Clause
11 considers the sale or redemption of a mortgaged estate.  Clause 12 makes332
provision for the needs of dependent children and for the educational training of the
Clause 8(2). 330
Clause 9.331
Clause 11 provides that:332
(1) Where the estate includes property which is subject to a mortgage, the surviving spouse or a surviving
child, may make an application to the court for the sale or redemption of the property.
(2) On application to the court, the court shall make an order for the sale or redemption of the property
subject to the mortgage.
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children of the intestate.  A person that fails to fulfil their obligations of providing for333
the reasonable needs and education of the deceased’s children is guilty of an offence
and may be punished with either the imposition of a fine not exceeding five hundred
penalty units or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding four years or to both, and a
court may make any orders that it deems necessary for the restoration of the child or
repayment of the education charges.334
Clause 13(1) makes provision for the distribution of the remainder of the estate of an
intestate in instances where the intestate is only survived by a spouse. In such cases
the residue of the estate is distributed as follows:
(a) seventy percent to the surviving spouse,
(b) twenty-five percent to the surviving parent, and
(c) five percent in accordance with customary law.
Clause 13(2) makes provision for the distribution of the remainder of the estate of an
intestate in instances where the intestate is not survived by either a child or a parent.
In such cases the surviving spouse is entitled to eighty percent of the estate and the
remaining twenty percent devolves according to customary law. Clause 14(1) makes
provision for the distribution of the estate of an intestate in instances where the intestate
is only survived by a child. In such cases the estate is distributed as follows:
(a) seventy-five percent to the surviving child;
(b) twenty percent to the surviving parent; and
(c) five percent in accordance with customary law.
Clause 14(2) makes provision for the distribution of the estate of an intestate in
Clause 12 provides that:333
(1) Before the estate of the intestate is distributed, provision shall be made for the needs of dependant
children of the intestate.
(2) Where the intestate is survived by children who are still pursuing education courses, provision shall be
made
(a) for the payment of the educational fees for the children, and
(b) for the provision of other necessaries for the children out of the deceased’s estate before the
distribution of the estate.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a dependant child is
(a) a child who depends on the intestate for the payment of education fees and provision of other
necessaries, or
(b) a child who is incapacitated and who depends on the intestate.
Clause 12(4).334
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instances where the intestate is not survived by a parent. In such cases the children of
the intestate are entitled to ninety percent of the estate and the remaining ten percent
devolves according to customary law. Clause 15 makes provision for the distribution of
the estate of an intestate in instances where the intestate is survived by a spouse and
children procreated with another woman. In such cases the estate is distributed as
follows:
(a) fifty percent to the surviving spouse;
(b) thirty-five percent to the surviving children;
(c) ten percent to the surviving parent; and
(d) five percent in accordance with customary law.
Clause 16 entitles a surviving parent to ninety percent of the estate in cases where the
intestate is not survived by a child or a spouse and the residue of the estate is
distributed according to customary law. Clause 17 accommodates foreigners or aliens
residing in Ghana and makes the Act applicable to them in certain scenarios.  Clause335
18 sets out the rules for the determination of the family which is to be regarded for the
purpose of succession to the property of an intestate. The rules provide:
(a) that family is the family to which the intestate belonged for the purpose of 
succession in accordance with the customary law of the community of which the
intestate was a member;
(b) in the case of an intestate who, being a member of two customary law
communities belonged to two families for the purposes of succession, that family
shall be the two families;
(c) in the case of an intestate who is not a member of a family, that family is the 
family with which the intestate was identified at the time of death or, failing that,
to the families of the parents of the intestate or failing that to the Republic.
Clause 19(1) makes provision for the distribution of the estate of an intestate in
instances where the intestate is not survived by either a spouse or child or a parent. In
such cases the estate devolves according to customary law. If customary law does not
apply to the distribution of an estate as referred to in sub-clause 1, the estate devolves
Clause 17 provides that:335
Where customary law is not applicable to the devolution of that part of the residue which by virtue of sections
5, 13, 14 or 16, devolves in accordance with customary law, that part of the residue devolves in equal shares
to those beneficiaries otherwise entitled to share the residue under the relevant provisions of this Act.
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to the Republic.  In such cases, the court may award maintenance to or rule that a336
portion or the whole of the intestate estate be distributed to a person that has been
maintained by the intestate or with whom the intestate was closely identified.  337
Clause 20 deals with the distribution of small intestate estates  and clause 21 allows338
the Minister responsible for Justice to vary (through legislation) the maximum value of
the estate as stipulated under clause 20. Where two or more persons are eligible to
share a part of an intestate estate, such heirs will separate it among themselves in
equal proportions.  Clause 23 deals with situations where the spouses die339
simultaneously.  Clause 24 makes provision for the distribution of the estate of an340
intestate in instances where the intestate is only survived by a grandchild. In such cases
the grandchild is entitled to the entire estate or to a portion thereof, provided that he or
she was dependent on the intestate at the time of death. Clause 25(1) forbids the
ejection of a surviving spouse or child from the matrimonial home before the distribution
of the estate of a deceased individual whether testate or intestate and subject to certain
qualifications.  Clause 25(2) defines the term “matrimonial home”.  341 342
Clause 19(2).336
Clause 19(3).337
Clause 20 provides that:338
Despite sections 4, 5, 13, 14 and 16
(a) where the total value of the residue does not exceed one thousand Ghana cedis, the residue shall
devolve to a surviving spouse or child of the intestate or both where the spouse and the child survive the
intestate;
(b) Where the intestate is survived only by a parent and the total value of the estate does not exceed one
thousand Ghana cedis the estate shall devolve to the surviving parent.
Clause 22.339
Clause 23 provides that:340
Where spouses die in circumstances
(a) in which it appears that their deaths were simultaneous, or
(b) rendering it uncertain as to which of them survived the other,
The older shall, for the purposes of this Act, be presumed to have predeceased the younger.
Clause 25(1) provides that:341
(1) A person shall not eject a surviving spouse or child from the matrimonial home before the distribution of
the estate of a deceased person whether testate or intestate
(a) where the matrimonial home is the self-acquired property of the deceased;
(b) where the matrimonial home is rented property, unless the ejection is pursuant to a court order;
(c) where the matrimonial home is the family house of the deceased, unless a period of six months has
expired from the date of the death of the deceased; or
(d) where the matrimonial home is public property, unless a period of three months has expired from the
date of death of the deceased.
A matrimonial home means:342
(a) the house or premises occupied by the deceased and the surviving spouse, or the deceased and a
surviving child or all of them at the time of the death of the deceased; or
(b) any other self-acquired house of the deceased occupied by the surviving spouse or child or both at
the time of the death of the deceased.
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Clause 26 makes it an offence to (a) unlawfully eject a surviving spouse from the
matrimonial home before the distribution of the estate of a deceased individual whether
testate or intestate, and (b) unlawfully deprive beneficiaries of the use of a part of the
property, property to which the Act applies, and which is, shared by the beneficiary with
the intestate, or confiscates, demolishes or unlawfully interferes with the property of the
intestate, before the distribution of the estate of a deceased individual whether testate
or intestate. The guilty party here may be sanctioned either with the imposition of a fine
not exceeding five hundred penalty units or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding
four years or to both. In this regard, a court may make any orders that it deems
necessary for the restoration or repayment of the person who was ejected or deprived. 
Clause 27 makes provision for other offences and includes locking up the property of
the deceased or taking ownership of household property within the matrimonial home,
before the distribution of the estate of a deceased individual whether testate or
intestate. Here, the guilty person will be punished with either the imposition of a fine not
exceeding five hundred penalty units or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding more
than four years. In this regard, a court may make any orders that it deems necessary
for the restoration or repayment of the spouse or child. Clause 28 makes provision for
regulations that may be enacted by the Minister responsible for Justice and clause 29
in entitled “interpretation”, but serves as a definitions clause for the Bill. Clause 30(1)
repeals the Intestate Succession Act, 1985 (PNDCL 111) but maintains that the notices,
order directions, appointments or any others acts made lawfully under the Intestate
Succession Act, 1985 and still in force immediately prior to the commencement of this
Act shall be regarded as having been made or prepared under this Act and remains
enforceable until reviewed, cancelled or terminated.  343
In general, the Intestate Succession Bill is laudable because it creates a uniform system
of intestate succession law that will operate throughout Ghana, irrespective of the
system of inheritance applicable to the intestate (ie, matrilineal or patrilineal succession)
and the kind of marriage concluded.  The Bill is a step in the right direction as it344
affords both women and children (“child” includes legitimate, illegitimate and adopted
Section 30(2).343
Memorandum to the Bill op cit 1.344
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children in clause 29) rights of succession to property – rights which were not
recognised under traditional matrilineal succession and rights which were only partially
recognised under traditional patrilineal succession. The Bill remedies some of the
problems associated with the Intestate Succession Law, 1985, by for example making
provision for polygamous marriages and dependent parents and is reflective of the
changes that have occurred in the Ghanaian family system.  The problems of the Bill345
include that its clauses are phrased too broadly, for example clause 19 refers to “a
person that has been maintained by the intestate or with whom the intestate was closely
identified”. These categories of persons are not defined in the Bill and could actually
cast the net of persons eligible for succession too wide. It is regrettable though that the
Act excludes stool, skin or family property as the inclusion thereof would have given
women an entitlement to more property. 
4.6 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992
Since independence, Ghana has enacted four Constitutions.  The first three346
Constitutions virtually made no reference to human rights and were very brief
documents. However, in 1992, Ghana adopted a supreme  Constitution (Fourth347
Constitution) which includes a chapter on fundamental human rights and freedoms.348
Article 11(1) ranks the law of Ghana as follows:
The laws of Ghana shall comprise –
(a) this Constitution;
(b) enactment made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by this
Constitution;
(c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any person or authority under a
power conferred by this Constitution;
Id 1-3.345
The First Republican Constitution became effective on 1 July 1960 and which was subsequently abrogated346
by a military junta on 24 February 1966. The Second Republican Constitution became effective on 22
August 1969 and which was abrogated by a military junta on 13 January 1972. The Third Republican
Constitution became effective on 24 September 1979 and which was subsequently abrogated on 31
December 1981. The Fourth Republican Constitution became effective on 6 January 1993 and remains in
force as the current law of Ghana. See Asare SK and Prempeh HK “Amending the Constitution of Ghana:
Is the imperial president trespassing?” (2010) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 196. 
Article 1(2) provides that: “This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to347
be inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void“. 
Chapter 5.348
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(d) the existing law; and 
(e) the common law.349
The Constitution specifically defines customary law as: “the rules of law which by
custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana”.  The Constitution also350
makes provision for the rights to equality,  personal liberty,  dignity  and to own351 352 353
property,  just to name but a few. The Constitution also makes provision for the354
establishment of a National House of Chiefs and a Regional House of Chiefs and
necessitates that these institutions “undertake an evaluation of the traditional customs
and usages with the view to eliminating those customs and usages that are outmoded
and socially harmful”.  It also mandates the Houses to embark on “a progressive355
study, interpretation and codification of customary law with a view to evolving, in
appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of customary law, and compiling the
customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin”.  The role356
Section 11(2) states that: “the common law of Ghana shall comprise the rules of law generally known349
as the common law, the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and the rules of customary
law including those determined by the Superior Court of Judicature”.
Article 11(3).350
Article 17 provides that:351
(1) All persons shall be equal before the law 
(2) A person shall not be discriminated against on grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion,
creed or social or economic status. 
(3) For the purposes of this article, “discriminate” means to give different treatment to different persons
attributable only or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, place of origin, political opinions,
colour, gender, occupation, religion or creed, whereby persons of one description are subjected to
disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another description which are not granted of persons
of another description are not made subject or are granted privileges or advantages which are not
granted to persons of another description. 
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from enacting laws that are reasonably necessary to
provide –
(a) for the implementation of policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, economic or
educational imbalance in the Ghanaian society;
(b) for matters relating to adoption, marriage divorce, burial devolution of property on death or other
matters of personal law;
(c) for the imposition of restrictions on the acquisitions of land by persons who are not citizens of
Ghana or on the political and economic activities of such persons and for other matters relating
to such persons; or 
(d) for making different provision for different communities having regard to their special
circumstances not being provision which is inconsistent with the spirit of this Constitution.
(5) Nothing shall be taken to be inconsistent with this article which is allowed to be done under any
provision of this Chapter.
Section 14.352
Section 15(1) provides that: “The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable” and section 15(2)(a)353
provides that: “No person shall, whether or not he is arrested, restricted or detained, be subjected to-
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
Article 18(1) provides that: “Every person has the right to own property either alone or in association354
with others”. 
Article 272(c).355
Articles 272(b) and 274(3)(f). 356
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these Houses will play with regards to abolishing outdated and destructive customs and
usages and codifying the law will be imperative for the improvement of the rights of
women and children. In order to be effective, such determinations must however be
made taking into consideration the provisions of the Constitution as the “constitutional
provisions in general, and any rights guaranteed therein in particular, are superior to
anything customary law dictates”.  . 357
With particular reference to the rights of spouses to inherit marital property, article 22
provides that:
(1) A spouse shall not be deprived of a reasonable provision out of the estate of a
spouse whether or not the spouse died having made a will. 
(2) Parliament shall, as soon as practicable after the coming into force of this
Constitution, enact legislation regulating the property rights of spouses.
(3) With a view to achieving the full realization of the rights referred to in clause (2)
of this article –
(a) spouses shall have equal access to property jointly acquired during
marriage;
(b) assets which are jointly acquired during marriage shall be distributed
equitably between the spouses upon dissolution of the marriage
Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and reasonably
and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law and persons
aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek
redress before a court or other tribunal.
In 2009 the legislature drafted the Property Rights of Spouses Bill which was to give
effect to Ghana’s constitutional obligations in terms of articles 22(2) and (3) of the
Constitution. This Bill will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.
4.7 The Property Rights of Spouses Bill358
The purpose of the Property Rights of Spouses Bill is to make provision for and
regulate the property rights of:
Kuenyehia A “W omen, marriage, and intestate succession in the context of legal pluralism in Africa”357
(2006) University of California Davis Law Review 400.
The Property Rights of Spouses Bill is referred to as the Property Rights of Spouses Act, 2009 in the358
draft legislation.
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(i) spouses during the subsistence of or upon the termination of a marriage; and
(ii) cohabiting couples and for matters related thereto.359
Clause 1 of the Bill, complies with article 22 of the Constitution and provides for equal
access to property jointly obtained during the subsistence of marriage,  and also360
permits the equitable distribution of property that is jointly obtained during marriage,
upon the dissolution of the marriage.  Clause 2 defines the term “spouse”.  This is361 362
imperative because the Constitution does not define the term in any of the sections
pertaining to spouses. Clause 3 makes provision for situations of cohabitation, ie, where
people merely reside together as husband and wife without completing any formal
marriage rites.  The clause also caters for circumstances where customary marriage363
ceremonies have begun, but have not been fully concluded. Clause 4 allows cohabitees
and marriage partners to make marital property agreements regulating their property
rights.  Clause 5 outlines the prerequisites for the marital property agreement.364 365
See the long title of the Bill.359
Clause 1(a).360
Clause 1(b).361
For purposes of the Bill,362
(1) a spouse means a man married to a woman or a a woman married to a man under the marriages Act,
1884 to 1985 which includes:
(a) the Marriage Ordinance (Cap 127);
(b) Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance Cap 129); and
(c) Customary marriage.
(2) A marriage under the Marriage Ordinance (Cap 27) is a monogamous union.
(3) A marriage under Parts One and Two of the Marriages Act 1884 –1985 may be actually or potentially
polygamous.
(4) A marriage is actually polygamous if there is more than one wife.
(5) A marriage is potentially polygamous if there is currently on wife but there could be others in the future.
Clause 3 provides that: 363
(1) Cohabitation refers to a situation in which a man and woman hold themselves out to the public to be man
and wife.
(2) Persons who have cohabited for a period of five years or more shall be deemed to be spouses and have
the rights of spouses for the purpose of this Act.
(3) The rights conferred by this section on cohabitees are available only to persons who
(a) have the capacity to be married to each other under a marriage recognised under this Act,
(b) are eighteen years and above, and
(c) have held themselves out as husband and wife for a period of not less than five years.
Clause 4 provides that:364
(1) A man and a woman in contemplation of marriage or cohabitation or who are married or cohabitating may
make an agreement with respect to
(a) the ownership of the separate property of each spouse,
(b) property acquired during the marriage or cohabitation, and
(c) the distribution of property acquired during the marriage or cohabitation.
(2) Spouses may make an agreement during marriage or cohabitation as regards the ownership and
distribution of property on dissolution of the marriage or termination of the cohabitation.
(3) The agreement may be for the settlement of any differences that may arise in relation to property owned
by either or both spouses.
Clause 5 provides that:365
(1) An agreement under section 4 may
(a) define the share of the property, or any part of the property to which each spouse is entitled on
separation, dissolute on of marriage, or termination of cohabitation, or
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Clause 6(1) charges each individual party to acquire independent legal advice before
drafting or concluding a marital property agreement, so as to avoid future disputes.
Clause 6(2) makes it compulsory for the legal practitioner to explain the legal
repercussions of the agreement to the relevant party and certify that this has actually
been done. Clause 7 provides the court with the authority to not enforce the
agreement.  Clause 8 allows the court to probe the agreement  and also permits a366 367
spouse, party or any other person having an interest in the subject matter of the
agreement, to make an application to the court for an investigation to be made where
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the court may vitiate the agreement.368
Clause 9 outlines the grounds that may be considered or proved to set aside or modify
and agreement.  Clause 10(1) defines the term “joint property of spouses”. In this369
regard and subject to section 11 (4), the joint property of spouses means:
property however titled, acquired by one or both spouses during the marriage and may
include:
(a)  the matrimonial home, and other immovable property;
(b) provide for the calculation of the share and the method by which the property or part of the property
may be divided.
(2) The agreement may be oral or in writing.
(3) Each party to an oral agreement shall have a witness and if an oral agreement is to be used in court, it
shall be confirmed by affidavit.
(4) The written agreement shall be signed by both parties and witnessed by one person each for each party
and may be filed in court.
(5) Where the agreement is filed in court, it may be amended or terminated only by an order of court on
application by the parties witnessed by two persons chosen by the parties.
(6) If a third party will be affected by the amendment or termination, the application shall be on notice to the
third party.
Clause 7 provides that: “Subject to section 9, a marital property agreement is not enforceable where366
the court is of the opinion that it would be unjust to give effect to the agreement”.
Clause 8(1) provides that: “A court has jurisdiction to enquire into an agreement made under367
subsection (1) of section 4 during cohabitation or marriage or on the termination of cohabitation or
dissolution of the marriage”.
Clause 8(2).368
Clause 9 provides that:369
(1) Where a party to an agreement alleges that there was no intention to enter into the agreement or that the
agreement
(a) is illegal,





(v) any other vitiating factor such as the unequal bargaining position of a spouse, the court may set
aside the agreement and make another order for the distribution of the property.
(2) An agreement may be set aside by the court for illegality or lack of full disclosure of assets by a party to
the agreement.
(3) The Court may set aside or modify an agreement on the ground of unconscionability where it is satisfied
that the purpose and effect of the agreement is contrary to conscience or that the agreement exploits the
unequal bargaining position of a spouse”.
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(b) household property;
(c) any property other than separate property acquired during the marriage;
(d) property which was separate property but which a spouse has made a contribution
towards except where this relates to the sale of family land; and
(e) a business for which seed money was provided by a spouse for its establishment.
In terms of clause 10(2), a court is authorised to prevent a spouse or a third party from
sanctioning the disposal of joint property  and may also make an order to protect or370
preserve joint property while judicial proceedings about joint property are still imminent
in court.  Clause 11 makes provision for the acquiring and maintenance of separate371
property during the course of the marriage  and prohibits separate property from372
distribution, unless there is an agreement in the converse.  Clause 11(2) will not be373
applicable in cases where a spouse can show that he or she has contributed
(monetarily or in kind) to the acquisition and preservation of the separate property.374
Clause 11(4) describes separate property as:
(a) self-acquired property and the proceeds and profits from the self acquired
property;
(b) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise,
inheritance or gift from a person other than the spouse;
(c) property that was acquired by gift or inheritance from a third party after the date
of the marriage;
(d) income from property referred to in paragraph (c) if the giver or testator has
expressly stated that it is to be excluded from the spouse’s joint property;
(e) damages or a right to damages for personal injuries, nervous shock, mental
distress or loss of guidance, care and companionship, or the part of a settlement
that represents those damages;
(f) a lump sum payment provided under a personal or similar plan;
(g) proceeds or right to proceeds of an insurance policy payable on the death of the
insured person;
(h) property that the spouses have agreed is not to be included in the joint property;
(i) property which the spouses by agreement regard as separate property;
(j) trust property except where the trust is a sham in which event the court may set
the trust aside in the best interest of the vulnerable spouse; and
(k) any other property that a spouse can prove is separate property.
Clause 10(2) specifically provides that: “The court may by order restrain a spouse or a third party from370
permitting the disposition of joint property and the court may rescind a disposition of joint property
made with the intention of defeating the financial provision of a spouse except if the disposition is to






In clause 12 of the Bill, spouses are granted equal access to joint property  and clause375
13 of the Bill makes provision for the equitable distribution of property where a marriage
is dissolved or where cohabitation ends. The relevant provision provides that:
(1) Where a marriage is being dissolved, the court that determines the property rights of
the spouses, may make an order to equitably distribute property jointly acquired during
the marriage without regard to the reasons for the breakdown of the marriage.
(2) Where cohabitation terminates, a cohabitee may apply to the court for an order for
the distribution of their joint property.
(3) The court may make an order for the distribution of property jointly acquired during
the cohabitation.
(4) The distribution of the property shall generally be in equal shares but a spouse
may on notice to the other spouse apply to the court to give not more than one
third of the value of the jointly acquired property to the other spouse.
(5) The court shall take into consideration the particular circumstances of each case
when distributing the property and shall take into consideration: 
(a) the length of the marriage;
(b) the age of the spouse;
(c) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition, maintenance or
improvement of the property including the contribution of a spouse towards
the upkeep or maintenance of the property in cash or kind;
(d) the contribution of the immediate family or any contribution
(i) to the maintenance of the matrimonial home, or
(ii) which facilitated the acquisition of the property or matrimonial home by
a spouse;
(e) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time of the distribution of
the property including the desirability to award the matrimonial home to a
particular spouse or the right of a spouse who has custody of a child to live
in the matrimonial home for a reasonable period of time;
(f) the need to make reasonable provision for other spouses and their children
as regard joint property after another marriage where the marriage is
polygamous;
(g) the period of cohabitation;
(h) whether there is an agreement related to the ownership and distribution of the
property in the best interest of a vulnerable spouse;
(i) financial misconduct or the wasting of assets; and
Clause 12 provides that:375
(1) Spouses shall have equal access to joint property under the following circumstances where each spouse:
(a) is entitled to the possession of the property;
(b) has the same interest in the property;
(c) has the same title; or
(d) has the property for the same time.
(2) Equal access includes the right to the use of, the benefit of and to enter the joint property and where there
is agreement between spouses, to the disposal of the joint property.
210
(j) any other fact which in the opinion of the Court requires consideration.
(6) A monetary contribution shall not be presumed to be of greater value than a non-
monetary contribution.
(7) The non-monetary contribution shall not be proved in monetary terms.
Under clause 14, the consent of a spouse is required before a transaction regarding the
matrimonial home (ie, joint property) can be concluded.  In cases where the376
matrimonial home is not joint property but was acquired by one spouse in his or her
individual capacity, six months notice of a transaction concerning such matrimonial
home must be given to the non-owning spouse.  Clause 14(3) prevents a bona fide377
purchaser from being prejudiced for reasons of lack of consent,  and clause 14(4)378
makes provision for the circumstances under which a court may dispense with the
requirement of spousal consent.  The remaining sub-clauses deal with instances379
where one of the spouses enters into a transaction regarding the jointly acquired
matrimonial home without obtaining the necessary consent and the relief available to
a spouse whose interests have been defeated in that regard.  Clause 15 makes380
provision for property settlement where a court is authorised to effect an order for the
amendment of a spouse’s interest in property, if it is just and equitable to do so. A
spouse’s interest in the matrimonial home is excluded from such amendment.  Clause381
Clause 14(1).376
Clause 14(2).377
Clause 14(3) provides that: “Despite section 1, the interest of a purchaser for value in good faith378
without notice shall not be prejudiced on account of the absence of consent of the other spouse to the
transaction”.
Clause 14(4) provides that: 379
The Court may dispense with the consent of a spouse required under subsection (1) where it is satisfied that
the consent cannot be obtained because of 
(a) the mental incapacity of the spouse which has been determined by a mental health professional or
psychiatrist,
(b) the unknown whereabouts of the spouse for seven years as declared by the court in which case the rules
of the Administration of Estates Act 1961, (Act 63) shall apply to the spouse presumed dead, or
(c) any other good reason for which consent should be dispensed with.
In this regard sub-clauses (5), (6) and (7) provide that: 380
(5) Subject to subsection (3), where a spouse enters into a transaction that relates to the jointly acquired
matrimonial home without the consent of the other spouse, that transaction may be set aside by the court
on an application by the other spouse.
(6) Where the court does not set aside a transaction, the spouse whose interest is defeated is entitled to
claim out of the proceeds of the transaction, the value of that spouse’s share in the matrimonial home.
(7) Where a transfer of the jointly acquired matrimonial home is ordered by the court and a spouse ordered
to make the transfer or conveyance is either unable or unwilling to do so, the court may order the registrar
of the court to execute the appropriate transfer or conveyance on the part of that spouse.
Clause 15 provides that:381
(1) In a proceeding related to property, the court may make an order to alter the interest of either spouse in
the property including an order
(a) for a settlement of property in substitution for an interest in the property, or
(b) requiring either or both spouses to make, a settlement or transfer of property determined by the court
for the benefit of either or both spouses.
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16 permits a court to set aside an order made in clause 15 if the order was attained
through fraud, duress, the giving of false evidence or the suppression of evidence.  382
The Bill in clause 17 makes provision for the giving of property as a gift by one spouse
to another bearing the rebuttable presumption that the property belongs to the receiving
spouse. Clause 18 stipulates that a spouse is not liable for any debts incurred by the
other spouse before the conclusion of the marriage, unless there is an agreement to the
contrary. Under clause 19, where a spouse incurs a liability (with the consent of the
other spouse) during the course of the marriage for necessaries of life for the nuclear
family, the debt shall become a family liability with both spouses being accountable for
it. Where a spouse incurs a liability (without the consent of the other spouse) during the
course of the marriage for necessaries of life for the nuclear family, the spouse that
incurred the liability will be solely accountable for it, unless there is an agreement to the
contrary. Clause 20 makes provision for the distribution of property between spouses
in polygamous marriages as follows:
(1) Where a husband has more than one wife in a polygamous marriage, the
ownership of the property shall be determined as follows:
(a) joint property acquired during the first marriage and before the second
marriage was contracted is owned by the husband and the first wife; and
(b) any joint property acquired after the second marriage is owned by the
husband and the co-wives and the same principle is applicable to a
subsequent marriage.
(2) Despite subsection (1) (b), where it is clear either by agreement or through the
conduct of the parties of the polygamous marriage that each has separate
matrimonial property, each wife owns that separate matrimonial property
separately without the inclusion of the other wives.
(3) A husband in a polygamous marriage who takes a subsequent wife or wives shall
together with the existing wife or wives make a declaration as prescribed of their
respective interest in the joint property.
(4) The provisions of section 5 shall apply to the declaration.
(2) The court shall not make the order unless it is satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so.
(3) Where the court makes an order under subsection (1) it shall have regard to
(a) the effect of the proposed order on the earning capacity of either spouse, and
(b) any other order that has been made under this Act in respect of a spouse.
Clause 16 provides that:382
(1) Where the court is satisfied on an application made by a person affected by an order, that the order was
obtained by fraud, duress, the giving of false evidence or the suppression of evidence, the court may set
aside the order and make another order.
(2) The court shall have regard to the protection of the interest of a purchaser in good faith for value without
notice in exercising its power under subsection (1).
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Clause 21 makes provision for situations in which the matrimonial home is rented
property.  Under clause 22 where a spouse obtains property either prior to the383
conclusion of a marriage or during the subsistence of the marriage and such property is
not joint property, but the other spouse made a contribution to the preservation and
enhancement of the property, that other spouse shall attain a beneficial interest in the
said property equal to the contribution made by that spouse. The Bill in clause 23 high-
lights the presumptions related to property obtained during the subsistence of marriage.384
In addition to or apart from the property distribution mentioned under clause 13, a court
may award a spouse maintenance for the reasonable necessities of the spouse until
death or re-marriage, according to clause 24(1) of the Bill. The maintenance order in
clause 24(1) may be in the form of a lump sum disbursement or periodic imbursements
over a particular time, and must (according to a court) be just, after careful consideration
of a number of factors.  Clause 24(3) stipulates that maintenance acquired under sub-385
Clause 21 provides that:383
(1) Where the parties to a marriage or cohabitees live in rented premises, the court may order the premises
to be assigned to one of the parties on dissolution of the relationship even though that party is not a party
to the tenancy agreement and shall take into consideration the best interest of any children of the
marriage.
(2) Where an assignment is made under subsection (1) the party to whom the assignment is made shall be
deemed to be a party to the tenancy agreement in replacement of the original tenant and shall attorn tenancy
to the owner, despite the presence in the tenancy agreement of a covenant against non-assignment.
(3) After the assignment, the original tenant may be ordered to continue to pay the rent for the premises for
a period of at least six months and the owner of the rented premises shall be given notice of the order
of the court.
Clause 23 provides that:384
Where during the subsistence of a marriage any property is acquired 
(a) in the name of a spouse, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the property is joint property with
the onus on the person who claims that the property is separate property to prove that it is separate
property; or
(b) in the names of the spouses jointly, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the beneficial interests
of the spouses are equal.
Clause 24(2) provides that:385
The maintenance order may be a lump sum or in specified amounts and for periods of time that the court
considers just after the court has considered.
(a) the financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance, including property apportioned to that
spouse, under section 13;
(b) the ability of the spouse to satisfy that spouse’s needs independently;
(c)  the present and future earning capacity of both spouses including the time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable the spouse who seeks maintenance to find appropriate
employment;
(d) the reduced or lost earning capacity of the spouse seeking maintenance because that spouse gave up
or delayed education, training employment or career opportunities during the marriage;
(e) the duration of the marriage;
(f) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(g) the age, physical and mental condition of the spouse who seeks maintenance;
(h) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each spouse has or is likely to have in the
foreseeable future;
(i) the children of the marriage in the custody of the spouse who seeks or needs maintenance;
(j) the contribution and services
(i) as a spouse, parent, wage earner,
(ii) as a manager of the home, and
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clause (1) is not subject to tax. Clauses 25-28 provide for various miscellaneous matters
like the jurisdiction of courts in matters arising under the Act,  applications to the Legal386
Aid Scheme for assistance in cases where the spouses cannot afford to pay for legal
expenses,  the provision for the settlement of disputes via alternative dispute resolu-387
tion,  and offences which includes the disposal of joint property or household property388
without the sanction of the other spouse, disallowing the other spouse the use of the
profits from the sale of joint property and the demolition of joint property in order to
frustrate the purpose of the Act.  With regards to the last mentioned matter, the penalty389
for such an offence is a fine not exceeding four hundred and fifty penalty units or a term
of imprisonment not exceeding three years or both. The court may additionally grant an
order for the restitution of property to the deprived spouse and if restitution is
unattainable, the court may make an order for a right of recourse for the sum total of the
income of the joint property upon the termination of the marriage.  Clause 29 repeals390
sections 19, 20 and 21 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 367 of 1971. Clause 30 makes
provision for regulations that may be enacted by the Minister responsible for Justice and
(iii) to the career or career potential of the other spouse of the person who is seeking maintenance;
(k) the wasteful dissipation of joint property by a spouse;
(l) a transfer or encumbrance made by a spouse in contemplation of a suit for divorce without fair
consideration; and
(m) any other factor which the court may find to be just and equitable.
Clause 25 provides that:386
(1) A District or Circuit Court or the \high Court may hear and determine a matter that arises under this Act.
(2) A matter arising under this Act shall be heard by the court in chambers.
Clause 26 provides that:387
(1) The Legal Aid Scheme Act, 1997 (Act 542) applies for the purpose of providing representation by a lawyer
for a spouse who cannot afford the payment of legal fees.
(2) A lawyer provided by the Legal Aid Scheme shall take the spouses through mediation.
Clause 27 provides that:388
(1) Spouses may agree to use alternative dispute resolution methods for the distribution of property acquired
during a marriage before or after the institution of legal proceedings for the dissolution of a marriage but
the agreement shall not oust the jurisdiction of the court.
(2) A mediator shall attempt to resolve a dispute through mediation thirty days after referral by a spouse and
a spouse may be represented at the mediation by a representative of the spouse’s choice.
(3) Upon resolution of the dispute by the mediation, the agreed terms shall be reduced to a written mediation
agreement.
Clause 28(1) provides that:389
(1) A spouse who
(a) denies the other spouse an equal right to stay in the matrimonial home and to use the household
property when a court has not determined the status of both spouses in relation to the use of the
matrimonial home or household property;
(b) disposes of joint property or household property
(i) in order to pre-empt the decision of the court on a matter that relates to the spouse, or
(ii) without the consent of the other spouse;
(c) denies the other spouse use of the proceeds from the sale of joint property; or
(d) destroys joint property in order to defeat the purpose of this Act or the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971
(Act 367), commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than four
hundred and fifty penalty units or a term of imprisonment of not more than three years or both.
Clause 28(2).390
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clause 31 in entitled “interpretation”, but serves as a definitions clause for the Bill.
In general, the Property Rights of Spouses Bill is admirable because it creates rules and
practical standards for the courts to determine the property rights of spouses in
furtherance of the provision in the Constitution and it is anticipated that the
promulgation of the Bill will guarantee fairness and equitability when dealing with
matters that relate to the property rights of spouses.  Some of the praiseworthy391
features of the Bill are that it recognises (a) polygamy; (b) that women can acquire
separate property; (c) both the monetary and non-monetary contributions made by a
wife to the family’s welfare;  and (d) that the matrimonial home falls into the joint392
property of the spouses thereby frustrating the right of the husband’s family to eject a
widow from her matrimonial home. The Bill is also consistent with the provisions  of393
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), which was actually the inspiration for the Property Rights of Spouses Bill.
The Bill would also facilitate a shift towards a sincere appreciation for women’s
economic labour by amending the rules so that such labour can be converted into
enforceable rights. This could be achieved because the Bill establishes a legal
presumption in favour of community of property in marriage.  394
Memorandum to the Bill op cit 1.391
Duwuona-Hammond C “Ensuring equity in the distribution of matrimonial property upon divorce:392
Preparing the path for legislation” (2005) University of Botswana Law Journal 117-119. See also
Bentsi-Enchill v Bentsi-Enchill [1976] 2 GLR 303 at 306, where the court stated that:
In recent years the wife is very often the wage earner and makes contribution towards to common expenses
by buying for and running the home. Judicial opinion today shows that the trend is to give credit to the wife
for her services in kind as housekeeper or for the use of her own income or savings in such a way as to
enable her husband to use his for the purchase of a house. 
In this regard article 2 provides that:393
State parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other
appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate
means, the practical realization of this principle; 
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate prohibiting
all discrimination against women; 
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through
competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any
act of discrimination.
Article 16(1)(h) of the Convention also provides that:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women …
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration,
enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration.
Higgins TE and Fenrich J “Legal pluralism, gender and access to land in Ghana” (2011-2012) Fordham394
Environmental Law Review 21.
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4.8 Conclusion
Ghana has taken some positive steps towards the attainments of equal rights for all its
citizens. The promulgation of the uniform Intestate Succession Law represents one of
these outstanding achievements. However, although the statute seeks to improve the
rights of both women and children with regard to intestate succession, it is rather
unfortunate that it has merely contributed to the continued discrimination of women and
has simultaneously created neoteric problems for women especially. The problems
associated with this piece of legislation far outweigh its benefits. The Constitution, 1992
has further sought to advance the rights of women with its various enactments.395
Although both these enactments are a step in the right direction in the sense that they
provide homogeneity of laws in Ghana and “offer a standard against which all
subsidiary laws are to be judged”,  they have not made significant inroads into396
improving the status and rights of women in general; and they also highlight the
pertinent fact that when customary law is involved, legislation may not be a suitable tool
to bring about change or to eliminate traditional western ideals of discrimination.
The introduction of both the Intestate Succession and the Property Rights of Spouses
Bills are commendable and will significantly improve the rights of both women and
children if they are adopted and promulgated by the Ghanaian Parliament. It is
unfortunate though that to date, Parliament has yet to pass these pieces of draft
legislation. Pressure is mounting from women’s groups for Parliament to pass the two
Bills.  As of January 2012, the report on the Intestate Succession Bill was with the397
Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and Gender Child Committees for a
second reading, whilst the Property Rights Bill still had to be reviewed by both the afore-
mentioned committees. It is therefore uncertain as to when the Bills will become law. 
See section 3.4 of this chapter.395
Kuenyehia (2006) op cit 399.396
MYJOYONLINE.COM at http://politics.myjoyonline.com/tgpolitics/print/index.php?url=http://politics397
.myjoyonline...page 1 published on 17/01/2012 (accessed 08/11/2012).
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4.9 Summary of chapter
Chapter 3 begins with a general overview of the current law in operation in Ghana.
Because of colonialism, and Ghana’s diverse “ethnic mix”  various legal systems398
currently function in Ghana, ie, English law, African customary law and Islamic law. The
law of intestate succession in Ghana originates primarily from two sources, ie, African
customary law and statutory law.  As a result thereof, attention is firstly given to the399
general principles of intestate succession under customary law in Ghana and thereafter
the legislation governing intestate succession in Ghana is discussed. Amongst the
pieces of legislation discussed are the Courts Act, 1971 and its predecessor the Courts
Act, 1960 which both contained the choice of law rules governing the intestate
succession of Ghanaian estates; the Marriage Ordinance which changed the existing
rules of African customary law to incorporate English law rules when distributing the
estates of persons who had married according to the Ordinance and who had died
intestate; and the Intestate Succession Law, which is now the uniform statute regulating
matters concerning intestate succession in Ghana. The advantages and disadvantages
of each of the afore-mentioned pieces of legislation are discussed at length at the
various intervals at which they are each considered. The Intestate Succession Law is
specifically evaluated with reference to a research study conducted by the Joseph R
Crowley Programme in International Human Rights at Fordham Law School. The
proposed Intestate Succession Bill is discussed thereafter. The Constitution of the
Republic of Ghana, 1992 has also effected changes to the law of intestate succession.
The provisions of the Constitution together with the proposed Property Rights of
Spouses Bill which give effect to articles 22(2) and 22(3) are also discussed at length.
In conclusion, the researcher assesses whether these new enactments have had any
significant impact on intestate succession in Ghana, in general, and whether they have
improved the lives of Ghana’s citizens, especially its women and children. 
Kuenyehia A (ed) Women and law in West Africa: Situational analysis of some key issues affecting398
women (1998) xi.
Dowuona-Hammond (1998) op cit 132.399
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CHAPTER 5
INTESTATE SUCCESSION IN THE KINGDOM OF
SWAZILAND
5.1 Introduction
Swaziland is one of the smallest countries in Africa bordering South Africa and Maputo.1
Like many of the countries in Africa, Swaziland was a British colony for a long period
of time.  However, on 6 September 1968, Swaziland acquired its independence from2
Britain.  In its first post-independence elections which were held in 1972, the Imbokodvo3
National Movement (the party of the then monarch King Sobhuza II),  won almost 75%4
of the votes.  On 12 April 1973, King Sobhuza II issued a proclamation  “declaring that5 6
he had assumed supreme power in the Kingdom of Swaziland and that all legislative,
executive and judicial power vested in him”.  The sole purpose of the proclamation was7
to “transform Swaziland into an absolute monarch with the King wielding absolute
powers”.  As a result thereof, Swaziland remains one of the last surviving absolute8
monarchs on the African continent.  King Sobhuza II  became the king of Swaziland9 10
in 1921 and ruled the country from 1972 until his death in August 1982.  He remains11
one of the most revered kings in Swaziland’s history. King Sobhuza II was succeeded
Armstrong AK and Nhlapo RT Law and the other sex: The legal position of women in Swaziland (1985) 1.1
See generally Matsebula JSM A history of Swaziland (1976) 147-160.2
Armstrong and Nhlapo op cit 1.3
King Sobhuza II belonged to the Dlamini clan and was referred to as “Ingwenyama” (head of the clan).4
For a history of the Dlamini clan see Bonner P Kings, commoners and concessionaries: The evolution
and dissolution of the nineteenth-century Swazi state (1983) 9-26. 
See Potholm CP Swaziland: The dynamics of political modernization (1972) 129.5
King’s Proclamation to the Nation no 12 of 1973. The purpose of this proclamation was endorsed by6
the current monarch King Mswati III in Decree no 1 of 1981 and Decree no 1 of 1987. 
Gumedze S “Human rights and the rule of law in Swaziland” (2005) African Human Rights Law Journal7
269. See also Booth AR Swaziland: Tradition and change in a southern African Kingdom  (1983) 73-74.
Fombad CM “The Swaziland Constitution of 2005: Can absolutism be reconciled with modern8
constitutionalism?” (2007) South African Journal on Human Rights 95.
Mzizi JB “The dominance of the Swazi monarchy and the moral dynamics of democratization of the9
Swazi state” (2004) Journal of African Elections 94. 
See generally Matsebula (1976) op cit 161-178.10
Global Investment and Business Center, USA Swaziland foreign policy and government guide (2010) 63.11
218
by his son Prince Makhosetive in 1986, when he was publicly crowned King Mswati III.12
King Mswati currently serves as the absolute monarch of Swaziland.
 
5.2 Swazi customary law 
In Swaziland, customary law may be defined as: 
All legally binding customary practices which are not repugnant to natural justice (and)
which have been developed from time immemorial and such proclamations, decrees,
orders and other enactments, passed by the Ngwenyama (the King) in consultation
with his Libandla (national council), which are intended to apply to Swazis  and to be13
enforced by Swazi courts.14
Swazi law and custom is unwritten  and uncodified and therefore materialises from15
what the Swa i people do, or – more correctly so – from what they think they should do;
rather than from what a group of legal experts deem they should do and believe.  The16
king (who is referred to as umlomo longacali manga, which literally means, “the mouth
that never lies”) and the royal family are the principal guardians of Swazi law and
custom. The king’s proclamations became Swazi law when they were publicly
announced to the nation and such public announcement took place at the cattle byre17
as that is where all national meetings are convened.  18
Ibid.12
The term “Swazi” is not defined in any Act, however Khumalo argues that we can infer from the Swazi13
Courts Act 80 of 1950 and the Swazi Administration Act 79 of 1950 that it means: “a member of an
indigenous population of Africa who is a Swazi citizen attached to a chief appointed under section 4
of the Swazi Administration Act 79 of 1950” (Khumalo JAM Swazi customary law Courts (1976) 1). 
Khumalo op cit 114
Adjetey FNA “Reclaiming the African woman’s individuality: The struggle between women’s15
reproductive autonomy and African society and culture” (1994-1995) American Law Review 1365.
W helpton FPvR “Swazi law and custom (emasiko nemi esiswati): Law (lesiko) or custom (umhambo)”16
(2004) Codicillus 27.
The cattle byre is usually built at the eastern end of the kraal and it is the place where the domestic17
animals reside at night. It is also believed to be the place where the ancestors reside and is therefore
considered the most sacred place in Swazi traditional religion (Kasenene P Religion in Swaziland
(1993) 31-32.
W helpton (2004) op cit 27.18
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5.3 The Swazi legal system
Like South Africa, Swaziland’s legal system is dualistic in nature.  It comprises Roman-19
Dutch law, which is the common law of Swaziland and Swazi customary law.  This20
status quo has been confirmed by section 252 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Swaziland Act 101 of 2005 which provides that:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution or any other written law, the
principles and rules that formed, immediately before the 6  September, 1968th
(Independence Day), the principles and rules of the Roman-Dutch Common Law
as applicable to Swaziland since 22  February 1907 are confirmed and shall bend
applied and enforced as the common law of Swaziland except where and to the
extent that those principles or rules are inconsistent with this Constitution or the
a statute.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the principles of Swazi customary
law (Swazi law and custom) are hereby recognized and adopted and shall be
applied and enforced as part of the law of Swaziland.  21
Comparable to South Africa, the application of Swazi customary law is also subject to
a repugnancy clause  found in section 252(3) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of22
Swaziland which provides that: 
(3) The provisions of subsection (2) do not apply in respect of any custom that is,
and to the extent that is, inconsistent with a provision of this Constitution or a
statute or repugnant to natural justice or morality or general principles of
humanity. 
For further in this regard see Pain JH “The reception of English and Roman-Dutch law in Africa with19
reference to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland” (1978) Comparative International Law Journal of
South Africa 167. 
Rautenbach C “Comments on the constitutional protection of religion in Swaziland” (2008) African20
Human Rights Law Journal 433. 
See also Thembinkosi v Ntombi and Another [2011] SZHC 129 at para. 30.21
A similar repugnancy clause is also contained in section 11(a) of the Swazi Courts Act 80 of 195022
which provides that: “The Swazi courts are to apply the Swazi law and custom prevailing in Swaziland
as far as it is not repugnant to natural justice or morality or inconsistent with the provisions of any law
in force in Swaziland”. This provision seeks to regulate the choice of which system of law to apply and
also serves to limit Swazi law and custom “in the name of ‘natural justice or morality’” (see W helpton
FPvR “Swazi law and custom in the Kingdom of Swaziland” (1997) South African Journal of Ethnology
148).
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According to Armstrong and Nhlapo,  there is a difference in the applicability of each23
system of law to the populace of Swaziland. The general law of the land applies to all
citizens of Swaziland whilst Swazi customary law applies only to citizens who are
ethnically Swazi.  There is also some dualism with regards to the way in which the law24
is administered.  Magistrate’s courts, High courts and Courts of Appeal apply the25
general law of the land,  whilst customary courts known as Swazi National Courts apply26
customary law.  In Magagula v Mabuza and Others,  the court held that:27 28
... the Constitution does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in marriages
solemnised in terms of Swazi Law and custom. Section 151(8)  of the Constitution29
ousts the jurisdiction of this court in matters relating to the office of the Ingwenyama,
the office of Indlovukazi (the Queen mother), the authorisation of a person to perform
the functions of Regent in terms of section 8, the appointment, and revocation and
suspension of a chief; the composition of the Swazi National Council and procedure
of the Council; and the Libutfo (regimental) systems.
In Thomo v Vilakati,  the court held that:30
Armstrong and Nhlapo op cit 3. 23
Adinkrah KO “Folk law is the culprit: W omen’s ‘non-rights’ in Swaziland” (1990-1991) Journal of Legal24
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 11.
Ibid.25
Nhlapo RT “Legal duality and multiple judicial organization in Swaziland: An analysis and a proposal”26
in Takirambudde PN (ed) The individual under African law (1982) 67. Also see Mdluli v Ngwenya and
Others [2007] SZHC 103 paras 8 and 9 and Shabangu and Others v Shabangu and Others [2008]
SZHC 39 para 14-16, in which the High Court of Swaziland has been especially reluctant to be a court
of first instance when deciding issues of customary law.
Khumalo op cit 4. See also section 3 of the Swazi Courts Act 80 of 1950, which provides for the27
establishment of Swazi courts, to exercise jurisdiction over members of the Swazi nation and section
11 which provides that:
A Swazi court shall administer –
(a) The Swazi law and custom prevailing in Swaziland in so far as it is not repugnant to natural justice or
morality or inconsistent with the provisions of any law in force in Swaziland;
(b) The provisions of all rules or orders made by the Ngwenyama or chief under the Swazi Administration
Act 79 of 1950 or any law repealing or replacing the same, and in force within the area of jurisdiction
of the court; 
(c) The provision of any law which the court is by or under such law authorised to administer.
See also Dladla v Dlamini (1977-1978) SLR 15 (CA) at 18B-C.  
[2011] SZHC 13 para 9.28
Section 151(9) provides that: “Notwithstanding subsection (1), the High Court has no original or29
appellate jurisdiction in matters relating to the office of the Ingwenyama, the office of Indlovukazi (the
Queen mother), the authorisation of a person to perform the functions of Regent in terms of section
8, the appointment, and revocation and suspension of a chief; the composition of the Swazi National
Council and procedure of the Council; and the Libutfo (regimental) systems, which matters shall
continue to be governed by Swazi law and custom”.
[2012] SZHC 125 para 21.30
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The Constitution gives the High Court unlimited original jurisdiction in civil and criminal
matters as well as appellate and review jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts and Swazi
Courts. However, the High Court has no original jurisdiction in matters in which a Swazi
Court has jurisdiction in terms of section 151(3)(b)  of the Constitution. 31
The current status quo means that the Swazi legal system makes provision for two
different systems of intestate succession: succession under the general law (which is
governed by the Roman-Dutch common law) and succession under customary law.32
 
5.4 Intestate succession under Swazi customary law
The fact that the Swazi legal system is dualistic in nature means that there are two
different sets of laws available for the regulation of intestate succession in Swaziland.
The legal system implemented will depend upon the type of marriage concluded by
Swazi persons.  If a customary marriage is concluded, then intestate succession is33
regulated by Swazi customary law. However, if a civil marriage  is concluded, then34
intestate succession will be regulated by the general law of the land which is Roman-
Dutch common law and its statutes.  In addition to the customary rules preventing a35
woman from inheriting property, women’s access to land is additionally frustrated where
she and her husband have contracted a marriage in community of property, as the
husband is automatically the administrator of the joint estate (which includes all
property).  In the next section of the thesis the researcher will be discussing the Swazi36
Section 151(3)(b) provides that: “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), the High Court- has31
no original but has review and appellate jurisdiction in matters in which a Swazi Court or Court Martial
has jurisdiction under any law for the time being in force”.
Rubin NN “The Swazi law of succession: A restatement” (1965) Journal of African Law 94.32
In this regard, sections 24, 25(1) and (2) of the Marriage Act 47 of 1964 were applicable. These33
sections provided that:
24 The consequences flowing from a marriage in terms of this Act shall be in accordance with the common
law as varied from time to time by enactments of the legislative authority unless both parties to the
marriage are Africans in which case, subject to the terms of section 25, the martial power of the husband
and the proprietary rights of the spouses shall be governed by Swazi law and custom. 
25 (1) If both parties to a marriage are Africans, the consequences flowing from the marriage shall be governed
by the law and custom applicable to them unless prior to the solemnisation of the marriage the parties
agree that the consequences flowing from the marriage shall be governed by the common law.
(2) If the parties agree that the consequences flowing from the marriage shall be governed by the
common law, the marriage officer shall endorse on the marriage certificate the fact of the agreement,
and the production of a marriage certificate so endorsed shall be evidence of that fact unless the
contrary is proved. 
In terms of the Marriage Act 47 of 1964.34
See generally, Armstrong and Nhlapo op cit 15-18.35
Armstrong A, Beyani C, Himonga C, Kabeberi-Macharia J, Molokomme A, Ncube W , Nhlapo T,36
Rwezaura B and Stewart J “Uncovering reality: Excavating women’s rights in African family” (1993)
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customary law of intestate succession together with the provisions of Swaziland’s
Intestate Succession Act 3 of 1953, which currently regulates intestate succession for
the general population of Swaziland. 
 
5.4.1 General principles of the Swazi customary law of intestate
succession
5.4.1.1 The Swazi family and property 
According to Swazi law and custom, the family is the most fundamental institution and
it is they who make the important decisions relating to the inheritance of status and
property.  The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act 101 of 2005 makes the37
State accountable for the protection and preservation on the family and its values.38
“The family group specifically, and the community at large, therefore, constitute the
framework within which individuals exercise their political, economic and social rights
and freedoms”.  It is therefore not surprising at all that a right protecting the family was39
included in Swaziland’s Constitution. 
In traditional Swazi societies, families reside together within an umuti (a homestead),
headed by a man (umnumzane).  Because of the potentially polygynous nature of Swazi40
marriage,  the homestead may consist of numerous homesteads (tindlu), with each41
individual wife having a separate indlu (home).  It is also customary for the following42
people to occupy an umuti: (a) “the umnumzane, and his wives and children, (b) the male
International Journal of Law and the Family 345.
W omen and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (W LSA) Inheritance in Swaziland:37
The law and practice (1994) 32. See also Mariah Dlamini v Augustine Dlamini [2012] SZHC 66 para
27 where the court stated that: “after the divorce, the question of the property was left to be determined
under Swazi law and custom”.
In this regard sections 3 and 5 provide that:38
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental unit of society and is entitled to protection by the State.
(5) Society and the State have the duty to preserve e and sustain the harmonious development, cohesion
and respect for the family and family values.
See also Dlamini v Dlamini [2012] SZHC 10 at para13.38
Van Schalkwyk op cit 21.39
Armstrong A, Chuulu M, Himonga C, Letuka P, Mokobi K, Ncube W , Nhlapo T, Rwezaura B and Vilakazi40
P “Towards a cultural understanding of the interplay between children’s and women’s rights: An eastern
and southern African perspective” (1995) The International Journal of Children’s Rights 351.
See Maziya v Bhiya and Others [2008] SZHC 183 at para14.41
W omen and the Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust op cit 33.42
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children and their families, (c) the mother and grandmother of the head of the homestead,
and (d) the sisters and daughters of the head of the homestead who are single or who
have returned from marriage, and their children”.  The umnumzane (and his successor43
after his death) bears the sole responsibility for the care of the people in the homestead. 
There is also a dual property system in Swaziland, ie, Swazi property comprises of Swazi
Nation Land and Title Deed Land.  Swazi Nation land is collectively owned and held in44
trust for the people by the King.  Access to Swazi Nation Land is limited for women though45
as they may only access land through a male member of the family.  However, the United46
Nations in Swaziland has proof of an up-and-coming practice where some chiefs avoid the
traditional rules of customary law and apportion land to women if a male person is not
available.  A widow is also disqualified from inheriting Swazi Nation land as such land must47
be disposed of in terms of Swazi law and custom and is excluded from the community of
property envisaged in section 2(4) of the Intestate Succession Law 3 of 1953. Additionally,
women married in community of property are prohibited from registering land in their own
name and can only acquire land through registration in the names of their husbands.  The48
fact that only men are allowed to own land means that women are automatically precluded
from inheriting land.  Under Swazi law and custom, property is controlled communally and49
is “exercised through consultation” through the male kinsmen.  50
5.4.1.2 Primogeniture
The Swazi customary law of succession is based on the principle of primogeniture.51
According to that principle, the eldest son of a man who has concluded a monogamous
Ibid.43
See Davies RH, O’Meara D and Dlamini S The kingdom of Swaziland: A profile (1985) 40.44
Section 211(1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act 101 of 2005 provides that: “From45
the date of commencement of this Constitution, all land (including any existing concessions) in
Swaziland, save privately held title-deed land, shall continue to vest in iNgwenyama in trust for the
Swazi nation as it vested on the 12  April,1973”.th
W omen and the Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust op cit 33.46
Social Institutions and Gender Index “Swaziland” at http://genderindex.org/country/swaziland#_ftn4247
(accessed 15/11/2012).
Ibid. See also section 16(3) of the Land Act No 37 of 1968.48
W omen and the Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust op cit 53.49
Ibid.50
See generally Iya PF “W omen, law and development in Swaziland: An overview of the impact of de51
jure discrimination against women” in Forster PG and Nsibande BJ (eds) Swaziland: Contemporary
social and economic issues (2000) 42. 
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marriage and the eldest son of each house in a polygynous household  will acquire a52
considerable share of any estate left by their father.  Younger sons will receive a share53
in the estate of their deceased father; however that share will be considerably less than
the share afforded to older sons.  54
Under Swazi customary law, the principle of primogeniture therefore makes women
ineligible for intestate succession. The fact that women are ineligible for succession is
unfair, as both men and women contribute to the acquisition of property, not just men
alone.  In fact, under Swazi law and custom, widows and daughters have no claim to55
the estate of their deceased husband or father.  Women are however entitled to certain56
items of property for example, the liphakelo a head of cattle given to her by her
husband’s father or the tinsulamnyembeti which she receives for each daughter that is
married.  A woman can however not dispose of such cattle unilaterally but must seek57
the permission of her legal guardian, ie, her husband.  58
Women were traditionally regarded as perpetual minors under Swazi law and custom.59
Before marriage a Swazi woman was subject to the guardianship of her father and after
marriage, she was subject to the guardianship of her husband. Upon the death of her
husband she fell under the guardianship of her husband’s successor and upon divorce,
she reverted back to being under the guardianship of her father.60
5.4.1.3 The distributable estate
When a man dies, the following items comprise his distributable estate:
As a result thereof, there is thus the matter of a general successor and a house successor in each52
house. For a distinction of these terms please refer to chapter 2 of this thesis. 
Armstrong (et al) (1995) op cit 355. See also Maseela v Maseela (1954) HCTLR 48 (B) at 54C-D.53
Rubin op cit 97.54
Matashane K and Letuka P “The role and concept of heir: A case of confusion” in Ncube W  and55
Stewart J (eds) Widowhood, inheritance laws, customs and practices in southern Africa (1995) 57.
See generally Marwick BA The Swazi: An ethnographic account of the natives of the Swaziland56
Protectorate (1966) 66-67.
Marwick op cit 44.57
W omen and Law in Southern Africa Research Trust Family in transition: The experience of Swaziland58
(1998) 110.
See Meesedoosa v Links 1915 TPD 357 at 360, where Mason J stated that: “I do not think there is any59
doubt that under Zulu and Swazi custom a native woman is a minor”. 
Armstrong (et al) (1993) op cit 342.60
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(a) Property, which includes:
(i) Land rights, ie, such rights to occupy and cultivate land and houses as were
granted to him by a Chief, or which he inherited, but not lesser rights of use,
or tenancies at will. Preferential rights to reoccupy land are inheritable.
(ii) Livestock, including cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, fowls, dogs, donkeys and
horses.
(iii) Movables, including furniture, weapons, jewellery, and other personal
possessions.
(iv) Modern movable property, including modern furniture and utensils,
machinery, motor cars, money, bank accounts, safe deposit accounts, post-
office savings accounts, shares.
(b) Claims arising out of contracts or delicts; these are transmissible both negatively
and positively. 
(c) Guardianship over minors (including widows, unmarried daughters, male and
female dependants).
(d) Offices, including titles to political offices, and certain religious offices.  61
From the above, we can thus conclude that succession in Swazi customary law is of a
universal nature, ie, the successor succeeds to both the assets and liabilities of the
deceased.  62
5.4.1.4 The powers and duties of successors
The general and house successors of the deceased have the same duties in relation
to those estates as the deceased.  The powers and duties of the house successor63
include the following:
(a) He must maintain the widow and all other family members of the house. The
estate must be administered in consultation with the widow and she has
recourse against him if he misuses the estate.
(b) He must make provision for emalobolo (ie, cattle delivered as marriage
goods to the father of the bride and his family by the groom and his family)
for the first wives of each son of the house, and he must receive and
Rubin op cit 99.61




safeguard the emalobolo received for daughters.  64
(c) He can be held accountable for the delicts of the family members of the
house.65
In addition to the powers and duties listed immediately above, the general successor
functions as the new family head (umnumzane) and manages the general estate in the
place of the deceased. As stated previously, he is responsible for the liabilities of the
deceased, even if the liabilities surpass the amount of the assets. Despite having
equivalent functions to the deceased, the general successor has less authority over the
members of the family.  The general successor is also entitled to:66
(a) the rights of guardianship over widows, minor children and other dependents;
(b) such offices as the deceased may have held;
(c) such land, or interests in land, as belonged to the deceased: except such land
as had been attached to other houses for cultivation and occupation by wives
and their children;
(d) all cattle attached to the main house (indlunkulu);
(e) such cattle as are received for emalobolo paid in respect of the oldest daughter
in each minor house (and all the emalobolo received for his uterine sisters;
(f) all other livestock, traditional and modern movables; and 
(g) such crops as are not produced by minor houses.  67
 
5.4.1.5 The general order of succession
Under Swazi customary law, the eligibility of the surviving members of the family group
to succeed to the intestate estate of the deceased, is determined by three important
factors namely “death, primogeniture and succession by males in the male line of
descent”.  Swazis also practice polygyny and as a result thereof, we may thus68
distinguish between succession in a monogamous household and succession in a
polygynous household.
Matashane and Letuka op cit 52.64
W helpton (2005) op cit 838.65
Ibid.66
Rubin op cit 104-105.67
Rautenbach C, Mojela K, du Plessis W  and Vorster LP “Law of succession and inheritance” in Bekker68
JC, Labuschagne JMT and Vorster LP Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa Part 1 Customary
law (2002) 111.
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5.4.1.5.1 Succession in a monogamous household
In a monogamous Swazi household, the eldest son succeeds as the head of the house
and to the general estate of the deceased and he assumes responsibility for the family
and manages the family property.69
If the deceased had no surviving sons to succeed him, the order of succession
proceeds as follows:
(a) the deceased’s younger brother who was next after him in seniority, or if such
younger brother did not survive the deceased;
(b) by the eldest son of such younger brother. Where such younger brother has died
prior to deceased and leaves no male issue, deceased’s successor will be – 
(c) a younger brother of deceased, next in seniority after those brothers already
deceased. In the case of each younger brother, if he has died before the
deceased, his eldest son will become successor to the deceased. Only where
such brother dies without male issue, does succession pass to the next senior
younger brother of the deceased;
(d) where deceased is not survived by younger brothers or their sons, the
inheritance passes to the elder brothers of deceased in order of seniority;
(e) where any such older brother fails to survive the deceased, his oldest surviving son
will become the successor; only where the most senior brother is not survived by
male issue does the succession pass to the next most senior brother;
(f) where the deceased is not survived by any of his brothers or their male issue,
deceased’s senior male agnatic relative will become his successor. Where none
survives the deceased; 
(g) the senior male grandchild of the deceased becomes the successor; where there
are no male grandchildren who survive the deceased,
(h) the successor will be the oldest son of the deceased’s oldest married sister; or,
if he has died prior to the deceased,
(i) his eldest son. Where no persons in categories (h) and (i) are available to
succeed, then, 
(j) the successor will be the oldest sons of the deceased’s other married sisters, in
order of seniority of such sisters. In each case, where such nephew has not
survived the deceased,
(k) the oldest son of the deceased nephew will become the successor (and, failing
male issue of such nephew, the succession will then pass to the oldest sons of
W helpton (2005) op cit 839.69
228
the next most senior married sister of the deceased). In the absence of such
persons, the successor will be –
(l) the male children (in descending order of age) of the sisters of the deceased’s
father.
(m) where no persons in categories (a)-(l) are available to succeed the deceased, his
wife may become his heir. In such a case she will revert to the guardianship of her
father (or his successor) and it is he who will control property inherited by her.
(n) where there are no persons in categories (a)-(l) to succeed the deceased, and
he is not survived by his wife, the estate becomes the property of the King.70
Another option available to the family of the deceased for the procreation of a
successor, in cases where the deceased has no surviving issue, is the institution of the
levirate (ukungena) custom.  Because death does not dissolve a customary marriage,71
the wife (or widow) of the deceased (who is still capable of bearing children) may be
asked to enter into a union with the brother of the deceased for the purpose of
producing a successor for the deceased.  Under Swazi customary law, a wife was not72
forced to enter into such an arrangement. She had to give her consent as “to her
participation in the arrangement and to the identity of the man chosen for her”.  The73
first male child born of such a union is regarded as the successor of the deceased.74
Under Swazi law and custom, only a deceased’s younger brother is qualified to enter
into an ukungena custom with the deceased’s wife. In order to be eligible the younger
brother must already be married.  The sororate custom or the marrying of seed-raisers75
in order to produce a successor is also practiced amongst the Swazis.  In this regard,76
only a younger sister of the deceased’s wife may substitute her.77
 
Rubin op cit 97-98. Please note that the words “heir” and “inheritance” were replaced with the words70
“successor” and “succession” respectively in categories (a)-(l) because the term “inheritance” is
distinguishable from “succession” according to customary law (see chapter 2 of this thesis).
For a detailed discussion of the levirate custom, please refer to chapter 2 of this thesis.71
Adjetey op cit 360.72
Armstrong (et al) (1993) op cit 348.73
W helpton op cit 839.74
Mokobi K and Kidd P “Marriage and inheritance: The chameleon changes its colours” in Ncube W  and75
Stewart J Widowhood, inheritance laws, customs and practices in southern Africa (1995) 23. 
For further information in this regard please see chapter 2 of this thesis and the findings of field76
research conducted in Swaziland at section 5.7 of this thesis, as well as Adjetey op cit 360-361.
Mokobi and Kidd op cit 23.77
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5.4.1.5.2 Succession in a polygynous household
In a polygynous Swazi household, the eldest son in each house succeeds in each
individual house.  If the eldest son in a house is deceased, succession will proceed78
along the following lines: first all his male descendents will be considered and thereafter
his younger brothers and their descendents.79
5.4.1.6 Succession to the estates of various categories of persons
 
5.4.1.6.1 The estate of an unmarried Swazi man 
In instances where a man dies before getting married, his father or the person
appointed as administrator of his estate, ie, the umpatseli may utilise cattle from the
deceased’s estate (for the payment of emalobolo) to enter into a levirate union with a
person chosen to do so by the deceased’s family council (ie, lusendvo)  in order to80
produce a successor for him. The first male child born of such a union is regarded as
the successor of the deceased. 
If the afore-mentioned process is not implemented, then the unmarried man is
succeeded by his father; unless his father has predeceased him, in which case he will
be succeeded by his oldest uterine brother. If the oldest uterine brother is unavailable
for succession, the oldest son of the deceased’s father by another wife will succeed the
unmarried man.  Should the previously mentioned relationships fail to produce a81
successor for the deceased, then the general principles of succession will be
considered in order to find a successor for the deceased.  82
Bekker JC Seymour’s customary law in southern Africa (1989) 275. See also Molungoa B Khatala v78
FB Khatala (1963-1966) HCTLR 97 (CA) at 100D-E and Lekaota Ralienyane v MR Lekaota (1963-
1966) HCTLR 38 (B)
W helpton (2005) op cit 839.79
Rubin op cit 105.80
Ibid.81
Ibid. Succession to the estates of married Swazi men will be dealt with at a later stage in this chapter. 82
230
5.4.1.6.2 The estate of a Swazi woman
Here we may distinguish between the estate of an unmarried woman, the estate of a
married woman and the estate of a widow. 
5.4.1.6.2.1 An unmarried woman
In cases where a woman dies before concluding a marriage, her father or his successor
(if he has predeceased her) will acquire all the property in her estate.  Here it is also83
possible for the lusendvo to elect to leave her property in the custody of her elder
brother to be held as house property. 
5.4.1.6.2.2 A married woman
The property of a married woman (who dies during the lifetime of her husband) will be
distributed between her eldest and youngest son/s.  Her eldest son will succeed to the84
following property: (a) the liphakelo cattle;  (b) other domesticated animals (known as85
timfuyo tekhaya); (c) property of the household (known as timphahla tendlu); and (d)
mats used for sleeping (known as emacansi).86
Property belonging to the house of the deceased married woman will remain in that
particular house and will continue to remain in the custody of her husband if he is still
alive.  The tinsulamnyembeti cattle  will be inherited by the youngest son of her house87 88
on the death of her husband; unless she has specifically designated any of her other
sons as heir (prior to her death) and with the consent of the family council.  89
Rubin op cit 105.83
W helpton (2005) op cit 839.84
A head of cattle given to her by her husband’s father.85
Ibid.86
W helpton (2005) op cit 839 and Rubin op cit 105.87
W hich a wife receives for each daughter that is married.88
Rubin op cit 105-106.89
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5.4.1.6.2.3 A widow 
If a widow dies, the tinsulamnyembeti cattle are automatically inherited by the youngest
son in her house, and property allotted to her by iphakela or property acquired in any
other way, is inherited by the eldest son in her house.  The property listed immediately90
above remains the property of the widow, but is subject to the custodianship of her
father (or his successor) unless she remarries. If the widow remarries, her estate will
fall under the custody of her husband and the first-born son of such a marriage will
inherit the property of her estate. If the widow dies without marrying again, her father
or his successor inherits the property of her estate, failing which it becomes the property
of the King.91
5.4.1.7 Disposition of property prior to death (disposition inter
vivos)
Swazi women may only dispose of property prior to death if they obtain the consent of
their husband and the family council.  Swazi men may also dispose of certain property92
prior to death and such dispositions are referred to as iphakela.  An example of such93
a disposition is the allotment of property owned by the man in his personal capacity, to
a particular house or son.  In order to be valid, such allotment must comply with certain94
formalities and all allotments made by the man must be attested to by the entire family. 
A Swazi man is however prohibited from allotting property belonging to the main
household and customary property like his traditional garments and spears as these
belong to his successor in title. Family members must support the wishes of the Swazi
man regarding the allotment of his property, however if the allotment is unjust, the
family council may review and overrule the desires of the deceased.  95
 
Rubin op cit 106.90
Ibid.91
Rubin op cit 106.92
Donzwa B, Ncube W  and Stewart J “W hich law? W hat law? Playing with the rules” in Ncube W  and93
Stewart J Widowhood, inheritance laws, customs and practices in southern Africa (2005) 98. 
W helpton (2005) op cit 840. 94
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5.4.1.8 A dying declaration (known as kuyaleta)
If an old person has a premonition that he is about to die, he may stipulate conclusive
instructions on how things should be conducted when he dies. Such instruction must
be given in the presence of members of the family, who act as witnesses.  Upon the96
death of the elderly person, the family has to decide whether it is going to adhere to the
instructions given or whether it is going to disregard them completely. Each instruction
is considered very carefully and if the family finds that it is in keeping with custom, they
may choose to follow it, for example, if the person gave instructions on the procedure
or protocol to follow at his funeral that would be acceptable.  The male person is97
however precluded from issuing instructions contrary to custom, for example he may
not stipulate where and in which wife’s kraal his body should lie in state.  98
5.4.1.9 Disinheritance 
The practice of disinheritance is also known amongst the Swazi.  A Swazi family head99
may disinherit a future successor if he can show good cause for doing so. If his reasons
for wanting to disinherit a future successor are justifiable, then he must convene a
meeting of the family council; and in their presence and the presence of his son; outline
his burden of proof to them and then make a proclamation to the effect that he
disinherits him.  The rules of natural justice also apply here as the son is given an100
opportunity to state his side of the case in an attempt to refute the claims of his
father.  After hearing all the facts, the family council will then arrive at a decision.  101 102
Some of the reasons given for disqualification include: there is evidence proving that his
mother practices witchcraft or is an adulteress; that his mother has already mothered a
child prior to the conclusion of her marriage; or if the house successor is incessantly
disobedient or cruel to his family members, or is generally deficient of respect for them.  103
W helpton (2005) op cit 840. 96
Ibid.97
W helpton (2005) op cit 840. 98
Kuper H The Swazi, a South African Kingdom  (1963) 89.99
Ibid.100




5.4.2 The process of intestate succession under Swazi law and
custom
Under Swazi law and custom, there are two important family structures which play key
roles in the process of succession, ie, the lusendvo (the family council) and the
umphatseli (administrator).  In this section of the chapter, the researcher discusses the104
roles played by each of the afore-mentioned structures in the choosing of the successor,
their role in administering the estate of the deceased and the various ways in which the
successor is appointed following the death of the family head or a married man. 
Once the family group has received confirmation of a Swazi man’s death or the death of
a family head, the onus rests with the mother of the deceased or a senior paternal uncle
to inform the relatives and convene the family council for the purpose of making important
decisions like burial arrangements, the selection of an administrator, the appointment of
a successor and other selected issues.  The surviving wife or wives are also involved105
in making the necessary arrangements for the burial of the deceased.  106
 
5.4.2.1 Death, burial and periods of mourning
Death is a significant event in Swazi customary law because not only is it regarded as
a passage to the spiritual world of the ancestors but it affects the continuity of the family
lineage. The events that take place after the death and burial of a Swazi man and the
sequence in which they occur are relevant for purposes of succession. Each of these
important events will be discussed individually hereunder. 
Traditionally, a family head is buried on the third day following his death  and he is buried107
adjacent to the cattle byre (sibaya).  Other family members are buried in the clearing at108
the back of their place of residence.  The umnumzane is buried with his head facing his109
Iya PF “The law of inheritance in Swaziland” in W omen and Law in Southern Africa Research Project104
Working Papers on Inheritance law in Southern Africa (1992) 68.
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Dludlu v Dludlu and Another (1982-1986) SLR 228 at 230C-D.106
Rubin op cit 100.107
W helpton (2005) op cit 832.108
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residence and that symbolises that he is still looking out for the family.  Prior to his body110
being taken to the place of burial, the family head’s body is taken into the cattle byre to bid
farewell to the ancestors.  Thereafter the body proceeds to the burial site. After the burial111
of the umnumzane, all attendees of the funeral proceed to a stream (which is in close proxi-
mity to the site of the grave) in order to partake in a cleansing ritual. Each person washes
their entire body in the stream in order to cleanse themselves from the death; as death is
regarded as a bad omen and which should not return to the family of the deceased. 
The completion of the burial service marks the beginning of the mourning period for the
wives of the umnumzane.  Mourning for widows is symbolised by the wearing of112
mourning garments and the performance of numerous ceremonies.  The first113
mourning period (known as ukufukama) begins immediately after the burial of the Swazi
male and lasts for one month.  The second period of mourning usually spans two114
planting seasons (ie, at least two years); but is dependent on the time at which the
deceased passed on.  The mourning period of two years is known as gwetwala115
tinsamo mbo. These two periods of mourning are extremely important because it is at
any time between the ukufakama and the gwetwala tinsamo mbo (or no later than 25
months after the death of the deceased), that the family council will assemble for the
purpose of electing a successor.  If a widow refused to “mourn” her husband, that act116
alone could disinherit her child.  Some of the customs practiced during the periods of117
mourning will also give the husband’s family an indication as to which of the wives will
be selected or considered as the main wife.  Until a successor is chosen, the118
deceased’s estate is placed under the care or custody of an administrator. The
selection, duties and role of the administrator will now be discussed in detail. 
Ibid.110
Ibid. 111
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5.4.2.2 The administrator of the estate (umphatseli)
The administrator is chosen by the family council. He (in the interim) obtained powers
of guardianship over everyone in the household, including the wife/wives of the
deceased.  The estate of a deceased Swazi man or family head is administered by119
his eldest son (referred to as lisokanchanti) or failing him, by his eldest brother.  The120
estate of a deceased man or family head is administered by the oldest of his younger
brothers or if he is unavailable for whatever reason, by his oldest brother; or failing him,
by the oldest son of the latter.  If there are no male family members to act as121
administrator of the deceased’s estate, a paternal aunt may be selected.  If the person122
selected as administrator by the family council, refuses to be appointed to such office
for various reasons, the family council will have to nominate someone else to fulfil this
important task.  The term of office of the umphatseli is terminated by the institution or123
appointment of the successor. If a successor is a minor, the umphatseli may be
entreated to continue his term of office until the successor obtains majority status.124
5.4.2.2.1 The rights, duties and liabilities of the administrator
In the interim, the umpatseli has the following obligations towards the estate of the
deceased:
(a) he acts as guardian of all minors and widows; and of other dependents of the
deceased who live within the deceased’s homestead;
(b) he assumes control of all property in the estate;
(c) he represents the estate in all legal proceedings, and, as guardian of the persons
enumerated in (a) supra may institute and defend legal proceedings on their behalf;
(d) he may settle any minor debts owing by the deceased, after consultation with,
and after receiving the consent of, the deceased’s widow(s). In respect of major
debts, however, he may not act. Settlement of these must wait the appointment
of the heir;
(e) he must recover any debts due to the estate;
Armstrong (et al) (1993) op cit 348.119
W helpton (2005) op cit 835.120
Rubin op cit 100.121
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(f) as the person controlling the property of the deceased, he may terminate tenancies
on the deceased’s land, but only after consultation with the deceased’s widow(s);
(g) he must distribute the estate amongst the heir(s) once the main heir has been
appointed.  125
The rights of the administrator include the obligations mentioned immediately above
and also extend to the rights required to fulfil those obligations effectively. With the
permission of the widow(s) of the deceased, the administrator may purchase, dispose
of or lease property in the deceased’s estate.126
The umpatseli will still be responsible for the maintenance  of the deceased’s127
widow(s), children and other dependents even in cases where the deceased’s estate
is unable to bear that burden due to a lack of resources.  However, once the128
successor has been appointed, the administrator may claim a refund for all expenses
incurred in relation thereto.  129
Where an administrator acts without being authorised to do so (ie, without seeking or
obtaining the permission of the widow(s)) and incurs a loss against the deceased’s
estate; he must reimburse the loss sustained.  It is not common for an administrator130
to receive compensation for managing the estate in the absence of the successor;
however, it is customary for the successor to present him with a beast as a token of
appreciation for what he has done.  131
5.4.2.2.2 The removal of an administrator 
 
The family council may remove an administrator from office if: he was unsuccessful in
performing his duties; or has abused or squandered the property of the estate.132
Rubin op cit 100-101.125
Rubin op cit 100.126
According to Rubin op cit 101, this type of maintenance refers to the provision of food, clothing, and127
paying for the education of children still at school.
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5.4.2.2.3 The termination of the responsibilities or duties of the
administrator
The administrator’s duties will come to an end when: he dies; he is removed from office
by the family council and when the successor is appointed.  133
 
5.4.2.3 The choosing of a successor (inkhosana)
The rationale behind the appointment of a successor is to guarantee that all family
members are taken care of.  The family council is responsible for the selection and134
appointment of a successor.  135
5.4.2.3.1 The composition of the family council
The family council comprises each and every adult member of a particular family group.136
This usually includes the siblings of the deceased (both male and female); his maternal
cousins (both male and female; the deceased’s father (if he is still alive); eminent
neighbours, the Chief, or other persons requested to participate; the wives of the
deceased and their respective children (both male and female).  A special family council137
is constituted for purposes of the appointment of the eldest son as successor or to select
the wife from whose house the successor will be appointed.  This special council138
consists of elected senior members of the family; both the deceased’s grandmothers (if
they are alive); the eldest son; senior aunts (known as bobabe labasikati) and uncles.  139
Before the successor is selected, the family council must also make a determination as
to whether a surviving wife is a widow or not. Although widowhood is a natural
consequence of marriage, under Swazi customary law, a surviving wife must be
Rubin op cit 101.133
W helpton (2005) op cit 835.134
Matashane and Letuka op cit 49.135
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Rubin op cit 103. See also W omen and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (W LSA)137
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confirmed as a widow by the family of her husband. In such cases, a widow may be
disqualified from being designated as the main wife if: (a) it was established that she
committed adultery or witchcraft, without her natal family reconciling for her
transgression through the payment of a fine; (b) she gave birth to an illegitimate child,
and (c) consequently married a man who was not the father of that child; or if she failed
to treat her in-laws with respect.  140
In cases where the husband’s family desired to deprive a widow of her status as “widow”,
the family had to approach a chief. If the chief was convinced that the surviving wife is in
fact a widow of the deceased, he was compelled to certify that she is treated in accordance
with the tenets of Swazi customary law and that her rights are protected. However, it is not
uncommon for chiefs to refuse to protect the rights of the widow because they feel
compelled to abide by the decision of the husband’s family. If a woman is disregarded as
a widow, it is possible that her children might be prohibited from succession.  141
5.4.2.3.2 The procedure involved in the selection of the successor
The brother of the deceased or the umpatseli assembles the family council for the
purpose of selecting the successor.  The rank of the deceased’s wives  plays an142 143
important role in the determination of the successor.  In other words, the family council144
chooses which widow is to be regarded as the main wife and the eldest son of that wife
will be the deceased’s successor.  The following factors (relating to the history of how145
the wives were married into the family) are taken into consideration when ranking the
wives for purposes of appointing a successor:
(a) Whether she was born of royal blood;
(b) Whether she is the daughter of a chief; 
W helpton (2005) op cit 836.140
Aphane (et al) op cit 32-33.141
Rubin op cit 103-104.142
For an explanation of ranking amongst wives in African customary law see chapter 2 of this thesis. See143
also R v Fakudze and Another (1970-1976) SLR 422 (HC) at 423F-H, where the court held that the
wife was not considered as being married because she was not anointed with the red ochre ( libovu).
As a result thereof, the wife was also not ranked as a wife. 
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(c) Whether she bears the surname of a grandmother (known as umfati longugogo);
(d) Whether she is a wife from a favoured marriage (referred to as umfati lokhiwe);
(e) Whether she is a wife from an arranged marriage (known as umfati
lowendzisiwe); or
(f) Whether she is a wife who was married after the normal process of courting”.  146
The order of preference for the ranking of the deceased’s wives is as follows: (a)
women of royal blood; (b) women of the same clan name as the deceased’s mother
(such a wife is referred to as the deceased’s gogo); (c) a women married by way of an
arranged marriage; (d) any wife who is the daughter of a chief (sikulu) or a governer
(induna); and (e) if the deceased did not leave a wife in any of the categories listed
above, any of the deceased’s wives may be considered.147
When determining which of the wives will be designated as the main wife, the family
council will also consider a woman married as a seed-raiser (inhlanti) in precisely the
same way as if she had been married as a wife. In fact amongst the Swazi, a son born
by a seed-raiser has a higher status (with regard to succession) than a son born
subsequently to a widow who has been substituted through the ukungena custom.  148
In addition to the factors highlighted above, when making their decision, the family
council will also consider the character of each wife and the character of each of their
eldest sons.  If the family council selects a wife with no sons as the main wife, it is149
possible for the eldest born son of the deceased to be placed in the house of such a
widow, and he will become the successor.  150
5.4.2.3.3 The appointment of the successor
Swazi customary law dictates that once the family council has chosen or appointed the
main wife, her eldest son becomes the successor of her husband’s deceased estate.
W helpton (2005) op cit 835. See also Kuper (1952) op cit 21 and W omen and Law in Southern Africa146
Research and Education Trust (W LSA) op cit 43-44.
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A ceremony is conducted to install or appoint the successor. All relatives together with
the chief’s kraal are notified of the day on which the ceremony will be held. The
ceremony takes place at the most senior household (known as indlunkhulu) and is
conducted in the format of a meeting.  Each house is seated according to its rank and151
its order of seniority and the widows are also seated in their particular order of rank.152
The children of the deceased are not present at such a meeting, but may be called in
when the son who is to be appointed as successor is requested to come in. Upon
entering the meeting, the children are traditionally seated next to their mother.  153
At this ceremony and according to Rubin,  the successor is officially pointed out as154
such by the administrator of the deceased’s estate and is presented with the spear and
wristlet of the deceased and is adorned with the deceased’s traditional attire (known as
imvunulo). According to Whelpton  however, it is the deceased’s sister who makes the155
declaration of who the successor is. After such pointing out or declaration, the property
of the deceased in handed over to the successor to manage on behalf of his father.156
The successor is also introduced to the relatives whom he will be compelled to care for,
whilst making use of the property previously shown to him.  It is possible for an157
illegitimate child to be chosen as the successor. This is usually conducted through the
process known as kufaka esisweni which means “putting a child in the women’s womb”.
This practice occurs where a wife or the main wife of the deceased has no male
children. As a result thereof, her interests will be considered and a type of “fictitious
fulfilment” occurs.  158
The successor assumes control of the family’s property and holds the property in trust
for them. He is not the owner of the property, but is merely a manager, who manages
the property in consultation with other members of the family, especially the main
Ibid.151
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wife.  A widow is not eligible to succeed to the property in her husband’s estate.  The159 160
successor has a duty to support the widow(s) and her dependent children. A widow and
her children were also entitled to maintenance  provided that the widow continued to161
reside with the family group of her husband. If she left the family group, she would
forfeit her right and the rights of her children to maintenance.  The property of the162
separate houses, ie, property amassed through the wife’s hard work, is left in the
possession of each individual wife but may not be alienated at their own free will
because such assets are controlled by each individual house successor.  163
At the time of his appointment, a successor not only succeeded to the property of the
deceased, but also succeeded to his obligations.  The successor is advised of all the164
liabilities owing by the deceased and is thereafter officially taken to be introduced to the
chief who will provide him with sound counsel regarding the future affairs of the
family.  The decision of the family council regarding the choice of successor is binding165
and is generally not disputed or amended, and a successor is also prohibited from
repudiating his appointment.  166
5.5 Intestate succession under the general law of the
land
The common law of intestate succession in Swaziland was gleaned from an old Holland
law entitled the Political Ordinance of 1580, which provided that intestate inheritance
(or succession) was based primarily on “consanguinity, ie, blood relationships to the
deceased, in accordance with establishment rules”.  The Roman-Dutch common law167
therefore made provision for the “equal distribution of the assets in the estate of the
deceased person among his descendents (male and female); or, failing them, to an
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ascendant male or female; and, failing them, to brothers or sisters or both, sharing the
estate equally”.  The Political Ordinance has however gone through numerous168
changes and has subsequently resulted in the Intestate Succession Law 3 of 1953
which now regulates certain aspects of intestate succession in the kingdom of
Swaziland. The provisions of this very short piece of legislation will be discussed
immediately hereunder. 
The Intestate Succession Law makes provision for the surviving spouse of every person
who dies intestate (either wholly or partially) after the coming into operation of the Act,
shall be declared to be an intestate heir of the deceased spouse.  The Act makes169
specific provision for stipulated conditions and/or portions of inheritance (or succession)
which are expressed as follows:
(a) If the spouses were married in community of property and if the deceased
spouse leaves any descendant who is entitled to succeed ab intestato, the
surviving spouse shall succeed to the extent of a child’s share or to so much as,
together with the surviving spouse’s share in the joint estate, does not exceed
one thousand two hundred rand in value (whichever is the greater);
(b) If the spouses were married out of community of property and the deceased
spouse leaves any descendant who is entitled to succeed ab intestato the
surviving spouse shall succeed to the extent of a child’s share or to so much as
does not exceed one thousand two hundred rand in value (whichever is the
greater); 
(c) If the spouses were married either in or out of community of property and the
deceased spouse leaves no descendant who is entitled to succeed ab intestato
but leaves a parent or a brother or sister (whether of the full or half blood) who
is entitled so to succeed, the surviving spouse shall succeed to the extent of a
half share or to so much as does not exceed one thousand two hundred rand in
value (whichever is the greater);
(d) In any case not covered by subsections (2), (3) or (4), the surviving spouse shall
be the sole intestate heir. 
(e) For the purposes of (the) Act any relationship by adoption under the Adoption of
Children Act No 64 of 1952, or any other law, governing the adoption of children
shall be equivalent to blood relationship.170
 





and illegitimate persons who are unmarried.  In regard thereto, section 4 of the Act171
provides that:
This Act shall not apply to any African if the estate of such African is required to be
administered and distributed according to the customs and usages of the tribe or
people to which the African belonged by virtue of section 68 of the Administration of
Estates Act. 
According to section 68 of the Administration of Estates Act:
(1) If any African who during his lifetime has not contracted a lawful marriage, or
who, being unmarried, is not the offspring of parents lawfully married, dies
intestate, his estate shall be administered and distributed according to the
customs and usages of the tribe or people to which he belonged; and if any
controversies or questions shall arise among his relatives, or reputed relatives,
regarding the distribution of the property left by him, such controversies or
questions shall be determined by a Swazi Court having jurisdiction.
(2) The Master may not be called upon to interfere in the administration and
distribution of the estate of any such African.
(3) For the purpose of this section, “African” shall mean any person belonging to any
of the aboriginal races or tribes of Africa south of the Equator, or any person one
of whose parents belong to any such race or tribe. 
 
From the above, it is apparent that section 68 of the Administration of Estates Act deals
exclusively with the distribution of an African’s estate,  and that the estates of all172
Africans falling out of the ambit of section 68 must therefore be administered according
to the general law of the land.  The modifications brought about by the Intestate173
Succession Law are commendable in that it makes specific provision for a widow and
her children in cases of intestacy and also accommodates legally adopted children for
purposes of inheritance. 
The Act is however problematic in that it fails to take cognisance of the fact that
marriage in Swazi customary law is polygynous and that a man may actually leave
behind more than one widow. The Act also fails to consider the inheritance rights of




illegitimate children  and also excludes all other possible relatives (except parents, a174
brother or sister) from inheritance (or succession) which is contrary to “living” Swazi
customary law in particular and African customary law in general.  175
5.6 The impact of constitutionalism on the customary
law of intestate succession in the Kingdom of
Swaziland
5.6.1 The Constitution of Swaziland no 1377 of 1968
As has already been stated, the Kingdom of Swaziland was a former British colony from
1902, until it gained its independence on 6 September 1968. One of Swaziland’s first
efforts at constitutional reform was taken in April of 1960 when Sobhuza III invited a small
group to hear his views on the subject and on the general way in which reform should be
introduced.  The First Swaziland Constitutional Committee resulted from this meeting176
and that Committee submitted its proposals for a Constitution for Swaziland in the end
of 1961.  One of the first enacted constitutions in Swaziland was the Constitution of177
Swaziland No 1377 of 1968  (hereafter referred to as the Independence Constitution)178
which was established under The Swaziland Independence Order of 1968. The
Independence Constitution was a Westminster Constitution  and was traditionally the179
type of constitution that Britain bestowed on most of its colonies in Africa.  180
The Independence Constitution was adopted after numerous constitutional conferences
were held in London between 1960 and 1967.  Some of the distinct features of the181
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Independence Constitution included: recognition of the supremacy of the monarchy,182
the recognition of Sobhuza II as the King of Swaziland  and as the Head of State,183 184
the Queen Mother or the Ndlovukazi was held in as high regard as the King as both of
them were exempted from taxation and legal proceedings,  the prohibition on185
Parliament from legislating on the following: (a) matters relating to the offices of
Ngwenyama and Ndlovukazi (the Queen Mother), (b) appointment of persons as
Regents, (c) the appointment, rescission and suspension of Chiefs, (d) the composition
of the Swazi National Council, (e) the Ncwala ceremony and the Libutfo (regimental)
system.  All these matters had to be regulated by Swazi law and custom.  The186 187
Constitution also made provision for succession to the throne of Swaziland  and for188
the installation of a Regent until the King was able to assume his functions and
responsibilities.  Rights to land  and minerals  were exercised exclusively at the189 190 191
discretion of the monarchy. In Chapter I, the Constitution also made provision for the
protection of various fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual which included
the rights to life,  personal liberty,  and protection from slavery and forced labour,192 193 194
protection from inhuman treatment,  protection from deprivation of property,195 196
See Chapter 5.182
And no longer as the supreme chief.183
Section 28 of Chapter IV provided that:184
(1) The King of Swaziland is the Head of State.
(2) The King shall do all things that belong to his office in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution
and of all other laws for the time being in force.
See sections 33-35.185
See section 62(2) and Schedule 3.186
Ibid.187
Section 29 of Chapter IV provided that: “W hen an announcement is made to the Swazi nation in188
accordance with Swazi law and custom that the King is vacant by reason of the death of the holder
thereof or any other cause, such person as, in accordance with Swazi law and custom, is declared to
be King shall become King”. 
Section 30 of Chapter IV provided that:189
(1) Until the King has been installed, that is to say, until he has publicly assumed the functions and
responsibilities of King in accordance with Swazi law and custom, or during any period where he is by
reason of absence from Swaziland or any other cause unable to perform the functions of his office, those
functions shall be performed, save as otherwise provided in this section, by the Ndlovukazi acting as
Regent.
(2) If the Regent is unable for any reason to perform the functions of such office, a person shall be
authorised, in accordance with Swazi law and custom (hereinafter referred to as an “authorised person”),









protection against arbitrary search or entry,  freedom of conscience,  expression,197 198 199
assembly and association,  movement  and protection from discrimination.  200 201 202
However, on 12 April 1973, King Sobhuza II, issued a Proclamation which repealed the
Constitution,  (save the provisions relating to the judicature, public servants, the203
monarchy, the offices of the Prime Minister and other Ministers, and the Attorney-
General) dissolved Parliament, placed an embargo on political parties and prohibited
trade unions from operating.  The main reasons put forward by the King for the repeal204
of the Constitution were that the Constitution was unsuccessful in laying down the
structure for good government and that it was instead a hindrance to peace and
progressive development in all aspects of life; that it had endorsed the introduction of
highly distasteful political practices foreign to and incongruous with the way of life of
Swazi society and was constructed to disturb and dismantle their tranquil, practical and
inherently democratic procedures for political activity; that there was no constitutional
way of rectifying it since the procedures prescribed by the Constitution itself were not
feasible (and) that he and his people after a protracted constitutional battle longed for
complete independence under a constitution created by and for themselves in full
freedom without external influence, in order that as a nation they might push forward
progressively under their own constitution which would ensure them peace, order, good
government and happiness.  205
The impact of the Proclamation thereby revolutionised Swaziland into an absolute
monarchy in which the King exclusively wielded all legislative, executive and judicial
powers.  In September 1973, however, Sobhuza II again attempted to promote the206







The King’s Proclamation to the Nation, Decree 11 of 1973.203
Matsebula JSM A history of Swaziland (1988) 256 and 260-261.204
W anda BP “The shaping of the modern Constitution of Swaziland: A review of some social and205
historical factors” (1990) Lesotho Law Journal 169.
Langwenya SM “Recent legal developments – Swaziland” (2005) University of Botswana Law Journal206
168.
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Commission.  The Commission was authorised to travel throughout Swaziland and207
conduct interviews with the Swazi people on the type of Constitution they desired.208
However, contrary to King Sobhuza’s promises and efforts, no “own” constitution was
ever enacted for the people of Swaziland during the rest of the period of his reign. 
5.6.2 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act 101 of
2005
5.6.2.1 Background
Like his predecessor, Mswati III continued to rule Swaziland by issuing laws and
proclamations and without any constitutional enactment. However, his lavish lifestyle209
and dictatorial style of rulership attracted considerable reproach, and after many years
of delaying the inevitable, he finally gave permission for the drafting of a new
constitution for Swaziland.  From 1992 onwards, Mswati III appointed various210
committees and commissions as pressure for constitutional reform intensified.  These211
various committees and commissions included the Tinkhundla Review Commission
(TRC) 1992,  the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) 1996,  (whose initial212 213
mandate was to develop a draft Constitution for Swaziland, but which was subsequently
downgraded to the development of a mere report which was produced as the Swaziland
Constitutional Review (Amendment) Decree 1 of 2000),  and finally the Constitution214
Drafting Committee (CDC) 2002.  The Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) 2002215
consisted of King Mswati’s brother, Prince David Dlamini, as chair, and a few other
selected members.  The composition of the Committee met with much criticism216
Barker D Swaziland (1965) 133-135.207
Matsebula (1988) op cit 265.208
See City Press “King Mswati spends millions on twenty Mercs” (2009-04-19); The Times “Surrounded209
by destitute subjects, Swaziland’s King lives royally” (2008-09-12) 3; The Star “Rich Swazi King unlikely
to heed calls for reform” (2008-09-18) 6; and The Citizen “Swazi King just another despot” (2006-11-
15) 12.
Fombad op cit 95.210








particularly for being “undemocratically elected”. As a result thereof, people at variance
with the composition of the Committee, clamoured for a more transparent and
democratically-appointed, all inclusive, broad-based structure. Organisations insisted
on, among others, that all barriers and obstacles to free political participation and
activity be expunged; that the CDC be democratised and extended to accommodate all
stakeholders on agreed ground rules and terms of reference ...”.  217
The CDC developed it first draft Constitution and presented it to the King on 31 May
2003.  Before the adoption of the document, time was afforded for public comment and218
input.  The Swaziland Constitution Bill 8 of 2004 was subsequently presented and tabled219
before parliament in October 2004.  After much debate, consultation, negotiation and220
various legal challenges, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland was adopted on
26 July 2005. In the sections that follow, I highlight some of the important sections of
Swaziland’s Constitution  as they pertain to the customary law of intestate succession.221
5.6.2.2 Specific provisions
Like South Africa’s and Ghana’s Constitutions, Swaziland’s Constitution is the supreme
law of the country.  The 2005 Constitution contains some similar features to those222
found in the 1968 Constitution.  For example the 2005 Constitution recognises the223
King and iNgwenyama of Swaziland as a hereditary Head of State,  and exempts both224
the Queen Mother (or the Ndlovukazi) and the King from taxation.  The Constitution225
also makes provision for succession to the throne of Swaziland  and for the installation226





The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act 101 of 2005.221
Section 2(1) provides that: “This Constitution is the supreme law of Swaziland and if any other law is222
inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”.
See Van Schalkwyk A The indigenous law of contract with particular reference to the Swazi in the223
Kingdom of Swaziland (Unpublished LLD thesis Unisa) (2006) 17. 
Section 4. 224




The Constitution also contains a chapter  on the protection and promotion of228
fundamental rights and freedoms. Chapter III applies to all law and binds the legislature,
the executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state as well as natural and legal
persons.  This section is silent on whether the King is included in any of these229
categories. Swaziland’s history has clearly shown that the King may pose the greatest
threat to the fundamental rights and freedoms included in Chapter III, which are the
rights of the people of Swaziland.  It is for this very reason that the Constitution should230
Chapter III.228
Section 14(2) provides that: “The fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter shall be229
respected and upheld by the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary and other organs or agencies
of Government and, where applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons in Swaziland, and shall
be enforceable by the courts as provided in this Constitution”. 
Fombad op cit 101. See also Lawyers for Human Rights v Swaziland (2005) AHRLR 66 para 58, where230
the Court held that the King’s Proclamation to the Nation 12 of 1973 (in which the King declared that
he had assumed supreme power in the Kingdom of Swaziland and that all legislative, executive and
judicial power vested in him, and in which he repealed the democratic Constitution of Swaziland that
was enacted in 1968), to the extent that it allowed the head of state to dismiss judges and exercise
judicial power, was in violation of article 26 of the African Charter. The reasons given by the court for
their judgment were as follows: 
Article 26 of the Charter provides that states parties shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of
the courts. Article 1 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary states that “[t]he
independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the state and enshrined in the Constitution or the law
of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the
independence of judiciary”. Article 11 of the same Principles states that “[t]he term of office of judges, their
independence, security ... shall be adequately secured by law”. Article 18 provides that “[j]udges shall be
subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to
discharge their duties”. Article 30 of the International Bar Association (IBA)’s Minimum Standards of Judicial
Independence also guarantees that “[a] judge shall not be subject to removal unless, by reason of a criminal
act or through gross or repeated neglect or physical or mental incapacity he/she has shown himself/herself
manifestly unfit to hold the position of judge” [article 30], and article 1(b) states that “[p]ersonal independence
means that the terms and conditions of judicial service are adequately secured so as to ensure that individual
judges are not subject to executive control”. 
By entrusting all judicial powers to the head of state with powers to remove judges, the Proclamation of 1973
seriously undermines the independence of the judiciary in Swaziland. The main raison d’être of the principle of
separation of powers is to ensure that no organ of government becomes to powerful and abuses its power. The
separation of powers amongst the three organs of government – executive, legislature and judiciary – ensures
checks and balances against excesses from any of them. By concentrating the powers of all three government
structures into one person, the doctrine of separation of powers is undermined and subject to abuse. 
In its Resolution on the Respect and the Strengthening on the Independence of the Judiciary adopted at its
19th ordinary session held from 26 March to 4 April 1996 at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, the African
Commission recognised “the need for African countries to have a strong and independent judiciary enjoying
the confidence of the people for sustainable democracy and development”. The Commission then called upon
all state parties to the Charter to
repeal all their legislation which are inconsistent with the principle of respect of the independence of the
judiciary, especially with regard to the appointment and posting of judges … refrain from taking any action
which may threaten directly or indirectly the independence and the security of judges and magistrates. 
Clearly, retaining a law which vests all judicial powers in the head of state with possibility of hiring and firing
judges directly threatens the independence and security of judges and the judiciary as a whole (at paras 55-58).
The Court also found that the King’s Proclamation to the Nation 12 of 1973 “outlawed the formation
of political parties or any similar structure. Political parties are one means through which citizens can
participate in governance either directly or through elected representatives of their choice. By
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have clearly stated that the King is subject to it to prevent the probability that he may
infringe upon the rights and freedoms of others without the possibility of having to face
any sanction or consequences.
Section 14(3) is of particular interest as it makes provision for every person, irrespective
of gender, race, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, creed, age or disability
to be entitled to the rights contained in Chapter III, but subject to respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and for the public interest. This would mean that “a right or freedom
could be limited to the extent that it infringes the rights and freedoms of others and the
public interest.”  This “limitation” sounds similar to the general limitations clause found231
in the South African Constitution  and may be invoked to “justify the infringement of232
rights or freedoms where the exercise of such rights or freedoms would disrespect the
prohibiting the formation of political parties, the King’s Proclamation seriously undermined the ability
of the Swaziland people to participate in the government of their country and thus violated article 13
of the Charter” (at para 63). The Court’s reasons therefore were:
Article 10 of the African Charter provides that “every individual shall have the right to free association
provided that he abides by the law”. Article 11 provides that “every individual shall have the right to assemble
freely with others. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by
law...” In communication, the African Commission, quoting its Resolution on the Right to Freedom of
Association, held that the regulation of the exercise of the right to freedom of association should be
consistent with states’ obligations under the African Charter and in regulating the use of this right, the
competent authorities should not enact provisions which would limit the exercise of this freedom and that the
competent authorities should not override constitutional provisions or undermine fundamental rights
guaranteed by the constitution and international standards. The Commission reiterated this in
communications 147/95 and 149/96 and concluded that this principle does not apply to freedom of
association alone, but also to all other rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter, including the right to
freedom of assembly. 
Admittedly, the Proclamation restricting the enjoyment of these rights was enacted prior to the coming into
effect of the Charter. However, the respondent state had an obligation to ensure that the Proclamation
conforms to the Charter when it ratified the latter in 1995. By ratifying the Charter without taking appropriate
steps to bring its laws in line with the same, the African Commission is of the opinion that the state has not
complied with its obligations under article 1 of the Charter and in failing to comply with the said duty, the
prohibition on the establishment of political parties under the Proclamation remained effective and
consequently restricted the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association and assembly of its citizens. The
Commission therefore finds the state to have violated these two articles by virtue of the 1973 Proclamation. 
The complainant also alleges violation of article 13 of the African Charter claiming that the King’s
Proclamation of 1973 restricted participation of citizens in governance as according to the complainant the
import of sections 11 and 12 of the Proclamation is that citizens can only participate in issues of governance
only within structures of the Tinkhundla. In communications 147/95 and 146/96 Jawara v The Gambia [(2000)
AHRLR 107 (ACHPR 2000)_paras 67-68] the Commission held that: 
The imposition of the ban on former ministers and members of parliament is in contravention of their
rights to participate freely in the government of their country provided for under article 13(1) of the Charter
… Also the banning of political parties is a violation of the complainants’ rights to freedom of association
guaranteed under article 10(1) of the Charter (at paras 60-62). 
Rautenbach op cit 445.231
See section 36.232
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exercise of other individual rights and freedoms and the public interest”.  233
Some of the specific rights protected in Chapter III include: the rights to life,  personal234
liberty,  and of persons with disabilities,  a fair hearing,  protection from slavery and235 236 237
forced labour,  protection from inhuman and degrading treatment,  protection against238 239
arbitrary search or entry,  freedom of conscience or religion,  expression,240 241 242
assembly and association,  and movement.  Like most Constitutions the Constitution243 244
of the Kingdom of Swaziland also makes specific provision for a right to equality. In this
regard section 20 provides that:
(1) All persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political,
economic, social and cultural life and in every other respect and shall enjoy equal
protection of the law. 
(2) For the avoidance of any doubt, a person shall not be discriminated against on
the grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion,
or social or economic standing, political opinion, age or disability.
(3) For the purposes of this section, “discriminate” means to give different treatment
to different persons attributable only or mainly to their respective descriptions by
gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, or social or
economic standing, political opinion, age or disability.
(4) Subject to the provisions of subsection (5) Parliament shall not be competent to
enact a law that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.
(5) Nothing in this section shall prevent Parliament from enacting laws that are
necessary for implementing policies and programmes aimed at redressing social,
economic or educational or other imbalances in society.
This section does not include sexual orientation and marital status as possible grounds
of discrimination. As stated above, the type of marriage contracted determined the law
applicable to the regulation and administration of intestate estates in Swaziland. This













meant (especially for women), that the choice of marriage or a women’s marital status
would either grant her rights of inheritance (or succession) or exclude her totally from
the group of persons eligible for succession (or inheritance). The fact that the Swazi
Constitution prohibits discrimination and at the same time recognises Swazi law and
custom means that it generates conflict between two opposing principles, namely the
right of an individual to equal treatment and the right of the group to practice the culture
of their choice.  This fact points to the following: that with human rights attention is245
given to individuals, whereas with Swazi law and custom, attention is placed on the
group or community, or the individual in the context of the group; that human rights
focuses on rights, whereas Swazi law and custom focuses on duties.  However, if the246
constitutional mandate to Parliament to “enact laws that are necessary for implementing
policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, economic or educational or other
imbalances in society”  is implemented, such policies and programmes could247
significantly improve the status and property rights of women in Swaziland. 
 
The Constitution also provides that: “a person has a right to own property either alone
or in association with others”.  This means that anyone (ie, male or female) can own248
property jointly or solely. This was confirmed by the Swazi Court in Aphane v Registrar
of Deeds and Others.  The dispute in this case arose in 2008, when Mary Joyce and249
her husband entered into a deed of sale to buy title deed land in Mbabane, Swaziland
and wanted both of their names registered as purchasers on the title deed.  Their250
request was denied as it contravened section 16(3) of the Deeds Registry Act.  Mary251
Joyce challenged the Act on the basis of sections 20 and 28  of the Constitution of the252
Kingdom of Swaziland. The court held that women married under the regime of
community of property are now entitled to register “immovable property, bonds and
other real rights” in their names.  The court also called for Parliament to urgently253
W helpton (1997) op cit 150.245
Van Schalkwyk op cit 20-21.246
Section 20(5).247
Section 19(1).248
[2010] SZHC 29. See also Dlamini-Ndwandwe NF “The Constitution and women’s property rights in249
Swaziland: Mary-Joyce Aphane v The Registrar of Deeds” (2011) Southern African Public Law 408-
428.
Aphane v Registrar of Deeds op cit para 5.250
37 of 1968.251
See below.252
Paras 31 and 36.253
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initiate the process of law reform so that provisions like section 16(3) of the Deeds
Registry Act, which are an affront to the rights of women, be completely eliminated from
Swaziland’s statute books.  254
The drafters of the Constitution also saw fit to include a number of special rights that
pertain specifically to the protection of the family,  freedoms of women,  the rights255 256
of the child,  and the rights of spouses. 257
Section 28 provides that:
(1) Women have the right to equal treatment with men and that right shall include
equal opportunities in political, economic and social activities.
(2) Subject to the availability of resources, the Government shall provide facilities
and opportunities necessary to enhance the welfare of women to enable them
to realise their full potential and advancement.
(3) A women shall not be compelled to undergo or uphold any custom to which she
is in conscience opposed.
Although not stated explicitly, section 28(3) of the Constitution is a compromise
between two competing rights namely the rights of women and cultural rights. The right
actually has the effect of suspending age-old Swazi customs in favour of equality for
women.  Section 29(4) provides that: “Children whether born in or out of wedlock shall258
enjoy the same protection and rights”. This section is given further emphasis by section
31 which abolishes the status of illegitimacy.  Section 7(b) provides that: “Parliament259
shall enact laws necessary to ensure that – a child is entitled to reasonable provision
out of the estate of its parents”. If such laws are actually enacted, they will definitely
improve the rights of children with regards to the inheritance of their parent’s property.
Section 233(9) provides that: “in the exercise of the functions and duties of his office,
a chief enforces a custom, tradition, practice or usage which is just and not
discriminatory”. In this regard, chiefs could play a pivotal role in eradicating male
Para 32.254
See footnote 38 of this chapter.255
Section 28.256
Section 29.257
Fombad op cit 100.258
Section 31 provides that: “For the avoidance of doubt, the (common law) status of illegitimacy of259
persons born out of wedlock is abolished”.
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primogeniture and thereby promoting the equal rights of succession to status and to
property for Swazi women. 
5.7 Field research
Because of the unwritten nature of Swazi law and custom, and the fact that this study
seeks to gauge the “living” or “unofficial” law of the Swazi people with regards to the law
specifically relating to intestate succession; fieldwork was an indispensable component
of this thesis. As explained in chapter 1 of this thesis field research was conducted in
the Kingdom of Swaziland by holding interviews with experts. In this section of the
thesis, the researcher reports on the findings of her field research in this regard. This
section of the thesis will be structured by first stating the question posed to the
interviewees and thereafter recording their responses.
Question 1
How is the Swazi family constituted?
According to the respondents, the act of marriage creates a Swazi family. A Swazi family
comprises of a group of people who are related to each other and is therefore characteristic
of an extended family. As a result thereof, individual family members must only exercise
rights within the context of the wider family group. Each person in the family has his or her
own room or hut and the family is headed by the husband (or his father should he still be
alive). The hut of the husband’s mother (kagogo) is the centre of all family discussions and
is also the place where the family meets or congregates to have their meals. 
Question 2
Which family member is the rightful successor upon the death of an intestate in
terms of Swazi law and custom? 
All the interviewees confirmed that the deceased’s eldest son was his successor and
that he took over all the responsibilities of and managed the assets of the intestate after
his death. Illegitimate children are not eligible for succession. 
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Question 3
Does the wife or do the wives of a deceased have to perform any rituals following
the death of the husband.
The wife or wives of a deceased have to mourn the death of the husband. The whole
process of mourning takes two years. At the outset, a widow or widows (bafelakati) are
confined to their matrimonial homes for a month. After the period of confinement, they are
free to go to a secluded place where they will then have a bath. A widow’s head will be
shaven using a knife and she will have to wear special attire for the period of mourning. The
special attire usually comprises of a string (known as umuzi) which must be worn across
the stomach or waist of the widow, a hat (made of umuzi) must be worn on her head, a skirt
made of goat skin that has been well softened must be worn around her waist and another
piece of goatskin is worn across her breast. All these items indicate that she is a widow.
Specific periods of time are allocated for the shedding of these clothes and these periods
occur from May to August (in the third year after the death of the husband). 
Question 4
What are the procedures invoked by the family when appointing or selecting a
successor? 
In cases of monogamous succession, the election of the successor is simple, in that the
family will merely appoint the oldest son as successor as there is only one wife and one
house. However, in instances of polygamy, a family must first choose the wife that will
be regarded as the main wife for purposes of succession. An important requirement
here is that the mother of the potential successor must been legally married to the
deceased for the successor to qualify for intestate succession.
Once the main wife is chosen, the family then hold a meeting to deliberate on the
matter. At this meeting, the family investigates whether the person eligible for
succession is capable of ruling the family. If it is found that the prospective successor
is capable of ruling the family, a beast will be slaughtered and an elder member of the
family will announce that the oldest son of the deceased is now the leader and the rest
of the family would accept that.
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If a successor is young, he must be assisted and advised by the older councillors on
how to rule.
Question 5
What property does a successor normally succeed to?
The respondents indicated that the successor succeeds to duties first, ie, he must
maintain all the deceased’s wives and he must treat them equally. He is also
responsible for the maintenance and care of the entire family and is universally liable
for all debts incurred. He becomes the sole breadwinner or custodian of the family. With
regards to property, the successor obtains family cattle which he also must look after
and is also entitled to the spear/s of his predecessor. 
Question 6
In South African customary law, and for purposes of succession, a distinction is
made between general, house and personal property. Does Swazi law and custom
make such distinctions?
Yes, Swazi law does make a distinction between general, house and personal property.
General property is property belonging to the whole family, whilst house property refers
to property belonging to a specific house. Personal property is property belonging to an
individual. In this regard, the interviewees noted that a Swazi women may have her own
property like fields and chickens, however she exercises control over this property
through the family head or through her husband. 
The respondents confirmed that Swazi law and custom made a distinction between
general and special succession. General succession meant that the successor obtained
the general property together with the house property of the house that he was now the
head of, whilst special succession meant that the successor only acquired the house
property of the house that he was now in charge of.




What happens in cases where there is no successor? In other words, what would
happen if the deceased had no children that could succeed him or what would
happen if the wife/wives of the deceased were unable to produce a successor?
Here the respondents stated that if a wife is unable to reproduce and she has been fully
labolaed, a younger girl (inhlanti) would be brought into the house to reproduce children
for her. The young girl must be selected from the family of the wife and need not be her
maternal sister, but could be any other female relative. There were certain procedures
that needed to be fulfilled in this regard:
(a) The husband’s family must determine why the wife is unable to produce
children.
(b) The wife’s family must also determine why the wife is unable to procreate.
(c) After those determinations are made, both families meet at a place where
the wife’s family will bring the substitute. 
A future substitute is identified by the wearing of an arm ring (known as inyongo-bile).
The future substitute must abide by the decision of her family and is not allowed to
refuse to engage in the practice of substitution. The children born out of such an
agreement belong to the wife who could not have children. The substitute becomes part
and parcel of the family into which she has been placed as a substitute. The husband
cannot choose the substitute, but must abide by the decision of his family. 
The respondents also mentioned the kungena custom as being applicable here.  They260
stated that the kungena custom was applied when the husband died before he could
procreate a successor. The family of the husband would then select a brother of the
deceased to procreate children for the deceased with the deceased’s wife. The selected
brother is usually the brother that will take control of the husband’s affairs (ie, the
administrator). He must ensure that cattle are looked after for the benefit of the children
Please note that the respondents mentioned the practice as kungena and not ukungena as stated in260
chapter 2 of this thesis. This practice is however referred to as ukungena in South Africa. 
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and he does not have a right to use such cattle. The children that are borne of the
kungena custom remain with their mother and belong to the deceased. 
Question 8
What would happen if the deceased only had daughters? Would the family
immediately engage in the practice of substitution to produce a successor or are
there other methods employed here to produce a successor.
The family would first look to the broader family circle for a male heir to appoint as a
successor in this regard. The family also engages in extensive consultation and
discussion regarding the finding of a successor. If an eligible male is identified from the
broader family circle, that person will be chosen as the successor. 
Question 9
Would it be possible in Swazi law and custom for a woman to succeed to the
property of a male intestate?
Here the interviewees accepted and stated that it was permissible for women to be
equally represented in Parliament, but it was not acceptable under Swazi law and
custom for a woman to be a successor. The female interviewees were adamant about
this, and even went as far as stating that Swazi customary law is correct in this regard.
I found their stance rather fascinating. 
The interviewees ironically mentioned that Swazi customary law should not remain
stagnant, but should be adapted and amended to keep abreast of modern
development. However, they still maintained that women were ineligible to succeed
because they would take the property of the inheritance and use it for the benefit of the
family into which they married. The respondents however mentioned that it was
possible for a woman to identify someone to take her place as successor. The person
so identified could not act independently with regards to the property in the intestate
estate, but had to report to the woman. I found this novel situation contradictory to what
the respondents had previously stated and it is therefore uncertain as to whether such
a practice exists in Swaziland or not.
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Question 10
Would you be in favour of or opposed to woman inheritance or succession?
The respondents vehemently stated that they would be opposed to women inheritance
or succession. The reason given for such a resounding response was that women leave
their families and become part of another family. Therefore, if a woman were to
succeed, this would create obvious practical and economic problems for the intestate’s
family. For example she could deprive them of their rights to certain entitled property,
or she could squander the property for the benefit of her husband’s family, or she could
leave them destitute after failing to maintain and provide for them. Another reason given
for avoiding women inheritance, was that it would be impossible to determine who
would succeed the woman upon her death, ie, would it be the women’s male child or
the women’s female child. 
Question 11
What would happen if the daughter of the intestate remained single or never
married? Would this change your position?
The interviewees stated that their position would not change. They maintained that a
female is merely part of the wider family and it would therefore be impossible for her to
succeed because it is still probable that she might marry at anytime in the future. They
also maintained that the family would find a suitable male successor even in such a
situation. 
Question 12
Are you aware of any local legislation affecting or governing the customary law
of intestate succession?
The respondents stated that Swazi law and custom was usually passed down orally
from one generation to the next, however, they were generally aware of the fact that
certain aspects of the Swazi law of intestate succession had been codified. They were
however unable to state the names of the local laws or legislation that had amended
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or codified the customary law of intestate succession, nor were they able to state any
of their provisions. I also found it remarkable that even though the research was
conducted in 2008, none of the interviewees mentioned the Constitution of the Republic
of Swaziland or its provisions as they relate to the Swazi law of intestate succession
and to the rights of women in general. 
Question 13
Are you aware of the fact that Swaziland has international obligations under
various pieces of international legislation and that these obligations could result
in women being able to succeed to the intestate estate of males? 
None of the respondents were aware of Swaziland’s obligations in international law.
They were ignorant in this regard.
Question 14
Would you be in favour of harmonising Swazi customary law with western law in
an attempt to accommodate women for intestate succession? Wouldn’t this bring
about equity?
The interviewees stated that Swazi customary law and western law are completely
different and cannot be harmonised. They noted that bringing these two distinct laws
together would actually create more conflict. Swazi law and custom is sufficient to
regulate intestate succession. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
Like Ghana and South Africa, Swaziland has used legislation as a tool to improve the
rights of its citizens. The enactment of the Intestate Succession Law which seeks to
afford a surviving spouse a share in the estate of a deceased spouse is laudable, albeit
with its associated problems. The Intestate Succession Law is however outdated and
was also enacted prior to the adoption of Swaziland’s Constitution and Swaziland’s. The
Law also needs to be consonant with Swaziland’s obligations at international law. The
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Law is therefore in dire need of reform so as to bring it into line with the values and
objects of the Constitution, especially those pertaining to women and children. 
One of Swaziland’s most noteworthy achievements thus far however, has been its
adoption of a final Constitution for the people of Swaziland. The Constitution is an
important document as it creates a standard against which all other laws may be tested.
One of the best features of Swaziland’s Constitution is its Chapter on the Protection and
Promotion of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms  as it takes cognisance of the fact261
that Swaziland is a traditional customary society.  The Constitution also aims to “blend262
the good institutions of traditional law and custom with those of an open and democratic
society so as to promote transparency and the social, economic and cultural
development of (the) Nation”.  In the future, it will be interesting to see how Swaziland263
achieves the afore-mentioned goal especially with reference to the impact of customary
law on the rights of women. The recent case of Mary Joyce Doo Aphane v The State
is however a step in the right direction. 
 
5.9 Summary of the chapter
Chapter 4 begins with a brief political history of Swaziland and its emergence as an
independent State from Britain in 1968. Mention is made of the fact that Swaziland
remains one of the last surviving absolute monarchies in Africa. Attention is then given
to the meaning of Swazi customary law and the magico-religious conceptions prevalent
amongst the people of Swaziland. Reference is then made to the fact that the Swazi
legal system is a dual legal system comprising of Roman-Dutch law which is the
common-law of Swaziland and Swazi customary law (the application of which is subject
to a repugnancy clause). 
The law of intestate succession in Swaziland originates primarily from two sources, ie,
Swazi customary law and statutory law. At this stage, the general principles of the
Swazi customary law of intestate succession are then set out. The various topics
Chapter 3.261
See section 27 which recognises the Swazi family.262
The preamble of the Constitution.263
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discussed are the Swazi family and property, primogeniture, the distributable estate, the
powers and duties of successors, the general order of succession, succession to the
estates of various categories of persons, dispositions inter vivos, dying declarations and
disinheritance. Attention is then given to the process of intestate succession under
Swazi law and custom. Certain procedures or rituals have to be performed before a
successor is finally appointed. For example, the Swazi observe certain death, burial and
mourning rituals; an administrator is appointed to manage the estate of the deceased
family head or Swazi man in the interim period (ie, between the time of the death and
the election of the successor); the family council is responsible for choosing the
successor; the rank of the deceased’s wives plays an important role in the
determination of the successor; and once the successor is appointed, a ceremony is
held to install him.
In the next section of the chapter intestate succession under the general law of the land
is discussed, with particular reference to the Intestate Succession Law 3 of 1953. Some
of the advantages and disadvantages of that piece of legislation are also discussed in
brief. Attention is then given to the impact of constitutionalism on the customary law of
intestate succession in the Kingdom of Swaziland. In this section reference is made to
the Constitution of Swaziland No 1377 of 1968 and the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Swaziland Act 101 of 2005 (Swaziland’s current Constitution) and their various
provisions. In the next section of the chapter, the researcher reports on the field
research conducted in Swaziland. In conclusion, the researcher highlights some of the
benefits of the current Constitution and assesses whether it will be able to meet the





The African customary law relating to intestate succession has always been known to
discriminate against women. In an attempt to deal with this dilemma, the countries of
South Africa, Ghana and Swaziland have all enacted legislation as a means of
alleviating some of the difficulties faced by African women in this regard. South Africa
has enacted the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related
Matters Act 11 of 2009, Ghana has enacted the Intestate Succession Law, 1985  (and1
has yet to pass the Intestate Succession Bill, 2009 and the Property Rights of Spouses
Bill, 2009) and Swaziland has enacted the Intestate Succession Law 3 of 1953. In this
chapter, the researcher assesses the successfulness of these pieces of legislation and
the case law that has brought about the enactment of such legislation (with particular
reference to South Africa) to effectively improve the rights of women and their rights of
access to intestate property. The researcher also evaluates whether these laws have
generally had any significant impact on the lives of the African women living in these
countries. Each assessment and comments on the pieces of legislation will be dealt
with under specific headings.
6.2 Changing the traditional concept of the African
family 
As stated previously, the family is the most important social construct in all African
societies. Traditionally, the African family was usually composed of a group of people
“descended through the male line from a common ancestor” who lived together in a
village.  Although urbanisation has contributed to the creation of an increased number2
PNDCL 111.1
Bekker JC Seymour’s customary law in southern Africa (1989) 69.2
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of nuclear African families, the African family still continues to remain community
orientated where for example family disputes and decisions (be it between Africans
living in urban and rural areas) are usually resolved or taken by the extended family and
not by the nuclear family in isolation.  For example, the appointment of the intestate3
successor at customary law is a determination that is generally undertaken by the
extended family group.  The extended family structure of the African family was4
confirmed by the interviewees in KwaZulu-Natal and Swaziland. 
All the statutory laws of South Africa, Ghana and Swaziland that amend the customary
law of intestate succession clearly perceive the African family as a nuclear family,  as5
opposed to being an extended family: a perception contrary to the traditional concept
of the family as understood in living customary law. This may be attributable to the fact
that colonisation resulted in two distinct systems of family law namely: the laws of the
coloniser and the laws of African traditional communities.  Legislators have therefore6
opted for a diluted version of African customary law, when attempting to redress some
of the problems associated with the African law of intestate succession. 
In Ghana and South Africa, the indigenous tribes or traditional leaders were
antagonistic towards the legislator’s approaches to dealing with customary law matters.
For example, the Akan reacted negatively to the Intestate Succession Law, 1985  as7
they felt that “their system of inheritance was under siege and the organic family
structure faced destruction by an alien system considered by traditionalists to be
mechanical and individualistic”.  In South Africa, the Customary Law of Succession8
Amendment Bill  met with much opposition from Contralesa for being Eurocentric and9
for not reflecting the principles of living customary law  with regards to the structural10
composition of the African family. The statutory laws adapting the customary law of
See Higgins TE, Fenrich J and Tanzer Z “Gender equality and customary marriage : Bargaining in the3
shadow of post-apartheid legal pluralism” (2007) Fordham International Law Journal 1698-1703.
See generally chapters 2, 4 and 5 of this thesis.4
See Freeman MDA “Ghana: Legislation for today” (1988-1989) Journal of Family Law 160. 5
Luckham Y “Law and the status of women in Ghana” (1976) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 69.6
PNDC Law 111.7
Dovlo E “Religion in the public sphere: Challenges and opportunities in Ghanaian lawmaking 1989-8
2004” (2005) Brigham Young University Law Review 639.
B109 of 1998.9
Himonga C “The advancement of African women’s rights in the first decade of democracy in South10
Africa: The reform of the customary law of marriage and succession” (2005) Acta Juridica 98.
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intestate succession is therefore not an accurate reflection of living customary law and
has the resultant effect of unfairly imposing western concepts, norms and ideals on
African communities,  which is wrong. 11
6.3 The non-recognition of tribal differences
African societies are pluralistic in nature: that means that they comprise of different
tribal communities (some of the various tribal groupings prevalent in South Africa and
Ghana have already been mentioned in Chapters 1 and 4 of this thesis). The customary
laws pertaining to intestate succession may therefore vary from tribe to tribe.  The12
revised enacted laws of intestate succession in both South Africa and Ghana fail to take
cognisance of these ethnic differences and make the incorrect assumption that
customary law is the same throughout the whole of South Africa and Ghana, and is
practiced in the same manner in all the various tribal groupings. 
The courts in their interpretation and application of African customary law have also
adopted this apparent false modus operandi. In fact, when cases of African customary
law are placed before the courts, courts have the innate predilection to apply official
rather than living customary law as a rule.  This is problematic because official13
customary law is often distorted and may not accurately reflect the law or customs
actually practiced in traditional communities.  It is therefore recommended that14
customary law would be more comprehensible if the courts based their decisions on
comprehensive and sufficient research rather than relying on oversimplified generali-
sations not true of all tribal societies.  The type of research envisaged should not only15
be devised to provide reliable description and evaluation, but it should also be cognisant
of the problems associated with social change.  Presiding judges and magistrates also16
See Church J “Constitutional equality and the position of women in a multi-cultural society” (1995)11
Comparative International Law Journal of South Africa 300.
See generally Bekker (1989) op cit 273-279 and Bankas EK “Problems of intestate succession and12
the conflict of laws in Ghana” (1992) International Lawyer 438.
Lehnert W  “The role of the courts in the conflict between African customary law and human rights”13
(2005) South African Journal on Human Rights 270.
Cornell D “The significance of the living customary law for an understanding of law: Does custom allow14
for a woman to be Hosi?” (2009) Constitutional Court Review 401.
Bankas op cit 439.15
Luckham op cit 91.16
266
often lack the necessary skills and knowledge to deal with matters pertaining to African
customary law in general.  It is therefore imperative that legal professionals such as17
judges and judicial officers receive adequate training in the subject.18
6.4 The disregard of African society as community
orientated 
African customary law is a community-based system of law in which rights do not
belong to individuals per se, but rights are exercised through or shared by the family
group or the community at large.  This was confirmed by the interviewees in KwaZulu-19
Natal and Swaziland. Constitutions, however, tend to focus on the rights of the
individual and guarantee specific individual human rights like the rights to life, human
dignity, equality and freedom from discrimination. This is true of the constitutions of
South Africa, Ghana and Swaziland. South Africa’s Constitution is unique however, in
that it makes provision for a group right to practice its culture.  The International20
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966  also makes provision for minority21
groups to enjoy their culture.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights22
(UDHR),1948 also makes provision for a group right to enjoy its culture.  This situation23
thus presents us with the following question: how do we find an acceptable balance
between the group’s right to practice its culture and the right of the individual (woman)
to equality and to be free from discrimination especially in regard to intestate
succession? Another way in which we could ask this question is how do we enforce
foreign constitutional principles or ideals onto traditional communities? 
Lehnert op cit 263-264.17
Id 263.18
W icomb W  and Smith H “Customary communities as ‘peoples’ and their customary tenure as ‘culture’:19
what we can do with the Endorois decision” (2011) African Human Rights Law Journal 427. See also
Oquaye M “Human rights and the transition to democracy under the PND C in Ghana” (1995) Human
Rights Quarterly 559-560. 
Section 31 provides that: 20
Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right with other
members of that community –
(a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language; and
(b) to form, join or maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.
Adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976.21
Article 27 provides that: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons22
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language”.
Article 27 provides that: “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the23
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits”. 
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One of the most effective ways of finding an acceptable balance is to give traditional
communities an opportunity to adapt and change the discriminatory laws themselves.24
As was seen in the South African case of Shilubana v Nwamitwa and Others  a woman25
was confirmed as the traditional leader of the Valoyi, a community where succession to
traditional leadership was based on the rule of male primogeniture: the court held that she
was correctly appointed by the traditional authorities of the community as it was their right
to develop their customary law under the Constitution.  Unlike western law, African26
customary law is not static, but dynamic, and is constantly evolving to deal with the
changing needs, circumstances and practices of traditional communities.  Shilubana is27
a good example of the interplay between living law and the supreme law of the
Constitution, and demonstrates that change that is brought about by the community is an
influential mechanism for harmonising gender equality and customary law.  If change is28
brought about by the community itself, it would also ensure that the amended rules and
or practices of customary law are received more readily by members of the community;
and would also secure the smooth implementation of the laws in the affected customary
communities: which is a positive step in the right direction and which could improve the
intestate succession rights of women more effectually.
Women themselves could also play a big role in improving their own circumstances.
They should educate themselves on their standing, position, rights and role in society.29
Negative stereotypes about women should be discouraged by educating African men,
in particular, on the positive role of women in traditional communities. Women need to
appreciate the fact that culture and tradition are mutable  so that they can organise30
themselves to investigate and impugn established practices of inequality and gender
discrimination.  31
Bekker JC and Boonzaaier CC “Succession of women to traditional leadership: Is the judgment in24
Shilubana v Nwamitwa based on sound legal principles?” (2009) Comparative and International Law
Journal of Southern Africa 459.
2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC).25
Shilubana (2008) op cit paras 50-75.26
See W omen and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (W LSA) Inheritance in27
Swaziland: The law and practice (1994) 23 and Shilubana (2008) op cit para 35.
Albertyn C “The stubborn persistence of patriarchy? Gender equality and cultural diversity in South28
Africa” (2009) Constitutional Court Review 208.
Agyei JA “African women: Championing their own development and empowerment- case study Ghana”29
(2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 128.
See W oodman GR “Legal pluralism and the search for justice” (1996) Journal of African Law 156.30
Ibid.31
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Thirdly, seeking an acceptable balance between the group’s right to practice its culture
and the right of the individual to equality may be a misnomer because as many Africans
leave the rural communities in search of employment in the urban areas or the cities or
leave to attend school or go to university or college, they may renounce traditional
customary practices  in favour of western ideals altogether. The instruction received32
at the various educational institutions they attend, together with their personally held
religious beliefs, and changes in the social structure of society may in fact contribute
to a decline in their interest in customary law tradition.  33
6.5 Replacing customary law with the common law
The laws  that have been enacted to ameliorate the adversity caused by the customary34
law rules of intestate succession are inconsistent with living customary law. In this
regard, it has also been common practice by the legislatures in South Africa, Ghana
and Swaziland, when reforming the customary law of intestate succession to merely
replace the existing customary law with the rules of the common law. 
The mere replacement of customary law with the common law has or could have
various negative repercussions for customary law as a system of law as a whole. The
first consequence of substitution is that it results in the total corrosion of customary law
as a body of law. Secondly, it could lead to situations whereby traditional or community
leaders (who are “there to uphold the people’s norms and values”)  could hinder the35
reception and implementation of the new laws in the customary communities in which
they serve,  as the common law does not reflect living customary law:  this could36 37
frustrate the rights of women even further. Thirdly, changes to living customary law
brought about by the legislature and the judiciary assume that the traditional
communities will readily adopt those amendments. However that is seldom the case
Davies J and Dagbanja D “The role and future of customary tort law in Ghana: A cross-cultural32
perspective” (2009) Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 326. 
Ibid.33
That is South Africa’s Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 1134
of 2009, Ghana’s Intestate Succession Law, 1985 and Swaziland’s Intestate Succession Law 3 of 1953.
Shilubana (2008) op cit para 39.35
Himonga op cit 99.36
Id 98.37
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and can be easily proved with reference to the field research conducted in Swaziland.
The fact that common law rules are unfamiliar to customary communities could lead to
situations whereby people may simply disregard the relevant legislation if they cannot
identify with it thereby minimising it to simple paper law that has no significance to their
lives or the lives of those it is designed to safeguard.  Fourthly, it has been historically38
proven in Ghana that when a country legislates for a drastic departure from customary
practice, the legislation is almost always ignored.  39
It is therefore recommended that the legislature rather engage in a “proper”
development of customary law rather than opting for a ‘substitutionary’ development all
the time, as the common law is not an acceptable mechanism for change and can
actually paint an exaggerated picture of what customary law actually entails. In this
regard, sections 39(1) and (2) of South Africa’s Constitution may prove to be helpful.
These sections provide that:
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –
(a) must promote the values that underlie and open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) must consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights. 
From the above, we can therefore infer that development by the legislature should
involve actual drafting of legislation that is consonant with the culture or customs
practiced by traditional communities and the values of the Constitution. For example,
according to Mbatha,  in South Africa it is common practice for women to inherit in40
customary law, converse to the principle of male primogeniture: in fact traditional
communities are actually quite open to allowing women to inherit property. However,
in Swaziland the panel of respondents were adamant that women are never entitled to
inherit in practice in customary communities. 
Himonga op cit 103.38
W oodman GR “Ghana reforms the law of intestate succession” (1985) Journal of African Law 127.39
Mbatha L “Reforming the customary law of succession” (2002) South African Journal of Human Rights40
259, 261-263, 282.
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The values of an open and democratic society means that “the values of all sections of
society must be taken into account and given due weight”.  We can thus extrapolate41
that when the South African Constitution is interpreted, the values of customary
communities must also be considered in the interpretative process. If this is done, the
legislature will be able to enact laws and the judiciary will be able to hand down
judgments that are culturally sensitive and that “encourage change in socio-cultural
patterns of behaviour which would bring such behaviour into line with the underlying
values of the Constitution”.  The constitutions of both Ghana and Swaziland do not42
contain any such interpretation clause guiding the interpretations of their chapters on
fundamental rights and freedoms. However, that being said, the fact that customary law
is specifically listed as a law or as a source of law in the constitutions of these countries,
means that it should be treated with the respect it deserves and its amendment should
be done through proper development of customary law and not through the substitution
of existing law for customary law. 
6.6 Transformative constitutionalism
The manner in which both the judiciary and the legislature have gone about
reconceptualising and developing the African customary law of intestate succession in
South Africa, leaves a lot to be desired. The approach of the majority of the Court in the
South African case of Bhe  and the approach of the Court in Shilubana  are both43 44
indicative of ‘transformative constitutionalism”. “Transformative constitutionalism” entails:
a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement
committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political
developments) to transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power
relationships in a democratic, participatory, an egalitarian direction. “Transformative
constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of inducing large scale social change through
non-violent political processes grounded in law.  45
S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) op cit para 368.41
Pieterse M “Killing it softly: Customary law in the new constitutional order” (2000) De Jure 47.42
Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus43
Curiae; Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President
of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC).
Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa (2008) 9 BCLR 914 (CC).44
Klare K “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) South African Journal on Human45
Rights 146, 150. See also Davis DM and Klare K “Transformative constitutionalism and the common
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In other words, law provides the mechanism for transformation in society, and “this is
how the law was used by the Constitutional Court when it abolished the customary rule
of male primogeniture in Bhe”.  The aim in the preamble of the Reform of the46
Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 is also
in harmony with the idea of “transformative constitutionalism”. The Courts in Bhe and
Shilubana attempted to transform the South African public into a just society by
applying the values of the Constitution such as human dignity, equality and freedom to
differentiating customary practices.  We are now left with a situation where the47
customary law of intestate succession has been developed to such an extent “that it
does not exist in its ‘old’ form anymore, because its rules have been amalgamated with
the rules of the common law of intestate succession”  thus creating a “new system” of48
the African customary law of intestate succession, which might be an utter and
complete misrepresentation of “living” customary law. 
The approach of the minority of the Court in Bhe was more reconciliatory in nature and
was an attempt to develop the rule of male primogeniture thereby accommodating the
African community and keeping “living” African customary law in tact.  It was a form of49
“conciliatory transformation”. In the researcher’s opinion such an approach is more
acceptable in our constitutional democracy as it does not abolish customary law
completely nor does it substitute customary law with the common law. In fact, it still
exhibits African values and promotes African, not Western culture and ideals.  It also50
acknowledges that law is a restrictive instrument in initiating constructive social
change.  The development brought about by the judiciary and legislature regarding the51
customary law of intestate succession, would have had far more reaching
consequences if social transformation had been driven by the customary communities
themselves instead of by the ideals of “transformative constitutionalism”. Furthermore
and customary law” (2010) South African Journal on Human Rights 403-509.
Rautenbach C and Du Plessis W  “Reform of the customary law of succession: Final nails in the46





Pieterse (1999) op cit 635.50
Kok A “The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000: Court-driven51
or legislature driven societal transformation” (2008) Stellenbosch Law Review 122.
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the fact that customary law is merely abolished without consulting the customary
communities affected, in order to accommodate the values of the Constitution is once
again indicative of the way in which customary law was treated under colonialism and
apartheid and is opposed to the principles of democracy as it promotes the preference
of one group of persons over the majority of the South African population.  52
It is hoped that the countries of Ghana and Swaziland will not fall prey to the notion of
“transformative constitutionalism” when their courts are called upon to adjudicate on
important matters involving the interaction between African customary law and the rights
entrenched in their constitutions. In this regard, the researcher recommends that the
judiciary in both Ghana and Swaziland adopt a more “conciliatory transformation” that
will still accommodate customary law and its values within their respective constitutional
democracies.
6.7 People are ignorant of the law
Traditional communities are often ignorant of the law as they traditionally reside in rural
communities where access to legal resources is basically non-existent or they are
simply illiterate or they rely solely on community leaders to tell them the rules and
customary laws which does not often happen. For example, after the Bhe  decision53
was given, many South African lawyers and representatives of non-governmental
organisations noted that as of May 2006, the case had had very little effect on the
“adjudication of disputes concerning inheritance rights, as most estates were still being
administered unofficially by family members or traditional leaders”.  In the informal54
interviews conducted with the people in KwaZulu-Natal, most participants had no
knowledge of the recent legislative or judicial developments undertaken in the field of
intestate succession. In Swaziland, the respondents were aware that codification of the
laws relating to intestate succession had taken place, but were ignorant of its
Sacks V “Multiculturalism, constitutionalism and the South African Constitution” (1997) Public Law 688-52
689. 
Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus53
Curiae; Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President
of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC).
Higgins (et al) (2007) op cit 1696.54
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provisions. In Ghana, fifteen years after the enactment of the Intestate Succession Law,
many Ghanaians, specifically those residing in rural communities, are ignorant of the
law and are therefore incapable of using its provisions to their advantage.  55
6.8 The changing role of women in African society and
the rule of primogeniture
The rule of primogeniture was devised to safeguard the structure and stability of the
extended family unit and ultimately the entire community. This served an assortment
of rationales, not least of which was the maintenance of obedience within the clan or
extended family. Everyone, individual had a role to play in the community and each role,
directly or indirectly, was devised to add to the communal good and welfare. The
successor did not merely succeed to the assets of the deceased; but succeeded to the
deceased’s duties as well. Property was owned communally and the family head, who
was the titular possessor of the property, managed it for the benefit of the family unit
as a whole. The successor stepped into the shoes of the family head and acquired all
the rights and became subject to all the obligations of the family head. The affiliates of
the family who were under the guardianship of the deceased fell under the guardianship
of his successor. The successor also attained the duty to maintain and support all the
members of the family who were guaranteed his security and benefited from the
successor’s maintenance and support. He succeeded to the property of the deceased
only in the sense that he assumed power over and managed the property subject to his
rights and obligations as head of the family unit.  56
Traditional customary law believed that only a man could fulfil the obligations of a
successor. However, customary communities that insist on the implementation of the
rule of primogeniture when electing a successor fail to consider the truth that the role
of women in African traditional societies has changed drastically. Because of
development and industrialisation, no longer are women staying at home, but they are
Dovlo op cit 641.55
Bhe and Others (2005) op cit paras 75-76.56
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becoming actively engaged in the economy.  Women residing in rural areas are57
involved in agricultural labour and frequently have to maintain and support their
households at their own expense due to the fact that their husbands are often migrant
labourers. It has therefore become common for women to own their own property  and58
to maintain and support their children and the wider family with the salaries earned from
their own labour. Ghana has made some positive inroads in this regard with the drafting
of the Intestate Succession Bill, 2009 and the Property Rights of Spouses Bill, 2009. 
These two Bills recognise that women may contribute to the acquisition of joint property
and to the matrimonial home and may also own their own property. It is unfortunate
though that these Bills have yet to be promulgated. The reasons for appointing a male
as a successor no longer holds water as women are indeed capable of fulfilling the
rights and obligations expected of a successor. In fact in some instances women may
even be more capable than men in executing such obligations. 
6.9 Final comments and conclusions
In conclusion, the question that needs to be asked is: is the enactment of new laws a
suitable way of improving the intestate succession rights of women in African societies?
My answer to this question is an emphatic no! The recently developed laws of intestate
succession (which have been highlighted in this thesis) to protect human rights
particularly the rights of women, has had little or no effect on the progression of
women’s rights of intestate succession in South Africa, Ghana and Swaziland in general
and has failed to improve the daily lived experiences of women as well.  59
One of the main reasons for the failure of these laws is that “even when the laws are
introduced to remove inequalities under the customary system, the customary system
continues to operate”.  This can be demonstrated by the research of the WLSA in60
Swaziland,  the researcher’s own field research in Swaziland, the research of Fenrich61
Musanya P and Chuulu M “W idowhood: Problems and more problems” in Ncube W  and Stewart J57
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and Higgins in Ghana  and the research of Higgins, Fenrich and Tanzar in South62
Africa.  These research reports clearly show that the respective pieces of legislation63
were rendered ineffective in their respective countries as succession was regulated by
the family or its relevant family structures which often thwarted the rights of women to
succeed to the property of their deceased spouses. Additionally, Higgins, Fenrich and
Tanzar’s research on customary marriage have shown that men in South Africa refuse
to acknowledge the constitutional right to gender equality and have even perceived the
right as a threat to their authority and also to the ethical foundations of the organisation
of their communities:  thereby posing a further threat to the intestate succession rights64
of women. The fact that no case law (in the mainstream courts) was found challenging
the rules of intestate succession in Swaziland is also evidence of the fact that
customary law is still largely controlled and administered by the customary communities
and their various structures. 
 
Another reason for the possible failure of these laws to improve the rights of women is
that African women have a tendency to blindly accept cultural practices or customs as
law without question. This fact was quite apparent from the interviews conducted in
Swaziland and KwaZulu-Natal. Most of the interviewees were adamant that men were
the only persons eligible for intestate succession under customary law – a fact they
genuinely accepted and were not prepared to challenge as the afore-mentioned rule
has been part of their customary way of life for centuries.
So the final question that needs to be asked is how do we ensure the successful
empowerment of women and the improvement of their rights of intestate succession under
African customary law? One way in which we could ensure such rights for women is to
make reference to the rights afforded to women in international human rights instruments.
Most African countries have ratified various international treaties or agreements that compel
them to promote the rights of women and guarantee equality. In this section, the
Fenrich J and Higgins TE “Promise unfulfilled: Law, culture and women’s inheritance rights in Ghana”62
(2001-2002) Fordham International Law Journal 259-341 (see chapter 4 of this thesis).
Higgins (et al) (2007) op cit 1696-1697.63
Id 1704.64
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international agreements ratified by South Africa,  Ghana  and Swaziland, as they affect65 66
or relate to the customary law of intestate succession, will be discussed in brief.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW),1979  censures all types of discrimination against women. Discrimination67
against women is defined as:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women,
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
other field.  68
The Convention compels all states that are party to it, to eliminate customary rules and
practices that discriminate against women. In this regard, article 5 provides that:
State parties shall take all appropriate measures:
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of inferiority or the superiority of either of
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; … 
This article is reinforced by article 2(f) which obliges States parties who denounce
discrimination against women in all its forms; to consent to pursue by all appropriate means
and without postponement a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this
end, undertake: “to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
women”. The Convention is particularly sensitive to the challenges faced by rural women69
and compels all State parties to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas.70
See Dugard J “International law and the South African Constitution” (1997) European Journal of65
International Law 77-92.
See Mwnda KK and Omusu SG “Human rights law in context: The case of Ghana”(1998-1999) Tilberg66
Foreign Law Review 263-298.
Adopted on 18 December 1979 and entered into force on 3 September 1981.67
Article 1.68
In this regard Article 14 provides that: “State Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced69
by rural women and the significant roles which rural women play in the economic survival of their families,
including their work in the non-monetized sectors of the economy, and shall take all appropriate measures
to ensure the application of the provisions of the present Convention to women in rural areas”.
In this regard article 14(2) provides that: “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to70
eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas …”
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In order to attain de facto equality between men and women, CEDAW allows ‘positive
discrimination’.  In this regard, article 4 of the Convention provides that:71
1 Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de
facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as
defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the
maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be
discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been
achieved. 
2 Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures
contained in the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be
considered discriminatory. 
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR),1981  provides that:72
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such
as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion,
national or social origin, fortune, birth or other status.73
Article 3 makes provision for equality by stating that: “every individual shall be equal
before the law  and shall be entitled to equal protection of the law”.  The African74 75
Charter also accentuates the place of the family, women and the duties and
responsibilities of state parties. In this regard, Article 18 provides that:
(1) The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by
the State, which shall take care of its physical health and moral. 
(2) The State shall have the duty to assist the family, which is the custodian of
morals and traditional values recognised by the community.
(3) The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and
also ensure the protection of the rights of women and the child as stipulated in
international declarations and conventions. 
The Charter also makes provision for a right to property which may only be infringed
Ebeku KSA “A new dawn for African women? Prospects of Africa’s Protocol on women’s rights” (2004)71
Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 102.





upon “in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws”.  76
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),1966  also makes77
provision for rights to equality. In this regard article 26 provides that:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
In a similar fashion to the ACHPR, the ICCPR protects the family by stating that “the
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection
by society and the State”.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 194878 79
is also concerned with the preservation of the family structure and its provision  relating80
to the family is phrased in exactly the same terms as those of the ICCPR. The UDHR
also grants everyone a right to own property jointly or on their own and prohibits the
arbitrary removal of individual property in this regard.  Equality is also made provision81
for in the UDHR. In this regard article 7 provides that:
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
The Protocol of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights of Women in Africa,
2003  provides that:82
States Parties shall commit themselves to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of women and men through public information, education and communication
Article 14.76
Adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976.77
Article 23(1).78
Adopted on 10 December 1948.79
Article 16(3).80
In this regard article 17 provides that: “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in81
association with others”.
W hich came into force on 25 November 2005 and is available at http://www.africa-union.org.82
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strategies with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional
practices and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men.83
The Protocol recognises that culture limits the rights of women and makes it abundantly
clear in article 17 “that women have a right to live in a positive cultural context and be
involved in the determination of cultural policies”.  In terms of the Protocol, African84
values are to be “based on the principles of equality, peace, freedom, dignity, justice,
solidarity and democracy”.  With regards to polygamy, the Protocol provides that:85
Monogamy is encouraged as the preferred form of marriage and that the rights of
women in marriage and family including in polygamous marital relationships are
promoted and protected.  86
Article 13(h) also provides that “States Parties must take the necessary measures to
recognise the economic value of the work of women in the home”. In regards to
intestacy, Article 21 provides that a widow:
shall have the right to an equitable share in the inheritance of the property of her
husband. A widow shall have the right to continue to live in the matrimonial house. In
case of remarriage, she shall retain this right if the house belongs to her or if she has
inherited it.
The courts and the legislature should be mindful of these international provisions when
deciding cases and enacting laws as these international instruments could be of great
assistance to improve the rights of women as far as the customary law of intestate
succession is concerned. However one problem with the application of international law
in the jurisprudences under consideration in this thesis is that the treaties that have
been ratified are not self-executing. In other words, in all of the countries under
discussion, when international treaties are ratified, individuals cannot rely on such
treaties to enforce their rights in the national law. In this regard, all of the countries
under discussion are only obliged to abide by a ratified treaty in its international
Article 2(2).83
Banda F “Blazing a trail: The African Protocol on W omen’s Rights comes into force” (2006) Journal84




relations with State parties. In order to be able to enforce international obligations in the
national law of South Africa,  Ghana  and Swaziland  the provisions of the treaties87 88 89
must be drafted by Parliament as legislation that forms part of the statutes of the
country.  With regards to the customary laws affecting intestate succession, South90
Africa has only enacted two pieces of legislation  and Swaziland has only enacted one91
piece of legislation giving effect to their international obligations. Ghana on the other
hand has been more progressive in this respect. Ghana first enacted the Intestate
Succession Law, 1985  and has subsequently drafted the Intestate Succession Bill,92
2009 and the Property Rights of Spouses Bill, 2009. The afore-mentioned Bills will give
effect to Ghana’s international obligations once they are passed by Parliament.
In this regard section 231 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108) of 1996 provides87
that:
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive.
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in
subsection (3).
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does
not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic
without approval by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in
the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time.
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national
legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law
in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic when this
Constitution took effect.
In this regard article 75 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 provides that:88
(1) The President may execute or cause to be executed treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of
Ghana.
(2) A treaty, agreement or convention executed by or under the authority of the President shall be subject
to ratification by –
(a) Act of Parliament; or
(b) a resolution of Parliament supported by the votes of more than on-half of all the members of
Parliament.
 In this regard section 238 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act 101 of 2005 provides89
that:
(1) The Government may execute or cause to be executed an international agreement in the name of the
Crown. 
(2) An international agreement executed by or under the authority of the Government shall be subject to
ratification and become binding on the government by:
(a) an Act of Parliament; or 
(b) a resolution of at least two-thirds of the members at a joint sitting of the two Chambers of Parliament. 
(3) The provisions of sub-section (2) do not apply where the agreement is of a technical, administrative or
executive nature or is an agreement which does not require ratification or accession. 
(4) Unless it is self-executing, an international agreement becomes law in Swaziland only when enacted into
law by Parliament. 
(5) Accession to an international agreement shall be done in the same manner as ratification under sub-
section (2). 
(6) For the purposes of this section, “international agreement” includes a treaty, convention, protocol,
international agreement or arrangement. 
Kludze AKP “Constitutional rights and their relationship with international human rights in Ghana”90
(2008) Israel Law Review 679.
That is the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 and the Reform91
of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. 
PNDCL 111.92
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Although South Africa’s statutory enactments may improve the rights of women and
could promote the realisation and enforcement of their rights at international law,
Swaziland requires more recent legislation in order for individual women to be able to
realise and enforce their rights at international law.
Another way in which we can secure the intestate succession rights of women is
through the concept of “participatory democracy”. South Africa’s,  Ghana’s  and93 94
Swaziland’s  constitutional democracies are representative and participatory in95
nature.  A participatory democracy is also encouraged in the various international96
human rights instruments.  Participatory democracy may be defined as “a vision of97
The following sections of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996 make provision for parti93
cipatory democracy. In this regard section 1(d) provides that: “The Republic of South Africa is one,
sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: universal adult suffrage, a common
voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure
accountability, responsiveness and openness”. Section 57(1) provides that: “The National Assembly
may – (a) determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures; and (b) make
rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to representative and participatory
democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement”. Section 59(1)(b) provides that: “The
National Assembly must – conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its sittings, and those of
its committees, in public…”. Section 70(1)(b) provides that: “The National Council of Provinces may
– make rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to representative and participatory
democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement”. Section 72(1)(b) provides that: “The
National Council of Provinces must- conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its sittings, and
those of its committees, in public…”. Section 116(1)(b) provides that: “A provincial legislature may –
make rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to representative and participatory
democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement”. Section 118(1) provides that a
provincial legislature must – (a) facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of
the legislature and its committees; and (b) conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its
sittings, and those of its committees, in public…”. Section 160(7) provides that: “a municipal council
must conduct its business in an open manner”.
Section 21(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana provides that: “All citizens shall have the94
right and freedom to form or join political parties and to participate in political activities subject to such
qualifications and law as are necessary in a free and democratic society and are consistent with this
Constitution”. 
Section 79 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act 101 of 2005 provides that: “the system95
of government for Swaziland is a democratic, participatory, tinkhundla-based system which
emphasizes devolution of state power from central government to tinkhundla areas and individual merit
as a basis for election or appointment to public office”. According to the Constitution, an inkhundla (ie,
a single tinkhundla) “consists of one or more chiefdoms which act as nomination areas for the elected
members of the House” (section 80(2)(b)). 
Nyati L “Public participation: W hat has the Constitutional Court given the public?” (2008) Law,96
Democracy and Development 102.
Article 21 of the UDHR provides that: 97
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Article 25 of the ICCPR provides that: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2
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governance that allows for maximum and active public involvement in all aspects of
public decision-making”.  Ideally, participatory democracy envisages a country where98
all citizens are given an equal opportunity to share or engage in the “making of
decisions that affect them”  and their rights.  Participation includes the right to be99 100
heard  and may also involve influencing legislative processes and decisions.  If101 102
active tribal community participation is involved during the review of discriminatory
customary laws like those pertaining to intestate succession, we would not only produce
laws that are more reflective of the living law in customary communities but we would
also be able to generate changes to existing laws more successfully and ensure the
positive reception and implementation of laws in the various customary communities.
However, it must be noted that this will only work if women play an active role in the
proceedings and if community structures are not male dominated in their
representation. 
and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in the country.
Article 13 of the ACHPR provides that: 
(1) Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly, or
through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.
(2) Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of his country.
(3) Every individual shall have the right of access to public property and services in strict equality of all
persons before the law.
Quinot G “Snapshot or participatory democracy? Political engagement as fundamental human right”98
(2009) South African Journal on Human Rights 397.
Ibid.99
See Govender K “An assessment of section 4 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair100
Discrimination Act 2000 as a means of advancing participatory democracy in South Africa” (2003) SA
Publiekreg/Public Law 406. 
See Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of Republic of South Africa and Others101
2008 (5) SA 171 (CC) op cit para 27 where the court intimated that “citizens must have a meaningful
opportunity to be heard and that in the process of considering and approving a proposed constitutional
amendment regarding the alteration of provincial boundaries, a provincial legislature must at least
provide the people who might be affected a reasonable opportunity to submit oral and written
comments and representations” (as quoted by Quinot at 398). 
See Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC)102
op cit para 235 where the court mentioned that: “All parties interested in legislation should feel that they
have been given a real opportunity to have their say, that they are taken seriously as citizens and that
their views matter and will receive due consideration at the moments when they could possibly
influence decisions in a meaningful fashion. The objective is both symbolical and practical: the persons
concerned must be manifestly shown the respect due to them as concerned citizens, and the
legislators must have the benefit of all inputs that will enable them to produce the best possible laws”
(as quoted by Nyati at 104). 
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Southall  takes this argument a step further by postulating that “the act of decision103
making should be removed from the bureaucratic government and should be entrusted
to smaller communities as that will facilitate the creation of laws and policies by
individuals and groups that are directly related to their needs”. In this regard, it is
therefore recommended that the governments of South Africa and Ghana should
institute (or re-institute in the case of South Africa) izimbizo forums which will facilitate
frequent communication and discourse between government and customary
communities.  An imbizo may be defined as “a gathering of senior community104
members for purposes of addressing matters of mutual and community interests”.105
Izimbizos however, will only be effective if the senior community members are equally
representative of both sexes, can be impartial, objective and incorrupt, and will consider
the imperatives of their respective Constitutions in all their decisions. The
successfulness of the izimbizos will also be dependant on whether each and every
member enjoys an equal freedom to air their views independent of their status in the
community and that resolutions are rendered on the sole basis of agreement.106
Discriminatory laws of intestate succession could therefore be transformed through
negotiation in the various izimbizos; and not merely imposed on by the legislature as
has been the case.
In this regard, a valuable lesson can be learnt from the Kingdom of Swaziland. In
Swaziland, customary law is created by the King, the Royal Family, Swazi National
Courts, the High Court, chiefs and their councils and family councils.  The creation of107
customary law is a consultative process at all the afore-mentioned levels. The King and
the Royal Family are the chief guardians of Swazi law and custom. It is therefore the
King, together with Queen Mother and “in consultation with his or her council who
(ultimately) decides customary law”:  a type of izimbizo forum. The only concern the108
researcher has with the Swaziland structure is that the councils of the King or the
Southall R “Public participation: The political challenge in Southern Africa” (2010) Journal of African103
Elections 10.
See Kondlo K “Making participatory governance work – re-inventing izimbizo forums in South Africa”104
(2010) Journal of Public Administration 385.
Id 387.105
Ibid.106
W omen and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (W LSA) Inheritance in Swaziland:107
The law and practice (1994) 24.
Ibid.108
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Queen Mother must comprise of an equal representation of both men and women, who
must be objective and impartial and who must not be able to be bought or coerced into
making decisions in a certain way. Hopefully that is the case. 
One way in which the legislature could assist in the improvement of the intestate
succession rights of women is to not merely enact superficial laws, but to “put teeth into
the legislation so that women’s ownership rights will be reinforced at all levels –
domestic, local, community and national”.  This can be done through the holding of109
public information forums with communities (especially rural communities), traditional
or community leaders, chiefs and their councils, family councils and headmen. It is
however vital that women be present and not excluded from such discussion forums
and they should be encouraged to actively participate in them.
Another way of improving the rights of women in regard to intestate succession is
through positive education and communication. Women should receive education on
their rights and men should receive education on the positive roles of women in society
and should be encouraged to change their incorrectly perceived ideologies of women
as the inferior gender. Such educational strategies could be conducted or facilitated
through the various Human Rights Commissions  of the countries under discussion.110
In South Africa, the Commission for Gender Equality  could also assist in this regard. 111
CEDAW states that: 
States Parties (who) condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to
pursue by all appropriate means (my emphasis) and without delay a policy of
eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake:
(e) To take all appropriate measures (my emphasis) to eliminate discrimination
against women by any person, organization or enterprise;
(f) To take all appropriate measures, (my emphasis) including legislation, to modify
or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women.  112
Mikell op cit 21.109
Created by section 184 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, section 163 of the Constitution110
of the Kingdom of Swaziland and section 216 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992.
Created by section 187 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.111
Article 2.112
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The phrase “all appropriate means or measures” requires a much broader undertaking
from States Parties than a mere enactment of law when eliminating discriminatory
practices. It is therefore submitted that anything that will eliminate discrimination must
be done to improve the rights of women. Finally, “in the long term, creative ways must
be found of reconciling the practical needs of a modern legal system, the cultural
heritage of the society it serves and the observance of internationally recognised human
rights norms”.  It is only then that we will achieve societies in which the rights of113
everyone (including women) are adequately respected and protected as intended. 
6.10 Summary of the chapter
In this chapter, the researcher assesses the effectiveness of the laws enacted in South
Africa, Ghana and Swaziland to improve the intestate succession rights of women in
general. The researcher argues that the enacted laws have firstly changed the traditional
concept of the family which does not accurately reflect living customary law. Secondly,
the laws fail to take cognisance of the fact that the customary laws pertaining to intestate
succession may vary from tribal community to tribal community. Thirdly, African
customary law is a community based system of law where rights are exercised through
or shared by the community at large. Constitutions however focus on individual rights –
a concept foreign to African customary law. Fourthly, the legislatures, when transforming
the customary laws of intestate succession have habitually replaced customary law with
the common law. That is problematic as common law does not precisely reflect the true
nature of the living customary law or its practices. Fifthly, the laws are inadequate
because people are generally ignorant of the new laws affecting the customary law of
intestate succession due to illiteracy, inaccessibility to legal resources or a failure by
community leaders to communicate new developments to them. 
In conclusion, the researcher brings the thesis to a meaningful end by making a few
recommendations on how to improve the succession rights of women. In this regard,
attention is given to the role of international law and its ability to empower African
Grant E “Human rights, cultural diversity and customary law in South Africa” (2006) Journal of African113
Law 22.
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women, the concept of “participatory democracy”, giving effect to the enacted laws by
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